


INVENTING LEBANON

Nationalism and the State under the Mandate

Kais Firro

I.B.TAURIS

INVENTING LEBANON



Modern Lebanon

Inventing Lebanon

Nationalism and State under the Mandate

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To my wife, Basma

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

English transliteration of Arabic terms follows the *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. With only a few exceptions (e.g., Michel Chiha, Jacques Tabet and Emile Eddé) names have been given according to their Arabic form in order to ensure uniformity.

PREFACE

The colonialist eye that drew the borders of the new Arab states in the Middle East following the first world war had little regard for the socio-economic and cultural realities pre-existing on the ground. At the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference, after some bickering between the two, Britain obtained a "mandate" for Iraq and Palestine, while France came away with Syria and Lebanon. Ostensibly, these mandates were intended to lead the new states toward independence, but, as Barbara Smith has put it, they were in fact "little more than a thinly disguised title deed, enabling the overseer to promote political, strategic, and economic metropolitan interests."[1]

British Mandatory Iraq was a composite of three former Ottoman provinces—Baghdad and Basra with Musul added later as a significant strategic asset —which demographically brought together three disparate groups: Shi'is and Sunnis, forming an Arab majority, and a minority of non-Arab Kurds.[2] In Palestine British policy followed the opposite course. First, "east" Palestine was turned into Transjordan and "given" to Amīr 'Abdalla, the recalcitrant youngest son of Sharīf Ḥusayn of the Hijaz. In "west" Palestine, the British Mandate authorities facilitated and encouraged the activities of the Jewish nationalist movement, Zionism, whose first settlers had arrived in Palestine from eastern Europe in the 1880s.[3]

Historically, Palestine and Transjordan were part of Bilād al-Shām, that geographical area of the Ottoman empire whose cultural and economic features encompassed also Syria and Mt. Lebanon, with Damascus at the center. In March 1920, anticipating independence but no doubt also apprehensive of things to come, Syrian nationalists held a political congress that called for the creation of an independent Arab state in "Greater Syria," i.e., a united Syria and Lebanon. Within a few days, encouraged by the presence of the French army, leading figures of Lebanon's Maronite community held a counter meeting in B'abda clamoring for the independence instead of "Greater Lebanon." Staking out a claim for the converging interests of the new state and France, they even designed the flag they envisioned as symbolizing this new entity, a large green cedar superimposed upon the French tricolor. This was a bold gesture as the Lebanese cedar grows only within the limited range of the Lebanon's high mountains: in large areas of modern Lebanon, such as 'Akkār in the north, Biqā' in the east, Jabal 'Amil in the south and, of course, along the coast, many people went through life without ever seeing a cedar tree. Extending, as it were, the

shadow of the Lebanese cedar in this way was indicative of a line of political thinking which sought to carry its own nationalist aspirations into the surrounding areas of Mt. Lebanon that were to be incorporated into "Greater Lebanon." When, twenty-three years later, newly independent Lebanon unfurled its national flag, the French tricolor had been done away with but the cedar had been retained, now set against a white background sporting two horizontal red bands. It is the trajectory of Lebanon's cedar against this shifting background that I have wanted to trace in the following pages. In a wider sense, this has meant trying to come to grips with the question of "Lebanese" nationalism, i.e., what is the variant form of nationalism that has gone into the making of Lebanon as a nation, if not "one" nation.

Recent theoretical approaches to nationalism put "a growing emphasis on the socially created quality of all collective identities" whereby the nation is seen as a "cultural construct, forged and engineered by various elites to meet certain needs or cater to specific interests."[4] That there is a strong element of "invention" in all this has been brought out by, among others, Eric Hobsbawm, who speaks of "that comparatively recent historical innovation, the 'nation,' with its associated phenomena: nationalism, the nation-state, national symbols, histories and the rest. All these rest on exercises in social engineering which are often deliberate and always innovative."[5] Hobsbawm illustrates this in a for our purposes useful parallel:

> Israeli and Palestinian nationalism or nations must be novel, whatever the historical continuities of Jews or Middle Eastern Muslims, since the very concept of territorial states of the currently standard type in their region was barely thought of a century ago, and hardly became a serious prospect before the end of World War I.[6]

Anderson encapsulates much of the above in the first of the three paradoxes that often, as he puts it, have "perplexed, if not irritated," theorists, i.e.: "(1) The objective modernity of nations to the historian's eye vs. their subjective antiquity in the eyes of nationalists."[7]

While today there is perhaps less reason to complain, as the editors of a 1997 collection did, that "scholarship on modern Arab history has not taken full advantage of the insights offered in [this] recent theoretical work,"[8] I am well aware that what I am presenting here is far different from what it would have been had I written this book fifteen or even ten years ago when I first began thinking about it. This is especially true of the first two chapters, which form Part One. Here I trace the formation of the competing nationalist discourses we find emerging in mandatory Lebanon — Lebanism, Arabism and Syrianism — and analyze the relationship between the various elements that make up their discursive fields. In Chapter one I outline the various primordialist and instrumentalist positions that guided Lebanon's politicians and writers "of the first hour." Chapter two continues this effort to unravel the controversies that constitute the all-consuming debate at the heart of modern Lebanon's history.

Analyzing the views of a later generation, especially of those who lived through the civil war, I show how significant the "first hour" debate remained for the way many of Lebanon's intellectuals approached questions of nationalism and state in the 1970s and 1980s.

Part Two forms the remainder of the book and contains a more straightforward attempt at historical analysis, in particular of the different stages in which the various elites that were thrown together in French-ruled "Greater Lebanon" forged or engineered the cultural construct that became the Lebanese nation. In the last two chapters I have tried to point up how "independence" and the 1943 election created the "fault line" that has been responsible for much of the upheavals that have plagued the country subsequently, not least the earthquake of the civil war that erupted in 1975. I will have succeeded if the reader finds he or she is able to make their own assessment of the "legacy" the colonial tradition has bequeathed to the polity and society of modern Lebanon.

This study could not have been completed without the help of a number of friends and institutions, and I am grateful to all of them. I am deeply indebted to my friend Nadim Shehadi, director of the Lebanese Centre, Oxford, with whom through the years I have had numerous long and valuable discussions on Lebanese historiography and who gave me free access to the Centre's library. I am grateful to Iyad Abu Shaqra, another very good friend, whose vast knowledge of Lebanese figures, past and present, proved vital in helping me paint the backdrop for many of the "actors" appearing in my story. I was fortunate to have Michael Johnson read my manuscript for the publisher, as his many well-considered comments helped me to further clarify my argument.

It is a special pleasure to acknowledge my gratitude to the staff of the Middle East Centre at St Antony's College, Oxford, where I was able to write a large part of my manuscript. Very helpful, too, as a glance at my sources will tell, have been the staff of the Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Nantes, and of the Public Record Office, London.

Finally, and by now almost as a matter of routine as this is the third book he has helped me edit, I am again deeply grateful to my good friend Dick Bruggeman for his unfailing good sense and support.

PART ONE

IN SEARCH OF A NATION

CHAPTER ONE

THE PRESENT IN THE PAST: FROM "MT. LEBANON" TO "GREATER LEBANON"

> Nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent though long-delayed political destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures: *that* is a reality.
>
> Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, pp. 48-49

In 1844, Maronite bishop Niqula Murad published a short treatise with the long title, *Notice historique sur la Nation Maronite et sur ses rapports avec la France, sur la Nation Druze et sur les diverses populations du Mont Liban*, in which he sets out how Maronite elites saw of the socio-economic and political future of Mount Lebanon. Striking is the emphasis right from the start on the close ties between the Maronites and France. Also, for Bishop Murad "Mont Liban" already stands for the *whole* of Mount Lebanon and includes Jabal al-Durūz, the southern part of the mountain and the traditional abode of the Druzes. In Iliya Harik's well-known description, Bishop Murad

> was the first Maronite leader to lay down the Modern Lebanese nationalist thesis: the political unity of the whole of Mount Lebanon under the Imarah (principality). In this argument he also extends his line of thought to the earlier times of the Maʿnis and claims that the history of Lebanon as a united polity dates back to their period. No mention is made of the religion of the Maʿnis or the [Druze] *iqtaʿ* leaders who ruled the country under them. However, when he treats of the Shihābi Imarah, Murad is more confident. With the Shihābis converted to the Maronite faith, together with the Abillamaʿ [Abu al-Lamʿ], he could claim that the Hakim (governor) of Mount Lebanon was always a Maronite under the Shihābis and that the country's ruling aristocracy was Maronite, too.[1]

The year before his death in 1862, Murad was able to witness how this geographical extension of Jabal Lubnān to encompass the whole of the mountain was given international recognition when the Ottomans, under pressure from the European powers, established the *mutaṣarrifiyya* of Mount Lebanon as a separate political and administrative entity.[2] As an autonomous Ottoman *sanjaq* (district) the *mutaṣarrifiyya* to a large extent enabled the Maronite economic and political elites to assert their predominance over the

other ethno-religious communities of the mountain. It also corresponded with the demands of those Maronites who wanted to see the districts of Jabbat Bsharrī, Batrūn, Jubayl, Kisrawān, Matn and Shūf as overwhelmingly Maronite-Christian, with minority populations of Druzes, Shi'is and Sunnis.

The Maronites originally inhabited that part of the northern mountain that was home to Lebanon's famous cedars. When the Sunni Mamluks, who ruled the region from the early twelfth century until the Ottoman conquest of 1516, expelled the Shi'is from Kisrawān between 1291 and 1305, Maronites began moving in. At the turn of the seventeenth century the Ottomans recognized Fakhr al-Dīn al-Ma'nī, chief of the Druze Ma'n family, as princely ruler (*amīr*) over the districts of al-Shūf, Kisrawān, Jabal Lubnān and parts of northern Palestine. Known as Jabal al-Durūz, al-Shūf now too became accessible to Maronite settlers, their numbers increasing especially under the Shihābī princes who succeeded the Ma'nīs in 1697. As Sunnis and originating from Ḥāṣbaiyā, the Shihābīs before long came to rely on the Maronites and other Christians to maintain their rule. To this came the growing economic penetration of Europe into the region which brought an improvement in the socioeconomic and political situation of the Maronites and other Christian communities and led to the rise of newly rich families in the highlands east of the port cities of Sidon, Beirut and Tripoli. This formed a direct challenge for the Druze *muqāta'jīs* (feudal notables) who had ruled the southern part of the mountain for centuries. When a number of Sunni Shihābīs — *amirs* of Jabal al-Durūz — and Abu al-Lam' *amīrs* — Druze *muqāta'jīs* of al-Matn — converted to Christianity, the Shihābīs were able to extend their hegemony over all of Mount Lebanon. For the Maronite Church, this meant that by the early nineteenth century it could play a vastly enhanced role in the political and economic life of the Maronites in general and those who had settled in Druze areas in particular. The impact this had on the way their political and religious elites — followed by Maronite historians and intellectuals — began to construct the history of "Jabal Lubnān" has been convincingly traced by Kamal Salibi and Iliya Harik.[3] Still, it remains difficult to discern the emergence after 1861 of an unrivaled "Lebanese identity"; what one finds, rather, is that in cultural and political terms most Maronites continue to think of themselves as Syrians (*shawām*, s. *shāmi*, i.e., belonging to Bilād al-Shām), or of course Arabs, and as Lebanese only in the more restricted territorial sense.[4]

Of the different explanations that have been offered for the transformation, in 1920, of Mount Lebanon into "*le Grand Liban*," the new territorial state of Greater Lebanon, most locate the origin of the idea of "Greater Lebanon" in the pre-first world war years. Not surprisingly, as it created a territorial entity whose economic resources made separation from Syria viable, the *mutaṣarrifiyya* is sometimes pictured as the realization, in part, of Maronite national aspirations. But, more generally, the turning point is placed in 1908, when the Young Turks seized the reins of power in the Ottoman empire. Lebanese Christians, especially the Maronites, were goaded by the centralization measures the new

government introduced and balked at its Turkification policies. The Maronite Church spoke out against the Ottoman parliament the Young Turks were convening in 1908, and the *mutaṣarrifiyya*'s administrative council, following suit, passed a resolution refusing to send representatives to the parliament which it saw as an infringement of Mount Lebanon's autonomy.[5]

When Muslims in Greater Syria also increasingly felt alienated by Istanbul's new policies, they too took up the nationalist ideas their Christian counterparts had been espousing for some time. That most Muslims called for some form of secular nationalism did not allay Christian fears that, as Salibi puts it, "the Arabs, in the name of Arab secularism, would impose their own Moslem dominance in Lebanon far more completely than the Turks."[6]

What the above suggests is that, when tracing the origins of the Greater Lebanon idea back to the pre-first world war period, we find Christian intellectuals leading the way. Albert Hourani was one of the first to highlight a volume called *La Question du Liban*, written by one M. Jouplain, the pseudonym of the Francophile Lebanese Bulus Nujaym, and published in Paris in 1908. For Nujaym the *mutaṣarrifiyya* was "no more than a stepping-stone towards real independence, which would some day be achieved with the help of Europe."[7] He wanted to see the *mutaṣarrifiyya* extended so that it included Beirut, the fertile plain of the Biqā', Bilād Bshāra, Marj'iyūn and al-Ḥūla in the south and 'Akkār in the north.[8] It appears that Nujaym was closely linked to major figures of the administrative council of the *mutaṣarrifiyya*; his arguments prefaced the demands the Lebanese delegations presented to the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference for an independent state of "Lebanon" whose "natural frontiers" would be similar to those of the *imāra* of Fakhr al-Dīn and the Shihābī *amīr*s.[9]

Nujaym may well have been familiar with the writings of Henri Lammens, a Flemish Jesuit priest living in Beirut where he taught at the University of Saint-Joseph. In 1902 Lammens published a series of articles, titled "Tasrīḥ al-Abṣār," in which he set out his views on Lebanon's geography, history, archaeology and population movements, arguing that the *mutaṣarrifiyya* of Lebanon was only one part of "Lebanon," which actually covered an area that extended from the Mediterranean in the west to al-'Aṣī (the Orontis) in the east, and from al-Nahr al-Kabīr in the north to al-Litānī in the south.[10]

Since it was this idea of Greater Lebanon in the end that was adopted by the French, historians have generally paid much attention to Christian "Lebanese" politicians and intellectuals active or writing in the years leading up to the French Mandate in 1920. Special focus is put on members of the "Lebanese" and "Syro-Lebanese" societies established by émigrés in France (Paris), Egypt, the United States, Brazil and other Latin-American countries, which are frequently seen as hothouses for "Lebanese nationalist" ambitions, as "despite their small membership, they had a significant influence on the crystallization of Lebanese Christian aspirations in national and secular terms."[11] As so often in the case of budding nationalist or revolutionary movements, the existence of

such émigré communities is explained by the repressive politics "back home." In the words of Rabbath:

> L'idée libanaise ne s'exprima toutefois, dans la vie politique, que durant la décade qui a précédé la guerre, non au Liban où les méthodes policières, alors en cours, eussent tôt fait de l'étouffer, mais en Egypte et en Amérique, par le truchement des diverses associations libanaises, précisément formées dans le but de propager les aspirations libanaises à une vie autonome.[12]

Naturally, among such disparate groups of émigré intellectuals and societies nationalist notions remained somewhat vague. We can discern two principal tendencies. The first Lebanese society that before 1919 was to call for the extension of Lebanon was most probably *Ḥizb al-Itiḥād al-Lubnānī* (Party of the Lebanese Unity) formed in Egypt by Lebanese emigrants in 1908, Yūsuf al-Sawdā, Iskander ʿAmmūn, August Adīb, Antūn al-Jumayl and others. According to al-Sawdā, within a year it demanded "a guarantee by the Powers for absolute independence of Lebanon within its natural frontiers."[13]

In August 1911 Naʿūm Mukarzil founded *Jamʿiyat al-Nahda al-Lubnāniyya* (Society of Lebanese Renaissance) in New York. Initially the society's goal was to guarantee the autonomy of Mount Lebanon and to ensure it had access to the Mediterranean. With other Lebanese Maronites and Christians groping to find a "national" framework acceptable to the Christians living in Mount Lebanon and the (then still) Ottoman provinces of Syria and Aleppo, Mukarzil participated in the 1913 Arab Congress in Paris which asked what political future the Arab East could have as a single area (see below). Only in 1919 did Mukarzil and his society, by now active among Lebanese émigrés throughout the United States, come around to the idea of "the restoration of Lebanon to its natural and historical frontiers in accordance with the map drawn up by the commander of the French [military] expedition to Syria in the years 1860-1861."[14] At the time the French had been unsuccessful in pushing through their project for a Greater Lebanon, but the map, whose borders coincide with those of the modern state of Lebanon, came in handy in 1919 to underpin the territorial demands of the Lebanese delegations in Versailles.[15] While he was in Paris, from March to October 1919, Mukarzil energetically promoted this idea of Greater Lebanon among French officials and clergy, with the Lebanese delegations, notably that of the the Maronite patriarch, Iliyās al-Ḥūwayik, likewise trying to persuade the French to accept the idea of "*le Grand Liban*," which, the patriarch reiterated, meant "la restitution au Liban de ses limites naturelles et historiques, telles qu'elles ont été tracées par l'état-major français dans la carte de 1860."[16]

By the time the patriarch's delegation arrived in Paris the official French position was as yet undecided on how to draw the borders of the territories France was demanding for its Mandate. The shift in favor of Greater Lebanon may have been gradual as a number of French interest groups had been lobbying the government on this point for some time already.[17] For example, in

1915 the French chambers of commerce had begun pressuring the government for the establishment of what they called *la Syrie française*, whose borders were to stretch from the Taurus in the north to the Sinai in the south. In January 1919, just when the Peace Conference was about to determine the territorial future of the Arab provinces of the now defunct Ottoman empire, a number of "experts" on the history, geography, archaeology and economy of Syria, and French merchants and missionaries who had a stake in the region came together at the Marseilles Chamber of Commerce to form the *Congrès français de la Syrie.* Taking part were also the two Lebanese intellectuals, Shukrī Ghānim and Dr. George Samné. With the future of Syria coming up for discussion at Versailles, the Marseilles Chamber of Commerce hurriedly published three volumes of papers which it presented to the Congrès. Not surprisingly, the general message of the congress was identical with the notion of *la Syrie française* that the Marseilles and Lyons chambers of commerce had been encouraging among French commercial circles and politicians since 1915.[18]

There were, however, also Lebanese Christians for whom the center of gravity lay more to the east, with Lebanon culturally and historically subsumed within "Greater Syria." Geographically more or less coterminous with Bilād al-Shām, Greater Syria was popular with the Protestant missionaries active in the region since the 1830s and with local intellectuals who were in touch with them, prominent among them Buṭrus al-Bustānī.[19] In his *La Syrie de demain*, which came out in 1916 in Paris, Nadra Moutran defines the relationship between Lebanon and Syria as follows: "Le Liban est une partie intégrante de la Syrie. Au point de vue historique, ethnographique et commercial, il ne saurait en être distingué."[20] Moutran's definition influenced many intellectuals of his period; actually it was little different from *la Syrie* as defined by Henri Lammens and many French scholars and politicians at the turn of the century.

One of the societies most active in adopting the idea of Greater Syria was the *Comité Central Syrien,* established in Paris during the first world war and headed by Shukrī Ghānim, who as a Maronite émigré also presided over the *Comité Libanais de Paris* established in 1912, which may explain why some historians see him as a Lebanese nationalist and others as a Syrian nationalist.[21] Ghānim's position was typical of the positions many other Lebanese Christians took up during the war years when the political future of the area was still uncertain. To begin with, many of them generally adopted the French stance on the territorial question and rejected Arab nationalist demands for a single Arab political entity to be established in the former Ottoman provinces under the Hashemite dynasty of Sharīf Ḥusayn of Mecca, who led the Arab Revolt that erupted in 1916 against the Ottomans. Like many Christian émigrés, Ghānim was of the opinion that: "Damascus is at least 1500 kilometers from Mecca. To annex Syria to Arabia would be to do violence to the very soil from which the rade and its history have sprung." Rabbath quotes this almost literally: "Damas, fit-il remarquer, est à 1500 km de la Mecque. L'annexion de la Syrie au Hedjaz

constituera un acte de violence à l'égard de son peuple."[22] This was also the view of *al-Lajna al-Lubnāniyya-al-Sūriyya fī Miṣr* (the Lebanese-Syrian Committee in Egypt), which consisted largely of Maronite and Greek-Orthodox émigrés and a small group of Sunnis led by Ḥaqqī (Bek) al-ʻAẓm. For them, the "Syrian question" was to be kept separate from the "Arab question." Greater Syria was to be prepared for independence under French guidance and "preserve the kind of autonomy provided to Lebanon" since 1861.[23]

The Lebanese intellectual émigrés in the two Americas who supported the idea of Greater Syria also rejected the "Arab" project of Amīr Fayṣal, son of Sharīf Ḥusayn, and even went so far as to suggest the United States ought to be the mandatory power to "prepare" Syrian independence. The most important of these émigré societies was *Rabiṭat Sūriā-Jabal Lubnān lil-Taḥrīr* (Syrian-Mount Lebanon Alliance for Liberation), which seems to have taken its inspiration from Ghānim's *Comité Central Syrien* in Paris. The importance of the Syrian Alliance derived from the fact that its members were all leading figures in Arab literature, such as Jubrān Khalīl Jubrān, Mikhā'īl Nuʻayma, Amīn al-Riḥānī, Iliyā Abu Māḍī, Nasīb ʻArīḍa and ʻAbd al-Masīḥ Ḥadād. At the time its president was Ayūb Thābit, who later was to give his support to the Greater Lebanon idea and to become president of the Lebanese republic. In February 1919, when the French still largely favored a single Syrian entity, eleven members of the Syrian Alliance submitted a petition to the French minister of Foreign Affairs, who was the secretary-general of the Peace Conference:

> We … utterly reject the claims presented to the Peace Conference by the delegate of the Hijaz [Amīr Fayṣal] … The Syrians are not Arabs and the Arabic language was imposed on seven million Christians who were the natives of the country, and as result of the fanatical domination of the Arabs and then the Turks, the number of those Christians — as recent estimates show — was reduced to less than one million … The Syrians, who belong to the civilized elements, are united … to solve the Syrian question on the basis of the federal unity of the whole of natural Syria under the protection … of one of the democratic Powers. The historic common goal, continuous cultural relations and a common economic interest, and most notably the effective military intervention in 1860 to save us from total extermination, all these make our inclination towards France natural.[24]

While the Syrian Alliance and most other émigré societies were mainly concerned with a Christian Syria, *al-Lajna al-Waṭaniyya al-Sūriyya-al-Lubnāniyya* (Syrian-Lebanese Committee) in Brazil saw Syria as a geographical-cultural and ethnic unity made up of the former Ottoman provinces Damascus, Aleppo, Beirut, and the two *sanjaq*s of Jerusalem and Mount Lebanon. The religious and communal divisions these included did not have to stand in the way of the unity of the Syrian nation: "Such division exists within all nations that have the same *ʻirq* (ethnic origin)."[25]

The Lebanese-Christian émigrés no doubt expressed the positions and perceptions of most of Lebanese-Christian intellectual and religious elites, but, as mentioned, these positions and perceptions varied according to the changing

circumstances of the years 1908-1920. Typically many of these intellectuals and elites shifted from Greater Lebanon to Greater Syria and *vice versa.* At the same time, even among those who saw Greater Syria as an historical and "ethnic" entity opinions differed. Some Christian intellectuals, such as Shukrī Ghānim and George Samné, were convinced by the end of 1919 that it "respond[ed] to the interests of the Christians of Syria and notably of Mount Lebanon and the adjacent regions of the coast and the Biqā'." For other Christian intellectuals Syria was the common homeland of all its inhabitants, Christians and Muslims alike. Others, again, believed that, even though they belonged to different religious communities, the Syrians had distinct national characteristics that set them apart from the "Arabs." These tendencies came up against "Syrian" Muslim intellectuals and elites, notably those of Beirut, who from 1913 increasingly encouraged a kind of "Arab-Syrian nationalism" demanding a share with the Ottomans in a decentralized administration of the Empire.[26]

For example, the activities of *Jam'iyyat Bayrūt al-islāḥiyya* (Beirut Reform Society), founded early in 1913, suggested that Christians and Muslims were then as yet overwhelmingly in favor of seeing the administration of their province reformed and not of secession from the empire. When the Ottomans, already in April of the same year, dissolved the society, Muslim and Christian intellectuals living and studying in Paris called for the creation of an Arab Congress there. Like the Beirut Reform Society, the Congress in Paris comprised Christians and Muslims most of whom wanted decentralization for all the Arab provinces of the Ottoman empire, but especially for those of Beirut, Damascus, and Aleppo, and the *sanjaq*s of Jerusalem and Mount Lebanon, which with them, too, meant that they saw Greater Syria as an Arab entity.[27]

Just as the Christian intellectuals who participated in the Arab Congress and supported Arab demands changed their position during the war years, and still more radically from the end of 1919,[28] so the Muslims, who in 1913 saw the Arab Congress as an intervention in Syria by foreigners, notably the French, against the "Muslim (i.e., Ottoman) Empire,"[29] gradually came around and began adopting the cause of Syrian independence under Arab rule. Not surprisingly, modern Lebanese historians dealing with the period 1908-1919 have felt the need to create some order among these various currents of intellectuals and political leaders and generally divide them into three distinct groups, Lebanese, Syrian and Arab, each with its own discrete tendencies.[30] Actually, of course, these "tendencies" were still very much in flux, at least until 1919, but in "the war over Lebanese history" are presented as "stable" from the outset in a way that until today reflects the debates on the making of Lebanon as a territorial and national state.[31] Which means that when, as they are wont to do, contemporary Lebanese historians ascribe "true" or "false" attitudes to intellectuals and politicians before 1919, what they point up is their own positionality, i.e., where they locate themselves within the confessional dispute that lies at the heart of Lebanese politics since 1920.

Either the establishment of Greater Lebanon by the French in 1920 is interpreted as correcting a historical injustice that had stripped Lebanon of its "limites historiques et naturelles," by "le retour à lui des territoires qui ont été arrachés par la Turquie," in the phrase of the Lebanese delegations to the Peace Conference.[32] Or, as it separated Lebanon from its Syrian or Arab "environment," Greater Lebanon is viewed as having obstructed the historical process that should have led to the creation of Greater Syria or a united Arab state in Syria or even in the entire Arab East.[33]

Maronite and other Christian historians will begin their accounts with Bulus Nujaym and the Lebanese societies that called for the revival of "ancient Lebanon," the unitary historians, generally Sunnis, Shi'is, Druzes but also Christians,[34] will point to the emergence of "Arab nationalism" in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, their focus being on the Arab and Arab-Syrian societies established between 1908-1911. The Beirut Reform Society and the Arab Congress of Paris of 1913 are seen as the continuation of these Arab-Syrian societies and the first tangible expressions of "Arab nationalism."[35]

Both groups of historians have the same approach to the question of ethnicity. For the former, it is important to prove that the idea of Greater Lebanon was accepted, in 1919-20, by some "Lebanese" Muslims, notably the Shi'is and Druzes, the latter highlight every single statement by Christian intellectuals and leaders of the period before 1920 in favor of "Arab unity" or "Syrian-Arab unity." Both approaches tend to believe that sectarian, religious and ethnic issues have no place within concepts of Greater Lebanon and Syrian-Arab unity respectively; they arise only when the distinction between religious and national community is blurred. For both, too, the "nation" to which they refer existed before 1920.[36]

But, of course, no "Arab-Syrian" nor "Lebanese national community" existed in the 1920s except in the minds of the small groups, outlined above, among whom nationalist notions had taken root. In other words, the three forms of nationalism which contemporary Lebanese historians see emerging during the French mandatory period out of the pre-1920 "nationalist tendencies," i.e., Lebanism, Syrianism and Arabism, are best analyzed as discursive systems whose formation should be located, *inter alia*, in the conflicting ways local sociocultural and ethnoreligious groups negotiated the imposition on the region of French foreign rule.

Lebanism

Between 1912 and 1920 four books saw the light of day which were all dedicated to *la Syrie*. Their authors were the Christian intellectuals Khairallah Khairallah, Nadra Moutran, George Samné and Jacques Tabet (Thābit), who all four delivered a similar message: the "new Syria" they envisaged was to secure, under European, preferably French, protection, the freedom of the Christian population.

Written before the outbreak of the first world war, Khairallah's book focused on Mount Lebanon, historic ties with the Phoenicians, and the principality of Mount Lebanon, which Khairallah saw as "Lebanese" rather than Druze. The history of the Muslims in Syria is almost entirely omitted, though the author preaches tolerance between the religious communities and wants to see all of them liberated from the Ottoman yoke. One concludes from the book that for Khairallah Mount Lebanon and its environs were the principal part of Syria, a geographical expression which suggests that he was in favor of Greater Lebanon.[37]

Nadra Moutran wrote his *La Syrie de demain* (Paris 1916) at the time when Greater Syria, known as *la Syrie française*, was gaining currency in French colonial circles, the French chambers of commerce, the missionary institutions in the Levant and among certain military and political officials. Moutran's book explicitly calls for *la Syrie française*, and although he mentions the differing political tendencies and the various religious communities in Syria, "Syrians" for Moutran are generally those who have the true interests of the population at heart and yearn for the creation of a new Syria following the victory of the French: "… les Syriens souhaitent-ils, avant tout, le triomphe des armes françaises, non seulement parce qu'elles combattent pour le motif le plus noble, pour la cause la plus juste, mais aussi parce que de la victoire française dépend l'avenir de leur pays."[38] Aware that the non-Christian population may not warm to this new Syria under French "protection" and realizing that the Christians of Lebanon may fear Muslim domination, Moutran counters that the Muslims, though they make up two-thirds of the population, are too divided among themselves to pose a threat:

> Oui, les musulmans constituent en Syrie les deux tiers de la population. Mais parmi eux il y a les Druzes, qui reçoivent de Londres leur mot d'ordre. Le jour où ils sauront que c'est avec l'approbation de l'Angleterre que la France débarque ses troupes en Syrie, ils seront pour la France … Il y a aussi les Chiites, qu'aucune cordialité n'unie aux Sunnites … Il y a de plus les Ansaries et les Ismailites.[39]

Significantly, Moutran adds that in the new Syria there is no cause for the Lebanese Christians to fear as the Muslims would never be able to have the upper hand: "[*le*] régime commun imposé à la Syrie ne donne à la majorité musulmane du pays une prépondérance … En cela leurs craintes seraient

partagées par tous les non-musulmans de la Syrie, sans excepter les Noucairies, les Druzes et les Chiites."[40] Moreover, the Lebanese Christians could rely on the French, who had proved their support from "Francis I to the present government."[41] Because of its ancient ties with France, *la Syrie française* would guarantee the economic dominance of the Christians, notably the Lebanese, even though the Christians formed only one-third of the population:

> … ils ont, sur une notoire partie de la population musulmane, une action réelle, effective: le commerce et une grande part de la propriété sont entre leurs mains. De plus, le Liban est chrétien et français. Or le Liban est la clef stratégique de la Syrie, d'autant plus que tous les ports syriens se trouvent dans sa zone.[42]

Those who want full independence for Syria, whether Christian or Muslim, Moutran depicts as idealists who lack all sense of political realism:

> Il y a sans doute parmi les Syriens un parti qui croit encore à la possibilité d'une Syrie indépendante. Il y en a même qui voudraient reconstituer l'Empire arabe … Néanmoins tous ces projets n'ont de partisans que des intellectuels, idéalistes qui n'ont aucune pratique des réalités politiques.[43]

Thus, Moutran's Syria is little different from that envisaged by French colonial circles and the chambers of the commerce between 1914 and 1919. George Samné's book, to which Shukrī Ghānim wrote the introduction, reflects the impact of the change in the French position after 1919 on the Lebanese intellectuals who supported the idea of Greater Syria. By the time the book was published in 1920, the French had decided to abandon the idea of *la Syrie française* following the agreement they had reached with the British on the final division between them of the former Ottoman provinces, which then became the mandated territories Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq. Although he still uses the term "Syria" as French colonial circles applied it before 1919, Ghānim now accepts that any new French policy may well bring a territorial division of the Mandate into several entities. Justification for this he finds in the historical religious division:

> La Syrie, étant donnés ses divisions religieuses actuelles et l'état d'esprit de ses populations, héritage de plusieurs siècles de tyrannie, ne peut qu'être formée en trois parties, ou en quatre si la Palestine ne doit pas en rester disjointe. Le Grand-Liban ou La Phénicie, la région de Damas, [et] celle d'Alep.[44]

In his introduction Ghānim never omits the term "*la Phénicie*" whenever he mentions "*le Grand Liban*." He also finds room to praise Charles Corm, the founder and director of *La Revue Phénicienne* around which he had gathered "a fine constellation of young writers."[45] In 1920 Ghānim's *le Grand-Liban ou la Phénicie* seemed more realistic than his *la Syrie française* or Greater Syria of the year before. For Ghānim, as long as France controlled the area the territorial issue would be resolved in the best interest of *le Grand Liban* which would then spill over into other parts of Syria:

> Le Grand-Liban ou la Phénicie qui devra comprendre presque tout le littoral a déjà une constitution embryonnaire qu'une commission instituée par le Haut Commissaire de France complète et améliore. D'autres commissions dans les autres parties de la Syrie s'en inspireront sans doute. Quoi qu'il en soit, la France est là pour guider, conseiller, équilibrer toutes choses.[46]

The chapter in Samné's book on the history of the Lebanon seems to have been written under the impact of the new territorial division of 1920; of the political project of *la Syrie française* only the geography remains. Unlike the first historians of Greater Lebanon — for example in his book *Fī Sabīl Lubnān,* Yūsuf al-Sawdā dedicates five chapters to the early history of Greater Lebanon — Samné is content to review "*les origines*" in a mere five pages, focusing on the multiracial "fusion" of Lebanon. The first period of "the origins" was one in which many "races" blended in Syria, among them "les Phéniciens, rameau de la grande émigration chamite, après avoir séjourné sur le golfe Persique, s'étaient fixés dans la vallée de Chanaan et sur les bords de la Méditerranée."[47] The second period was that of "the Arab conquest," and the Crusaders. With the third period, "from the 12th century to 1860," the history of Syria becomes the history of Mount Lebanon and the Maronites. The brief fourth period, "the events of 1840-1860," presents Samné's version of the civil wars which culminate in the creation of *le Liban autonome.* In his interpretation of the historical developments within the Ottoman Empire, he describes in great detail how Lebanon developed from 1861 onwards, blaming the violation by the Ottomans of *les règlements organiques* of Lebanon's autonomy and the resulting economic pressure for having caused "l'exode en foule des montagnards vers des pays plus prospères et plus hospitaliers."[48] He then inserts, without further comment, a map of Ottoman Greater Lebanon entitled "Carte du Liban et des pays qui lui ont été arrachés," It had been drawn by Shukrī Ghānim and Ḥabīb Mas'ud, who claimed they had based it on a map of "l'Etat-Major français en 1860."[49]

Like Ghānim, whose shift from Syrianism to Lebanism followed the turn in French policy, Samné too seems to have adapted his concepts in 1919 in accordance with the territorial division the French put through; yet he wants his new position to be seen as consistent with his former Syrianism and thus dots his text throughout with the terms "Syria" and "the Syrian nation." Consistent also is the way he refers to the three "tendencies" that divided the Lebanese émigrés before 1919. According to him, there may have been four or five individuals who "réclament à cor et à cri l'incorporation du Liban à un empire hedjazien." Then there was "une minorité," with whom he shared at least what he described as "la peur de voir leur Montagne régie par les Bédouins." The third tendency represented the majority of the émigrés for whom Lebanon was a "partie intégrante de la Syrie"[50] while they vehemently opposed the projects of the British to divide Syria between the "Bedouins du Hedjaz" in Damascus and the Zionists in Palestine.[51]

As Samné never completely abandoned "Greater Syria," he will have welcomed the French act which, in 1920, brought his Syrianism closer to the Lebanism of al-Sawdā and in line with the Lebanese delegations to the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919. Although he called his book *La Syrie,* he actually pays little attention to the Syrian territories of Damascus, Aleppo, and so on, but deals in depth and detail with the economy and administration of Greater Lebanon. The following passage, echoing Lammen's "Lebanon is for Syria what the Nile is for Egypt," represents Samné's new nationalist ideology in a nutshell:

> Aujourd'hui le Liban demande à la fois plus d'espace pour respirer, vivre, et se développer matériellement … Pour nous, la question était résolue dès les premiers jours. Un Grand Liban autonome sera pour la Syrie tout entière le gage de son développement intégral. Rien en effet n'est supérieur à l'example; déjà le nationalisme syrien est sorti du nationalisme libanais"[52]

This new Lebanon, far from being a primarily administrative unit, ought to be a vital political and economic entity as envisioned by Nujaym.[53]

The fourth book on Syria I want to briefly consider is the one published by Tabet in 1920, who more than anyone else identifies *la Syrie* with *la Phénicie*, i.e., Lebanon. Tabet began writing his book in 1916 when *la Syrie française* was still on the political agenda of French colonial circles and "Syro-Lebanese" intellectuals. Although he felt no need to adjust the title of his book, the territorial division of 1920 meant that "Syria" and "Syrian nation," took on a different meaning for him. According to Tabet, at the end of the Ottoman period there were three peoples, or "*nations*," in search of independence, the Phoenicians (i.e., Syrians), the Armenians and the Arabs:

> … il existe des nations asserviés, la Phénicie, l'Arménie, l'Arabie qui avaient longtemps joué un grand rôle dans l'histoire et qui ne pouvaient oublier leur passé … La question armenièn ne a longtemps occupé les chancelleries européennes et été traitée dans de nombreux ouvrages. La question syrienne, moins bien connue, a été confondue à tort avec la question Arabe.[54]

To settle the question of the difference between the Syrians (Phoenicians) and the Arabs, Tabet resorts to geography and history, and finds that Lebanon is the core of Syria: "Le Liban est le noyau autour duquel vient se greffer la question syrienne." The openness of the Lebanese and their ability to absorb new ideas are for Tabet testimony to their Phoenician origin: "Les libanais qui furent les premiers à recevoir la semence des idées libératrices semblaient comme les Phéniciens dont l'histoire fait des 'courtiers d'idées'."[55] Then Tabet summarizes the history of Mount Lebanon from 1860 to 1913 as a manifestation of Syrian (Phoenician) nationalist aspirations. In a brief comment on the Arab influence, he argues that although the Arab Empire unified the Yemen, Najd, Mesopotamia and Syria, it never succeeded in altering the "soul" of Syria or Phoenicia:

> La conquête arabe avait groupé, il est vrai, tous ces pays distinctes en un même califat; mais l'étiquette politique que la force impose aux nations, de même

> qu'elle ne peut changer la nature de leur sol et de leur climat, ne peut pas non plus changer leur âme et leur mentalité; elle tombe d'elle-même lorsque l'arme arabe est brisée. La Syrie, politiquement, ne peut pas être plus arabe qu'elle n'est ottomane. La Syrie est syrienne et phénicienne.[56]

Lebanese Christian émigrés in Egypt who support Arabism Tabet sees as collaborators with Egypt and Britain, whose position is contrary to that of France, the true protector of the Syrians. However, "nos compatriotes d'Egypte n'entâchent en rien la fidélité inébranlable de la majorité des syriens envers la France."[57] Marginalizing the Muslim role in the history of his "Syria," Tabet distinguishes two contrary political projects: that of the Muslims, who dream of an Arab revival, and that of the Christians, for whom government means economic prosperity:

> L'élément musulman rêve toujours de renaissance arabe, et l'élément chrétien n'aspire qu'à la force gouvernementale qui sera la plus profitable à l'essor économique et plus lucrative pour l'élément indigène … Les musulmans semblent pencher vers une dangereuse et vaine satisfaction d'amour-propre, et les chrétiens disposés à laisser sans regret les ennuis politiques à la nation tutélaire pour se consacrer tout entier aux projets matériels qu'elle leur aura préparés. Entre la xénophobie des musulmans et le mercantilisme des chrétiens, en cela bien digne des Phéniciens, il y a sans doute une moyenne plus conforme aux données politiques de la question, ainsi qu'à la raison et aux véritables intérêts du pays. Les musulmans doivent se rendre compte que l'union arabe est une impossibilité géographique autant que politique.[58]

As to the Phoenician origin of the Syrians, he argues that "L'histoire ne fait pas plus de sauts que la nature; tout y est lié par un enchâinement logique et régulier, aucune création n'y sort du néant."[59] After historically having placed Phoenicia at the heart of Syria, Tabet notes how it had brought civilization to many parts of the ancient world — and despite the marks left by occupation under diverse empires, the cultural legacy of Phoenicia had continued to play an important role in history, which "mérite en premier lieu la reconnaissance des Syriens."[60] How the Phoenicians had been able to preserve their legacy despite foreign domination he explains through the parallel history of Mount Lebanon: "Mais depuis la domination romaine, à travers toutes les vicissitudes politiques dont la Syrie a été le théâtre, il est une contrée privilégiée … qui a toujours joui d'une indépendance …, c'est le Liban."[61] Having located the geography of this "*indépendance*" in Lebanon he reaches the Maronites, who "continuèrent …à vivre de leur vie propre et réussirent pleinement à sauvegarder leur existence nationale."[62] While he considers the ancient Egyptians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs and Ottomans as forces of occupation and oppression, he portrays the Crusaders as liberators of the heartland of Syria, Lebanon: "L'époque des croisades apporta pour les peuples du Liban et pour les Maronites en particulier un surcrôit de privilèges et de libertés. Les croisés accueillis comme des libérateurs."[63]

In a chapter on ethnography, Tabet is keen to show how the Syrian "race" had been preserved. As he tells is, already before the Seleucids (312-64 BC) there was a Syrian race which had maintained its "*pureté ethnographique*."[64] Subsequent occupation by foreigners had had only a limited impact because these had controlled the country militarily and politically but had intermixed only slightly with the local population. As to the Arab conquest of Syria, while admitting that the gradual infiltration into the region by Arabs before the rise of the Islam has facilitated their conquest of Syria, Tabet avers that

> ce serait aussi une erreur de croire que la population locale a été complètement submergée par l'invasion. A part l'armée régulière des Califes, la conquête arabe apporta aussi des villes de l'Arabie ses clans de noblesse et ses commerçants; mais les nouveaux conquérants aussi bien que leurs prédécesseurs défendirent aux tribus pillardes du désert l'accès de territoires habités.[65]

At the same time, Tabet maximizes the impact on the "Syrian ethnography" of the Crusaders:

> Les Croisades semblent, à prime abord, avoir introduit en Syrie un élément étranger d'une certaine importance vu leur nombre et le temps qu'elles occupèrent (1096-1270) … [La] majorité retourna … vers l'Europe; une fort petite quantité s'éparpilla dans le pays, et surtout au Liban, où les Maronites leur donnèrent refuge.[66]

Distinguishing between "*race*" as the outcome of nature and "*nationalité*" as a product of *homo politicus*, Tabet concludes:

> La nationalité est une dénomination politique qui n'a aucun trait commun avec la race et que les conquérants imposent pour des raisons d'état aux peuples les plus variés. Tandis que la race est une oeuvre de la nature, le produit en espèce humaine d'un pays qu'on ne peut transplanter, sans qu'il perde son caractère propre et ses qualités distinctives … [En] Syrie … les divers éléments … par différentes conquêtes, ont perdu toutes les qualités originelles incompatibles avec le pays syrien, pour acquérir, pendant de nombreux siècles, toutes les qualités que l'air, le soleil, l'eau et les produits de la Syrie impriment à ses habitants.[67]

Because the language of the population of Syria is Arabic, Tabet has to play down the role of language as a constitutive element of nationalism. As he identifies Syria with Lebanon, or, more correctly, with the Lebanon of the Christians, he argues that Arabic will soon be facing competition from French:

> En réalité la langue arabe reste dans le pays la langue universelle. Elle se trouvera bientôt face à face avec une nouvelle langue: le français. Cette nouvelle langue, par sa richesse, sa beauté et son organisation, est bien autrement redoutable que la langue turque … [L]es Syriens ont d'abord parlé toutes les langues: le phénicien, l'égyptien, le chaldéen, l'hébreu et le grec et que l'arabe moderne est tellement différent de l'arabe préislamique … Ces continuelles transformations diminuent singulièrement …, la valeur nationale des langues sur le caractère du peuple.[68]

For Tabet, France entered Syria in order to "liberate" the Syrians. Accordingly, "Il n'y a dans cette matière ni conquérants ni conquis, ni vainqueurs ni vaincus."[69] Although he justifies the demands of the "Lebanese" for *le Grand Liban,* he wants to maintain the political unity of Syria under decentralization because of the economic benefits this would entail for the Christians of Syria in general and those of Lebanon in particular. They can "se répandre dans tous les milieux et de participer largement à la vie et à l'essor du pays."[70]

Even after 1920, especially in the Christian educational institutions that had been established in the nineteenth century under European patronage, and were now reinforced under the French Mandate, "Phoenicia" offered an escape from the Arabism that, often bearing overtly Muslim aspects, was gradually developing in the area. Inspired by the historical perceptions of two Maronite clergymen and chroniclers, Gabriel (Jubrā'īl) Ibn al-Qilā'ī (d. 1516) and Isṭifān Dūwayhī (d.1704), some bolstered this with the claim of Mardaite ancestry for the Maronites, not just to counter Arabism but to create a myth of Maronite resistance to the "Arab-Muslim invaders" of Lebanon in the seventeenth century. Al-Qilā'ī had described Maronite resistance to the Muslim invaders, while for al-Dūwayhī the Maronites were linked to the Mardaites, Armenians who had immigrated to Syria from Anatolia and had then been driven by Byzantine, not Muslim, persecution, into Mount Lebanon.[71]

The debate on these issues may well have been launched in 1902 when, besides the Maronites and Mardaites, Henri Lammens brought in a third group early Muslim chroniclers had called *al-Jarājima*, who had fought against the Arab-Muslims in the seventh century. The most prominent debaters at the time had been Yūsuf Dibs and Joseph Diriān, who were both keen on tracing the early history of the Maronites.[72] Although it never put an end to the other versions of that early history, the historical debate enabled many later historians and intellectuals to use the triple combination of Maronites, Mardaites, and *al-Jarājima* as additional historical justification for their Maronite-Lebanese nationalist discourse. Like Phoenicia, the Mardaites and *al-Jarājima* served to disclaim any link with Arabism. Aware that these historical perceptions more or less cancel each other out, from 1917 onwards scholars suggested a compromise which argues that the Mardaites or *al-Jarājima* had taken refuge in Mount Lebanon and so had become absorbed within the Maronite descendants of the Phoenicians. For example, Yūsuf al-Sawdā, whose books were popular among the Lebanese Maronites, at one point writes: "Whatever the origin of the Mardaites … their historical record is related to the historical record of Lebanon … in the same manner as … the Phoenicians."[73]

For our purpose, what is most striking about the above accounts is, of course, how they use "ancient materials to construct invented traditions of a novel type for quite novel purposes" and highlight, again, how relevant such "invented traditions" are "to that comparatively recent historical innovation, the 'nation,' with its associated phenomena: nationalism, the nation-state, national symbols, histories and the rest."[74] As Hobsbawm elaborates:

> All these rest on exercises in social engineering which are often deliberate and always innovative, if only because historical novelty implies innovation. Israeli and Palestinian nationalism or nations [for example] must be novel, whatever the historic continuities of Jews or Middle Eastern Muslims, *since the very concept of territorial states of the currently standard type in their region were barely thought of a century ago*, and hardly became a serious prospect before the end of World War I.[75]

While the Lebanist discourse speaks of the historical continuity of a "Lebanese nation" since the times of "Phoenicia" and of a "cultural legacy" untouched by Semitic influence, in the counter narratives of Arabism and Syrianism we will, of course, be able to recognize the same "curious, but understandable, paradox":

> modern nations and all their impedimenta generally claim to be the opposite of novel, namely rooted in the remotest antiquity, and the opposite of constructed, namely human communities so "natural" as to require no definition other than self-assertion.[76]

Michel Chiha

If, with the blessing of the French mandatory authorities, the Maronites were able to underpin their Lebanism with the kind of mythmaking briefly outlined above, the fact remains that not all Christian or even Maronite intellectuals were won over, especially as Christians had been overwhelmingly involved, since the late nineteenth century, in the formation of secular Arabism and Syrianism. It was the French, in their efforts to prop up their Greater Lebanon scheme of 1920, who suppressed the emergence of secular Arabism and Syrianism among Lebanese Christian intellectuals, who, as long as they situated themselves within either discourse, found themselves ousted from the established Lebanese political strata. In the end the Lebanism that was gradually adopted by most Maronites and, to some extent, the other Christian strata of the new territorial state was the kind represented by such political activists as Yūsuf al-Sawdā.

Neither "Greater Lebanon" nor Lebanism in their pre-1920 form was accepted by the Sunni, Shi'i, and Druze intellectuals and notables who together represented the Muslim population of French Mandatory Greater Lebanon. Between 1908 and 1918, some continued to support the "Muslim empire" against the economic and political designs of the Western allies, others had placed their hopes in the Sharifians of Mecca to achieve at least part of their "nationalist" goals with the creation of an independent Arab state in the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman empire. Inevitably, the rapidly changing events of 1919-1920 forced also these Sunni, Shi'i and Druze intellectuals and leaders within "Greater Lebanon" to rethink their ideological and political positions.

Some scholars have argued that Lebanon was confronted by the same problems as the other territorial states of the Middle East that had been created by the Versailles Peace Conference, such as Syria, Jordan and Iraq, except that Lebanon's conflictual multi-communal structure of Lebanon made the process of nation-building much more complex.

The ethnic rifts that arise when different etho-religious communities exist within the same linguistic group have always placed obstacles in the way of nation-building, a circumstance which still obtains in the Middle East. It is not difficult to pinpoint the ethnopolitics of the modern Arab states, despite the ideological veneer that covers it. This, too, is part of the legacy of the colonial period as nationalist movements needed to forge an ideological consensus that could help them bind the various ethnic groups together. Generally, pan-Arabism, either secular or blended with Islamism, pan-Islamism, or Islamism blended with Arabism together with local patriotism, were enlisted in the struggle against the colonial regimes. Hardened into state ideologies in the post-colonial period, these discourses serve the established elites in the various states until today to control power relations and to suppress all forms of opposition, particularly when the latter assume an ethnic nature.

Because Lebanism as a political discourse was enacted by Maronite intellectuals who for the purpose "annexed" the history and, to some extent, the culture of other areas to Mount Lebanon, their Muslim peers were quick to denounce the establishment of Greater Lebanon as a French act serving "Maronite interests."[77] Sharp opposition came even from those Muslim leaders who had accepted the territorial *faits accomplis* of 1920. In an effort to attenuate this opposition and to encourage Muslims to cooperate with the new state, Christian-Lebanese leaders set out to modify Lebanism and somehow adapt it to Lebanon's multi-communal character. They began to search for common denominators among the diverse communities that could be incorporated in Lebanism, without renouncing its basic concepts, such as the "historical continuity" of Lebanon.

The main motivating force behind this search was undoubtedly Michel Chiha, whose personality, writings and political activities evinced the combined qualities needed to see the process through if it were to be successful. First, he belonged to Lebanon's tiny Chaldean community. Through business and family ties with the Far'ūn family and with Bshara al-Khuri, a leading politician of the Maronite elite who was to become independent Lebanon's first president in 1943,[78] Chiha's own example demonstrated the possibility of integration between the Maronites and other communities in a "mercantile society." As a scion of a merchant family and a successful banker he maintained ramified relations with Muslims as well as Christians in Beirut and other cities throughout Lebanon. Thus he realized early on how important economic ties could be as an instrument for modifying people's attitudes and behavior. Moreover, because of the good relations he had cultivated with the French

authorities Chiha was able actively to intervene in French decision-making during the first years of the Mandate. In 1926, during the critical time of the Syrian revolt (1925–1927), when Maronite leaders and intellectuals feared the French might be amenable to a territorial revision in favor of the Muslims, Chiha was the most dominant member of the committee the French had charged with drafting the new Lebanese constitution.[79]

The political upheavals of 1925–1926 had a great impact on the French as well as the Christian supporters of Greater Lebanon. At that time the Sunni opposition leaders in the coastal cities were mobilizing supporters in large sections of the Sunni community and stirring up discontent among the Shi'is and Druzes. This murmuring, combined with the revolt in Syria, compelled the French to consider two options. One was to try to silence the "separatist" movement, the other, on the contrary, to seek a formula that would satisfy the demands of the "separatists" or the "irredentists," whereby some French officials even proposed detaching certain areas from Lebanon, such as 'Akkār, Biqā', and notably Tripoli.[80] To safeguard the fundamental character of their Lebanism, some of the current supporters of Grearter Lebanon — possibly including even, secretly, Émile Eddé (see below) — were ready to give up all or part of these areas to Syria. However, spurred by the Maronite Patriarch, the majority of the Christian leaders opposed any territorial concession to "Syrian unity" at the expense of Greater Lebanon.[81] Yūsuf al-Sawdā, as one of the "founding fathers" of Lebanism, formed a lobby with other Maronite leaders, in February 1926, in defense of the "territorial unity" of Greater Lebanon. Meanwhile Michel Chiha, since 1925 delegate of the minorities (small Christian communities) in the Representative Council (the Parliament)[82] succeeded in mobilizing seven of his Maronite and Greek-Catholic fellow members of parliament to approach the French High Commissioner and speak out against any territorial concessions.[83] Both parties — those who were ready to cede certain territories of Greater Lebanon and those who wanted none of that — stressed their loyalty to Lebanism, wanting to see the national ambitions of the Maronites and other Christians guaranteed and demanding that any form of Arab-Syrian nationalism that threatened to eclipse Lebanism be sidelined.

That the Mandatory authorities were quick to accede to the request by the Maronite and Christian leaders and intellectuals to maintain the integrity of Lebanese territory despite the pressures the Syrian Revolt put on them, is clear from the way they responded to the demands of the Representative Council's members, represented by Yūsuf al-Khāzin, that France fulfill its obligation to implement "dans le plus brief delai [le] Statut organique" for Lebanon, as stipulated in the Declaration of the Mandate issued by the Council of the League of Nations on 24 July 1922. A committee to start preparing the constitution had been established by the end of 1925. Chaired by Musā Nammūr (Maronite), its members were 'Umar Dā'ūq (Sunni), 'Abbūd 'Abd al-Razzāq (Sunni), Fū'ād Arslān (Druze), Ṣubḥī Ḥaydar (Shi'i), Yūsuf al-Zayn (Shi'i), Petro Ṭrād (Greek Orthodox), Yūsuf Sālim (Greek Catholic), Rūkuz

Abu Nādir (Maronite), Shibl Dammūs (Greek Orthodox), George Thābit (Protestant) and Michel Chiha. On 19 May 1926 they presented a draft constitution to the Representative Council, and within four days, on 23 May, i.e., without giving members sufficient time to discuss the draft, the High Commissioner approved it as final.[84]

In the 1970s the newspaper *al-Nahār* interviewed people who had been privy to the work of the Constitution Committee which revealed that it was almost certainly Michel Chiha who had formulated the draft in French and in the spirit of the French constitution of 1875.[85] Others suggested that Chiha had been influenced by the Egyptian constitution of 1923 or even by that of Belgium of 1831.[86] In the memoirs he published in 1960, Bshara al-Khuri acknowledged that his brother-in-law had played an active role in writing the constitution; he had been himself one of the people Chiha had consulted.[87] At a time when the majority of the Sunni elite were boycotting the new state and the French and some Christians were contemplating a territorial revision, Chiha seemed to have regarded the creation of the constitution as a supreme challenge. As a supporter of Greater Lebanon, an admirer of French culture and democracy, and keenly aware of the problems inherent in the multi-communal structure of the new state, Chiha evidently sought the ideological equilibrium for his constitution that could make Lebanism more acceptable to the Muslims, amalgamate western and eastern values, and assimilate the different outlooks held by the elites of Lebanon's various confessions.

There are conflicting accounts among those who followed the debate on confessional representation as to the positions maintained by Chiha. On the one hand it seems that Chiha rejected confessional representation:

> Quand la délibération êut abordé la question du confessionalisme, les avis furent opposés … Au cours de l'une des réunions, une violente altercation éclata entre Moussa Nammour [Musā Nammūr] et Soubhi Haidar [Ṣubḥī Ḥaydar], d'une part, et Michel Chiha, d'autre part; Nammour et Haidar insistaient pour qu'une disposition fut rédigée, portant sur le maintien du confessionalisme …, alors que Michel Chiha s'y opposait.[88]

On the other, the outcome of the committee's work suggests that, as a means of reducing communal dissatisfaction and enhancing "*la garantie de l'avenir*," Chiha did see confessional representation,[89] or, as contemporary Lebanese authors prefer to call it, "corporate federalism" as a solution.[90]

By ensuring proportional representation of Lebanon's different ethnic communities and the equality of all Lebanese before the law, the constitution was designed to create a basis for power sharing as part of the process of nation-building. With this balance in place, Chiha no doubt believed that the Lebanism the Christian intellectuals had articulated during and after the first world war could unite the various discrete communal loyalties into one single national loyalty. Thus, while articles 1-4 defined the territorial state and article 5 adopted a national flag symbolizing the image of Lebanon in the eyes of the

Maronite intellectuals and elites,[91] the constitution also contained concepts intended to adapt the Lebanism of al-Sawdā, Charles Corm and others to the multi-communal structure of a Lebanon where the majority of Sunni, Shi'i and Druze intellectuals and elites supported Arabism. Chiha's search for a Lebanism that would be acceptable to all Lebanese citizens can be traced through the many articles he published in the journal *Le Réveil,* since1920, and in his daily paper, *Le jour,* since 1936.

His book *Liban d'aujourd'hui* (1942) is a synthesis of these ideas. As such it reflects the formation of the Lebanist discourse in which Christian intellectuals and leaders sought to ground the building of their Lebanese nation. Right from the start, Chiha relates the new Lebanon to Phoenicia: "Le Liban d'aujourd'hui, vieux de cinq mille ans et davantage, ne s'étonne plus lorsqu'on dit de lui qu'il est jeune … Par là il justifie son autre nom de Phénicie …"[92] He adds that: "Pour ce qui est de notre territoire, le Liban d'aujourd'hui s'identifie à peu près avec le Liban-Phénicie métropolitaine du passé,"[93] though he realizes that the Phoenicia of "yesterday" stretched all the way from Mount Carmel in the south to the isle of Arwad and Tartus in the north. While he is willing to let go of the Galilee or the 'Alawi Mountain, Mount Lebanon and Biqā', he asserts, had always been an integral part of the Phoenician coast.[94]

Chiha then sets out to refute the "Arabism" of Lebanon along the same lines as Tabit, Samné, al-Sawdā and others. Unlike them, however, Chiha does not restrict the racial origin and Phoenicianism to the Christian population of Lebanon. Answering the question: "Les hommes vivants qui constituent le peuple libanais d'aujourd'hui, qui sont-ils?,[95] Chiha follows Western scholars, such as Lammens, and claims that the origin of the Lebanese population should be sought in the blending of races in the course of centuries before the emergence of Phoenicia. But only with Phoenicia did "l'ethnographie" of Lebanon become "mieux connue et claire" and distinctive, "non seulement du point de vue des frontières mais de celui des méthodes politiques." As this went accompanied by economic prosperity, it strengthened the "national" characteristics of the Phoenicians, before they succumbed to the successive invasions of Egyptians, Assyrians, Persians, Greek-Macedonians, Romans and Muslims.[96]

After a cursory description of the pre-Islamic invasion, Chiha portrays the Arab conquest in much the same manner as the Christian intellectuals who first formulated Lebanism versus Arabism, but he introduces a new element when he adds that Islam replaced the "national" nature of Phoenicia with confessionalism, implying that it is this part of Muslim legacy that forms the main obstacle to the "rebuilding of the nation": "Par la force des choses, avec l'islam naissant, l'étiquette principale des individus qui, sous la domination de Byzance, était nationale … devient confessionnelle."[97] As he then tells us, from both the ancient coast of Phoenicia and the Mountain "les populations seront plus d'une fois acculées à la révolte [against the Muslims], malmenées, dispersées" until the advent of the Crusaders, many of whom never returned to Europe but through intermarriage became part of the Lebanese people.[98] During the Muslim

periods, persecuted minorities found refuge in the Lebanese mountain ranges, among them the Isma'ilis, 'Alawis, Druzes, and Shi'is. Meanwhile, the coastal cities were assimilating populations of Mamluks, Saljuqs, Mongols and others who ruled or invaded the area. During the Ottoman period, the waves of migration into Lebanon abated and the Lebanese people were able to establish their own political entity in the form of Ma'nī and Shihābī principalities.[99]

This way of re-presenting Lebanon's history enables Chiha to refute the claim of Semitic ancestry for the modern Lebanese. The Lebanese are the descendants not only of the Phoenicians but also of many other "races" that throughout the centuries merged in "Lebanon"; neither the Semitic race nor Semitic culture ever predominated in the melting process. After eliminating any one particular descent in which Arabists could ground Arabism, Chiha assumes that his task of putting Lebanism before Arabism has been achieved: "Dira-t-on après celà que le Liban d'aujourd'hui est sémitique? Dira-t-on qu'il est arabe? Chacun en jugera."

Aware of the geographical and ethnographic ties that historically have always closely linked Lebanon to Syria, Chiha next embarks on undercutting the Arabism of Syria. For this he resorts to Lammens' notions of Syria: "Le Père Lammens auquel on accorde, je suppose, quelque crédit, contestait que la Syrie elle-même fût arabe. Pour lui elle a un caractère original, elle est syrienne". But he quickly realizes that if Lammens' notion of the "caractère original" of Syria also applies to Lebanon, this would deprive his Lebanism of its own uniqueness. Thus history and ethnography become secondary components when Chiha seeks to establish the uniqueness of his Lebanism, brought out only when they help to reinforce his denial of the Arab connection but marginalized when they are liable to obfuscate the difference between Lebanism and Syrianism. In a passage in which he shows himself as adept, if not more, at discursive formation as Lammens, he writes:

> Nous dirons pour notre part avec des arguments plus décisifs encore, que la population du Liban est libanaise, tout simplement et que réserve faite de naturalisations très récentes, elle n'est pas plus phénicienne qu'égyptienne, égéenne, assyrienne ou médique, grecque, romaine, byzantine, arabe, avec ou sans consanguité, ou européenne par les alliances, ou turque par exemple. Tout au plus dirons-nous qu'elle est une varíeté méditerranéenne probablement la moins déchiffrable. Elle a son visage à elle et nul autre. Et l'on ne pourra pas expliquer le Liban d'aujourd'hui sans la prendre exactement pour ce qu'elle est.[100]

On the one hand, Chiha here seems to abandon the Phoenicianism and historical arguments on which the Lebanism of the 1908-1920 rested; on the other, by stressing the diverse racial origins of "Lebanese nation," he envisions that the new Lebanese, steeped as they are in the Mediterranean culture, will revive the characteristics of the Phoenicians, who also were a mixture of races and who equally fostered their national identity through their Mediterraneanism.

Finally, Chiha also finds his way round the fact that Arabic is the language of the Lebanese: although Arabic "*est une langue magnifique,*" it alone cannot be the national language of a nation that strives for the wider horizons of economic and cultural prosperity. The new Lebanese, like the Phoenicians, should be polyglot: "Le Liban-Phénicie ne pouvait être que polyglotte."[101]
Chiha called his book *Liban d'aujourd'hui,* but, as in his other articles and lectures, he in effect ignores the present when he invents a past whose main elements will be reconstituted only at some point in the future. This past and future are both determined by the geography of a land at a crossroads which, as it allowed Phoenicia, will allow Greater Lebanon to be cosmopolitan in culture and economy. One almost senses that by postulating this cosmopolitanism Chiha is stretching his Lebanism to the breaking point, though for him it seems to have been no more than one more ideological construct to eliminate the "threat" of any form of Arabism becoming the national ideology of modern Lebanon. Alluding to this threat in ambiguous language,[102] he demands "une compréhension suffisante de sa position géographique [of Lebanon] …; et, ensuite, de la nature des groupements divers dont l'association constitue le peuple libanais."[103]

Just as his Phoenicia through its geography succeeded in forging a cosmopolitan nation from various populations it came to contain, the same applies, under certain conditions, to the new nation. This focus on Lebanon's geography has led some scholars to consider Chiha a geographical determinist.[104] But here we should recall that Chiha was a merchant-banker, who saw laissez-faire as the economic essence of cosmopolitan Lebanon, and an intellectual, who envisaged western culture, values and political systems as the means whereby the disparate communities that through the ages had found refuge in Lebanon could be blended into a single nation. Geography, with this cosmopolitan aspect, determined the future only if the "Lebanese people" successfully handled the "inconveniences" that still posed a threat:

> Nous ne nierons pas que la route sur laquelle nous nous trouvons et que le bastion-refuge qui la domine ont pour nous des avantages qui peuvent aller croissant du point de vue intellectuel et du point de vue économique. Mais il est manifeste que cette situation a des inconvénients graves, qu'elle comporte pour nous une menace constante sur le plan social et sur le plan politique.[105]

The main "inconvenience" that stood in the way of Lebanism was the traditional particularism of the minority groups. As within the unity of the "nation," Chiha's Lebanism leaves room for the communities as different entities, his approach is "syncretistic," and aims, as Theodor Hanfs states, "neither for unity nor for diversity at any cost, but for unity in diversity."[106] This unity in diversity can be obtained by adopting a political pluralism, particularly parliamentarianism, as the arena for debate among the representatives of the "syncretistic" (ethnic) groups or the associated confessional minorities. While Chiha calls for a Lebanism that can unite all Lebanon's

populations, he acknowledges that "*la diversité est notre destin.*"[107] Because it is a "pays de minorités confessionelles associées, le Liban ne saurait tenir longtemps, politiquement, sans une assemblée qui soit le lieu de rencontre et d'union des communautés, en vue du contrôle commun de la vie politique de la nation."[108] Narrowing the gap between the social classes, and solving the problem of external "*convoitise*" and the internal "*irrédentisme*,[109] is brought about by the adoption of an economic and political system based on western legal models. The most suitable model for Lebanon are the Swiss, because of the great similarity between Lebanon and Switzerland not just in the mountainous geography they share, but more significantly in the diversity of their multicommunal populations.[110]

Where Chiha's Lebanism differs from that of the founders is that it offers a blueprint for building a *nation* within the territorial state that is Lebanon, while theirs, first and foremost, was meant to create "Lebanon" and justify it as a territorial state. Although both reject Arabism, Chiha's Lebanism, in the way it takes in the multicommunal entities, suggests a formula by which the Maronite elite could try to persuade the elites and intellectuals of the different communities not only to recognize the Lebanon they had created but also to be involved in power sharing. While the Lebanism of the founders hardly went beyond serving as a justification of the "national aspiration" of the "Lebanese," Chiha's Lebanism tackles both sides of the coin — political power sharing and ideological justification for Greater Lebanon. From 1926 this became the political discourse of the ruling elite to regulate Lebanon's "diversity."

Arabism

In actual fact, as formulated by Christian or, more narrowly Maronite intellectuals, Lebanism remained limited to and accepted by communal segments only, even within the Christian communities. That it was only partially successful in raising the national consciousness of Lebanese Christian intellectuals means that we can expect a number of other controversial interpretations of the group identity that the Lebanist discourse set out to construct and of the power relations it wanted to entrench. There are those who reject its historical, geographical and ethnographic tenets and consider the Lebanism of the founders and of Chiha as the ideological expression of mere parochial confessionalism, far removed from the nationalist discourse that could negate exactly these parochial loyalties that typify Lebanon's ethno-religious communities and absorb them within a wider "meta-loyalty" of the nation. Others, who accept the Lebanist discourse, continue to defend it on two fronts. One stresses that it is no different from the other nationalisms found in other territorial states in the Arab world, where loyalty to state nationalism (*waṭaniyya*) is deeper than that to the "undefined and ambiguous" pan-

nationalism (*qawmiyya*) that is meant to transcend existing borders.[111] The other highlights the importance of Lebanism for the way it confronts the two main "dangers" in the Middle East: Arab nationalism, which has become politically Islamicized; and the various Islamic movements that seek to build an "Islamic empire" where secular nationalism will never have a chance.[112] Another result has been that some contemporary Lebanese writers have begun reassessing the "historical perceptions" of the first founders of Lebanism on how the Lebanese nation had withstood the Arab-Muslim invaders, reiterating the "successive persecutions" and "Christian resistance" from the Mardaites to the present day. Paradoxically, the nationalism that for Chiha and others was to create "unity" with "diversity" perpetuated the confessional "diversity" and deepened the communal cleavage in Lebanon.[113]

Similarly, and in reaction, the Arabism of the Mandatory period, in its appeal to the "Arab people" of Lebanon to unite without distinction between Christian and Muslim, was to don a confessional garb, even though there were Sunni, Shi'i, and Druze intellectuals who shared the secular Arab-nationalism of the Christian founders. Initially, when intellectuals of the various communities began refuting the historical, geographical and ethnographic arguments of the Lebanists, the "national ideologies" they formulated were a combination of Arab nationalism and Syrianism. The discourse of Arabism, too, reconstructed the historical past in the image of the present. "Phoenicians," "Arameans," "Assyrians" and others became the ancestors of the modern Arabs as Greater Syria was portrayed as having existed as an Arab country before the rise of Islam. Successive invasions had done nothing to change the "Arab portrait" of Lebanon. Not only were the Phoenicians seen as Arabs, but the Maronites, too, were viewed as descendants of Arab tribes that had migrated from pre-Islamic Arabia. Muḥammad Bayhum (1887-1980), a Sunni intellectual and politician who supported the Arab government of Fayṣal in Damascus, may serve here as an exponent of this Arabist discourse. Active in politics and writing from the 1920s to the 1970s, Bayhum argues against Lebanism's separation of Lebanon from "the Arab world," and instead calls upon the Lebanese communities to unite under the banner of Arab nationalism. Basing himself on "archaeological discoveries," European historians and Arabist Christian intellectuals, Bayhum concludes that, like other parts of Syria, Lebanon had been Arabized before the rise of the Islam.[114]

But, unlike the founders of Lebanism, Bayhum does not focus on the pre-Islamic periods and dedicates the bulk of his historical record to Lebanon under the successive Muslim dynasties. To show how Christians had traditionally been well treated by Muslims, he quotes European and Muslim historians.[115] Referring to the Crusaders, he omits the historical accounts of collaboration between Maronites and Crusaders, and instead concentrates on a number of prominent Maronite and other Christian families whose "ancestors" had come to settle in Lebanon from Arabia or the Hawran.[116] The Ma'nī principality is described as Arab, its princes the first to manifest signs of Arabism in the face of Ottoman domination.[117]

Throughout his books and articles, Bayhum constructs an historical antithesis to Lebanism. As he sees it, it was the creation of Greater Lebanon that fostered Lebanism among the established leaders of the new Lebanon. When Beirut became the capital of Greater Lebanon, he writes,

> a large group, supporters of the Mandate, came from Mount [Lebanon] into [the town] and took over the high ranks in the government and commercial companies. Thanks to their scientific skills, commercial expertise, and social activities, they succeeded to shape the face of [Beirut], before the Muslims of Beirut and other Lebanese cities, who had rejected the new order and boycotted the institutions, had a chance to realize what had happened: when they did, the right moment had passed. It is worth noting that those who seized the seats of power during the Mandatory period belonged to the group which wanted a Lebanon separated from the Arab countries and, therefore, they collaborated with the Mandatory state to invent this Lebanon of theirs, [going as far as to] claim that the Lebanese belonged to a separate nation that had its own specific characteristics, totally unconnected with the Arabs [around them].[118]

Bayhum points to a serious attempt during the first decade of the Mandatory period to have the Lebanese vernacular recognized as a separate language, i.e., distinct from Arabic.[119] This attempt, of course, failed, but then French was promoted in the official and educational institutions and gained a special place, notably among the "upper classes."[120] Bayhum also mentions the debate that erupted in the early 1930s, on historical issues when state officials commissioned two academics, Asad Rustum and Fū'ād al-Bustānī, to prepare a history curriculum for schools along the lines of the historical arguments of Lebanism. According to Bayhum, because of the professional integrity of both academics the initiative came to nothing.[121]

Unlike Chiha's "syncretistic" Lebanism, Bayhum's Arabist discourse recognizes the Christians as "equal" partners, and he calls, at least on the ideological level, for integration of the Christians within the "Arab nation." The "artificial" division of the Arab world into separate and independent states cannot alter the fact that Lebanon's "national" ties with it are sealed by a common history and its people's Arab origin. As Lebanon has no other course but to adopt Arabism, which puts Muslims and Christians on an equal footing, Bayhum has little problem either in finding the antithesis to *la diversité est notre destin*, namely, "unity is our destiny."[122] At first, Bayhum shared the view of most other Sunni elites and intellectuals of Lebanon who envisaged the romantic restoration of a "national unity" in the form of one state comprising all or several Arab states. But after 1926, as did others of his Sunni colleagues, Bayhum changed his mind when some Sunni Muslim leaders decided gradually to accept the new territorial division of the 1920s. Over the next two decades the majority of Sunni Muslim leaders of Lebanon involved themselves more and more actively in the political life of the country, though they continued to pay lip service to pan-Arab "unity".

Bayhum admits that it had been an error of judgment on the part of the Muslim leaders to refuse to take part in the political life of the new state during

the 1920s because this had left the field open to the supporters of Lebanism, to occupy its high official ranks and to shape the new state's identity.[123]

When Bayhum links the "'national portrait"' of Greater Lebanon to the occupants of the upper echelons in the state institutions, we may read this as his way of pointing to social engineering. Like the majority of the Muslim (Sunni, Shi'i and Druze) elites of the Mandatory period, Bayhum claims that during the first six years of the new Lebanon, the Maronite ruling and religious elites, backed by the French Mandatory administration, had been able to put in place their Lebanist discourse of "Lebanon as a homeland for the Christians" which for them justified "discrimination against the Muslims." At the same time, Bayhum recognizes that part of the blame lies with the Muslim elites themselves, as for more than six years they had spurned taking part in state institutions: "In fact, the Muslims in Greater Lebanon, including myself, are also responsible for the discrimination which affected them at that time."[124]

With Bayhum we now have the main elements in place that were to influence, if not determine, the early phase of the three conflicting discourses that, following the imposition of French mandatory rule, sought to construct the collective history and identity of the "Lebanese"—Lebanism, Arabism and Syrianism. As we saw, the way individuals positioned themselves within the field of power relations created by the Mandate varied *before* 1920, mostly in response to the rapidly changing political situation brought on by the war years, and continued to vary *after* 1920, as Arabism and Syrianism began to contest the hegemony that Lebanism had been able to wrest for itself at the outset of the Mandate.

At this point I find it helpful to recall Hobsbawm's reminder to the effect that

> all historians, whatever else their objectives, are engaged in this process (of invention) inasmuch as they contribute, consciously or not, to the creation, dismantling and restructuring of images of the past which belong not only to the world of specialist investigation but to the public sphere of man as a political being.[125]

Thus, in the following pages I want to look back at the "invention" of Lebanon from the vantage point offered by contemporary Lebanese intellectuals, historians and social scientists. As Paul Brass has argued,

> whether or not the culture of the group is ancient or is newly-fashioned, the study of ethnicity and nationality is in large part the study of politically induced cultural change. More precisely, it is the study of the process by which élites and counter-élites within ethnic groups select aspects of the group's culture, attach new value and meaning to them, and use them as symbols to mobilize the group, to defend its interests, and to compete with other groups. In the process, those élites have an advantage whose leaders can operate most skillfully in relation to both the deeply-felt primordial attachments of group members and the shifting relationships of politics.[126]

Chapter two, then, is largely an attempt to point up the primordial and instrumentalist elements Brass refers to that typify the writings of these contemporary Lebanese and to trace how they went about re-presenting the making of modern Lebanon. What we will find is that, even when written in the 1970s and 80s, none of the narratives they built succeeds in escaping the pull of the formative years of the state under the French Mandate. In other words, even when they are at their most lucid in outlining politically induced cultural change, they remain caught within the discourse of either Lebanism or Arabism, their arguments an integral part of the "confessional" debate. Or, if you wish, they never manage to step outside the "system."

CHAPTER TWO

THE PAST IN THE PRESENT: CONFESSIONALISM VS NATIONALISM

> Disgraced and abandoned by the world, it is possible that the Lebanese are finally beginning to discover themselves. There is a noticeable consensus among all but the more committed extremists today that all are Lebanese, sharing the same national identity, regardless of other, secondary, group affiliations and loyalties.
>
> Kamal Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions* (1985), p. 3.

"Confessionalism," "proportional representation," "consociationalist democracy," are some of the terms Lebanese authors have coined to define what is generally called the "Lebanese system." Briefly put, this consists of the institutionalization and legitimization of the confessional distribution of power that makes up governmental rule in Lebanon. Viewed by many as the continuation of the *mutaṣarrifiyya* established in Mount Lebanon in 1860, the system is often portrayed as a unique form of political organization. But it equally stands for the process of nation-building in a state whose borders had been drawn by the French to include unequal numbers of Christians and Muslims: Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Druzes, Shi'is, Sunnis, and others. Nazih Ayubi equates consociationalism with what he calls "community-centred corporatism," of which "Lebanon represents the main Middle Eastern example (in some senses a 'stretching' of the Ottoman *millet* formula to its extreme possible limits) and one of the most significant cases on the international level."[1] Until the outbreak of the civil war in 1975, it seemed also one of the most successful.

Salibi "One"—Salibi "Two"

For Kamal Salibi, one of Lebanon's foremost contemporary historians, that success was politically rooted in "a Christian-Muslim partnership in which both sides are almost equal in strength," but which is "organized according to liberal traditions which the Christians, in particular, uphold."[2] Without the Christians, Salibi wrote in 1966, "it might not have been much different from the rest of

the Middle East." In other words, in no small measure because of the cultural level introduced by the Christians the Lebanese system enabled the country to stand "apart from its surroundings, displaying those marked Western tendencies by which it is chiefly distinguished."[3] Thus, "Lebanon as a Westernizing country," Salibi continues,

> can claim exceptional achievements. Here, as hardly anywhere else today in the Middle East and the Afro-Asian world, the existence of a free society has made a relative amount of stability and true progress possible. The Lebanese, unlike other Asians and Africans, have shown themselves capable of examining their national faults without undue sensitivity. They have also made intelligent attempts to resolve their major internal and external problems without resorting to authoritarian measures.[4]

Clearly, for Salibi the "national faults" he mentions are there only because the westernization process in Lebanon is as yet incomplete, blame for which, he implies, cannot be laid at the door of the Christians.

In 1985, after ten years of civil war, Salibi's tone is very different: "In all but name, Lebanon today is a non-country." But he immediately goes on: "Yet, paradoxically, there has not been a time when the Muslims and Christians of Lebanon have exhibited, on the whole, a keener *consciousness of common identity*, albeit with somewhat different nuances. They did not [do so] in 1920 … nor did they really in 1943."[5] No longer speaking of a Christian-Muslim partnership (in which the Christians more or less made the difference) but instead of a common identity for Christians and Muslims, Salibi now locates the latter in the deep attachment there resides in all Lebanese communities to a primordial core: "The plain fact remained that the religious communities in Lebanon were essentially tribes, or in any case behaved as tribes, and the [confidence] game that came to be played between them [in 1920] was a tribal game. At an overt level, the game was a contest between different nationalities for the country. At the covert level, tribal rivalries and jealousies were mainly involved."[6] "Tribe" here is used literally, not figuratively, and is the same as the "core" of Smyth's *ethnie*, "which resides in … [the] quartet of 'myths, memories, values and symbols' and in the characteristic forms of styles and genres of certain historical configuration of the populations."[7] What had gone wrong was that "nationalist ideals and principles aimed at the common good … normally served as a mere cover [for] atavistic loyalties."[8] Three years later Salibi develops this line of thought as follows:

> Religious sects, in their social behavior, may be described as tribes in disguise. What holds a given sect together, and keeps it in existence down the generation, is instinctive group solidarity rather than reasoned religious conviction. In the modern Arab East (as is no doubt the case elsewhere), existing Christian and Islamic sects are in fact tribes, not only in social behavior but also by historical origin.[9]

Digging ever deeper to reveal this tribal "core," Salibi comes up with historical traces which tell him that the origins of both Muslim and Christian sects in Lebanon are to be found in the Arabian peninsula, before they migrated northwards. For example, the Maronites, who in Arabic are called *Mawārina* (pl. of *Murānī*) and whose first patriarch is called Yuḥanna al-Sarūmī, were driven out by the Jews from Wādī Sarūm, which "is reckoned to be the most fertile tributary of Wadi Najran" in Yemen where "at least two villages still carry the name Muran."[10] The Shi'is of Lebanon, who are called *Matāwila* (pl. of *Mitwalī*), are three tribes, Awza', 'Āmila (from Yemen), and Matwal (from the village of Mutawil, in the southern Hijāz).[11] The Druzes "rather than being called after Darazī, actually carry the name of an Arab tribe, Banu Darīza, who inhabited the vicinity of Mecca some time before Islam." Salibi further suggests that al-Darazī himself was given that name because he "belonged to the Banu Dariza."[12]

With this kind of fanciful anthropology Salibi may have hoped to persuade Lebanese ethno-religious communities of their "common identity." But it cannot settle the many other controversies that make up the all-consuming debate at the heart of modern Lebanon's history. Revolving as it does around *al-ṭā'ifiyya* (confessionalism), into this debate Lebanon's politicians, intellectuals and practically everyone else who has a stake in the country's political and cultural future, compress the weight of their disagreements on questions of national identity, the distribution of power and wealth, the nature of Lebanon's culture, the legitimacy and history of the state, ties with the West as well as the East, and so forth. It is of course in the first place the "actors," those who formulate ideological justifications for ethnic and nationalist movements, who will want to decide what "belongs" and what doesn't, what is "genuine" and what is "false." In Chapter One I showed how primordialist and instrumentalist positions guided the actions and writings of Lebanon's politicians and intellectuals "of the first hour," both those who helped put in place the Lebanese system, i.e., confessionalism (*al-ṭā'ifiyya*), as those who worked to oppose it. I will now turn in some detail to the spate of academic and other writings produced since the 1950s, in particular following the outbreak of the civil war by a generation trying to come to grips with the ravages of the civil war. My main aim here is, first, to show how that "first hour" debate has continued to set the parameters for the polemics of today, and then also to analyze how significant primordialist/culturalist and instrumentalist/modernist arguments have remained in the way contemporary authors position themselves when they set out to create/invent their self-image. Given the unstable political and social conditions thrown up by the civil war, it will come as no surprise to find many of them shifting position, often more than once and not seldom from one end of the political spectrum to the other.

Remains the question of why this should be so. That is, why do we find historians and intellectuals during or, rather, in the face of a brutal and often

savage civil war, reproducing arguments and constructs that had helped underpin a political system that now seemed to be collapsing before their very eyes. Answers to this question will start to unfold, I hope, as we go along.

In his comprehensive study *Identité confessionnelle et temps social chez les historiens libanais contemporains*, Ahmad Beydoun makes an exception for Kamal Salibi who, he says, cannot be accused of "confessional historiography" because his main effort has been to illustrate the gap between "myth" and "true history."[13] But, as we saw above, Salibi had not much of a problem either in rewriting his historical narrative according to how events were developing in the present. For Salibi, too, "the civil war has failed as yet to destroy the fundamental political and administrative structure of the Lebanese Republic," i.e., the Lebanese system has been safeguarded.[14] To make sure it continues to work, i.e., to ensure Lebanon's survival as a sovereign territorial state, a slight historical correction is required:

> Because the Christian Lebanese … claimed for the different communities which happened to form the population of Lebanon a special historical nationality separate and distinct from the common Arabism, they kept the legitimacy of the Lebanese state in question not only for other Arabs, but also for large and important sectors of the Lebanese population.[15]

How Salibi, by inventing a common Arab identity, facilitates this "concession to the reality of Arabism" the Christian needed to make we saw above.

On the whole one can discern three broad tendencies typifying the historiographical debate. Here, too, the range of differing positions and arguments we find within each of them reveals how very much alive these disputes have remained—or, of course, how entrenched the system has become. The first is made up of scholars who hold on to Chiha's notion of "*la diversité est notre destin*." These are mainly Christians and their approach largely "primordialist." The second, directly opposed to the first, consists mainly of Muslim scholars for whom Chiha's "*diversité*" is unacceptable because it entails an "artificial" division of the Lebanese people who are all Arabs, and it separates them from the Arab nation, which alone is the "authentic" national entity for the Lebanese state. Here positions too rest on primordialist/culturalist arguments, in this case that Arab culture alone can guarantee a rightful place for each of the religious communities within Lebanon's borders. The third tendency brings together Muslim and Christian scholars who view "ethnicity" and "confessionalism" as instruments in the hands of interested parties out to maintain their political hegemony. Communal cleavages should be done away with so that the Lebanese can truly become one *sha'b* (people or nation) and Lebanon their *waṭan* (country).

Messarra and Harik: "La diversité est notre destin"

Taking their cue from Chiha's perceptions on Lebanon as *un pays des communautés associées,* many contemporary Christian scholars view Lebanon's ethno-religious communities as natural entities. To mind spring the works of Antoine Messarra and Iliya Harik, two scholars from different disciplines and different communities. In his *Théorie générale du système politique libanais* Antoine Messarra analyses the Lebanese system in terms of "independent entities" that are grounded not in religion but in culture: "Les communautés par rapport à l'État au Liban ne sont pas des communautés de fidèles, mais des groupements culturels."[16] To enable these "cultural groupings" to live together necessitates a political system based on "[l]e partage du pouvoir en vue d'une participation de toutes le communautés au pouvoir et à la gestion des ressources et de la prospérité collective et, d'autre part, en respectant le particularismes des communautés."[17] Because power-sharing required 'une large coalition des leaders politiques' of these communities the system was based on consensus.[18] Although Messarra recognizes the role of the elites in the creation of such a consensus, it is cultural pluralism that determines this role. Like Chiha, whose definition of Lebanon as un pays des communautés associées led him to the deterministic notion that *la diversité est notre destin,* his pluralist notion of *groupements culturels* leads Messarra to the similarly deterministic conclusion that "le Liban est condamné au modèle de participation ou modèle consensuel."[19]

Wanting to erect a barrier between the political system and religious symbols and sentiments, Messarra argues that the Lebanese system differentiates between the communities as "socio-cultural entities of spiritual families (*'ā'ilāt ruḥiyya*)" and as religious frameworks of "believers." Socio-cultural entities are there to promote power-sharing but also to ensure that individual religious beliefs are held in respect. The politicization of religion by the elites, as occurred in Lebanon, does not stem from their recognition of the communities as socio-cultural entities but rests with the politicians who use the religious sentiments of the believers as a political instrument. This differentiation between "socio-culture entities" and "believers" helps him to justify the system which, he believes, works to diminish confessional politics and reduce the role of the political elites who are behind the politicization of religious sentiments. In this sense, based as it is on cultural primordialism, the political system becomes a discrete factor that can act independently of and remain largely unaffected by people who may want to manipulate religion for political aims.[20]

Iliya Harik, too, sees *al-ṭā'ifiyya* (confessionalism) as a socio-political and primordial (*'arīqa*) phenomenon unique to Lebanon. For Harik each *ṭā'ifa* (community or confession) has its own "social characteristics" that have been formed throughout the historical process by geographical, economic and cultural components.[21] While in 1920 the elites of Lebanon established a political system that recognized the "social characteristics" of each individual community, elites in Syria, Iraq, Turkey and Iran, from the moment these had

become territorial states, had been busy trying to integrate by force the several communities within their borders into a homogeneous and united nation. Not only had integration not been achieved in any of these four countries, but forced integration had led to domination by one group over the others. Writing before 1975, Harik argues that it was Lebanon's recognition of the communities as social and cultural units and their proportional representation in state institutions that had contained the confessional conflict.[22] Getting rid of confessionalism could be achieved not by superseding, but, on the contrary, by continuing the principle of proportional representation.[23]

Although with many Lebanese the civil war undermined their conviction that the political system worked, Harik never abandoned his belief that it was the sole guarantee of the survival of united Lebanon. "Lebanon was and still is a pluralist society in its culture … and its political system. Its social structure is obvious to everyone and its heterogeneity is not a transitional but a historical and primordial phenomenon (*ẓāhira ʿarīqa*)." Criticizing those who wanted to abolish the system and see it replaced by a uniform and homogeneous society, he asks whether they could achieve this without violence—and even then, would Lebanese society ever really be homogeneous?[24] According to him the civil war was not caused by the system itself, so to speak from the inside, but from the outside, e.g., by regional conflicts, particularly the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.[25] The only way forward for a united Lebanon was to improve the existing system because its social and cultural characteristics made confessionalism "primordial" and "perennial." In this sense, Harik always subscribed to the Chiha's two famous statements: "*La diversité est notre destin"* and "*Le Liban un pays des communautés associées.*"

The primordial approach is found in many other Christian scholars and intellectuals for whom cultural cleavage would always form the main obstacle on the road to Lebanese nationhood.[26] Although, with Harik and Messarra, they approach the confessional or "ethnic" pluralism of Lebanon in ways similar to Chiha, their analysis of nation-building in a multi-communal state is limited because they refuse to accept that Lebanism and Arabism lead to two opposed national identities. Some allude to Lebanon's Arab face but, on the whole, the nation is seen as congruent with the state. Lebanon, for them, is a nation-state and all who live within its borders together form the Lebanese nation.[27]

Munaḥ al-Ṣulḥ and al-Faḍl Shalaq: "Lebanon—One Culture"

The second tendency is typical primarily of Sunni Muslim intellectuals, who clearly see the political confessionalism of Lebanon as a French creation rather than as a political solution to a primordial-cultural problem. This does not make them instrumentalists, as here the communities are seen as groups adhering to religious doctrines rather than as social and cultural entities. That is, in

Lebanon, as in all other Arab countries, there is one nation, namely the Arab nation. Although these intellectuals are willing to accept the "colonialist territorial division" of the Arab *umma* into several Arab states as a *fait accompli*, they stress that neither this nor the presence of different religious communities can supersede the Arab identity of the Lebanese. Munaḥ al-Ṣulḥ and al-Faḍl Shalaq are two of the many intellectuals who well represent this tendency. Countering the concept of Lebanon as a country of associated communities, Munaḥ al-Ṣulḥ argues:

> It is a sort of simplification contradicting reality and history to conceive of Lebanon as a society of mere confessions, and consequently as a stock company in which every community has shares proportional to the number of its members, and finally it [Lebanon] was born like this to justify its existence, essence of its system and continuity. In fact Lebanon … with its present boundaries and its structure and system has two tendencies: one separating [it] from and the other relating [it] to the Arab area …[28]

Since the confessional system was adopted, the state of Lebanon will always have to confront the communal issue. However, unlike Harik and Messarra, Munaḥ al-Ṣulḥ argues that the integration process of building the nation-state should rely not on any communal consensus but "on independence [vis-à-vis the West] and on Arabism, which constitute the chemistry of *al-indimāj al-waṭanī* (national integration)."[29]

The intimate relationship between religion—i.e., Islam—and culture—i.e., Arab culture—is further worked out by al-Faḍl Shalaq, for whom Lebanon is an integral part of Arab culture, even though some Christians, because of their minority complex, may reject this. According to him, both the Muslims and the Christians incontestably belong to Arab, i.e., Muslim culture: "Islamic culture (in its holistic sense) is a historical legacy and an objective reality which cannot be removed by political desires and motives." In this sense, the one culture that is primordial and perennial is the Arab-Muslim one. Thus "the non-Muslim minorities were and are a part of the Islamic society in the past and the present … And if some minorities, or portions of them, claim for themselves non-Arab-Islamic culture, this is no other than adopting an alien culture" for which he sees no chance to succeed.[30] As Lebanon's minorities do not constitute cultural entities but are rooted in religious doctrines, there is but one "historic solution" for the minority problematics. It calls for two preconditions: "First, the minorities should undertake their duties for *al-indimāj fī jism al-'umma* (integration in the national body) and recognize their Arab identities, abandoning their tendency to separatism. Second, the [Arab-Muslim] majority should propose a democratic and rational arrangement which for the minorities will create … a situation in which arguments based on the fear complex [of the minorities] can be eliminated."[31]

Again, if among contemporary Lebanese their cultural-primordialist approach leads many Christian intellectuals to fully endorse Lebanism on the

point of cultural diversity, that same approach leads many Muslim intellectuals to adopt arguments similar to those brought forward by Sunni nationalists during the Mandatory period regarding the unity of Arab culture in Lebanon.

Ṣāygh and Mughayzil: Colonialism at the Root of Confessionalism

The third tendency comprises those intellectuals and scholar for whom the "confessional system" in Lebanon is no other than the indigenous response to French colonialism by a specific group or groups in Mount Lebanon who, in the 1920s, were able to translate this form of collaboration into a position of hegemony in the new state. What further significantly helped them to achieve this was their instrumental use of sectarianism. While culturally, economically and politically they consider Lebanon as an Arab country, they see nationalism as a recent phenomenon, imported into or, if one wishes, implanted in the Middle East as the corollary of that other product of modernism—colonialism. Western economic penetration into *Bilād al-Shām* (Greater Syria) led to the rise of a bourgeoisie that had a clear class interest in promoting nationalist ideas. Confessionalism, or the way it is being exploited by the elites, is here seen as embodying a regressive policy, put in place by exactly this combination of related factors, i.e., colonialist penetration, a newly-rising "middle class" and the counter attempts of traditional strata to prevent themselves from being eclipsed. Not surprisingly, authors here often feel most comfortable with an openly Marxist approach.

The view that confessionalism in Lebanon is purely an instrument in the hands of the elites to propel their own economic and political interests is eloquently put forward by Anīs al-Ṣāygh in his *Lubnān al-Ṭā'ifī* (Confessionalist Lebanon), published as early as 1955. The fact that Ṣāygh was a refugee from Palestine who had fled to Lebanon from his home town Tiberias during the war of 1948 may well have helped shape his critical attitude.

Four years later Joseph Mughayzil, a Greek-Orthodox Lebanese intellectual, approached the subject along much the same lines in his *Lubnān wal-Qaḍiyya al-'Arabiyya* (Lebanon and the Arab Cause). Both authors are still widely quoted by almost all contemporary Lebanese intellectuals who today deal with confessionalism in a similarly critical way. Ṣāygh uses the term *al-ṭā'ifiyya* on two levels; on the first, *al-ṭā'ifiyya* means much the same as "multi-communal society," on the second, it stands for the politicization of society by those he calls *al-ṭā'ifiyyūn* (confessionalists). Ṣāygh's polemical approach is clear from the start in the way he sets out his argument with those who see confessionalism in Lebanon as "primordial" and a "facts of nature":

> According to the contemporary confessionalists [the supporters of the political system], confessionalism becomes one of [the axioms] ordained by history as a *firman* … That is, confessionalism becomes its own raison d'être in the present.

> According to its contemporary supporters, confessionalism becomes the direct raison d'être of Lebanon. But confessionalism has no raison d'être in Lebanon, it is the most dangerous and false [claim].[32]

Ṣāygh holds that these confessionalists depend on the argument that "Lebanon has always been a living museum of different communities."[33]

Accordingly, the author outlines that Lebanon underwent six historical stages, from before Christianity to the present, in each of which *al-ṭā'ifiyya* may have had its specific features but was always used as a political tool. Even "the confessionalists of the [first] stage manipulated *al-ṭā'ifiyya,* using it as a mask behind which to hide their commercial and political interests."[34] With the spread of Christianity, *al-ṭā'ifiyya* took the form of a sectarian dispute, with the clergy encouraging and manipulating it. From the Arab-Muslim conquest to the beginning of the Mamluk period, the third stage, *al-ṭā'ifiyya*, could be found wearing feudal garb. It was in the fourth stage, from the Mamluk period to the nineteenth century, that *al-ṭā'ifiyya* became feudally subordinated to the interests of the big landowners. The fifth stage, which lasted from the nineteenth century to the establishment of Greater Lebanon, was the colonial period, in which the Western powers used *al-ṭā'ifiyya* to promote their own interests. In the early twentieth century, the sixth stage, "*al-ṭā'ifiyya* became part of the history of the country, even its entire history … has become real, [though, here, too] remains hidden from sight behind [the] disguise [of such] twentieth-century concepts as nationalism, scientism and democracy." Thus *al-ṭā'ifiyya* turned into an ideology "through which the new confessionalists now attempt to lure the masses."[35]

Ṣāygh underpins his "instrumentalist" approach with accounts from Muslim, Lebanese-Christian and European chroniclers and historians. Having shown in the first five chapters the historical development of *al-ṭā'ifiyya* as an instrument of politicians, clergymen, and colonial powers,[36] in his final chapter entitled *al-ṭā'ifiyya al-'aqā'idiyya* (ideological confessionalism), Ṣāygh tackles his subject on several fronts, critically analyzing such topics as the power of ideology in the modern age, nationalist concepts in the Middle East, and the interrelation between ideologies—as disguises—and the interests of those who promote them, and others when the "new confessionalists" of the Lebanese state "realized that the twentieth-century human being has become (obsessed with ideology)," they turned confessionalism into an ideology. There are two currents: one Islamic confessionalism in the guise of Arab nationalism, and the other Christian confessionalism, masked as Lebanese-nationalism.[37]

The roots of both currents should be located in Lebanon of the late nineteenth century, but here Ṣāygh distinguishes between two forms or stages in the development of each of these nationalist concepts. "Arabism" in its first form was not *qawmiyya* (nationalism) but more akin to *waṭaniyya* (patriotism). According to him, confusion between the two terms has prevailed among Arab scholars ever since George Antonius published his *The Arab Awakening* in 1932.

Patriotism is related to the intellectual activities of the students of the Protestant College of Beirut, who wanted to "revive" what they saw as "the national culture" by following concepts worked out by Buṭrus al-Bustānī and Nāṣīf al-Yāzijī. This cultural Arabism or patriotism was soon taken up by the Muslim elites, who transformed it into Islamic-confessional nationalism. The separate history and culture that Maronite clergymen and politicians were meanwhile inventing led to Christian-confessional nationalism. Thus, the Arabism of the Muslim elites and the Lebanism of the Christian elites, as they emerged in Mandatory Lebanon Ṣāygh explains as new forms of an age-old confessionalism, this time masked by nationalist ideologies.[38] A non-confessional nationalist concept arose only in the 1920s and 1930s, i.e., one that differed from nineteenth-century patriotism and from confessional nationalism, through the works of Qusṭanṭīn Zuraiq, Nabīh Fāris, Niqūlā Ziyāda, Edward 'Atiyya and Albert Hourani. Even though it was formulated by secularist scholars who conceived of Islam in terms of culture rather than religion, this new nationalism was harnessed by Muslims to their interest in Lebanon as a confessionalist state.[39]

In a similar vein, Mughayzil also points to two causes that together secured confessionalism in Lebanon since the nineteenth century. According to Mughayzil, two combined causes led to the rise of confessionalism in Lebanon: the internal elites and colonial interests.[40] It was these two factors that during the Mandatory period solidified confessionalism as a political system, while at the same time obfuscating nationalist conceptions and dichotomizing the elites into Christians and Muslims. This state of affairs could only lead to conflicts, as happened in 1958 over the shortlived United Arab Republic between Syria and Egypt.[41] After the civil war had further deepened that dichotomy, Mughayzil must have felt sadly vindicated. In an article on "the impact of the political dispute on the religious life in Lebanon," published in 1985, he repeats the same arguments he had put forward twenty-six years earlier, that confessionalism, by the merger of colonial interests and elite politics in the Mandatory period, had led to the politicizations of every aspect of Lebanese life in the post-independence era.[42]

Ṣāygh and Mughayzil have been severely criticized by other Christian intellectuals for the way Muslim intellectuals have been able to use their standpoint to undermine the fundamentals of the cultural pluralism of Lebanese society and, especially, the "specificity" of Christian culture within the Muslim environment. To what extent Chiha's basic arguments still prevail among a large segment of the contemporary Christian intellectuals and politicians can be gauged from the criticism Charles Shartouni, a Maronite intellectual, has leveled against Mughayzil's conception of "confessionalism":

> [That] confessionalism is a transient phenomenon whose origin went back to the Western colonial era, is an ideological statement and does not correspond with the socio-historical reality from which the phenomenon stems. Confessionalism is a general social phenomenon produced by the socio-political

> structure of *Dār al-Islām*. Within *Dār al-Islām* the association [of the different sects] has been based on unequal social contract, stressing the specific juridical position of the non-Muslims which, on the socio-political and civic-topographic level, sidelined them into a marginal and stagnant position and, with time, into tragical demographic degradation … In this way the national and ethnic Churches, the Jewish groups and even the Muslim minorities were turned into a series of ghettos within the Muslim city, from *ḥārat al-Naṣāra* (the Christian quarter) to *ḥārat al-Yahūd* (the Jewish quarter). [43]

For Shartouni, the confessional structure put in place in Lebanon in the 1920s was "the most significant historical attempt to depart" from the Muslim legacy "through a consensual political endeavor based on an equal contract among the Muslim community, the non-Muslim communities and the Muslim minorities' communities." It was a Lebanese form of *kayān* (entity) that had its roots in the Middle Ages.[44]

Confessionalism here is seen, first of all, as the product of the primordial nature of the Muslim state, with the Lebanese *kayān* then correcting the historic injustice committed by *Dār al-Islām.* The instrumentalist perceptions of Ṣāygh and Mughayzil are adopted by almost all Christian and Muslim intellectuals who see Lebanon's political confessionalism as a malady of which the country must be cured. In the debate with the supporters of *al-ṣīgha al-Shīḥāwiyya* (Chiha's form) of nationalism and Lebanon's political system, Marxists and different nationalists (whether Arab Muslims, secular Arabs, or Syrian nationalists) continue to cite Ṣāygh's and Mughayzil's theses but not seldom ignore the difference they make between "instrumental" and "primordial" approaches to match their concepts. This is especially obvious with intellectuals and politicians who see Arab-Muslim culture as the only primordial—that is, for them genuine—culture in Lebanon. These apply the "instrumentalism" of Ṣāygh and Mughayzil only to refute *al-ṣīgha al-Shīḥāwiyya.* But the same can be noticed even among Lebanese Marxists, many of whom have to shed their "instrumentalist" approach somewhere along the line as they picture "confessionalism" as a sort of "false consciousness" perpetuated by the bourgeoisie in the class struggle that will inexorably culminate in a socialist regime.

Ziyāda and Kawtharānī: Arab-Muslim Tradition vs. Western Colonialism

Further nuances can be found in the writing of Maʿn Ziyāda and Wajīh Kawtharānī. Maʿn Ziyāda is a Sunni Muslim historian who, among other things, oversaw the production of a series of "Studies on Arab Nationalist Thought" published by the institute of *al-Inmā' al-ʿArabī* (Arab Development).[45] An article he included in a volume titled *Lubnān: al-Ḥaḍāra al-Waḥida*

(Lebanon: One Civilization) gives a fair idea of Ziyāda's view on culture and nationalism in Lebanon.[46] He first lists different definitions of the terms *ḥaḍāra* (civilization) and *thaqāfa* (culture) as he finds them in dictionaries and in Western academic literature. Adopting of the terminology of American anthropologists and the distinction they make between "culture" and "civilization" will lead us up the garden path if this convinces us that Lebanon has several "cultural forms," and consequently several identities, because even in small areas different nuances on the cultural level, as in "folklore," can be found.[47]

To refute "cultural pluralism" as the basis of a separate Christian nationalism, Ziyāda argues that the key to understanding nationalism in Lebanon is to locate the different nuances of "culture" within its "one civilization." Like many parts of the Arab world, Lebanon was Arabized before and remained Arab after the rise of the Islam. The fact that Lebanon is inhabited by several religio-cultural communities does not mean that it has several civilizations. Cultural elements typical of each region are in constant flux to the extent that this sometimes introduces enclaves into the overall Arab tradition, as we see today: "The tradition is fissured, scattered and never constant (*al-turāth mabtūr mutaqati' ghayr muttaṣil).* It was severed by the dark ages and different forms of colonialism."[48] Even the huge impact the West had in Lebanon never succeeded in excising this culture from the wider Arab civilization, as the latter serves as the framework for all "cultural expressions and behaviors."[49]

In other words, Arab *ḥaḍāra* (civilization) is a "primordial" factor which Western economic and cultural penetration cannot totally suppress even among Lebanon's Christians. To illustrate how this applies specifically to the Maronites, whose intellectuals "claim" a separate nationality, Ziyāda includes a quote from Henry Guys, who was French consul in Beirut in the early nineteenth century, in which he describes some aspects of Maronite "cultural expressions and behaviors." Ziyāda then comments: "If the author had not mentioned that he was speaking of Maronites … the reader could easily think that he was speaking not just of the Maronites but at the very least, of all Lebanese, and, we may add, of Iraqis or Kuwaitis as well."[50]

Much like Ṣāygh and Mughayzil, Ziyāda claims that in Lebanon, as in all the Arab countries, confessionalism became a "political instrument" only due to Ottoman and Western colonialism.[51] From the sixteenth until the late nineteenth century, the Ottomans controlled the region through a policy of divide-and-rule. At the same time, Western powers, notably France and Britain, were using the religious communities to gain a foothold for their economic, cultural and political penetration of the Middle East. In Lebanon, the French educational institutions of the Jesuits and other missionaries went about energetically to foster specific nuances of culture in Lebanon

> to produce intellectuals of the type which France wanted. In these institutions, during their heyday, the idea was born that the Maronites were a separate,

> superior and specific *ḥaḍāra* (civilization) and that there was a pluralism of civilizations in Lebanon. The first exponents of this claim were Michel Chiha, Petro Ṭrād, Charles Dabbās and others who had all been educated by the foreign French missionaries.[52]

Still, however successful they may have been in fostering cultural separatism, there always remained clear traces of the "primordial" elements of Arab culture. This explains why, despite Westernization and colonialism, the Lebanese masses until today share with the Arabs not only their language but all other means of cultural expression, such as the art, literature, etc.[53]

In a historical study in which he covers the socio-political development of Lebanon and the Arab East from 1860 to 1920, Wajīh Kawtharāni, a Shi'i historian, uses the term the "Arab-Muslim civilization" in much the same way as Ziyāda, though with him there is a stronger focus on the mode of production and the social structure of the Ottoman Muslim period when it comes to defining the meaning of the term. Placing nineteenth-century Mount Lebanon and then the establishment of Greater Lebanon within the context of an historical period, he argues that "this civilization" had been in decline since at least the eighteenth century. Before it lost its vigor in the nineteenth century, Lebanon's several communities, including the Maronites, had attained full integration within the cultural and socio-economic structure of the Arab East.[54] When this was then interrupted by Europe's forceful expansion into the Ottoman empire, cultural "pockets" were being inserted into this "united civilization." In a historical process that culminated after the first world war with the imposition of French and British mandates European colonialism forced radical changes upon the traditional socio-economic structure of Arab societies in the East. One such change was the severing of *al- mutaṣarrifiyya* of Mount Lebanon, and subsequently Greater Lebanon, from its natural hinterland and turning it into a separate political entity whose leaders claimed nationalist particularity vis-à-vis its Arab-Muslim surroundings.[55]

Elsewhere Kawtharānī analyzes the socio-economic and political situations in Lebanon since the sixteenth century even more succinctly, arguing that the Arab-Muslim types of economy, society and polity were subject to the joint pressures of colonialism and the concomitant deterioration of the socio-economic structures in the Ottoman provinces. He reiterates that from 1516 to the early nineteenth century, the struggle within societies, i.e., in Mount Lebanon as well as in other parts of the Ottoman empire, bore the economic and political features of conflict between classes and clans rather than between religious communities.[56]

Until the nineteenth century *al-ta'adud al-madhhabī* (sectarian pluralism) was restricted merely to differences among the doctrines of the sects. Social stratification developed later, only with the onset of colonialism, and it was then that the socio-economic and ideological forms of *ṭā'ifiyya* (confessionalism)

arose. A first form of pluralism known in Lebanon and of course throughout the Ottoman empire was the *millet* system, which was "meant to organize the specificities of the religious doctrines within the state."[57] With time, through the Capitulations[58] and the increasing commercial and cultural expansion of Europe, *millets* became "religious minorities" over which the European powers demanded the right of protection. From here, it was a small step for "the subject of the 'religious minorities' to become a legal issue, which justified intervention by one partner [to the agreement] in the affairs of the other." Kawtharānī is then able to clinch his argument by stating that "[t]hus, in the nineteenth-century colonial lexicon the 'Ottoman *millet*' became synonymous with 'nation' and 'people' in their European sense."[59]

The economic and cultural intervention of "Western colonialism fostered the 'specificity' of the Maronite community, giving it political and territorial form whose ideological expression was to be imparted to the Lebanese project [of Greater Lebanon] as one of the colonial ways of dividing *al-waṭan al-'Arabī* (the Arab country)."[60] The Lebanese "project," as it allowed the Maronite community to predominate, provoked Muslim opposition. The Maronite elites resorted to "ideology as a successful instrument" for producing and reproducing the conditions that kept this predominance in place. Bilingualism and cultural pluralism were part of this ideology[61]. Kawtharānī on the one hand argues that "Lebanism" and "Greater Lebanon" were instruments of European colonialism and the Maronite elites who economically and culturally had integrated into the "network of relations with Western capitalism, while on the other, he treats such terms as *al-waṭan al-'Arabī* (the Arab nation), *al-ḥaḍāra al-'Arabiyya* (Arab civilization) and *al-turāth al-'Arabī al-aṣīl* (Arab genuine tradition) as abstract "givens." Yet, somewhat paradoxically, he also claims that the latter arose as part of the challenge of the East to European colonial expansion.[62] As *al-waṭan al-'Arabī* is "a primordial and perennial entity" that existed long before the colonial period, even outside all historical development, he resolves this by claiming that the challenge to Western colonialism actually was no other than a reforming, reviving, uniting and mobilizing of the productive forces that lie concealed within the Arab tradition.[63]

Viewing the modern history of the Arab East as a battlefield where the Arab-Muslim "tradition" faces the economic and cultural offensive of the West, Kawtharānī romanticizes not only the early Arab-Muslim periods but even the early Muslim rule of the Ottomans. He sees both the Lebanism of the Christian intellectuals and politicians and the kind of nationalism adopted by the Muslim politicians in Mandatory Lebanon as products of the "pockets" engendered in Arab-Muslim society by the inroads of colonialism and Ottoman decline. In this sense, the economic, if not Marxist, explanation Kawtharānī offers of the historical background to the establishment of Greater Lebanon and the rise of Lebanism reflects the works of some modern Lebanese Marxist scholars whose viewpoints form an antithesis to the positions of Christian scholars who keep supporting Chiha's outlook.[64]

Ḍāhir: Hyphenating Confessionalism and Class

While Ziyāda and Kawtharānī view Lebanon's cultural pluralism (*al-ta'adudiyya al-haḍāriyya*) of *al-ṭā'ifiyya* as the fragmentation of the "one civilization" (*al-ḥaḍāra al-wāḥida*) wrought by the divisive forces of the West, Mas'ūd Ḍāhir and Mahdī 'Amil approach the issues of "confessional" cleavage and cultural pluralism from a "Marxist" point of view. Theirs are controversial interpretations of these same issues, as commonly found among Lebanese Marxist intellectuals and scholars. In the first of Ḍāhir's four historical works, *The Social History of Lebanon, 1914–1926*, written before 1975, "Greater Lebanon" is seen as the product of French imperialism. The social structures, the political systems and confessional conflicts introduced into Mount Lebanon in the nineteenth century, and later during the Mandatory, were directly determined by economic factors, i.e., by a European power subordinating the country to the demands of market capitalism, whereby the class struggle was played out behind the ideological disguise of confessionalism. In this historical perception, both leaders and masses increasingly ignored their religio-communal or clannish background in favor of "social classes," whose stratification was dictated by the economic transformation set in motion by the imperialist expansion of European capitalism.[65]

In *Lebanon: Independence, System and Pact*, written after the outbreak of the civil war, Ḍāhir presents a Marxist explanation of the failure of the Lebanese political system. Part one includes the Mandatory period and offers the same analytical approach as his previous study, but Ḍāhir seems to run into trouble when he tries to combine his perception of the "class struggle" with his notion of the confessional system. While the classes are pictured as "social groupings" without people, religious leaders and politicians are seen as representatives of confessional and national tendencies and clans rather than of social classes.[66]

When, in a chapter called *Bayna 'urūbat al-dhāt wa-'urūbat al-maṣlaḥa* ("Between Arabism of the heart and Arabism of the interest"), Ḍāhir deals with the "nationalism" that developed during the Mandatory period in much the same way as the Arab-nationalists, he abandons his Marxist approach. Under the French Mandate, two political tendencies developed, one Arabist, calling for full independence, the other confessionalist, rejecting Lebanon's Arabism and seeking "the continuation of the Mandate in order to protect independence against the danger of absorption of the Lebanese territories into the neighboring Arab countries."[67] According to Ḍāhir, encouraged by the French authorities the confessionalist tendency rejected Arabism, which was deliberately identified with Islamism, and then invented a Phoenician and Mediterranean national identity. Here it is the abstract terms in which Ḍāhir describes the political dispute of the Mandatory period between nationalists and confessionalists that makes one question to what extent Ḍāhir is still beholden to his Marxist view.[68]

This reification of nationalism enables Ḍāhir to transform Arabism into a "primordial force," existing outside classes and communities. But when he then

"discovers" that at the end of the Mandatory period it is the "confessionalist" or "isolationist" forces in Lebanon that adopted Arabism, he reverts to a Marxist explanation. That is, the Arabism adopted by "Christian isolationists" Ḍāhir calls *al-ʿurūba al-iqtiṣādiyya wal-rūḥiyya* (economic and spiritual Arabism), it facilitated acceptance of the compromise that was *al-mithāq al-waṭanī,* the National Pact, that in 1943 grounded the confessional system for an independent Lebanon in laws. As a bourgeois class seeking to expand their economic interests throughout the Arab countries, the Christian isolationists were after the profits they stood to make in the Arab markets. In other words, their Arabism existed only on the declaratory level of "spiritual unity" among the Arabs, while at the same time they persisted in "*Lubnān al-Lubnānī*" (Lebanese Lebanon) which they saw as independent from the Arab world. As Lebanon's political independence meant an end to the French Mandate and its protection, the Lebanese bourgeoisie raised the slogan of *inhāʾ al-ʿuzla* ("the end of isolation").[69]

The Arabism of these "isolationists" could never be true of those who struggled for the independence of a "non-confessional Lebanon."[70] Ḍāhir does not name the leaders of these true Arabists, but only speaks of "the group of non-confessionals, some liberals, and supporters of the unity of Lebanon and not the unity of the confessions in Lebanon."[71] In much the same vein, Ḍāhir sees the Muslim leaders who cooperated with the Christian bourgeoisie as confessionalists representing the Muslim bourgeoisie. But then, when it comes to explaining what inspired the shift this "Muslim bourgeoisie" enacted during the Mandatory period from complete rejection of Greater Lebanon in the 1920s to full acceptance of "an independent Lebanon with an Arab face" in 1943, Ḍāhir points to confessional considerations of these Muslim leaders rather than the interests of a bourgeois class.[72]

Because Ḍāhir speaks of "bourgeoisie" and "confessionalists" in highly general terms, never naming personalities or pinpointing individuals, it is hard to distinguish his "Muslim confessionalist-bourgeoisie," with which its Christian counterpart established the National Pact in 1943, from the Muslim leaders of the 1920s and 1930s, who represented "the champions of the independence" of Arabist-Lebanon. It seems that the same personalities are called upon twice to serve two paradoxical aims in his approach. The first is to explain how the confessionalism of the Mandatory period led to the National Pact and to point up the deficiency of the Lebanese system. The second is to highlight the Arab-nationalists as active opponents of the French confessionalist divide-and-rule policy. This may be seen explicitly when he describes "the struggle against division and for independence." According to Ḍāhir, leaders who in 1920 had been against the annexation of "the four districts" to Mount Lebanon, proved willing, from 1936 onwards, to accept Greater Lebanon within those 1920 frontiers, on condition that it was given full independence and could fully cooperate with its neighboring Arab countries. Here Ḍāhir relies on a short treatise written in 1936 by Kāẓim al-Ṣulḥ, a close relative of Riyāḍ al-

Ṣulḥ (whom Ḍāhir describes as the leader of the Muslim confessionalist-bourgeoisie). In order to convince the Muslim leaders to accept the 1920 frontiers, both Kāẓim and Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ justified such a shift as the best way in which the Muslims could remove the suspicions and fears of the Christian about Arabism.[73] Ḍāhir portrays people such as Yūsuf al-Sawdā and Taqiy al-Dīn al-Ṣulḥ as champions of Christian-Muslim brotherhood, of Lebanon's independence and inter-Arab cooperation, especially as "class motivations" do not come into it with them.[74]

Writing during the late 1970s the author states that the civil war had exposed "the historic injustice" these Christian and Muslim confessional-bourgeois leaders had committed when they adopted the political confessional system as set out in Chiha's formula and discarded the Arab national identity of the country:

> The … Lebanese bourgeoisie promotes the slogan of Western culture to attract its Christian wing and advances economic Arabism to attract its Muslim wing. The clear ideological origin of this slogan stems, inescapably, from the original slogan that called for an independent Lebanon on the basis of unity among the confessions … which is repeated by Michel Chiha in all his writings.[75]

Criticizing the Lebanese system established during the Mandatory period and consolidated in the National Pact of 1943, Ḍāhir bemoans the fact that the unity among the confessions, instead of creating an independent state, had created independent confessional states within the state dangerously rooted in "the cultural pluralism dreamed up by the confessionalists."[76]

Viewing confessionalism through the Marxist prism of the class struggle, Ḍāhir utilizes the terms "confessional" and "class" as two components of the Lebanese socio-political system.[77] Although he does not specify which of the two predominates, Ḍāhir states that "[the] confessional ideology was not born during the campaign for independence, but is ancient. It is an historical reality, a centuries-old vestige, [in other words] confessionalism is rooted in the confessional-class system in Lebanon."[78]

This hyphenation ("confessional-class") is axiomatic in Ḍāhir's book *al-Judhūr al-Tārīkhiyya lil Mas'ala al-ṭā'ifiyya 1697–1861* (The Historical Roots of the Lebanese Confessional Problem, 1697–1861) which he published in 1981. As the product of a Marxist intellectual fully engaged in the polemics on *ṭabī'at al-ṣīgha al-Lubnāniyya* (the nature of the Lebanese system) which the outbreak of "the confessional civil war" had brought to the surface, Ḍāhir's now seeks to tease out the socio-economic nature of confessionalism. The best way to do so is by analyzing the forces of production that stratified confessionalism as far back as 1697, with the Shihābī ascendancy in Mount Lebanon, until 1861. As this method "has proved its reliability in the analysis of the development of all societies," Ḍāhir wants to use it here in support of the masses who struggle to "erase the confessional-class society and construct a democratic secular society,

which opens the way to eliminating the exploitation of one human being by another."[79]

Not unlike Kawtharānī, Ḍāhir ascribes the stratification of the confessional-class society in Lebanon to two historical forces: Western colonialism and the concomitant decline of the Ottoman empire. However, he holds that the inroads colonialism was making into the socio-economic infrastructure of the Ottoman empire can explain only *al-ʿām* (the macro) level of confessional-class stratification in Lebanon. At *al-khāṣ* (the micro) level, Ḍāhir focuses on the way the Maronite Church organized itself politically under the impact of the West. He then concludes that "the Lebanese confessional problem is essentially a political problem limited to the Maronites in certain Lebanese areas, and does not extend to Christians throughout the Arab East."[80]

Continuing his search for the roots of stratification, Ḍāhir temporarily abandons his hyphenated confessional-class society and concentrates on the historical factors that helped put confessionalism in place. Marxist theory here again aids him in his attempt to locate the emergence of confessionalism among the stages of historical materialism: "It is necessary to search for historical stage at which confessionalism emerged with a stratified nature as a result of the capitalist mode of production and its [social] relations, and not as mere forms of religious tenets. The emergence of this stratified confessionalism could not be investigated … before the birth of the state in its modern capitalist form."[81] In this way the author differentiates between, on the one hand, the religious community which, in the pre-capitalist stage, simply comprises the faithful, and the transformation of that community into a stratified entity with social characteristics following the introduction of the capitalist mode of production. Ḍāhir then argues that in many historical cases "the bourgeois state destroyed almost all the ancient feudal relationships in favor of the ascendant forces of the bourgeoisie." Viewing confessionalism as a form of feudalism, he resorts to two Marxist concepts to explain how it could have survived in the era of capitalism. The first is the role played by "peripheral capitalism prevalent in the Arab East in preserving several pre-capitalist forms, such as *al-tajziʾa al-iqlīmiyya* (localism), *al-ʿashāʾiriyya* (tribalism), *al-ṭāʾifiyya* (confessionalism), *al-ʿirqiyya* (ethnicity), and others."[82] The second is the Asiatic mode of production, which also preserved "many of its ancient fundamentals such as confessionalism, clannishness and localism" until the capitalist stage.[83]

Here Ḍāhir seems to give us, on one and the same page, two clearly contradictory statements, the first saying that in the pre-capitalist era the religious communities were exactly that, communities of believers, which then as result of the capitalist mode of production, stratified into confessionalism, the second that confessionalism existed before and could survive under capitalism as one of the fundamentals of the Asiatic mode of production. This is highlighted in the following passage:

> Scientific analysis of the development of our Eastern societies from the pre-capitalist to capitalist modes of production [shows] how they kept many of their

> previous forms and, in fact, explains how these [pre-capitalist] modes continued to be the stratified basis within [these Eastern societies] after the emergence of world capitalist production and exchange of goods.[84]

To back up his notion that stratified confessionalism existed before the capitalist era he settles on the Ottoman *millet* system as a good example of a political system created by the Asiatic mode of production.[85]

As "history repeats itself," Ḍāhir deterministically assumes that "the fate of the Lebanese confessionalist system, which was established on the basis of the Ottoman *millet* system and inherited from it many features of the Asiatic mode of production … cannot be any better than the fate of its maternal [i.e., Ottoman] model." The only solution to the Lebanese predicaments is for the state "to pass from the *millet* system into the secular stage, which becomes the true gateway within for Lebanese society toward the horizons of the natural political development within its Arab environment."[86] Having abandoned his argument that confessionalism cannot have become stratified in the pre-capitalist era, the author now presents confessionalism as the legacy of the past. It is no longer "*tashwīh* (blurring) of the social struggle or *ḥirfa* (deviation) from its real framework" but an integral part of the socio-economic and political structure. In other words, confessionalism is no longer "false consciousness."[87] Instead of laying bare "the roots of confessionalism," Ḍāhir has come up with somewhat wishy-washy results which in many ways are close to the primordialist approach represented by "*la diversité est notre destin*." What sets Ḍāhir apart from the primordialists is his Marxist terminology, his negation of the system as based on "the unity of associated confessions," and his desire to establish "a new Arab, democratic and non-confessional Lebanon."[88]

Throughout the long and detailed historical survey he presents in his *al-Judhūr*, Ḍāhir persistently accommodates his narrative to his main argument that "confessionalism and class are two sides of the same coin."[89] It would take us too far to fully analyze Ḍāhir's fascinating 500–page attempt to harness the historical account he gives of one part of modern Lebanon, namely Mount Lebanon, to his political cause of helping "the masses of all the confessions, i.e., the class-confessional oppressed masses, who do not cease to struggle for emancipation from their confessionalism and classicism."[90] Still, the following two examples may suffice to give a clear idea of how Ḍāhir goes about the task he has set himself. The first is his analysis of the steady rise from the eighteenth century on, of the Maronite Church as a socio-economic and cultural force in the "confessional-class" struggle. Ḍāhir painstakingly describes how the Church expanded through the economic exploitation of the poor rural population, the silk producers and the craftspeople, and through its firm grip on the education system, the health services, cultural production, and so on. One result was the decline of the Maronite landlords in the nineteenth century. Ḍāhir then describes the "class" struggle of the Christian peasants against their Druze landlords in the nineteenth century.[91] Despite the socio-economic trans-

formations supposedly leading in the opposite direction and the social upheavals and civil strife, Mount Lebanon's political course took on a confessional hue when oppressed Christian and Druze peasants, i.e., Lebanese of the same class, fought each other. About a century later the same stratified confessionalism resulted in the outbreak of civil war in Greater Lebanon. Both confessional civil wars took place, the author states, simply because "the prevalent mode of production gave confessionalism the possibility *al-ḥulūl fī qalb ʿulaqāt al-intāj al-musayṭira* (to be at the heart of the dominant relations of production)."[92]

ʿAmil: "Confessionalism (…) is nothing."

A theoretical debate soon evolved among Lebanese intellectuals, especially among Marxists, around the hyphenation of "confessional-class" "class-confessional" introduced by Ḍāhir.[93] Probably the most cogent exposition of the Marxist view and its implications for such issues as the political system, "class" and "confession," "national" and "confessional" identities, "cultural pluralism" and others can be found in the theoretical work of Mahdī ʿAmil,[94] an author whom we were already able to single out as representative of the Lebanese instrumentalist Marxists.

In his *Fī al-Dawla al-ṭāʾifiyya* (On the Confessional State), published one year before his death (ʿAmil was assassinated in 1987), he levels criticism on two fronts: i.e., at those who "take their cue from Chiha's concepts," such as Antoine Messarra, Iliya Harik and others, and at those who, as he sees it, "pervert" or "misunderstand" aspects of Marxist theory, such as Masʿūd Ḍāhir and Aḥmad Bʿalbakī.[95] When criticizing Lebanese intellectuals and politicians who justify the political system and the confessionalism on which it is based, he argues that their perception is mistaken because it stems from the way they define *al-ṭāʾifa* (the "confession" i.e., the religious community) as *jawhar* (essence) or *kayān mustaql qāʾim bi nafsihi* (an independent and self-contained entity). As such, relations among the communities must necessarily be conducted through the outside medium of the state. The latter functions by means of a system of political confessionalism to maintain a balance that will always be delicate and to guarantee a peaceful coexistence among the religious communities that will always remain precarious. In his view, the conceptual separation between the state and the confessions or the religious communities not only errs in the way it defines "confessionalism" and its relation with the Lebanese state, but more importantly, it prevents Lebanon from being one *shaʿb* (people or nation) and one *waṭan* (country).[96]

Such a separation, ʿAmil claims, omits two interrelated dimensions of "the confessional state": the economic domination of the bourgeoisie and the political, ideological and constitutional system that enables the bourgeoisie to maintain its class domination:

> Confessionalism … is the historical formation of the political system through which the Lebanese bourgeoisie has practiced its class domination … The historical conditions [during the second half of the nineteenth century and the Mandate period] in which the Lebanese bourgeois state was formed as a "confessional" state are the same conditions in which capitalism in Lebanon was formed, i.e., the conditions of [permanent] crisis. These conditions also aborted the development of the Lebanese bourgeois toward … a type of European bourgeoisie … For these reasons and others, the "confessional" form became the essence of the Lebanese state as bourgeois state … This form permits the bourgeoisie to control the class struggle, keeping the working class trapped in a relationship of dependency … on it.[97]

According to 'Amil, the permanent crisis in which the Lebanese state has found itself since it was established, stems from the type of relationship that pertains between the capitalism of Lebanon itself (as the periphery) and the capitalism in the center (the metropolis). The structural crisis of capitalist production in Lebanon 'Amil calls "the colonial form"—different from capitalist production proper because it results from its dependency on imperialism. The distinction he introduces between "imperialism" and "colonialism" enables him to refute the argument of his Marxist colleagues that "confessionalism" existed already in the pre-capitalist era. Capitalism in Lebanon was of the colonial type by virtue of its dependency on the capitalism at the imperialist center. This inherent dependency explained the inability of Lebanese capitalism to shed the relations of pre-capitalist production. It is in these conditions that reside Lebanon's "confessionalism and clannishness," which therefore are neither "primordial" nor "static and rooted."[98]

'Amil distinguishes the "religious ideologies" that existed in the feudal systems before the state from the "confessionalism" in Lebanon. Tracing "confessionalism" to "rooted religious ideologies" means "explaining the present through the past."[99] Different from the religious ideologies that prevailed in the feudal era, confessionalism became the system of the state not because there were multiple religious communities in Lebanon but as a result of the type of capitalism that had grown there: "Capitalism in Lebanon … explains 'confessionalism,' even if 'this confessionalism' is rooted in history."[100] Confessionalism was never a political system in the Middle East; the Ottoman *millet* system was not political in the modern Lebanese sense. Moreover, the use of confessionalism in Lebanon is completely different from the way it was used in the old Muslim states.[101] Historically, Lebanese confessionalism started with the 1926 constitution and evolved until the establishment of the High Shi'i Council in 1967, through a number of state decrees.[102]

Accordingly, 'Amil wants to rescue two related features that have become blurred by confessionalism and which Chiha, as the representative of the bourgeoisie, ideologically justified through his concept of "cultural pluralism." The first is the specific class nature of the state, which pretends to a neutral role, and the second—more important—is the relationship between class dom-

ination and confessional domination by one community (the Maronite). As 'Amil succinctly phrases it, confessional domination forms the basis for the state's confessional pluralism and simultaneously guarantees the bourgeois nature of the state.[103] Although he stresses that Lebanon's confessional domination is that of the Maronites, he argues that as a bourgeois political system "confessionalism is bourgeois in nature. The 'confessional' conduct of the class struggle is bourgeois, whether practiced by Islamic or Christian groups."[104] 'Amil emphasizes that the confessional state can be no other than one community dominating all others. Chiha's concept of Lebanon as a "country of associated communal minorities" served to blur this domination. "Cultural pluralism" is merely another name for the same idea. Chiha and the intellectuals and politicians who supported him indirectly acknowledged this domination when they claimed it could be legitimized in many ways—historical, natural, geographical, religious and cultural. In search of this legitimacy, they resorted to a "history" that was to help them differentiate between *al-jawhar* (the essence) and *al-'āriḍ* (the transient). "This essence is nothing but *Lubnān al-kayān* ("Lebanon the entity"), which has always been Christian … [C]onsequently Maronitism permeates beyond the frontiers of the community and history, whose beginning it is." Maronitism becomes the "*al-kayān - al-jawhar* (the entity, the essence) or an abstraction through which … the Phoenicians are Maronitized. But the transient … is the (other), and the other are the Arabs, Islam and now [1977–9] the Palestinians." To illustrate his point 'Amil reminds his readers of Chiha's statement: "Our destiny—of us, the Lebanese—is to live always in danger, even to live with this danger, which is the danger of the tyranny of the transient over the essence, and to live the adventure of the essence, defending itself from the tyranny of the transient."[105]

In keeping with his instrumentalist Marxist approach, 'Amil lashes out not only at *al-ṣigha al-Shihāwiyya* and writers like Messarra, Harik, Naṣīf Naṣṣar and Bassām al-Hāshim who support it,[106] but also at the concept of Arab nationalism as represented by Kawtharānī. Both concepts share a "primordialist view," each with its own primordial value. In his criticism of the Arab nationalists' exposition he singles out their argument that confessionalism in Lebanon was created and recreated to split Arab unity and then adds that it stems from the same source as "the bourgeois ideology." He particularly criticizes those Arab nationalists who claim that "Lebanon is composed of *'ṭawā'if'* ('religious communities') which coexist under the domination of the Christian 'communities,' specifically the Maronite." These Arab nationalists, therefore, see the solidarity of the Christians, notably the Maronites, "as naturally [directed] against the Arab-Islamic solidarity … or against Arab nationalism, because this has been and still is [the Maronite] position, from the Arab-Muslim conquest until today, via the Crusades and the Mandate." According to 'Amil, this nationalist explanation of the Lebanese case was inspired by "the logic of the racialist 'confessional' ideology, though it has a 'nationalist' color."[107]

Rejecting both concepts, ʿAmil argues that this domination by one community is not Maronite domination *per se* but has its roots in the specific nature of Lebanon as a colonial bourgeois state. He explains this through an in-depth analysis of the internal contradiction inherent in such a state. ʿAmil devotes literally hundreds of pages to this analysis, but, as in the case of Ḍāhir, I will briefly concentrate here on only two of its main aspects. One is the way the author conceptualizes the contradiction within the Lebanese bourgeois-colonial state and the other is the way he points up the contradiction within the Lebanese "confessional state" as the political form of the former. Significantly, this political form allows sub-units of the Lebanese bourgeoisie to cohere into the dominant class. ʿAmil explains this coherency, which inevitably leads to the domination of one particular sub-unit, through the pre-capitalist mode of production and the social forms that were typical of it in Lebanon. The bourgeoisie in a colonial type of state can reach dominance only through "*al-iqṭāʿāt al-siyāsiyya*" (freely translated as the distribution of political power). Though derived from *iqtāʿ* (feudalism), *al-iqṭāʿāt al-siyāsiyya* is made to stand for the distribution of power among politicians as representatives of clans and religious communities. Because feudalism can not exist in the bourgeois colonial state, there is no room for any duality—the political apparatus will always have a bourgeois character. The "confessional" form this has is fundamental for the distribution of power, and thus for its existence as political apparatus. He argues that *al-iqṭāʿāt al-siyāsiyya,* the clan and confessional representatives, lack the power to function independently: they are completely dependent on the bourgeois apparatus, much as the pre-capitalist modes of production are dependent on the social colonial structure. Outside this structure they lack any coherency because this obtains only when they are subject to the colonial mode of production. Politically, *al-iqṭāʿāt al-siyāsiyya* cannot adhere of their own will, but only through the bourgeois apparatus itself whose own infrastructure consists of the colonial relations of production. At the same time, *al-iqṭāʿāt al-siyāsiyya*—as the "confessional" and clan "elites"—for their part guarantee the reproduction of the "confessional" political system, preventing the masses—"as confessions" or religious communities—from ever becoming an independent political force in the structure of the class struggle. This then creates the impression of confessional co-existence.[108]

But in his view, this form of apparent "coexistence" itself is the origin of the chronic crisis of the Lebanese system because, unlike the European state, where the capitalist structure is a factor of coherency and integration, the confessional state—as the state of the colonial bourgeoisie—is a factor of dissociation. Whereas the European state can achieve unity of society, secularism and internal coherency through control of the class struggle, the Lebanese state abandoned the class struggle when it adopted confessionalism as the political form of bourgeois class practice. Although groups within the dominant class can acquire coherency, within the state confessionalism creates dissociation. Yet, the author persistently holds that this same internal dissociation is the very basis on which

the bourgeoisie can maintain its class domination and reproduce the social structure of a state of the colonial type.[109]

"It is natural," 'Amil explains, "that the relations between the different parts of the dominant class are characterized by competition and dispute, which also prevail on the level of confessional domination." The two are related: the first, domination of the class, "is in general, with a few extraordinary exceptions, a factor of the unity and coherency of the state" because ultimately the different parts of the same class which seek to maintain class dominance can control their conflict. This dynamics permits the dominance of one part of the same class over the others. The second form of domination stems from the competition and dispute between the "alleged" confessional representatives. To keep the masses chained to their confessional, these representatives accept the dominance of one particular group. In other words, it is never a religious community that dominates, but this community's bourgeois representatives. Though this dynamics between class and confessional representatives guarantees the reproduction of class domination adjusted by confessional equilibrium, consensus and democracy, it cannot but invite confessional conflicts—not between the confessions or the religious communities but between their "alleged" representatives![110]

In an uncompromisingly instrumentalist approach, 'Amil insists that only in the historical circumstances of the class struggle as it was played out since the Mandate did the confessional form of this struggle emerge. This leads him to deny the existence of *al-ṭā'ifa* (the confession) as an ethnic group in the modern sociological sense: "*Al-ṭā'ifa,* therefore, is not an entity. It is not essence. It is nothing. It is a political relationship determined by a certain historical form of the class struggle which is controlled by the bourgeoisie in the political absence of its class alternative."[111]

In his polemic with Ḍāhir, his Marxist colleague who defines *al-ṭā'ifa* "as a human grouping which has coalesced historically," 'Amil poses these questions: "What is the main ingredient that makes up this grouping (*al-ṭā'ifa*)? Is it a religious ingredient? Cultural? Ethnic? Political? Economic? National? Linguistic? And how has this grouping coalesced? And by whom?"[112] In 'Amil's view many of these questions are irrelevant: "Probably I have been misunderstood … Thus I repeat: *al-ṭā'ifa—la al-tā'ifiyya* (confession—not confessionalism) is the political relationship of class dependency of the working classes … on the bourgeoisie, in a form of political confessional representation. But *al-ṭā'ifiyya* (confessionalism) is the political system through which this bourgeoisie dominates."[113] In this sense, 'Amil's "confession" appears wherever a form of political confessional representation exists.

The question that now immediately arises is why is this political representation specifically confessional? 'Amil responds by repeating his argument that *al-ṭā'ifa* is not an independent entity but exists only because the dominant class wants to blur the real struggle, namely the class struggle through which and dependent on which the "confessions" can emerge. To say,

with Fawaz Ṭraboulsi, that "clan and confessional loyalties are part of the relations of production" is a heresy as far as ʻAmil is concerned: "Because the relations of production exist among human beings in the course of producing their material living, they are divided into classes according to their actual position vis-à-vis the means of production … The class … has no connection with religious, confessional and sectarian loyalties."[114]

Like many Lebanese intellectuals of the Left in the 1970s or even the 1980s, ʻAmil insists on regarding Lebanon's chronic ethnic "illness" as resulting from the bourgeoisie's failure to build a nation-state according to the European model. Not only in Lebanon but elsewhere in the Arab world, it is the colonial type of bourgeoisie which forms the obstacle. In other words, the Arab nationalism articulated by this bourgeoisie is an ideology that serves no other purpose than class domination.[115] Although ʻAmil's "class struggle" somewhat tends to ignore the cultural dimension of "Arab civilization" and its impact on nationalism, he is closest to the Arab nationalists who see "Arabism" and "Arab civilization" as "givens," i.e., Lebanon shares this civilization with the Arab countries. In this respect, ʻAmil differentiates between "subjective" nationalism, which he equates with the ideology of the Arab bourgeoisie, and the "objective" culture of the "Arab nation," which the bourgeoisie uses as a political instrument.[116] Thus, he denies the role of "cultural pluralism" in the origin of the "confessional strife" in Lebanon. And it is in this way that he wants to arrive at what he calls "*waṭan li-shaʻb lā liṭawāʼif* (a country for a nation, not for the confessions)."[117]

As a Marxist, ʻAmil is probably the most consistent in the way he puts economic factors at the heart of his explanation of Lebanon's confessional system in Lebanon. Still, ʻAmil does not give us an answer either to the one fundamental question of why, from the 1920s onwards, the "colonial bourgeoisie" and the "dominant class" decided upon *al-ṭāʼifa* as best suited to their purpose. Even the new term he coins for them in their pre-capitalist form, *al-iqṭāʻāt al-siyāsiyya,* leaves unanswered what was specifically "confessional" about them. If he acknowledges that only under the Lebanese system did *al-iqṭāʻāt al-siyāsiyya* become "confessional" representatives, does this not mean that also before their "transformation" they represented some kind of collectivity? And why not call this collective entity *al-ṭāʼifa*? The new features the historical developments lent this *ṭāʼifa* after 1920 then set it apart from the way it had functioned in its various forms in the past. For centuries people in the areas that now make up Lebanon identified themselves—or were identified by others—as Maronites, Druzes, Shiʻis, Sunnis, etc., and as such were concentrated in specific areas. The question ʻAmil asked as to what factors—religious, cultural, ethnic, national, linguistic, and so on—sets them apart is not entirely rhetorical. Since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries religious identification in the Middle East has been subject to constant change: Iran from Sunni became Shiʻi, almost all Christian religious communities at one point or another split into two or more

separate communities, each again promoting new solidarities and new "cultural entities"; even if some communities preserved their unity, as for example the Maronites, these were often subject to internal transformations on both the institutional and cultural level. As Paul Brass has it:

> Religious identification too is subject to change—and not only by modern cosmopolitan man engaged in enlightened spiritual quests. Shifts in religious practices brought about under the influence of religious reformers are common occurrences in pre-modern, modernizing, and even in post-industrial societies. Sometimes such shifts are clearly designed to promote internal solidarity and external differentiation from other groups.[118]

Brass is here arguing, against the primordialist position, that "attachments" based on "place of birth, kinship relationships, religion, language, and social practices" are not the "givens" (Geertz's term) of the human condition, but can vary. He reminds us, for example, how in certain situations "ethnic group members have deliberately shifted their own language and educated their children in a different language than their mother tongue in order to differentiate themselves further from another ethnic group."[119]

In Part One I have tried to show how the failure of Lebanon, up to the present day, to become a nation-state has its roots in the very creation of "Greater Lebanon" in 1920—instead of melting into one nation, the deeply entrenched divergences among the elites of the ethno-religious communities the French had brought together only sharpened the cleavages between them. The result was the deadlock of "confessionalism."

From the outset all Sunni and large segments of the Shi'i, Druze and Greek Orthodox intellectuals and politicians rejected the new state they had become part of, refusing to accept borders that had been drawn by the French and a political structure that had been put in place by the established elite around Michel Chiha. And when, after 1926, they began to come around to the idea of Greater Lebanon as a territorial state, this only intensified the debate among them as to what the defining national features of that state ought to be. *Al-ṣigha al-Shiḥāwiyya* now came up against the multiple forms of collective identity that had survived and even been reinforced by the establishment of Greater Lebanon and others newly fashioned to directly oppose it. In Part Two I trace the road that led from here to independence.

PART TWO

IN THE SHADOW OF THE CEDAR

CHAPTER THREE

BETWEEN TOWN AND COUNTRYSIDE

> Historically (…) mafia was the practical Sicilian remedy for an explosive countryside. The term *mafia* refers to the leaseholders (*gabelloto*) and field guards (*compiere*) who controlled rural estates on behalf of their absentee landowners. (Only later did the term acquire its present connotation of a criminal gang.) If we look at Lebanon through Sicilian spectacles, it is striking the extent to which the countryside was controlled by similar social forces: the Lebanese *zu'ama* (leaders) and *qabadayat* ("tough men"). In Lebanon as in Sicily, the remedy for peasant insurgency was political violence by estate managers and their agents.
>
> Edmund Burke III, "Rural Collective Action," p. 25

Rural Resistance

Until recently, a pervasive paradigm in historical writing saw the countryside as a passive factor in the politics of Mandatory Syria and Lebanon. One of the first historians of the Mandatory period, Stephen Longrigg, wrote in 1958 that

> the masses in the countryside continued to ignore politics (except when specifically incited thereto by their landlords or visiting foreigners), and to find the conditions of their lives, as of their minds, but little changed; but in the towns it was more evident that in modernity of atmosphere, in new possibilities of progress and enterprise, a new era had dawned.[1]

Longrigg of course was a "modernist" historian but many scholars still accept his broad generalization and continue to focus on the town as the location where national ideologies were being worked out and confessional politics put into practice by urban elites and absentee landlords. Such a focus does not prevent the various socio-political events that occurred in the countryside from being included in the overall historical narrative, but it ignores the significant way in which they influenced the entire socio-political process. And it skews the historical picture of Lebanon during the onset of the French Mandate.

As we shall see, during the first five years of the Mandate it was exactly the countryside that forced the French to reconsider many of the policies and administrative institutions they had already or were about to put into place. As early as 1920, there were a good many uprisings, some large, some small, and

other forms of violence throughout Jabal al-'Alawin, Jabal al-Durūz, Jabal 'Amil, al-Biqā' and al-Shūf. Peasant unrest also spread through large rural areas around Aleppo and al-Jazīra (near the Syrian-Iraqi border) as late as 1923. Their culmination was the Syrian Revolt of 1925–1927. Though of course politics in the towns was coupled with that in the countryside, it was in reaction to these acts of rural resistance and "violence" that we should read the constitutional and administrative "reorganization" the French implemented after 1925. As I argue in this chapter, the whole phenomenon of resistance during these first five years points to the new tripartite relationship between town, countryside and ruling authorities that had come about following the imposition of the Mandate. As such, it merits a fresh historical perspective.

During the early 1920s, one finds the French military authorities making efforts to thwart the increasing activities of what they called "brigands" in many parts of the Mandated territories. Perhaps one of the more striking examples of such countryside "bands" are the *shaqiy*s[2] of northern Syria. During the summer of 1923 *shaqiy*s attacked and plundered landlords' residences, wealthy quarters and "garden" caravans, and tax collectors in and around Aleppo. In May 1923, Smart, the British consul there, reported that 'Alawi "groups" had joined the several Sunni "bands" in attacks on the outskirts of Aleppo.[3] The same phenomenon prevailed in al-Jazīra as far as Abu Kamāl on the Syrian-Iraqi border.[4] In addition a Revolutionary Committee emerged in the countryside around Aleppo who in their attacks singled out the French authorities and the commercial circles of the city.[5]

*Shaqiy*s had already operated in the Ottoman empire. However, the first world war and the early years of the Mandate period were a period of economic depression and *shaqiy*s became more active. In many parts of Syria their raids would intensify at harvest time. In late June 1923 the British consul reports: "A band a few days ago plundered a village near El-Bab, 20 miles east of Aleppo, belonging to Ahmed Effendi El-Yemlikha, director of cadastre at Aleppo, and carried off his son, for whose release a ransom of 500 Turkish gold pounds is now being demanded." Another band had threatened the inhabitants of an Aleppo quarter, informing them that if a ransom of 500 Turkish gold pounds was not paid, the harvest they had just collected would be burned.[6] He also mentioned a band that had looted a caravan traveling from Aleppo to Dayr Al-Zūr on Nahr al-Dhahab (a stream near Aleppo) and another one that had murdered three tax-collectors and six of the gendarmes that accompanied them in the village of Sabbayyeh near Antioch.[7]

Undoubtedly, Mount Lebanon had suffered much economic hardship during the first world war. In 1914 already its inhabitants had seen the near complete decline of two main sources of income, silk production and remittances from Lebanese emigrants. In the summer of 1915 the mountain was plagued by huge swarms of locusts which ravaged whole regions. In 1916 inhabitants began to feel the grip of hunger, and in 1917–18 famine struck large

sections of the populations. Supplies from Biqāʿ and Ḥawrān were seized by Ottoman troops[8] or "manipulated by the *mutaṣarrif, qāʾimmaqāms* and others, who in many cases sold the grain at exorbitant prices."[9] Although the entry of the French into the area brought some relief from the famine, *fallāḥīn* continued to suffer from food shortages and loss of the income they had earned before 1914 from silk production.[10]

From 1920 on, the French authorities began taking tougher measures against the *shaqiy*s because they disrupted the main commercial traffic between the coastal cities and the interior. Containing them here was more crucial than in the Aleppo area because some of the bands were seen by the French authorities as sectarian in nature and thus could provoke sectarian strife. In March 1923, the British consul reported that the local gendermarie in al-Shūf district had succeeded in killing "two well-known brigands, named Ḥasan Thābit, and Shāmil ʿAzzām, and in capturing Maḥmūd Thābit, brother of the first-named." Ḥasan Thābit "was a leader of a band which for some three years has terrorized the Bekaa and surrounding districts … [Shāmil ʿAzzām] was his second-in-command, and was the murderer of Fouad Bey Jounblat [Fūʾād Junblāṭ] … who was killed last year. The band, however still exists, and its new leader is reputed to be Shakib el Wahab [Shakīb al-Wahhāb]."[11] The British consul here seems to confuse between the two groups of Thābit and Wahhāb. The latter was organized after the Arab defeat at the hands of the French at Maysalūn, by Wahhāb, who in 1919 had joined Fayṣal's forces in Damascus. The killing of Fūʾād Junblāṭ by this band may have been deliberate or accidental. Fūʾād Junblāṭ, the Druze leader of the Junblāṭī faction, had been appointed by the French in 1920 as *qāʾimmaqām* (governor) of al-Shūf district, which from 1861 had been mostly in the hands of Arslān family. While the French authorities were distributing the main official posts in the Druze area among the leading Druze clans, such as Junblāṭ, Arslān and ʿImād, the appointment of Fūʾād Junblāṭ as *qāʾimmaqām* could but renew Druze factionalism.[12]

While French official authorities treated the members of the Lebanese bands as outlaws bent on disrupting public order, Arab sources generally see them as members of the resistance against European rule, supported and guided in 1919–20 by Fayṣal's government, and after the latter's quick demise, by Syrian Arab "nationalists" who had fled to Transjordan. In the summer of 1920, the French authorities accused bands of Shiʿi *fallāḥīn* of raiding the Christian villages of the Biqāʿ. The unrest in the Shiʿi rural area in south Lebanon turned into a local uprising in 1921 which culminated in an attack by a band led by Adham Khanjar against General Gouraud near Qunayṭira.[13] However, while the French were able to subdue many of these Shiʿi bands in south Lebanon in 1920–21,[14] further eruptions of "brigandage" among the Druzes and Christians in al-Shūf and Biqāʿ threatened to undermine security and order in these regions.[15] According to the official Mandatory press, the Druze bands had been formed by fugitives or former soldiers from Syria who had left with Amīr Fayṣal

and established themselves in Transjordan.[16] For the Druze historian, Ḥasan al-Bʿaynī, who also mentions the Transjordanian connection, Ḥasan Thābit's group belonged to the "patriotic bands" that operated against the French authorities and the Christian bands in defense of the Druze interests.[17]

The above leaves room for the assumption that the aims of the Druze and Christian bands were often political, even though they continued to pillage caravans, highway traffic, wealthy merchants and villagers. Activities concentrated on the Damascus-Beirut road and May 1923 may well have been the bloodiest month in al-Shūf and Biqāʿ since the establishment of the Mandate. In the village of Bḥamdūn, much frequented in the summer by wealthy Beirut merchants, a Druze band murdered a Jewish couple and two of their children. A few days later, the deaths of two Druzes were reported, one near Kafr Nabrakh and the other on the Bayt al-Dīn road. In June, a British national was killed when an unknown band attacked four vehicles. On the Beirut-Sidon road two Druzes, one from Dayr Bābā and the other from Kfarḥīm, were murdered.[18] Relying on official sources, the British consul in Damascus also reported, on 24 May, that a band of sixteen Druzes had attacked and plundered a caravan of fifteen muleteers who had been on their way to the villages of Fradīs and Bārūk, killing eight of the muleteers, five Christians and three Sunnis. One or two days later a "Druze band" disguised in military dress was reported to have moved into the Druze village of Qanafār in Biqāʿ, arresting three Druzes, two of whom they had killed outside the village.[19] Six days after this report, the British consul of course had to confirm that the report of the incident of Qanafār had been "garbled: Christians dressed as gendarmes had got hold of some Druzes and killed two of them."[20]

That the activities of the bands in al-Shūf and Biqāʿ were bearing sectarian color becomes clear when we find that in 1921 the French authorities appointed Fūʾād Mghabghab and Yūsuf Kasbar, both Christians, to positions in the higher gendarmerie. Going by oral and written Druze testimony, Bʿaynī mentions that Mghabghab's hostile conduct toward the Druze villagers led to great agitation among the community.[21] In one of his reports, the acting British consul-general first described "the outbreak of brigandage and murder in the Shouf" as "the outcome of the long-existing religious feuds between the Maronites and Druzes," but then added that "there is reason to believe that the appointments to the higher Gendarmerie and other official posts [which] are largely dictated by political expediencies and are not dependent on the qualifications of the nominees … have made the present outbreak possible."[22] In order to stave off sectarian conflict, the administration of al-Shūf was "temporarily entrusted to a French officer."[23] The *qāʾimmaqām*s of al-Shūf and Dayr al-Qamar were dismissed. A gendarmerie force under a French officer was sent to Biqāʿ to clear it of brigands.[24] Further "drastic measures" included the arrest of eight Druze notables from the villages of Bʿaqlīn and Bārūk, who were taken to Beirut and detained as hostages. At the same time, in order to demonstrate some balance,

the former Maronite *qā'immaqām* of Dayr al-Qamar "was also arrested but was shortly after released."[25]

What this shows is that the new Mandatory administration upset the relationship that had existed between the elites of the Maronites and the Druzes on Mount Lebanon since 1861. Druze-Maronite confessional strife in the nineteenth century had been brought to an end in 1861 when, under the pressure of France and with the consent of Britain, Russia, Prussia and Austria, the Ottoman empire had granted Mount Lebanon administrative autonomy and created the *mutaṣarrifiyya*. This had ushered in a "long peace" of more than a half century between the two religious communities. *Al-mutaṣarrifiyya* gave political and economic preponderance to the Maronite elites, but it allowed the leading Druze families to maintain their political power as long as they went along with this Maronite dominance. Following the first world war many Druze leaders and intellectuals expected that the establishment of the Arab government in Damascus (1919–1920) would help change the balance of power on Mount Lebanon in their favor. Lebanese Druzes were politically active in Damascus up to Fayṣal's defeat at Maysalūn in 1920, and remained so after they had fled to Transjordan.[26] For most Druzes the introduction of the new French administration in al-Shūf, was a new form of Maronite domination now backed by direct French support.[27] Unlike the majority of the Shi'is and Sunnis, who lived in areas that had been annexed to Mount Lebanon only in 1920, most of the Druze community in the new state of Lebanon had always lived on Mount Lebanon. This meant that Shi'i and especially Sunni elites probably did not look upon Greater Lebanon's borders as final and immutable. But as the Druzes inhabited the "core" area of the new state and as they believed the French had formed Lebanon under pressure of the Maronite elites, many Druze elites were keenly aware that, whatever its territorial size, the new state would always guarantee the predominance of the Maronites.

To this came that the reorganization of the administration in the new state affected the Druze elites on both the regional and national levels more than it did other confessional elites. On the regional level, Greater Lebanon was divided into four new administrative units (*mutaṣarrifiyya*s or *sanjaq*s): northern Lebanon, with Zgharta as its center, Mount Lebanon, with B'abda as its center, Southern Lebanon, with Sidon as its center, and Biqā', with Zaḥla as its center. Apart from Sidon, these centers were Maronite and Christian towns. Beirut and Tripoli remained independent administrations.[28] Even in the sub-units (*qaḍā*s and *mudīriyya*s) within the four *mutaṣarrifiyya*s, which totaled more than twenty, the only official post occupied by members of the Druze elites was that of *qā'immaqām* in al-Shūf, for which competition among the leading families continued throughout the Mandate period. In the Representative Council, which replaced the Administrative Council of 1861–1920 and which then, in 1926, became the Lebanese parliament, confessional representation limited the Druze elites to a mere two delegates.[29]

At the same time, budgetary pressures forced the French authorities already in 1921 to seek a reform of the regional and national administrations. In the

wake of the first world war the French government had no intention to invest capital in Syria and Lebanon and was unwilling to let the French taxpayers make up for possible budgetary deficits in Syria and Lebanon. Thus, at the end of 1920, the French Mandatory increased taxes. According to the British consul, this caused public dissatisfaction even among the Maronites: "The increase of taxation in the old Lebanon, where a merely nominal tax was before levied on real property … No account is taken of the fact that, in spite of this increase, taxation remains relatively very low."[30] Although as a result French expenditure fell from FF 90 million in 1920 to FF 56 million in 1921 and to FF 44 million in 1922, the French authorities, through a proposal for administrative reform in June 1922, sought further cuts in the main departments of the Lebanese administration.[31] This proposal faced opposition from leading figures among the Christian Lebanese francophiles and was rejected by the Representative Council.[32]

As the French remained supreme in policy making, it was the Maronite and other Christian elites who occupied most senior official posts. This, in turn, enabled them to foster the future political system of the new state. That is, the new political array created in Lebanon between 1920 and 1922 restricted the ability of the leading Druze families to negotiate for official posts and for themselves. Whereas during the period of *al-mutaṣarrifiyya* they had shown great flexibility in their deals with the Maronite elites, in Greater Lebanon they found themselves up against new competitors belonging to elites from beyond Mount Lebanon and the traditional policy-making strata. This weakening of their bargaining power meant a further decline in the status of the community. In the words of a Druze emigrant in Egypt: "What increases my worry is that the situation of the community is going from bad to worse, and their rights are gradually being lost. If such a situation continues for a long time, it will be the most inferior community in Greater Lebanon in contrast to what it was in small Lebanon."[33]

Until at least 1926, the Sunni and Shi'i elites in the rural areas felt no pressure to mobilize in a confessional way but adjusted to the new rules of political bargaining by competing between themselves through a network of alliances they formed with their Christian counterparts and the Muslim elites in Beirut and Tripoli. Whereas in the Druze areas, economic pressure on the *fallāḥīn* went hand in hand with disaffection among the elites, Shi'i and Sunni elites collaborated with the French authorities, which is why the bands in their areas could be contained in years 1920–1921. This may also explain why the economic distress and the emergence of new bands in the Shi'i and Sunni areas after 1921 did not lead to the kind of "confessional" strife as flared up in the Druze areas.[34] In the rural Shi'i and Sunni areas such as south Lebanon, Biqā' and 'Akkār, the elites represented were generally by absentee landlords and regional politics was conducted in the towns, away from the *fallāḥīn*.

Although it was economic hardship rather than political motivation that provoked the activities of the Shi'i and Sunni bands, the French as well as the local pro-French press were quick to denounce them as "sectarian." The wish may well have been father to the thought. When in early 1920 the Maronite Patriarch asked General Gouraud to intervene against bands that habitually attacked Christian villages in Jabal 'Amil and al-Biqā', he launched a military operation using heavy weapons, artillery and even aircraft and attacking a large number of villages. There were many casualties while large numbers among the surviving inhabitants fled and sought refuge in northern Palestine and other safe areas.[35] Military actions of this kind created much resentment among Shi'i and Sunni *fallāḥīn*, not just against the French but also against the Maronites.

Still, it remains difficult to measure what impact this unrest in the countryside during the first five year of the Mandate may have had on ethnicizing the different religious communities. It is not difficult, however, to see how from the beginning of their Mandatory rule, the French introduced a policy of purposely dividing the Syrian and Lebanese populations along lines of sectarian and regional communities. In Lebanon they could justify their policy as continuing the "confessionalism" that had been adopted by the *mutaṣarrifiyya* regime. But this French "respect for tradition" quickly appeared to have its pragmatic reasons. It did not suffice the French to divide the Mandated territories into political entities, or states—Greater Lebanon, 'Alawī, Druze, Damascus and Aleppo—with that they further introduced political systems that were based on "confessional" representation, not just in Lebanon but in the other new states as well.[36]

The Politics of Confessionalism: First Elections

In Lebanon the "confessional" system was formally installed in 1921. Preparations for general elections included a census to determine how the communities would be represented. Although both the 1921 census and the May 22 general elections to the Representative Council, provoked the opposition of the urban Sunni elites—who rejected the existence of Lebanon as a separate state and refused to countenance its "confessional" features—the two acts effectively established the fundamentals of "political confessionalism" on the one hand and the clan features of the system in the other. The two electoral decrees issued in March the following year became the electoral law the Lebanese state applied until 1943.[37]

Greater Lebanon was divided into six constituencies: Beirut, Mount Lebanon, Tripoli, Northern Lebanon, Southern Lebanon, and Biqā'. The "confessional" distribution within the constituencies was fixed in proportion to the size of each community therein and in the Council according to the division of the total number of representatives. This regional and confessional electoral regime enabled candidates from the different communities to form alliances

with others and so compile competing lists. Such alliances, in which the French authorities were heavily involved, reinforced the pro-French elites in the towns and countryside. To promote pro-French candidates, the Mandatory authorities could abort the formation of lists based on political parties or alliances between non-sectarian political forces. The outcome was that clan rivalries within every community dominated the formation of the lists and the course of the elections. As a result of these alliances and French intervention a different mixture of elites emerged after the 1922 elections. Alongside urban Christian merchants who had decided to go into politics and had the backing of the French, clan elites in the towns and the countryside were among the members of the first members of the Representative Council.[38]

British officials, who generally watched their French counterparts in the Middle East with critical eyes, were skeptical. One of them wrote:

> The general attitude of the majority of the population is one of indignation at the management of the elections. It is believed that a correct surmise as to the procedure adopted is that only those candidates which the High Commissioner wished to be elected have been elected. In fact the general opinion is that the whole thing has been a farce. At Zahle and Beshrre people were forcibly prevented from voting for the opposition candidates with the result that numbers of people refrained from voting at all … It is fully realized that the Representative Council will be merely so in name and will be completely under the domination of the French Authorities.[39]

Bshara al-Khuri and Yūsuf al-Sawdā, both supporters of Greater Lebanon, voiced similar criticisms.[40]

Much the same happened in the 1925 elections. The High Commission worked to ensure the return of its supporters and the political elites again pushed their clan and factional alliances across communal and regional lines, with the merchants and free professionals of the towns and the landlords of the countryside resorting to the clan framework to form their lists. Descriptions of preparations by the elites for and of the atmosphere during the 1925 elections can be found in Walīd ʻAwaḍ's *Aṣḥāb al-Fakhāma.* ʻAwaḍ relates, for example, how Yūsuf Sālim, a Greek Catholic belonging to a Sidon merchant family, succeeded in winning a parliamentary seat through alliances with the local chiefs, even though his candidacy had been disapproved by the High Commission.[41] ʻAwaḍ also explains how someone like Êmile Eddé had failed in his bid to be elected in Beirut owing to an alliance between George Thābit, Eddé's opponent in the 1922 elections, and ʻUmar al-Dāʻūq and ʻUmar Bayhum, Sunni leaders belonging to Beirut merchant families. Similar pacts were concluded in the north, where two Sunnis, Muḥammad al-Jisr of Tripoli and ʻAbbūd Abd al-Razzāq of ʻAkkār, allied themselves with Christian candidates backed by the French authorities.[42]

The elections were held in June. In July a Druze revolt broke out in the Ḥawrān against the French. This soon swelled into a Syrian Arab-nationalist

revolt in which Sunnis, Shi'is and others joined in. In September the revolt spread to Biqā' and threatened to encroach further upon Mount Lebanon. Although Druze and Arab Syrian nationalist leaders tried to prevent sectarian clashes in the mixed Druze-Christian areas, there were incidents throughout Greater Lebanon in which Druzes, Shi'is and Sunnis attacked Christians whom they accused of collaborating with the French. Supporters of Greater Lebanon among the Christian leaders became anxious about safeguarding the integrity of the Lebanese state, especially as the revolt coincided with intense "Arab nationalist" activities among the Sunni elites of the coastal cities of Lebanon.[43] Their alarm increased when in 1926 the French proposed plans to revise the 1920 territorial division by "surrendering" territories such as Tripoli to Syria.[44] While this did not happen, the Syrian revolt did stimulate the French authorities, as we already saw, to fulfil the first article of the terms of the Mandate issued by the League of Nations in 1922, which stipulated Mandatory Powers the duty to frame a constitution for the Mandatory territories within three years.[45]

The Politics of Economics

The promulgation, in May 1926, of the Constitution is generally considered as the act that established the modern state of Lebanon. As we saw, it took place against a background of internal socio-economic and political cleavages that already then were being transformed into profound and distinctly "confessional" chasms. Although historically the economic gap between Mount Lebanon and the annexed areas of Biqā', Jabal 'Amil and 'Akkār can be traced back to the nineteenth century, it became wider when the French failed to encourage the rural economy. With the political system they put in place through the administrative institutions and the trappings of democracy they introduced parliamentary representation and a constitution—new economic legislation was to facilitate their political control. Soon after the establishment of the Mandate, the French began to draw up plans for "economic reforms" in Syria and Lebanon and asked French economic "experts" to measure *que vaut la Syrie* ("what Syria is worth") and to suggest ways of increasing its industrial and agricultural production.[46]

In other words, as with the British Mandate in Palestine, Mandatory rule was not to be at the expense of the home economy. As Barbara Smith has put it, "The assignment of territory under the Mandate system was little more than a thinly disguised title deed, enabling the overseer to promote political, strategic and economic metropolitan interests."[47]

The first steps in this direction were taken in March 1921, when the High Commissioner issued an *arrêté* (decree) intended to unify all taxes and duties throughout the whole of Greater Lebanon on the basis of the Ottoman

legislation that had been in force in the province of Beirut. Resistance by the elites of Mount Lebanon and bureaucratic problems caused the process to be drawn out over the entire Mandatory period. From 1861, taxation in Mount Lebanon had differed from other Ottoman provinces; apart from customs and excise duties, only two taxes were imposed, the *miri* (land tax), which was based on the "productivity" of land assessed by an old and fixed system of measurement, and *māl al-aʿnāq* (poll tax). In the province of Beirut, as in other Ottoman provinces, in addition to customs and excise, at least seven different kinds of taxes were levied: *al-ʿushr,* the tithe, the *werko* (a tax based on the capital value of land), the *tamatuʿ* (a semi income tax), an animal tax, a road tax, and monopoly taxes on tobacco and salt.[48]

Because the annexed areas, notably south Lebanon, were the main tobacco-growing regions, the monopoly tax on this commodity widened the taxation differential in Lebanon. The tobacco agriculture and industry had become a monopoly in 1876, and in 1881 its revenue was conceded to the Ottoman Public Debt. Three years later the concession was leased out to a French company in an arrangement called the *regie.* The French authorities maintained the monopoly until 1930, when the *regie* contract expired. However they replaced the monopoly by the *banderole* excise duty, placed at the high rate of 25 percent and supposedly to be applied to all the territories of Lebanon. Nevertheless, the annexed areas continued to pay the bulk of the monopoly tax, the *banderole* being treated as the continuation of the *regie.* In 1935 the *banderole* system was abolished and the monopoly tax was re-instituted to include Mount Lebanon, which provoked the anger of the Maronite elites and Church.[49]

Although the French "experts" pointed out the need to reform industry, agriculture and trade if the more "promising" factors among the economic prospects of Syria and Lebanon were to be stimulated, the Mandatory authorities were led by "economic" calculations of their own, as they wanted to avoid confrontation with social strata whose loyalty to the Mandate was vital. Reading through the economic regulations that came out at the beginning of the Mandate, one clearly observes the High Commissioner successfully establishing an economic apparatus of an army of advisors all geared to introducing effective systems of finance and customs and fixing an appropriate tariff to furnish more revenues. It is not difficult to imagine how they went about their task. Written testimony comes from Norman Bruns, professor of economics at the American University of Beirut (AUB) who wrote in 1933:

> Syria to-day, like England in 1775, is undergoing a fundamental transition, the evolution of a feudal agricultural economy into capitalist industrial- agricultural economy … A growing middle class has begun to fill the gap which existed between landed proprietors and the rural proletariat. Little by little a capitalist class will emerge to supplant the landed aristocracy as the controlling element of the country.[50]

Bruns connects the rise of the merchant class with the introduction of the customs and tariff policy. In Beirut he had witnessed now this class had benefited from the tariff regulations, and how this had changed Syria and Lebanon into a trade center in the Middle East. Although the general tariff wall around Syria rose from 11.5% in 1921 to 16.5% in 1932, the Open Door policy in general remained part of the Mandate system. Between 1921 and 1932 the French authorities concluded commercial trade agreements with almost all the neighboring countries of the Middle East—Turkey, Iraq, Palestine, Najd and Egypt.[51] Through its various French officials, who formed "so many pyramids at the apex of which is the High Commissioner,"[52] the Mandate determined economic policy. To find local partners in this policy local businessmen were often consulted, particularly in trade negotiations and fixing tariffs. Lebanese economic organizations, such as the chambers of commerce, held regular meetings with the High Commissioner and his advisors.[53]

At the same time, the Open Door policy imposed great pressure on the merchant community of Beirut owing to the competition it allowed, especially with European businessmen. Those who could successfully handle such competition were either local agents of European enterprises or traders who had had a sound commercial background before the Mandatory period. By contrast, the Open Door policy led to bankruptcies of business people unable to cope with competition or were easily affected by economic crises, such as that of 1930–1932.[54]

In his *Plan de reconstruction de l'économie libanaise et de reforme de l'état,* which was to serve as the guide to economic planning by the Lebanese government at the beginning of independence, Gabriel Menassa summarized the results of economic policy in Lebanon and Syria from 1919 to 1944. According to him, from 1919 to 1939, commerce actually faced numerous obstacles owing to French policy, despite the trade agreements with neighboring countries and the application of a "minimum tariff":

> Alors que, dans le monde entier, prévalaient les tarifs préférentiels, les contingentements et les accords de réciprocité, … le Liban et la Syrie se trouvaient complètement désarmés dans la lutte économique qui a caractérisé la période d'entre deux guerres.[55]

Although after the first world war Lebanese industry found "des circonstances favorables à sa renaissance … [et] des capitaux considérables ont été investis dans des entreprises industrielles, … la plus part d'entre elles souffert de la concurrence étrangère." The list of industries which Menassa presents show that most of them were no more than small enterprises producing food, textiles (cotton and silk), and building materials.[56]

It was the city of Beirut that profited most from the economic development of the Mandatory period. It became not only the political, educational and intellectual center of Lebanon but also the country's commercial and industrial center even of all French Mandatory territories. To reduce the competition of

the port of Haifa in British Mandatory Palestine, the French authorities enlarged the port of Beirut in 1930, and again in 1938. Together with the commercial and financial enterprises of its merchants and bankers, Beirut attracted most of the new industrial activities. According to Ḍāhir's estimate, until 1929, when most "factories" were handicraft workshops, there were in Beirut 140 such industrial enterprises, while on Mount Lebanon alone there were 241. But when industrial plants began to emerge, almost all were concentrated in Beirut; out of 27 modern factories established in Lebanon before 1939, 23 were located in or around Beirut.[57]

The silk industry, which had had about 200 spinning mills before the first world war, most of them on Mount Lebanon, declined sharply during the war. After 1919 there was a French attempt to revive it but cocoon growing diminished each year and by 1929 had fallen to about 35 percent of the 1919 figure. The recovery of the industry between 1930 and 1938 was too slight to restore it to its former glory.[58] Although it continued to decline, at the end of the Mandatory period almost the entire silk industry (about 16 spinning and weaving factories) were centered in Beirut and its close environs.[59]

The rise of a new capitalist class, however, did not mean (*pace* Bruns) that it was about to "supplant the landed aristocracy as the controlling element of the country." Instead we find that, in the interest of "Greater Lebanon" and with the natural backing of the French authorities, urban Christian elites, ignoring their Sunni urban counterparts, began to forge alliances with Sunni elites in the countryside, again with "confessional" political rather than economic factors playing a major role.

As we have seen, the state of Greater Lebanon was rejected by almost the entire Sunni merchant and '*ulama* strata of the main coastal cities Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon. Most influential leaders of, for example, the Salām, Ṣulḥ, Dā'ūq, Bayhum, Biṣār and Karāmī families continued to deny the legitimacy of "Greater Lebanon," at least until the Syrian Revolt of 1925–26. This rejection by the urban Sunni elites has been explained in various ways. Many scholars still accept Najla Atiyah's 1973 thesis on "The Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis towards the State of Lebanon."[60] Atiyah focuses on the historical legacy of a centuries-old cultural distinction between Christians and Sunnis and seeks to relate intellectual activities of the Sunnis Rashīd Riḍa, 'Abd al-Ghanī al-'Uraysī, Aḥmad 'Abbās al-Azharī and others before the first world war to the attitude the Sunnis took up vis-à-vis the intervention by the French in 1918–20 and the establishment of the "Christian" state of Lebanon.[61] Atiyah looks for references in the writing of Rashīd Riḍa and others to contrast the Muslim concept of the state she finds there with the "classical" notion western scholars had formed of it, and then compares this Muslim concept with the Sunni attitude to the state of Lebanon. When the Sunnis were forcefully incorporated in "Greater Lebanon," this meant for them a three-fold crisis, religious, legal, and emotional.[62]

When she then goes on to describe how the urban Muslim elites began to adapt to the status quo, Atiyah abandons her view of Islam's "static" concept of the state and admits that from 1930 onward the Sunnis' "negative attitude" to the state, "lost much of its vehemence. It became confined mainly to occasional verbal outbursts which were limited to complaints about injustice in the way government positions and benefits were being distributed."[63] Atiyah later revises her explanation of the Muslim attitude during the Mandate, focusing more on the "confessional structure" of the state as having determined this attitude.[64]

Zamir adds an economic factor to those that determined "the negative Sunni attitude," but otherwise follows Atiyah's earlier perception and speaks of the "grave religious, cultural, political … crisis and [the] powerful emotional blow"[65] that hit the "Sunnis" in the first years of the new state. To the "historical explanation" of the Muslim position before 1920,[66] Zamir adds Atiyah's "normative" considerations of religious beliefs and culture, and follows approximately the same line of argument:

> Contrary to the Western concept, Islam sees no separation between religion and state; it thus leaves little room for loyalty to a secular state, and certainly not to a Christian one. For Muslims, the role of the state is to implement and defend the shari'a (religious law). The Sunnis in Lebanon could therefore never fully identify with the Lebanese Christian state set up and guaranteed by a foreign Christian power.[67]

Based as they are on an Orientalist notion of the "unchangeable nature of the Islam," such normative consideration, if they could ever explain the political behavior of the Sunni elites, cannot explain the gradual integration of the Sunni elites into the state that was to come later. Some members of the elites may have resorted to the symbols of an "imaginary" community of Muslims—the "real country extends beyond Lebanon to where a beautiful flag flies, a flag that has sanctity, beauty, and history"[68]—in order to justify their rejection of the Lebanese state. But such talk disappears when we find them beginning to favor "integration" into the system to demand positions in the state's administration.

It makes more sense to conclude that economic factors combined with political ones when the Sunni elites changed attitude. During the last decades of the Ottoman period the Sunnis of Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon expanded their economic ties with the interior. With the Christian *nouveaux riches,* many of them Maronites, and the well-established Greek Orthodox merchants, they formed the merchant community of the three cities that were annexed in 1920. Admittedly, even during the nineteenth century commercial and industrial activities took on a certain confessional distribution, but that was owing to the Western preference for establishing economic relations with Christian merchant houses, whose members then acquired a knowledge of French and English. Given the network of missionary schools and the Capitulations system under which the Western powers could grant protection to local subjects, Christian

merchants virtually monopolized the overseas trade. Although some of them also traded with Europe, Beiruti Sunni merchants generally were better placed in the chain of commercial exchange to re-export Western products to the hinterland and to import raw materials from Syrian interior to Beirut. Thus, Tripoli Sunni merchants had good reasons to fear the consequences the political separation of the coastal cities from the interior would entail, especially as their trade ties with the Syrian interior had benefited from the opening of the Hijaz railway between their city and Homs in 1911. Meanwhile, the rise of Beirut as the center of commerce during the Mandatory period aroused concern among the Sunni merchants that gradually they might become subordinated to the Christian-dominated center.[69] Europe's preference to deal with Christian merchants was encouraged by the French Mandate, furthering "confessional" economic activities. To this came that the dismemberment of the Ottoman empire had brought new borders which restricted the geographical hinterland of the coastal ports. At least until 1928, when tariff agreements with the neighboring countries helped restore some of their earlier ties, the Sunni merchants of the coastal cities found themselves facing three constraining factors: the emergence of their Christian counterparts, who also became involved in the new industrial activity of Beirut, the shrinking of their hinterland, and the whims of French domination.

As did the majority of the urban elites of Syria, the Sunni elites of the coastal cities of Greater Lebanon supported the Arab government of Amīr Fayṣal. Fayṣal's defeat at Maysalūn and the establishment by France of Greater Lebanon, welcomed by the wealthy Christian strata, effectively meant for the Sunni elites the end of their dream of "reviving" an Arab-Muslim state in the former Ottoman provinces of the Arab East that could provide economic and political breadth for their ambitions. In the absence of a pro-French alternative elite among the Sunnis of the big towns, the French authorities as well the Christian supporters of Greater Lebanon now embarked on a dual policy of creating such alternative Sunni elites in the countryside while simultaneously conducting a stick-and-carrot policy with the urban elites.

Urban Merchants and Countryside Elites

It appears that in 1920 the French had the support of only three Sunni rural landlords—'Abbūd 'Abd al-Razzāq of 'Akkār, Amīr Khālid Shihāb, of Ḥāṣbaiyā, and Ḥusayn Qaz'ūn, of Biqā', all three elected as members of the first Representative Council—and of the Circassian leader Sa'īd Pasha Khurshid, who until his assassination in April 1922 served as director of the interior. In 1922, the French authorities won to their side three urban Sunni leaders, Ḥalīm Qaddūra and Muḥammad Muftī, of Beirut, and Nūr al-Dīn 'Alamaddīn, of Tripoli, all belonging to second-rank leading families and also made members of

the Representative Council. The assassination of Khurshid by members of a Sunni band served the authorities as a pretext to apply the "stick" against a numbr of leading Sunnis—Salīm Salām, Ṣalāḥ Bayhum, Ḥasan al-Qādī, Salīm Ṭabbāra, Bashīr Naqqāsh, ʻArif Darwīsh, Rashīd Shatīla, Salīm Kurdiyya and Sheikh Muṣṭafā Ghalāiynī—whom they exiled, and against Muḥammad Jamīl Bayhum, who was arrested and interrogated.[70] In 1925 the French were able to widen the circle of their supporters among the rural and secondary Sunni urban elites with two representatives of the leading Beirut families, ʻUmar Dāʻūq and ʻUmar Bayhum. Nonetheless, it was the Arab nationalist discourse of almost all the urban Sunni elites that gained strength not only among the Sunnis but also among the Druzes and Shiʻis.[71]

Wanting to frustrate an alliance between the rural elites of the Shiʻis and Druzes with the urban Sunni elites, the French authorities and their Christian supporters embarked on an economic policy directed not only at the rural Sunni elite but also at the Shiʻi and the Druze rural elites, which aimed at developing entire rural areas of Lebanon in favor of the landlords. French "economic experts" were called in to advise on modernizing agriculture through changes in three related issues: the fiscal system, land ownership, and farming methods. The current fiscal system, as mentioned above, meant that Mount Lebanon, with its majority of Maronites, was taxed differently from "the annexed areas," inhabited by a majority of Shiʻis and Sunnis. In an effort to assess how soon and to what extent the economy of Lebanon and Syria could be made subservient to that of France—using the region as a source of raw materials for France and as an import market for finished European goods[72]—French experts draw up plans for the implementation of the necessary changes. Ironically, it was budgetary considerations that prevented the French Mandatory authorities from introducing right away land taxation reforms, which in turn delayed the intended changes in farming methods.[73] Bruns reports:

> Farming methods are primitive and the yield is small. At least a part of the peasants' backwardness is due to the land system. The latifundia system prevails in all parts of Syria except the old Lebanon [Mount Lebanon] where small holdings are the rule. The land is owned by large landlords … Exploitation is left to the peasant tenants who see little incentive for increasing the product, or for improving another man's property.[74]

Bruns lays the blame for this at the door of the landlords. About fifteen years after the independence of Lebanon the latifundia and its landlords continued to benefit from the Mandatory legacy, presenting the same problems for agricultural reform:

> Dans les zones où le régime des grandes propriétés domine, le métayage est la règle. Mais les métayers n'étant pas protégés par un statut adéquat ne sont pas encouragés à investir dans la terre puisque les plus clair de leurs travaux profite aux propriétaires et suppose des moyens financiers qui leur manquent. Ils ne peuvent compter sur les crédits de la Banque Agricole puisque ceux-ci sont

> accordés seulement aux propriétaires qui, lorsqu'ils en obtiennent, les placent souvent dans les autres secteurs d'activité que l'agriculture.[75]

In 1937 *La Banque Agricole,* in order to "élargir le champ d'action de cette Institution," added a new statute to its constitution which authorized, "sous certaines réserves, le recours à des ressources exceptionnelles."[76] However the administration did not change the rules, which continued to be "presque entièrement constitués par des prêts sur garantie immobilière … et sur les récoltes par voie de garantie solidaire des exploitants et du propriétaire du terrain."[77]

Through the centuries, geographical differences between the Mount and the other rural areas of Lebanon had led to different socio-economic developments, different sorts of crops, and a different type of land ownership. In 'Akkār, Biqā', and South Lebanon the latifundia system prevailed, on Mount Lebanon the *muqāṭa'jiyya.*[78] During the nineteenth century the absorption of the Mount's silk culture into French capitalism, the peasant revolts and the political upheavals had brought about the decline of the *muqāṭa'jī*s and the development of smallholdings.[79] However, large tracts of land on Mount Lebanon were still in the hands of the Maronite Church and the former *muqāṭa'jī* families during the Mandatory period.[80]

In addition, Beirut merchants were able to exploit the *fallāḥīn*'s need for cash. In a penetrating study of rural life in Syria and Lebanon intended to serve the French Mandate, André Latron gives many examples of merchants acquiring lands on Mount Lebanon when *fallāḥīn* defaulted on these loans. Though the decline of landowning families on Mount Lebanon favored "un morcellement de plus en plus poussé et la disparition des ces immenses latifundia," already during the first world war: "des gens de Beyrouth, capitalistes ou grands commerçants et spéculateurs, riches en numéraire, ont acquis dans le Metten [Matn] et le Chouf [Shūf] des parties de villages cédées a prix très bas par les paysans miséreux."[81]

Latron describes of the system of *métayage* (tenancy) in different parts of Syria and Lebanon and the way it developed from the nineteenth century onward shows explicitly how during the Mandatory period the latifundia system was still strongly entrenched in the areas of 'Akkār, Biqā' and Jabal 'Amil, where the peasants operated under several sorts of tenancy that enabled the landlords to maintain their economic power.[82] Like other French scholars of the Mandatory period, Latron refrains from speculating on figures concerning the distribution of landownership, undoubtedly aware that land-measure units in Syria and Lebanon were different from one place to other; size of properties was generally measured by the number of villages and hamlets under the landowner's control.[83]

Ḍāhir, of course, has a clear interest in just this kind of distribution of landownership in the Mandatory period. According to him, 84,111 small landholders, or 7.82 percent of the total owners of land, possessed 945,000 hectares or 35 percent of the total cultivated lands of Lebanon, while 191 big

landowners possessed 40,500 hectares or 15 percent of the cultivated land. A mere 171 members of landowning families or capitalists owned 135,000 hectares or 50 per cent of the cultivated land.[84] Although an accurate picture of the property relations between peasant and landlord in "the annexed areas" of Greater Lebanon still needs to be drawn, the new regional historiography that has begun emerging among Lebanese writers enables one to gain an impression of the social and economic life of the countryside and its relationship with the town.[85]

Writing on south Lebanon, Farḥān Ṣāliḥ shows that Ḍāhir's figures for the distribution on the landed property can be never accurate since measurement of land ownership went by number of villages belonging to a particular landowner. Extrapolating from number of villages and kind of property, Ṣāliḥ finds that as late as the 1970s, the power of the big landlords remained intact, even throughout a period of rapid economic transformation. According to his calculation, the total number of the villages and hamlets in the countryside of Sidon, Tyre, Jizzīn, al-Nabaṭiyya, Bent Jbayl, Marj'iyūn, and Ḥasbaiyā was 452, property being divided into three categories. About 250 (i.e., 55 percent) of the total villages, and hamlets had been parceled among the owners as these lands were cultivated through the *mushā'* system.[86] In about 162 villages (36 percent), the peasants were still tenants working as *'ujarā'* (hired hands) for the landowning families. In the remaining 40 villages (9 percent), some peasant had benefited from parcellation while others were still tenants.[87]

Although the *sharāka* (association or tenancy) system could differ even within small areas of a few villages, in general south Lebanon shared many features with 'Akkār and Biqā'. From the examples given by Latron, in these areas we find that landlords not only owned the land but they also provided the seeds, tools and in many cases even the animals to the tenants. The latter had great difficulty changing their landlords because

> le maître retirent chez lui ses gens jusqu'au règlement de leur dettes, celles-ci n'ayant parfois pas d'autre objet que de stabiliser le métayer. Si le paysan veut aller ailleurs, il doit trouver un autre maître qui, avant de le prendre, consent à le dégager de sa dette, et a devenir ainsi son créancier.[88]

Thus, wherever they went the *fallāḥīn* remained in a condition of complete dependency: "l'occupation prolongée du sol par une même famille de métayers crée en fait une sort de servitude du profit de l'occupant."[89] In south Lebanon and Biqā', where the *mushā'* prevailed, the stability of the tenancy in the same latifunda was accompanied by "*une rotation périodique des lots de culture entre les métayers* ."[90]

Some French officials may have assumed that Law No. 2500 of 1924, which stipulated obligatory parcellation of collective lands, would help strengthen the *fallāḥīn*'s grip on the land and stimulate agricultural productivity. However, in many cases the reverse happened and the law only helped reinforce the

economic and political power of the landlords and the merchant-landowners in the countryside. Not surprisingly, the law had been called for by some of the landlords and other big proprietors.[91] Only in those rare cases where the landlords had failed to register the parcellated lands of the *mushā', fallāḥīn* could become small proprietors. In general, notably in south Lebanon, Biqā', and 'Akkār, the cadastre worked in favor of the landlords. In his research on 'Akkār, Gilesnan finds that Latron's description of the impact of the cadastre on Biqā' matches his own case study in 'Akkār, where landlords continued to possess large portions of the land until the late 1960s.[92]

Initially due to the lack of financial resources, shortage of clerks to run the cadastre, and the unstable political situation in Lebanon, the cadastral survey had to wait until 1926. Through four *arrêtés* in March 1926 and another in November 1930 legislation was enacted through which the cadastre authorities could regulate "the rights of landed property."[93] In effect, from 1926 until the end of the Mandate, the same reasons kept the survey from being completed as the budget for the cadastral survey had to be subjected to the Ministry of Finance which had other priorities.[94] From 1926 to 1929 the cadastre limited its work in the plains where, 100,000 hectares of land were registered. Then, in 1929, Eddé's government tried to accelerate the work of the cadastre and to complete the registration of another 100,000 hectares "in the plains" by 1932 in order "to establish a solid basis for land taxation."[95] By 1946, "Les surfaces cadastrées … atteignent près de 400.000 Ha. sur un million d'hectares pour tout le territoire libanais. Il s'agit des terres arables en plaine et de certaines régions de la montagne."[96]

Menassa's figures show that the legal status of about 600,000 hectares, most of them in the plains, by the late 1940s was still what it had been at the end of the Ottoman period. This enabled landlords to maintain most of the prerogatives they had enjoyed before the Mandate, which meant, among other things, that the landlord-peasant relationship continued to be similar to that of the late Ottoman period. As we saw above in the case of *mushā'* land, the registration of 400,000 hectares during the Mandatory period was done with the consent of the landlords as it worked in their favor. The same is true of the *sharāka* in the plain where landlords were able to transfer most of the registered lands into private estates. In other words, the cadastral survey in general developed to meet the "needs" of the landlords and was thus detrimental to the interests of the *fallāḥīn*.

South Lebanon, Biqā' and 'Akkār were and remained the peripheral and less developed areas of a country whose center, Beirut, was a highly developed mercantile economy. In his history of landownership in south Lebanon, Khalīl Aḥmad Khalīl traces the rise of the elite families of landlords back to the Ottoman period. According to him, "the traditional elite" consolidated its economic and political power by exploiting "the religious men," the '*ulama*. At the beginning of the Mandatory period, there were three main landowning families, al-As'ad, 'Usayrān and Zayn, which established their economic and

political power through clan factionalism, embracing the small landlords of such families as al-Ṣabāḥ, Shāhīn, Bayḍūn, al-Khalīl, and Ṣafiy al-Dīn. The author gives as examples of how the latter acquired the parcellated *mushā'* lands of the village of Sham' and the 'Usayrān of the *mushā'* lands in 'Ayn Abu 'Abdalla and how al-Khalīl could seize Shabrīḥa's *mushā'* lands. Khalīl states that the factionalism re-emerged already during the first elections in the 1920s as the core of the new form of politics in south Lebanon. French policy after 1926 helped the landlords, known as *kulak al-janūb* (the "southern colleagues") to better stabilize their estates.[97]

The reconstruction of the clans' history as traced by Aḥmad 'Arif al-Zayn in his 1913 *Tārīkh Ṣaidā* illustrates the connection leading Shi'i rural families developed with Sidon, whose population was largely Sunni and whose urban life and activities were dominated by Sunni merchant families. He singles out his own al-Zayn family and the 'Usayrān to show how influential Shi'i families had become part of the town's elite through entering commerce and other urban activities before the Mandatory period. Alongside such Sunni merchant families in Sidon as the Ṣulḥ, the Bizri, and the Naqīb, who were involved in commerce, but also held positions in Ottoman civil and religious administration, the 'Usayrāns had done especially well in the commercial and intellectual life of the city.[98] While the As'ad family continued to rely exclusively on its agricultural wealth and to control its vast estates in many parts of Jabal 'Amil from its headquarters in the village of Taiba,[99] the integration of the Zayns and the 'Usayrāns into the urban life of Sunni Sidon affected the political outlook of their members toward "Arab nationalism," the French Mandate and the state of Lebanon before and after 1920. Important, too, is that the rural Shi'i Zayn and 'Usayrān families, after they had become involved in Sunni urban life in Sidon before 1914, reciprocated by inviting the Sunni Ṣulḥ family to extend their commercial ties into the rural regions of the Shi'is. At the end of the Ottoman period we find Riḍā al-Ṣulḥ, the head of the family, allying himself with members of the leading Shi'i families against Kāmil al-As'ad (father of Aḥmad), a pact that continued to influence the political life of south Lebanon during and even beyond the Mandatory period.[100]

Through the verbal accounts he collected of how the landlords of south Lebanon controlled the peasants and enlarged their estates, a Shi'i author, Ḥasan Qbaysī, sketches how landlords manipulated the Ottoman land registers to increase their propriety holdings. This manipulation continued in the Mandatory period when leaders who had "bought their seats" in the parliament were able to annex large tracts of *mushā'* lands to their estates through the Mandatory cadastral survey they helped introduce. Qbaysī also describes the kinds of *khawa*s (taxes in excess of the official ones) imposed by landlords on the peasants, sailors and fishermen of the Tyre district and the violence and humiliation that accompanied this.[101]

In his story of Berqayl, a village in 'Akkār belonging to the landowner 'Abbūd 'Abd al-Razzāq, Gilsenan looks at present "local narratives" of the past

which he then interweaves with the historical narratives he was able to reconstruct how Barqayl's past lives on in the present.[102] What stands out, here too, is the socio-political framework that enabled and still enables the ʿAkkāri "lords of the Lebanese marches" to maintain control over the overwhelmingly poor *fallāḥīn*. Berqayl may serve as a paradigm for most of the chief villages in ʿAkkār, south Lebanon and throughout the Biqāʿ that belong to large landowners. Significant is the difference between the various systems under which *fallāḥīn* would be contracted by the big landlords. For example, in the mountainous regions of southern Lebanon, as on Mount Lebanon itself, where fruit and olive orchards prevailed we find that the preferred form of contract is long-term, i.e., the predominant systems are the *mughārasa* and *musāqa*. In areas where main crops were cereals or tobacco it was usually the short-term *muzāraʿa* contract that bound the *fallāḥīn* to the owner, often for seasonal jobs only and at the most for one year. The *mughārasa* and *musāqa* systems enabled *fallāḥīn* to cultivate the lots they held for a number of years in succession, not seldom even for life. Thus it was the growing of tobacco, which began in the nineteenth century but intensified during the Mandate and for which short-term contracts were sufficient, that helped strengthen the economic hold of the big landowners, especially in such areas as southern Lebanon where until the late 1960s seventy percent of the *fallāḥīn* cultivated this crop.[103] In the south, geographical diversity and historical development have created a mixed land system, enabling small property holdings to survive next to large estates.[104]

The mixed land system was also typical of the Biqāʿ valley. In the villages along the slopes of the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon Mountains small and large holdings coexisted, with peasant-landlord relations based mainly on *mughārasa* and *musāqa*. This guaranteed the villagers a certain social stability, especially when the introduction in 1858 of the Ottoman Land Law enabled them to acquire "private" plots of land. The cadastral survey the French initiated accelerated the process, notably for *mushāʿ* lands that were out of bounds for the big landlords.[105] In the Biqāʿ plain itself, however, where cereals continued to be the main crop, the latter had little difficulty in expanding their position of power—even though the *mushāʿ* prevailed, *fallāḥīn* worked mainly on *muzāraʿa* contracts.[106] When the cadastral survey began dissolving the *mushāʿ* lands, landlords simply converted them into their own private property.

From at least the sixteenth century until the second half of the nineteenth, the Shiʿi princes of the Ḥarfūsh family played an economic and political role in the Biqāʿ similar to that of the *muqāṭaʿjī* families of Mount Lebanon. The influence they derived from their vast estates in the Baʿlbak area enabled them to serve as intermediaries between other Shiʿi landlords of the Biqāʿ—the Ḥaydar family of Baʿlbak, the Ḥamāda family of the Hermel, and other small leading families—and the Ottoman administration in Damascus. The decline of this powerful family began in the late nineteenth century and accelerated during the Mandatory period when the Ḥaydars and Ḥamādas rose as the new influential intermediaries.[107] At least until the mid-nineteenth century, the

Junblāṭ family administered a huge estate in the Biqā', which was worked by Druze, Christian and Shi'i *fallāḥīn*. Subsequently it was broken up among small local landowners and absentee Sunni landlords living in Damascus.[108] The Sunni Shihāb family, whose Sunni and Christianized members had ruled Mount Lebanon from 1697 to 1840, possessed scattered lands in the Ḥāṣbaiyā area.

A main shift occurs when during the Mandate period a new stratum of figures in politics, the civil service, parliament and government seeks to entrench its influence and prestige by buying up landed estates in the countryside. This gives rise to a move in the opposite direction by rural landlords seeking a growing role in the political life of Beirut and acquiring at the same time more and more properties in the areas where their influence is greatest. This blending of the sources of political power and economic wealth in town and countryside is then further propelled by the new state's need to enforce cohesion between its capital, Mount Lebanon and the "peripheral" areas. The description Latron offers of how this two-way relationship between urban elites and rural landlords was being played out is as graphic as it is illuminating:

> Le grand notable assigne à la terre un rôle autant politique qu'économique. En effet, les hautes fonctions publique ont été souvent, en marge du grand commerce, le seul moyen d'enrichissement rapide; or ces fonctions ont été pendant longtemps attribuées aux individus les plus influents, à défaut des plus avisés, autrement dit aux maîtres des fiefs politiques. Dans ce pays fragmenté en communautés villageoises, pour que le notable soit tout ensemble arbitre, conseiller, soutien et protecteur du village, il lui suffi d'y posséder quelques parcelles de terre. C'est pourquoi certains notables, pour étendre leur influence politique ou pour l'affermir, ont acheté des parcelles ou des parts indivises, dispersées dans la plupart des villages de leur région, le faible revenu de ces 'terres d'influence' étant compensé par 'des terres de rapport'. Quand la décadence politique survient, les terres d'influence sont liquidées en premier lieu. D'ailleurs, le grand propriétaire abandonne le village pour la ville dès qu'il se sent suffisamment fort et évolué … [Le] citadin de vieille souche urbaine, …n'a acheté que dans les villages où il est assuré de ne pas être trop volé par les voisins ou par les métayers….[dans] les régions les plus évoluées … et morcelées au point de vue des influence locales.[109]

Refashioning the Zu'ama

There is perhaps no better place to start tracing the shifts in elite formation outlined above than at the foot of Mt. Hermon. That, at least, is where al-Riyāshī locates the principle at work when, as he describes it, right after the first world war the Shihābī *amīrs* were "invited" by France to take an active part in the future politics of Lebanon. As it would safeguard their entitlement to top-

ranking public offices, the Shihābī princes did not hesitate long before they accepted this invitation "to ascend Mt. Hermon." Al-Riyāshī adds that they did so as "true followers of Machiavelli" and goes on to ridicule "the political 'bazaar' that opened in the fall of 1918 … with the arrival of the Allies … and that is still running today."[110] Al-Riyāshī knew what he was talking about as for a brief period he himself had worked for the French in the eastern district during the first visit to the region of the King-Crane Commission. The latter had been sent to "learn the wishes of the local populations" regarding the political future of the former Arab provinces of the Ottoman empire.[111] Al-Riyāshi had been given large sums of money by the French military authorities for distribution among the *zu'ama* (s. *za'īm*, leader) of the districts of Biqā', Ba'lbak, Rāshaiyā and Ḥāṣbaiyā in order to ensure that they would express their "preference" for a French Mandate. He went about his task by first seeking out the *qabadayāt*, the strong-arm leaders in the villages and towns:

> After some experience we learned in Beirut how to win over the big and small (leaders) through the *qabadayāt* … As soon as I had arrived in the four districts … I met secretly, under the cloak of darkness, with the *qabadayāt* who are feared by the *zu'ama* who will [do anything to] prevent arousing their anger. … I then called the [latter] and held among them a "bazaar." This bazaar was fair enough: they support the French in the [King-Crane] commission and I pay them … The *zu'ama* and *wujaha* came rushing toward me [and] two years later Crane returned to this country to find … the French had succeeded in appeasing many who had earlier opposed them.[112]

It was these leading figures who immediately decided "to ascend Mt. Hermon," but then also others who at first rejected the French invitation and joined the "bazaar" a few years later, who became part of the *zu'ama*, Lebanon's refashioned elite that was to rule the country in the decades that followed. Al-Riyāshī in this context points to a phenomenon that more than anything else is symptomatic of the process, i.e., the break-down of the traditional system of titles that were indicative of a person's social and economic position. He speaks ironically of *mashāykh 'an ṣaḥiḥ wa-mashāykh 'an kidhb*, i.e., "true sheikhs and false sheikhs," as the resulting "anarchy" makes it impossible to distinguish who is a genuine and who a parvenu "sheikh or bek among this [abundance of] sheikhs and beks."[113]

The origin of the terms *za'īm* and *zu'ama*, i.e., "leader(s)," as used in Lebanon and other parts of the Middle East is somewhat obscure. According to the thirteenth-century Arabic dictionary, *Lisān al-'Arab*, the noun *za'īm* derives from the verb *za'ma*, which stands for *ḍamina wa-kafila* (to guarantee); a *za'īm* is a *ḍāmin wa-kafil* (guarantor). A person's ability to put up guarantees or securities for others entitled him to become *za'īm al-qawm* (leader of the group).[114] The first edition of the *EI* lists seven usages of the Turkish term *zeamet* as appearing in Turkish and Arabic in various places and at different

times.[115] Lebanese chronicles, official Ottoman documents and other historical sources are replete with titles that all designate the socio-political ranks of those who held leadership positions—*amīr, sheikh, muqāta'jī, muqadam, agha, bey*, etc.—but *za'īm* and *zu'ama* appear only seldom, and then generally, like *a'yān* (s. *'ayn*) and *wujahā'* (s. *wajīh*), in the plural indicating influential people from different strata and occupations. Only in certain urban centers, e.g., Damascus, is the singular *za'īm* used and then stands for a strong-arm leader whose influence on the *qabadayāt* of a number of quarters made him the most powerful *qabadāy*, or patron, though generally he did not belong to any of the notable strata, i.e., of either the merchants (*tujjār*), the *'ulama'* or the government officials (*qalamiyya*).[116]

Harik also speaks of the "anarchy in the assessment of political positions" in Lebanon that followed upon the rise of the "bourgeoisie." As he explains, during the Ottoman period the titles of the aristocracy in Mount Lebanon, 'Akkār and Jabal 'Amil were hereditary. In Mount Lebanon the local *amīr* or governor could grant titles to the aristocracy, while in 'Akkār and Jabal 'Amil titles were granted by the Ottoman authorities. With the Mandate, "any attempt to study the class characteristics of the political elite is bound to run into trouble"—the inflation in the title of *sheikh*, for example, led such ancient Druze sheikhs as the Junblāṭs or Shi'i sheikhs as the Ḥamādas and As'ads to adopt the title *bek*.[117]

Clear is that with the French Mandatory period we are beginning to find all kinds of influential people—along the entire political spectrum but not necessarily members of the traditional elites—emerging as part of the *zu'ama*. The French invitation "to ascend Mt. Hermon," together with the overall socio-economic and political changes the Mandate introduced, enabled various elements to join the *zu'ama* who in the past would never have been able to secure a position in the elite stratum.

In a study in which he outlines the major roles the *zu'ama* played in the ethnopolitics of Lebanon during the civil was of 1958, Arnold Hottinger defines a *za'im* as "the recognized leader of a community who has the power to speak for his clients as a group or as individuals." He goes on to analyze this relationship between a *za'īm* and his clients and the different position taken up by the *zu'ama* in the cities and the countryside.[118] In a follow-up study he offers a historical perspective for the way the *zu'ama* developed.[119] Viewing the modern state of Lebanon as the continuation of the *mutaṣarrifiyya*, Hottinger explains that the traditional "feudal" families were able to survive and even prosper as *zu'ama* after the abolition of "feudalism" by successfully integrating into the stratum that came to hold the new public administration. Through the prism of the 1958 civil war, in which the *zu'ama* manifested the powerful position they occupied in the way they mobilized the masses of their respective religious communities, Hottinger looks back at the history of the leading families since the Ottoman period. In this way he portrays them as representatives of specific communities, with the leaders of Mt. Lebanon active

in the same political field as their counterparts in the coastal cities, Jabal 'Amil and the Biqā'. With the Mandatory period, Hottinger sees the *zu'ama* as made up of two groups, i.e., the descendants of the traditional "feudal" families, on the one hand, and on the other a modern stratum, newly risen when money became an "indispensable corollary of *za'im*-ship." Though the French Mandate introduced some significant changes in the rules of the political game, the *zu'ama*, whether old or new, continued to "represent their communities" as intermediaries as they had done during the Ottoman period and it was this age-old role of "patrons of client groups that gave them weight and power."[120]

Unlike Hottinger, Harik avoids using the term *zu'ama* in his writings; even in Arabic he prefers substituting *al-nukhba al-siyāsiyya*, a translation of the Western term "political elite."[121] According to Harik, Hottinger "mistakenly gives the impression that the feudal aristocracy dominates the political scene and also makes several specific errors [when] he lists five deputies as belonging to the 'great feudal families'."[122] Writing in the early 1970s, when political life in Lebanon had all the appearances of being successful and "unique in the Middle East," in other words "Western,"[123] Harik sets about analyzing Lebanon's achievement through the theory of elites that had become en vogue in the early 1960s and which itself was a reassessment of the early twentieth-century theories of Pareto, Mosca and others.[124] Important aspects highlighted by theoretical and empirical studies of elites are the overall social framework within which elites act, the relationship between class and elite and the "personalities" of leaders. Analyses of the relations among individuals within certain elite groups aim at pointing up the "circulation" of leadership within families, certain professions and communal or regional groups.[125]

Through a quantitative analysis of members of parliament and top-ranking officials Harik sets out to remove the "general impression" (given by researchers such as Hottinger) that the political elite was a

> continuation of the aristocratic strata which ruled Lebanon before the nineteenth century: Members of the aristocracy have occupied few top offices since the beginning of the Lebanese Republic in 1926 … Rhetoric, inadequate knowledge of social history, and poor terminology have resulted in the use of the inappropriate term "feudalism" in reference to the political elite of Lebanon.[126]

Harik concurs with D.A. Rustow's critique of Lasswell who postulated a dichotomy in society between a small group of "the influential … who get the most of what there is to get," and "the rest," i.e., the "mass."[127] For "the influential" Harik uses the classical Arabic term *ahl al-ḥal wal-rabṭ*, literally "those who resolve [problems] and bind [people] together." Checking the professional background of all members of parliament from independence to 1968, Harik concludes that factors of education, business and personal skills successfully competed with the "patrician" pedigree of the traditional Lebanese elites.[128] As to the circulation of the elites within the cabinet and the parliament since 1922, he presents figures of the numbers of clans that provided members

for these two institutions. During the Mandate (1922–1943), individuals from 45 families occupied cabinet posts, but between 1943 and 1970 more than two-thirds of these families disappeared from the political arena.[129] During the years 1922–1968, the total number of families represented in the various parliaments was 271. From 1922–1943 deputies from 103 different families occupied parliamentary seats. Of these, 80 failed to contribute deputies to the 1968 chamber.[130] From this Harik concludes that "like ministers of state, most members of parliament are constantly threatened and unseated by challengers."[131]

Harik then uses his analysis of "political confessionalism," the electoral system, the political parties and the attempt by the "counter-elite" to challenge the established elite to corroborate his notion (and, as it were, put all his cards on the table) that "the genius of the political elite in Lebanon had begot and nurtured a realistic and pragmatic system [which] caused liberty to prevail and evinced the ability to survive in [the] uneasy and unstable environment [of the Middle East]."[132] Keen to point up the positive elements of the Lebanon's "confessional" distribution of power and the advantages of the "confessional" and regional electoral system, Harik singles out the founders of the state as "characterized by a pragmatic political experience." And, almost in the same breath, he adds:

> It is incorrect to attribute this achievement to the French, though the role they played was welcomed [by the Lebanese] … It also would be wrong to consider the current Lebanese electoral system, based as it is on confessional distribution, as the cause of confessional behavior or as a consecration of confessional tendencies … [On the contrary,] its objective was to contain the confessional conflict.[133]

Harik firmly believes that the electoral laws, with all the changes introduced in them since 1922, continued to respect the wishes of the communities and to fairly draw delegates from the different groups that make up the Lebanese nation.[134]

For Harik, the picture he arrives at of the political elite and the way it functions in a multi-communal society such as modern Lebanon is a highly "positive," some would say idealistic, one—even the descendants of the traditional aristocratic families are seen to have adapted to the new "pragmatic" and realistic elite. Hottinger indeed sees things differently. As intermediaries of their communities and client groups with the ruling authorities—much as the elites during the Ottoman period had been—he views the *zu'ama* as an elite group that is out to block attempts made "from above" (i.e., the presidential institution) at modernizing political life. Thus, for Hottinger, the *zu'ama* are playing a negative role: "Should *za'im*-ship come to an end, Lebanese democracy, with its distinctive form of 'party democracy' based on a two—or multi-party system, could take its place," though for the meantime, this "remains an open question."[135]

Still seeking an answer, some thirty years after Hottingre published his article, is Samīr Khalaf who, in 1987, published his *Lebanon's Predicament*, a thorough analysis of modern Lebanon's socio-economic and political development and the role the elites have played in it.[136] Khalaf sees a solution in a "dialectics of tradition and modernity," in other words,

> how to modernize without abandoning traditions. The patrimonial manager, the political *za'im*, the confessional bureaucrat, the company union, the parochial voluntary association, and the urban quarter are all, in fact, devices for achieving such a synthesis.[137]

Like Harik and Hottinger, Khalaf finds himself returning to the Mandatory period as crucial for our understanding of the current patron-cleint networks, the circulation of the elite and its part in creating Lebanon's "predicament." In a chapter tellingly called "Changing Forms of Political Patronage," Khalaf gives examples of the behavior of two *aqṭāb* ("most powerful") of the *zu'ama* about one year after the outbreak of the civil war of 1975. One was Ṣabrī Ḥamāda, descendant of an old feudal family and the traditional *za'īm* of the Shi'i community of Ba'lbak, and a prominent figure in political life since the beginning of the Mandate; the other was Kamīl Sham'ūn (Camile Chamoun), who also began his political career in Mandate, though not a scion of a feudal family. The two *zu'ama aqṭāb* are typical figures of the elite who had transformed feudal patronage.[138] According to Khalaf, under the *mutaṣarrifiyya* and in Mandatory Lebanon

> a gradual absorption of prominent families into the new government bureaucracy generated … a new breed of political leadership or patronage; a patronage more bureaucratic than feudal in nature … Furthermore, by virtue of their administrative positions, they offered more of the desired linkages between "center" and "periphery" that clients almost always seek in their patrons. The leadership that emerged …, along with their second- and third-generation descendants, constitutes today the bulk of the political elite of Lebanon … The Khuris of the Shūf, the Solhs of Saida, the Khalils of Sour, the Salams, Beyhums, Daouks, Taqlas, and Chihas of Beirut, the Karamis of Tripoli, the Eddes of Batroun … these and a score of other prominent names were drawn … into the political and national struggle of their communities.[139]

In Khalaf's view, the *zu'ama* in general and the *aqṭāb* in particular were able to perpetuate their political patronage in two ways: "families," and the electoral system as put in place during the early years of the Mandate. They then used parliament as a vehicle to extend the scope of this patronage—Khalaf quotes Malcolm Kerr: "Politics [in Lebanon] exists only in Lasswell's limited sense of 'who gets what, when, and how'."[140] Harik sounds almost naive by comparison in the way he portrays parliament as "a representative chamber to which people send those on whom they rely … to represent their fundamental rights and demands. It is a chamber of *aṣḥab al-nufūdh* (the most influential leaders) through whom the balance of power and rule is achieved, and thereby the

people can guarantee stability and freedom."[141] More cynically but probably more realistically, Khalaf tells us that "the so-called 'parliamentary game' … is no more than a game of musical chairs among its *aqtab* [who are] jockeying to extend their share of clients in the government."[142]

When he analyzes the composition and circulation of the elite, Khalaf can use the tables and figures used by Harik and others to point to the "impressive degree of incessant change and fluctuation in the parliament's personnel" they indicate as well as the rise in the level of formal education among them.[143] Khalaf then suggest probing beyond the statistics into how exactly this circulation of the elite came about.[144] When Messara's figures show that 62 percent of the members of the various parliaments between 1920 and 1970 were related through the kinship attachments prevailing among them, Khalaf uses this to reveal the oligarchic and dynastic characteristics of the Lebanese elite.[145] More impressive even is his finding that 35 percent of all parliament seats were monopolized from 1920 to 1972 by no more than six families.[146] When it comes to political behavior Khalaf finds that deputies are virtually unaffected by the responsibilities one would assume their political affiliation entailed—constantly preoccupied by local rather than national issues, they devote most of their time and energies to satisfying the petty private interests of their clients.[147]

Finally, I wish to highlight Michael Johnson's study on the Sunni Muslims of Beirut for the light it sheds on many aspects of the patron-client network in Lebanon. Though a case study of an urban society and thus unable to explain the whole of the "clientele network," the merit of Johnson's work lies primarily in showing how *zu'ama, qabadayāt* and confessionalism, combined with a political system based on regional representation, were the corroborating factors that entrenched the "clientele system" in Lebanon's politics. As Johnson has it, the *zu'ama* of the Beirut's Sunni community, as members of parliament

> had access to state patronage which they distributed to their supporters. The relationship between the *za'im* and his followers was essentially "dyadic" or "clientelist" in the sense that individualized contracts or agreements were made between the patron and client, whereby welfare services of various kinds were exchanged for political, and particularly electoral, support. This dyadic relationship was not an equal exchange, for the *za'im* controlled access to wealth and power while the resources of client often amounted only to the votes of himself and his family. As result, the patron was sometimes resented by his followers, who were forced by the system to become individually beholden to their *za'im*. Maintaining dyadic relations with individual and dependent followers was to the advantage of the patron, because under this arrangement clients were less likely to unite together to press for a greater share of patronage. Nevertheless, it was necessary to organize the clientele so that it could be mobilized during elections and other political confrontations, and it was here that the qabadays were important."[148]

Despite their differences in focus and approach, what clearly emerges from the studies of both Khalaf and Johnson is that, even though one can trace the

patron-client network back to the Ottoman period, the changed economic and political conditions thrown up during the French Mandate were fertile ground for a new form of patrimonialism to take root and a new political elite to assert itself. The main significant elements were the creation of the territorial state of Lebanon under the French, the accelerated transformation of the socio-economic relationship between town and countryside and the implications this had for the distribution of wealth and power, and the adoption of a confessional political system. What stands out is how this coalescence of the "old" and the "new," i.e., the preservation of traditional patterns within modern socio-economic structures, created the "political field" of the new state, thereby setting out, for better and for worse, the road along which Lebanon's society and polity have since traveled.

CHAPTER FOUR

DID THE SYSTEM CREATE THE *ZU'AMA*, OR VICE-VERSA?

> It is quite clear that the implantation of Western models of the modern nation state in the Middle East … [has] led to very different patterns of formation, different from the West and from each other. These are for the most part modern states, in terms of forms of organisation, administration and rule, but they are not modern Western states.
>
> Sami Zubaida, *Islam, The People and the State*, p. 145.

For Benedict Anderson it is the "decisive historic role" of the "Creole pioneers" in the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Americas that led to the emergence of "nation-ness," nationality and nationalism —as "cultural artefacts [these are] 'modular,' capable of being transplanted, with varying degrees of self-consciousness, to a great variety of social terrains, *to merge and be merged* with a correspondingly wide variety of political and ideological constellations."[1] In Ernst Gellner's well-known version of the modernist approach, "nations and nationalism [are linked to] the needs of generating 'high culture' for modernisation and industrial development."[2] More particularly,

> The process of industrialisation took place in successive phases and in different conditions, and engendered various new rivalries, with new gains and losses to be made and avoided. Internationalism was often predicted by the prophets and commentators of the industrial age … but the very opposite came to pass: the age of nationalism.[3]

As he phrased it in his characteristically succinct way, "[t]he great, but valid, paradox is this: nations can be defined only in terms of the age of nationalism, rather than, as you might expect, the other way round."[4] And in the Middle East, we may now add, can be defined no less cogently—and *not* paradoxically—in terms of the age of colonialism. If we accept, with Barbara Smith, that the Mandate system in effect allowed France and Britain to pursue their own, very definite political, strategic and economic metropolitan interests,[5] the nation-states that came out of the French and British Mandates are clearly different animals from their European or American precursors as well as from each other.[6] As Zubaida writes,

> The units postulated as nations in the Middle East, as elsewhere, were highly variable: Turkey, Egypt and Iran could be held to constitute historic and cultural

> unities, reinforced by the new processes of the conception of the nation. *But the division within Greater Syria and the entity of Iraq had no such logic.* … However, the debates and struggles over these divisions and units were themselves part of the developing political field(s), underlaid by the new cultural and technical processes.[7]

This political field—"of organisation, mobilisation, agitation and struggle"—developed, alongside the various state formations we find in the Middle East, as "a whole complex of political models, vocabularies, organizations and techniques." As Zubaida elaborates:

> The vocabularies of this field are those of the nation, nationality and nationalism, of popular sovereignty, democracy, legality and representation, of political parties and parliamentary institutions, as well as various ideological pursuits of nationalism, Islam and socialism.[8]

In the preceding chapters I have tried to set out the disparate elements that made up the political field that developed during the 1920s and 1930s in French Mandatory Lebanon. I now wish to turn, more narrowly, to the *zu'ama*, the urban and rural elites who by meshing their commercial and thereby their political interests, moved within a very brief span into positions of power in the new state. I want in particular to focus on how and to what extent their way of organization and mobilization within this political field proved decisive for what today we know as Lebanon. In the process our analysis should help shed further light on the question of the nature of Lebanese nationalism.

The Rise of the *zu'ama-aqṭāb*

Following the 1926 Constitution which called for the establishment of a two-chamber parliament (Art. 16), the existing elected Representative Council was converted into a Chamber of deputies while a Senate was created by the High Commissioner naming its sixteen members. In a common session on, 26 May 1926, of the two chambers chaired by Sheikh Muḥammad al-Jisr—one of the leading Sunni *'ulama'* of Tripoli, newly appointed as senator, and the editor of a popular local newspaper, *Ṭarābuls*—a Greek Orthodox merchant, Charles Dabbās, was elected as the first president of the Lebanese Republic. According to al-Riyāshī, the Syrian Revolt of 1925 had intensified the opposition of the Arab "nationalist" and Sunni leaders who saw the formation of Lebanon as largely serving the interests of the Maronites and Dabbās simply formed a compromise choice. A veteran supporter of Greater Lebanon from before 1920, Charles Dabbās was a lawyer, had married a French woman, and had access to both the merchant circles of Beirut and the French authorities, factors that did much to help smooth his path to the presidency. The only element that could

prevent his election was the Maronite Patriarch, but internal communal considerations made the Patriarch actually welcome it. Finally, Dabbās also had also gained the support of Muḥammad al-Jisr.[9]

As we already saw, together with the Sunni landlords 'Abbūd 'Abd al-Razzāq, Khālid Shihāb, and Ḥusayn Qaz'ūn, the 1925 elections returned as deputies the Sunni urban merchant Kahyr al-Dīn 'Aḍra of Tripoli, and the Beirutis 'Umar al-Dā'ūq and 'Umar Bayhum. In this sense the years 1925-1926 were a turning point, as leading Sunni families who since 1920 had boycotted the institutions of the Lebanese state began to give way to *zu'ama*, no longer adverse to working together with the Mandate authorities. While the Ṣulḥ and Salām families of Sidon and Beirut, the Karāmīs of Tripoli and other merchant and '*ulama* families intensified their rejectionist stance, the High Commissioner again turned to merchant and '*ulama* families in Beirut and Tripoli to gain further concessions from the Sunni elite. In this way 'Abdalla Bayhum of Beirut, Muḥammad al-Kastī, the *qāḍi quḍāt al-shar'* (head of the *shar'i* court) of Beirut, and Muḥammad al-Jisr became Sunni senators. As Shi'i senators the High Commissioner named three members of the influential landlord families, al-Zayn and al-Faḍl of Jabal 'Amil, and Ḥaydar of Biqā'.[10]

To compensate the powerful Shi'i family of As'ad, one of its members, 'Alī Naṣrāt al-As'ad, was appointed minister of agriculture in the newly formed government of August Adīb—a Maronite merchant with long-term financial experience in Egypt—which altogether comprised seven ministers representing the major religious communities. As did the two Chambers, Adīb's government, installed in December 1926, brought together urban merchants and rural landlords. Besides Adīb himself as prime minister, the government included Najīb Qabbānī, a member of a Beirut Sunni merchant family, Salīm Talḥūq, of the old Druze *muqāṭa'ji* family which ruled the district of al-Gharb al-Fawqānī (the "upper district" of Gharb), and 'Alī al-As'ad, whose family had ruled many parts of Jabal 'Amil for at least one century. The three other members of the government, Najīb Amiūnī, Yūsuf Aftimus and Bshara al-Khuri, all had connections with the Beirut merchant community.[11]

The departure of Amiūnī and Aftimus within a year of their appointment, and the subsequent rise in the Lebanese political arena of Bshara al-Khuri exemplify how it had become possible for merchants, lawyers and other professionals to establish themselves among the *zu'ama.* Exactly because they lacked the right personal qualities and appropriate clan and confessional support, both merchant ministers were unable to sustain a political career after 1927. Bshara al-Khuri, on the other hand, quickly found his way in the new political field and build his *za'āma* (leadership) by mobilizing his family, confessional, and mercantile ties and his educational background for the task. Al-Khuri was born in 1880 in Rishmayya, a village in an area whose multi-communal milieu—inhabited by Druzes, Maronites, and other Christians, and a small number of Shi'is—helped him to develop his obvious ability to bargain and compromise. Like many of

Lebanon's first generation of Christian leaders, he had been educated in the Jesuit schools in Lebanon and, in 1912, had obtained a law degree from the University of Paris. As was the case with many supporters of Greater Lebanon, such as Yūsuf al-Sawdā, Émile Eddé, August Adīb and other merchants and intellectuals, al-Khuri had spent several years in Egypt before 1920. He also had good relations with *al-Itiḥād al-Lubnānī*, which in 1919 had called for the creation of Greater Lebanon.[12]

Curious as to how the *zu'ama* of Lebanon, "those princes of Machiavelli," negotiated their first rungs on the political ladder, al-Riyāshī tells us how in the first years of the Mandate al-Khuri successfully exploited his ties with the Jesuits, whose influence—"dominance" he even calls it—over the French officials was great: "He was able … to mobilize this dominance for his own interests … His first political step, which was already a big one, left no doubt that his next steps would be even bigger. Relying on God and the Jesuits, and with the backing of the French, he entered the *saray* (government) straight into the Ministry of the Interior … in 1926." This was at a time that the French were still promoting local politicians from among the "old and aged horses." But "from his first hour in the ministry this new energetic young man began to direct his attention to two objects: The first was to gain the support of Sheikh Muḥammad al-Jisr, speaker of the Chamber … and representative of the Muslims in the *saray* and much respected, if not feared, by Dabbās, the president of the republic. The second was to win over the representative of the High Commissioner in the Lebanese government, the true governor of the *saray.*"[13]

The first six months of parliamentary and constitutional life of Lebanon quickly taught the *zu'ama* the ropes, especially how to use parliamentary debates and decisions to their advantage. Early in 1927 discussions on the budget already brought the first government crisis. The event would prove typical of the many crises that were to come. Competition between Christian *aqṭāb* for a seat in government led a small group to try to topple the government over the budgetary issue. Prompted by Émil Eddé, Ayūb Thābit and Alpierre Qashū' organized the opposition within the Chambers. The result was that after three months of discussions Parliament had still not approved the budget the government had presented.[14] It was these strata of well-established *zu'ama-aqṭāb*, who had emerged into the political arena as leading figures of the Maronite elite early in 1920 or even earlier, that Bshara al-Khuri found himself up against. And he lost no time to skillfully integrate himself into the political and economic elite of Beirut. Al-Riyāshī writes: "At this time Sheikh Bshara al-Khuri had already been 'Beirutized' by his integration into the leading group of the city … and then, he was married to a girl from the richest and most respected Beiruti Christian family."[15] Although not descendent from a *muqāṭa'jī* family, as soon as he had made it into the Beirut elite, in 1926–27, al-Khuri was given the title of sheikh as seal of his acceptance within the *zu'ama* of the whole of Lebanon.[16]

After the budget of 1927 was finally approved at the end of April, Émile Eddé's group kept up its criticism of the government's expenditure policy,

demanding a reduction in the number of ministers from seven to four or even only three. The deputies were reluctant to accept such a reduction as it would affect three or four *zu'ama* ministers with whom they had reciprocal interests, but the members of the Senate—all appointed by the High Commissioner—approved the reduction. As a result, at the beginning of May August Adīb handed in the resignation of his government. This gave al-Khuri an opportunity for his "second big step," to become prime minister. He had been preparing for it as soon as he had secured the confidence of the delegate of the High Commissioner, and both the president and premier. Dabbās had appointed al-Khuri acting prime minister when Adīb left for France in November 1926 to negotiate Lebanon's share in the old Ottoman debt.[17]

Competition for the premiership widened beyond the Maronite *zu'ama* when Sheikh Muḥammad al-Jisr decided to enter the race. Probably encouraged by the French authorities—al-Jisr's candidacy might help reduce the opposition of Sunni leaders to the French and obviate their rejection of the Lebanese state—Dabbās charged al-Jisr with forming a new government. When he declined the task, this cleared the way for al-Khuri and Eddé to fight it out between them. Al-Khuri came out on top and al-Jisr by way of compensation was appointed speaker of the Parliament.[18]

Al-Khuri's cabinet comprised six ministers belonging to the elites of "the major religious communities." As he was unable to attract members of the Sunni urban elite, al-Khuri followed the French tactics of combining Christian merchant-*zu'ama* with Sunni, Shi'i and Druze landlord-*zu'ama*; his cabinet united the merchants George Thābit (Maronite) and Iliyās Fayāḍ (Greek Orthodox) with the landlords Khālid Shihāb (Sunni), Aḥmad al-Ḥusaynī (Shi'i), and Salīm Talḥūq (Druze). However, Eddé denounced the size of this cabinet as inflated, too, and under the banner of "financial reform" formed an opposition group with the *aqṭāb*, Ayūb Thābit, Mūsā Nammūr, Shibl Dammūs and Muḥammad al-Jisr.[19] In June, news of financial problems within the government and of corruption of high officials reached the Lebanese public. As the British Consul reported:

> The Minister of Finance had to obtain from the High Commissioner an advance of £S 30,000 Gold from the Lebanese share in the customs receipts … The recent scandals in the Public Works Department have served to show how the money goes. Most of the district engineers of the department are being prosecuted as are some of the higher officials at head-quarters. Very large sums must have been wasted or stolen. There has also been a scandal in the Public Health Department.[20]

On 5 July, Eddé's group presented their "project of reform" that had been prepared by Ayūb Thābit, one of Eddé's supporters in the Chamber of deputies. It asked for a reform in the authority vested in the government and its premier, a change in relations between the legislative and executive branches, and a reduction of the number of ministers to four, including the premier.[21] To fend off Eddé's group, Bshara al-Khuri wanted to introduce a constitutional reform

suggested by the French and President Dabbās that abolished the Senate, introduced a balance between the legislature and the executive, and reinforced the power of the president especially in matters of the budget.[22] The result was a growing division among the governmental and parliamentary elites into two clear factions, "Éddé" and "Khuri," each believing that the other's reform was only intended to weaken their political power.[23]

Again al-Khuri won out, because the French authorities mobilized a majority in both Chambers. As soon as the Senate was abolished, the new Chamber, of 46 deputies, elected in its first session Sheikh Muḥammad al-Jisr as speaker. The latter was quickly encouraged by the French and the president to put himself up as the spokesman of the Muslims in Lebanon.[24] Both French and Christian elites had been working to create legitimacy for al-Jisr's leadership so as to counter any renewal of activities on the part of the Sunni leader against the *fait accomplis* policy on the territorial issue. In 1926, for example, al-Jisr had been called to Tripoli as counter-*zaʿīm* to ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Karāmī, ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Biṣār and ʿArif Ḥasan al-Rifāʿī, who had been arrested by the French in July of that year.[25] In 1927 it was even more urgent to use al-Jisr as counter-*zaʿīm* vis-à-vis all the urban Sunni leaders, particularly when several of the latter were planning a "nationalist" congress in Beirut to renew the demand for territorial revision—held on 25 October, one week after the election of al-Jisr as speaker, apart from Karāmī, al-Biṣār, ʿArif Ḥasan al-Rifāʿī and ʿAbdalla al-Yāfī, none of the urban Sunni leaders participated in this congress.[26]

However, when the chips came down, neither the constitutional reform nor the support of al-Jisr in Parliament could salvage the new government of al-Khuri. Although the 1928 budget was approved without difficulty, through further intrigues (*ḥartaqāt*) the *aqṭāb* still succeeded in bringing down the government on 5 January 1928, i.e., after barely seven months. In his memoirs, al-Khuri blames the *ḥarb al-karasī* ("war for the seats") of the *zuʿamā*: "Soon after the approval of the budget, *al-ḥartaqāt* over seats in the government began."[27] Al-Khuri tendered his resignation and left the *saray*, firm in his knowledge that he would return as soon as possible with renewed zeal to challenge those who had brought him down: "He quit the *saray* in the winter of 1928 but left footprints in the stone of its doorstep as a pledge of his return."[28]

And, indeed, soon after the president charged him again with the task of forming the government. In an obvious attempt to outdo his opponents in Parliament, al-Khuri decided to reduce the number of members of his cabinet to three (himself included), and at the same time to invite the two *aqṭābs,* Émile Eddé and Alpierre Qashū', to take office in this pared-down government. When they—predictably—refused, al-Khuri turned to Ayūb Thābit, whom he offered the two ministries of the Interior and Health. To sow further discord also within the Sunni urban elite, which continued to boycott the Lebanese state as a separate entity, al-Khuri offered three portfolios to Ḥusayn al-Aḥdab, the mayor of Beirut. With the support of the latter al-Khuri also hoped to gain a chance to mollify his relative Khayr al-Dīn al-Aḥdab, who in 1925 had established an

Arab nationalist paper, *al-'Ahd al-Jadīd*, in which he constantly attacked the separatism of the Lebanese Christian elite and especially the supremacist position the Maronites took up within the state.[29]

Although it gained the confidence of Parliament with a majority of 33 votes to two, the life span of the new government, too, was only seven months. It has been suggested that Émile Eddé gave the government his vote of confidence because "in his heart he believed that Ayūb Thābit, with his highstrung character, would make its life short."[30] Al-Khuri himself also mentions Thābit, especially his attitude vis-à-vis the deputies, as one of the reasons why his government was brought down so soon again, but saw as the chief reason the number of cabinet members: this was too small to be able to satisfy the appetite of the *aqṭāb* deputies who were vying for a ministry post just at the crucial time that al-Dabbās was seeking a second term as president and for this needed the support from these *aqṭāb* and other deputies.[31]

Some Maronite leaders by this time were pushing for the supreme office of the state to fall in the hands of one of them. One of the richest Maronite merchants of Beirut, George Lutfalla, whose father had lived for many years in Egypt, had actually launched his campaign for the presidency one whole year before the end of Dabbās' occupancy.[32] Al-Khuri's government was succeeded by that of Ḥabīb Pasha al-Sa'd, which faced three immediately important issues: the end of Dabbās's presidency, constitutional reform, and a powerful new wave of Muslim opposition to the separation of Lebanon from Syria.[33] The urgency of the last issue lay in the fact that it threatened to undo the growing integration of Sunni *zu'ama* into the Lebanese government, parliament and administration. While so far only a few members of the urban Sunni elite had been found ready to participate in state institutions, Sunni oppositionists appeared to be developing a dual strategy. On the one hand, they continued to stress their allegiance to Syria as *al-waṭan* (their national country), but on the other, as they stepped up opposition to "Christian domination," they were increasingly willing to address their grievances to the French authorities about the lack of fair "proportional distribution" of posts in the administration among the religious communities.[34]

As this wave of opposition to Lebanese separatism was also gaining the support of Shi'i *zu'ama*, notably the Ḥaydar family in Biqā', French officials suggested to al-Sa'd that he add a Shi'i member as fourth to his government, which already included again the Sunni Ḥusayn al-Aḥdab. Al-Sa'd's four ministers were Sper Don Abu al-Rūs, a Beirut merchant with whom al-Sa'd had had good relations since before the first world war, Musā Nammūr, one of the Maronite *aqṭāb*, al-Aḥdab, and Subḥī Ḥaydar, the Shi'i deputy from Ba'lbak. The choice of Subḥī Ḥaydar is significant because only one month before the formation of the government, he had participated with another 46 Lebanese personalities in a conference in Damascus which had called for the unification of all "Syrian districts" including those which had been annexed to "ancient Lebanon."[35] As he was a deputy in the Lebanese Parliament, Ḥaydar had been summoned to an official meeting with President Dabbās who "expressed his

utter annoyance at his presence at a congress that intended to dismantle Lebanon."[36] This meeting seemed to have smoothed Ḥaydar's way into government and he soon became the most powerful Shi'i *za'īm* in Biqā'.[37]

Although his government, too, was to last a brief eight months, from 19 August 1928 to 14 May 1929, al-Sa'd proved that the "old horses" of the Maronite *zu'ama* could stay the course as well as, if not better than, the "new horses" of the merchant-*zu'ama* who had emerged in the early years of the Mandate. Al-Sa'd himself belonged to the established powerful elite of the late Ottoman period. Owing to his family's influential position on Mount Lebanon, he had been appointed head of the Representative Council of the *mutaṣarrifiyya* which, in turn, had enabled him to play a significant role in politics during and after the first world war. Although "al-Sa'd's mistake" (al-Riyāshī)—in 1918 he had agreed to serve as the governor of Lebanon on behalf of Fayṣal—"had become more or less his Original Sin," he regained his leading role when he succeeded in forming the government.[38] However, it was not long before the "war for seats" in the government of this "functionary of the old school" and the approach of the general elections "brought things to a head, and a sufficient number of deputies were found who were ready to vote in favor of a no-confidence motion. The cabinet, therefore, met on 8 May and decided to resign."[39]

When, pressured by the French authorities, the deputies elected Dabbās as president for a second term of three years (from 26 May 1929 until 25 May 1932), the stage was set for a series of events whose impact on the socio-political development of the country would prove crucial. Primarily it was the convergence of French Mandatory policies and the influence of the *zu'ama* as "clans," i.e., of "national" and "confessional" politics, that accelerated the ethnicization of the whole of Lebanon's society. Regional grievances, clan and individual interests, economic and educational reforms, demography—all proved factors that deepened sectarianism instead of fostering national unity.

True Reform or Tool?

Forming a new government this time fell again to Bshara al-Khuri. Installed on 14 May 1929 with Ḥusayn al-Aḥdab and Najīb Abu Ṣuwān as its two ministers, it proposed a new electoral law whereby, in addition to the 30 elected deputies, Parliament would be made up of another fifteen appointed deputies and distributed according to community. As in 1922 and 1925, the elections, held in July, again evinced alliances among *zu'ama* across the different communities, clan disputes and the undeniable intervention of the government and the French authorities. Although in his memoirs al-Khuri denies that his government directly intervened in the elections, he also mentions how he used to follow every step of the elections, intervene in the compilation of lists and offer his guidance to candidates.[40]

Neither al-Khuri nor Émil Eddé put themselves up as candidates because they knew their appointment as deputies had been guaranteed by the High Commissioner.[41] Although al-Sa'd was advised by al-Khuri to withdraw his candidacy, he insisted to take part in a constituency that was dominated by two Druze landlords, Tawfīq Arslān and Rashīd Junblāṭ, who had united with five Christians, Rūkuz Abu Nādir, Iskander al-Bustāni, Anīs al-Khuri, Michel Zakkūr and Jubrān Naṣṣār. In the end, al-Sa'd was able to maintain his status among the Maronite *zu'ama* because of the High Commissioner's decision to include him among the appointed deputies. As in 1922 and 1925, there were clan clashes in many regions, notably in the north between the two Maronite candidates Wadī' Ṭarabay and, Qabalān Franjiyya, a newcomer to the politics whose clan ties in the Zgharta area clinched the leadership for him. The newly elected and appointed Chamber was not much different from the old one and continued to be based on coalitions between urban/merchant families and rural/landlord families.[42]

A-Khuri's government managed to hold out against the new Chamber for only four months—on 11 November he already tendered his resignation, thereby closing the first phase of his political career. In his memoirs, al-Khuri does not go into detail as to why he resigned, but his comments on the suggestion that Émile Eddé form the next government may give us a hint: "Let Émile Eddé take his chances, if he succeeds we will support him, but if he fails we then can put end to the mood of reform and salvation."[43]

As it was, neither al-Khuri nor al-Sa'd proved capable of introducing radical change in the administration that would have reduced expenditures. Though rhetorically they demanded radical reforms, deputies continued "de s'occuper des intérêts particuliers de ses membres ou des querelles de villages, intéressant leur électeurs influents,"[44] At a time when the economic crisis that had the Western world in its grip began to affect also the Lebanese and the Syrian economy,

> Les protestations fusèrent de tous les milieux. Aucune promesse n'avait été tenue par la République qui avait coûté trop cher. Le budget, à cause d'elle, s'était élevé de quatre à neuf millions livres syriennes, montant énorme pour l'époque. Le favoritisme, la dilapidation des deniers publics, l'impéritie des gouvernements s'étalaient à toutes les marches du pouvoir … C'est alors que les yeux se tournèrent vers M. Émile Eddé, avocat de talent et homme énergique.[45]

The criticism that was leveled at al-Khuri not only attacked his inability to reform the economy but also the favoritism he practiced toward "clients" and friends. Summarizing this first phase of al-Khuri's career, al-Riyāshī writes sardonically: "Because he was accustomed more to giving than to taking, he did not leave his first government office before concluding deals in favor of his friends. Perhaps these deals would not cost the state, but they could not be concluded without the device of the prime minister." Such arrangements included the construction of roads and throughfares which "passed through land possessed by the members of the consortium with whom he had close kinship and friendship."[46] According to the British consul, al-Khuri resigned

because he preferred "to take up the post of legal adviser of the newly-formed Lebanese branch of the Bank Misr."[47]

Although al-Khuri, ever the successful lawyer and businessman, returned to run the affairs of his personal estate, his interest in politics "occupied him day and night unflaggingly," as he waited and "worked in silence and patience to strike out at those who had caused him pain."[48] And he waited for Émile Eddé to make a first wrong move, even maneuvered him into position for it. Émile Eddé was born around 1884 in Damascus, the name Eddé suggesting family origins in the village of Eddé near Jubayl (Byblos). His father Ibrāhīm had grown up and studied in Beirut before being invited to serve as dragoman at the French consulate in Damascus. This position brought him into contact with Beiruti and Damascene "high society" and the Western communities of these two cities. This, in turn, led to Ibrāhīm's marriage to Maria Donato, a descendant of the famous Doge Francesco Donato of Venice. Émile was the couple's twelfth child. The family showed a strong leaning toward the French and French culture: one of Émile's brothers became a Jesuit priest, another an officer in the French navy; a sister married a French businessman. Émile spent his childhood and most of his adolescence in Beirut, where his father had a house on Sursuq Street. Like many children of Beirut merchants, Émile attended the Jesuit schools and the college of Saint Joseph. In 1900 he left Lebanon to complete his law studies in Aix-en-Provence.[49]

After his return in 1907 Eddé embarked on a professional career as lawyer. In 1912, when he began working as lawyer for the French consulate, Eddé's political destiny became firmly tied to the future of the French in the Middle East. That same year he married Lodi Sursuq. Both events would prove highly significant for his political fortunes. The Greek Orthodox Sursuq family was one of the richest not only in Lebanon but throughout the Middle East. Its economic activities, land acquisitions, and merchant houses spread over Lebanon, Syria, Palestine and Egypt. That one of Beirut's streets carried the name of the family symbolized its power and wealth. Accompanying his wife and her family on their visits to Egypt, Eddé established contacts with Lebanese émigrés there interested in the Greater Lebanon idea. As a devoted Francophile, Eddé fled at the outbreak of the war in 1914 to Egypt, where he played an important role in the recruitment of volunteers for *La Légion d'Orient* that the French established in Egypt at the end of 1916. In 1918, as the French were driving the Ottomans out of the coastal region of Lebanon, Eddé disembarked at Beirut, wearing his army uniform. Soon he was appointed *conseiller principal* of the French military authorities on the coast. From that time until his re-emergence in the internal political arena in 1922, Eddé was the man "*pour le Liban avec la France.*"[50]

Eddé's personal characteristics and intellectual make-up matched the type of Lebanese that Michel Chiha envisioned: polyglot scion of a mountain family, his outlook Mediterranean and his interests mercantile, adhering to "Western" values and with little or no interest in Arab culture. Although his rhetoric might

at times betray his background, by 1922 Eddé had adjusted to the politics of the *zu'ama.*

Still, it was here that Eddé made his first "wrong move" when he decided to abandon the formula of "three ministers." As a subterfuge, he introduced the novelty of a *sous-secretaire d'Éat des affaires économiques au ministère des Finances* in the government he formed in November 1929. The post was given to a young lawyer, Gabriel Menassa, while Eddé's four ministers were well-known politicians, Najīb Abu Ṣuwān, Mūsā Nammūr (both Maronites), Ḥusayn al-Aḥdab (Sunni), and Aḥmad al-Ḥusaynī (Shi'i), the latter serving as minister for the first time. Criticizing Eddé for his readiness to discard a principle which he had earlier used to bring down Bshara al-Khuri, opposition deputies and *zu'ama* ridiculed the formation of his government, dubbing Menassa *farkh wazīr* ("nestling" minister). They also believed that Menassa's appointment had nothing to do with the planned financial reform, as the British consul reported: "It does not appear that he [Menassa] has any special qualification for [the job]."[51]

On 22 November 1929 Eddé placed before the Chamber a plan of reform that was quite ambitious in the radical changes it envisaged into the administrative, judicial, educational, and economic functions of the Lebanese state. Ten days earlier, the British consul had tried to forecast its fate:

> Mr. Eddé … intends to introduce drastic reforms … [If he reduces] the number of officials by one half … he will certainly become widely unpopular … The French certainly cannot initiate a change … Complaints are made that they, having invented [sic] the Constitution, are responsible for what goes wrong, but these complaints would be as nothing compared to the complaints which could arise if they of their own initiative introduced changes.[52]

Eddé was likely to face great opposition because "the politicians are enjoying themselves, and with so many useless posts there seems to be a place in the Administration for almost any idler who wants one."[53]

The original text of the reform bill was written in French and translated into Arabic. Lebanese historians still argue about the question in which language the reform was actually presented in the Chamber by Najīb Abu Ṣuwān.[54] The 25-page text of the reform and the minutes of the three successive sessions Parliament dedicated to debating it deserve a more thorough analysis than I can provide here.[55] But briefly put, the first section seeks to simplify the administrative machinery by reducing the number of districts from eleven to five, while instead of the 36 *mudīr*s in charge of the sub-districts there would be seventeen *qā'immaqām*s in charge of the *qaḍā*s. The second section deals with the simplification and reorganization of the judicial system. While the reform would increase the number of magistrates courts to seventeen, to match the numbers of the *qaḍā*s, it limited the courts of first instance to five, one in each district, with one higher court, intended to perform the duties previously falling to the Court of Appeal and Court of Causation. Consequently, the number of

magistrates, which stood at 150, was to be reduced by about one half, and about 340 minor judicial offices would be abolished.[56]

Not surprisingly, the reduction in the number of the officials in the judiciary provoked much dissatisfaction as they had always seen themselves as apostles for the new state. The judicial reform itself seemed to add fuel to the flames among Muslim leaders opposed to the establishment of the Lebanese entity and the revision it introduced of the Ottoman codes concerning personal status, especially the removal of the Christians from the jurisdiction of the Muslim religious courts. Although Muslims were hardly affected by the revision, the envisaged changes provoked the ire of some Muslim leaders, as for them it entailed an obvious attempt to impart Western, i.e., Christian features to the state. According to ʻAwaḍ, the uproar around the issue of the religious courts did not arise from genuine concern among the Muslim leaders, but was "an instrument used by Bshara al-Khuri for his political interests."[57]

The reform criticized the existing taxation system, which "differentiated between the several districts of Lebanon," but its author suggested that the subject should be closely studied before any concrete steps were taken. In other words, the reform did not immediately put in place a new system that would equalize between ancient Lebanon and the annexed areas. Actually, the entire economic section of the reform is phrased in generalities and does not anywhere come close to specifics for the various economic sectors.[58]

More than the revision of the personal status codes, the section on education took on a "confessional" aspect. A deep cut into the education budgets was presented as though this would lead to an improvement in the educational system. The program envisaged the closure of 111 state schools out of the total of 162 then existing in Lebanon. Although there are no lists available of the localities where schools were to be closed, the elites of the Muslim communities claimed that most of these served Sunni, Shiʻi and Druze children. The Sunni urban elite began mobilizing all Muslim communities in Lebanon against what they called Eddé's policy of "discrimination." Eddé may have underestimated the confessional implications of his reform, although the campaign to derail it got underway at least two weeks before its presentation in Parliament. With the Muslim and "nationalist" press carrying reports and attacks on Eddé's plans, Muslim leaders held a rally on 9 November to air their opinions.[59]

However, the agitation within the community did not appear to lead the Sunni, Shiʻi and Druze members of Parliament to change their position. During the debates, only Bshara al-Khuri and Yūsuf al-Zayn were against the "abolition of state schools even in the localities where there are private schools, because the latter are not ready to accept pupils from different communities, due to their confessional characteristics."[60] In his criticism, Yūsuf al-Zayn analyzed the economic dimension of the proposed closure of the schools, arguing that poor families would encounter the greatest difficulties in paying the high fees the private schools demanded. He also pointed out the contradiction in the reform, as it planned simultaneously to cut the education budget and to increase

expenditure on road construction: "Despite their vital function, are roads more important than minds, and should we close schools in order to open prisons?"[61]

However, unlike for al-Khuri, who abstained in a vote of non-confidence, for al-Zayn, it was crucial to maintain a sound relationship with the government and the French authorities to secure his position among the rival *zu'ama* of the Shi'i community, and he was one of the thirty members who duly approved the reform project. All eighteen Sunni, Shi'i and Druze deputies gave their support to the reform, though not unequivocally—questions and reservations were raised concerning the judicial changes.[62]

"Confessional" Crisis

Outside Parliament, however, Muslim *zu'ama* and intellectuals succeeded in galvanizing the Muslim population into action by turning the question of educational reform into a crisis. The reform was seen as a means to cut the Muslims off from their Arab cultural heritage. For Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ, the Sunni "nationalist" leader, the reform was a clear attempt to "invent a non-Arab homeland in Lebanon" and 'Alī Nāṣir al-Dīn, the prominent Druze intellectual, branded it a "fabrication" meant to facilitate the domination of the ruling party.[63] There were also rumors that the Lebanese government, backed by the French, wanted to replace the Arabic alphabet by the Latin script.[64] As he tells it, Muḥammad Bayhum was among a number of people who aborted a decision taken in 1928 by the ministry of education which would have recognized "the Lebanese vernacular" as a separate language which the students could opt to use in their matriculation examinations.[65]

Eddé's government fell on 20 March 1930 before it had had a chance to fully implement the reform. Thus, the education budget for 1931 was only slightly affected. Owing to the 1929–30 crisis, the 1932 annual report to the League of Nations devoted a special place to education. According to the report, expenditure on education in 1930 amounted to £S 294,679. In 1931 this was cut to £S 274,147. Note that the 1930 budget was approved before the installation of Eddé's government and that of 1931 was approved by his government. The report explains the reason for the cut: "La diminution…a porté principalement sur l'enseignement primaire officiel dont les crédits globaux sont raminés de £ L.S 235,828 à 212,725, elle est la consequence des supressions faites en Jan. 1930 par … Eddé" but the share of the National Library and Museum in education expenditure increased.[66] This means that the state schools received about 5 percent of the total budget when Eddé decided to reform the economy. But his government increased expenditure on institutions that could benefit the elite of the country and contribute to national pride.

If we look at the relative numbers of state and private schools, not only the educational gap between Christians and Muslims becomes clear but also the role

the educational system played in reinforcing "national" culture. Although the number of state schools increased from 128 in 1930 to 134 in 1931, and the number of the pupils from 13,385 to 14,435, the 1,335 private schools operating in 1931 comprised a total of 103,795 pupils. Most of these schools belonged to religious, mainly Christian institutions, among them 434 foreign schools. While in 1931 there was one state secondary school, there were 69 private secondary and 13 private vocational schools.[67]

The 1932 report to the League of Nations provides a table of the "confessional" distribution of the schools and pupils in 1931 which shows that in the state schools there were 3,309 Christian pupils (198 of them at the secondary school), while there were a total of 11,012 Sunni, Shi'i, Druze and other pupils. In other words, the non-Christian pupils constituted over 70 percent of the total in the state schools. On the other hand, the number of Christian pupils in private schools was 71,803, i.e., more than 70 percent, while that of the Sunnis, Shi'is and Druzes was 30,248; "other pupils" (probably Jews) numbered 1,744.[68]

The British consul mentions the "confessional" dispute and describes the "agitation" prevailing among the Muslims in two reports he sent to London in February 1930: "A 'Great Islamic Congress of the Lebanese Littoral is to be convened to consider the situation of the Muslim community and devise means of protecting their rights … Apparently not only Muslims, both Sunnis and Shiahs (Metwalis), but also Druzes are eligible to take part in the conference." He added that he thought there was "no reason to think that the rights of this non-Christian minority are in any way threatened. The object of those desirous of assembling the congress is no doubt to call attention to the fact that the Muslim element, even if a minority, is nevertheless an important one which has to be taken into account." The organizers of the congress "got together a temporary committee to register with the Prime Minister a protest against the injustice done to Muslims by closing of a certain number of their schools."[69]

In his second report the consul's pro-Christian bias comes to the fore when he speaks of "[the] agitation to protect Muslim rights and particularly as regards schools, which, although not justified, is having some measures of success … an imaginary grievance is better than none at all when it is a question of trying to set on foot an agitation, and the month of Ramadan, with its abnormal conditions of existence, is a propitious time for attempting to work upon Muslim feeling." The consul highlights the special role of *al-'Ahd al-Jadīd*, which described the issue of schools as a "matter of living concern to the Muslim World" and had printed a message from the President of the Supreme Muslim Council in Jerusalem, Hājj Amīn al-Ḥusaynī, to the President of the Muslim Council in Beirut, Sheikh Muṣṭafa al-Ghalāiynī. Because feelings were already running high, the latter had decided to confine the celebration of the Ramadan feast to almsgiving. The consul mentions the role of "the nationalists," but perceptibly adds:

> There are, however, certain other considerations of local interest which helped to complicate matters. For one thing Hussein el Ahdab, the Muslim Minister in the Cabinet, has of late been having rather a bad time. A newspaper claims to have proof of irregularities in his department and has launched a campaign against him. The first result of this has been the holding of an enquiry, and the second may be the disappearance of Hussein Bey. In these circumstances he is naturally disgruntled and using *al-'Ahd al-Jadid* of his relative Khayr al-Din and the "Muslim cause" as means of pressure.[70]

Whether real, imagined, or simply used by the *zu'ama* as a political tool, the grievances and feelings of discrimination led to polarization among large numbers of the Lebanese Christians and Muslims. The press then exploited this and it did not take long for communities in Palestine, Syria, and Iraq to be affected, too. While the French Mandatory authorities in Syria and Lebanon refrained from criticizing the reforms, the French consul in Iraq wanted them to be considered noting that they had the support of the "Muslims of Palestine" and quoting the Syrian press which described "the reforms of President Eddé as tools in the war of the Lebanese Christians against Islam"—viewing the reforms as "an act of aggression," nationalist circles in Iraq were joining Syrian demands for "the annexed areas" of the coast of Lebanon, Biqā' and the south to be restored to the Syrian Federation.[71]

Outside literate urban circles, the Syrian and Iraqi press had far less influence among the masses than the Lebanese press. But even among literate Lebanese, instead of fostering a "united national feeling," the press only helped deepen the division as it reflected two opposing "nationalist" courses. As 'Awaḍ describes it, unable to control the press "agitation" against Eddé, the High Commissioner contemplated intervening to stop the reforms, telling President Dabbās: "They [the Muslims] are vilifying France in the streets as a result of Émile Eddé's policy … [France] cannot be deaf to what disturbs the people."[72] Adding fuel to the flames was Eddé's alleged reaction: "If the Muslims are not content in the Lebanese Republic and its separation from Syria … they have no choice but to go back to the desert whence they came."[73]

Zu'ama and intellectuals alike found in Beirut's ever-expanding press industry a ready means through which to disseminate their ideological viewpoints and rally support for their political alliances. In 1930–32 there were reportedly sixty-six periodicals coming out in Lebanon and another thirty-five publications issued irregularly. Total circulation of Lebanon's twelve daily newspapers was 42,000.[74] For a small non-Western country such as Lebanon these were significant numbers. The crucial role books, journals, newspapers and pamphlets played in shaping the "debates and struggles" in Mandatory Lebanon on confessional and national issues not only highlights the way in which, for Zubaida, "new cultural and technical processes" underpin a "developing political field," but of course also exemplifies the complicity of "print capitalism," as Anderson has it, in the making of national consciousness.[75]

Because the pro-French Christian press expressed views that were very similar in tone, Muslim intellectuals and some Muslim leaders began to see the statement Eddé had allegedly made as typical of the political mood prevalent among the partisans of Lebanon as a separate entity. At the same time, it remains difficult to ascertain if indeed Eddé actually ever made this "statement" as the available sources contain neither the occasion nor the date on which he might have done so. Both al-Riyāshī and ʻAwaḍ, who report on it, are at pains to exonerate Eddé and quote Muslim leaders who were his peers and were well acquainted with Eddé's character and temperament. They suggest that, as in the case of the judicial reforms, behind the rumors lay the rivalry between Eddé and al-Khuri—the latter certainly was able to draw political benefit from them.[76] That Eddé never denied the statement ʻAwaḍ explains through a lack of perspicuity on his part (somewhat surprising in a politician of his ilk) vis-à-vis the role the media had come to play in political life. [77]

The Race for the Presidency

Soon after, with the campaign against him in the press spilling over into the streets, Eddé resigned. It fell to the man who had been Lebanon's first prime minister, August Adīb, to form a new government. This took office on 25 March 1930 and had four ministers. Its very first task was to appease the public and mollify the deputies. At al-Khuri's prompting, it shelved Eddé's reforms; in December the new minister of education, Jubrān Tuwaynī, reopened many of the schools that had been closed.[78] However, as the economic crisis deepened and the *zuʻama* continued to put a poke in the wheel, Adīb was forced, on 22 July 1931, to reshuffle his cabinet. This was the eighth since 1926 and would be the last before the High Commissioner, on 9 May 1932, decided to suspend the constitution.[79]

Like al-Khuri after his resignation, Eddé continued to combine political and professional interests through his lucrative law practice and his ties with the merchant community of Beirut:

> Le président Eddé redevient alors Maitre Eddé, avocat au barreau de Beyrouth, commercialist réputé, qui plaidait aussi, de temps à autre, des grandes affaires criminelles. Outres les contentieux dont il avait déjâ la charge tels que Union Vie, Banco di Roma, l'Office des Eax de Beyrouth, dont les actionnaires étaient des sociétés françaises, il assura, à partir de 1930, la défense des intérêts de six P. and I. Clubs britanniques … Ceux-ci bénéficiaient d'énormes capitaux.[80]

With Dabbās' second term as president slated to come to an end on 25 May 1932, Eddé and al-Khuri, who had both set their eyes on the post, began gearing up for the elections as early as mid-1931. The race was to deepen not only the rift between the two men but also the rivalry between the two factions

that backed them. Making deals to form "alliances" within the Chamber intensified, with both Eddé and al-Khuri for the first time trying to transform these into more or less stable political frameworks. 'Awaḍ describes the first half of 1931 as the turning point in the relations between the two Maronite leaders, as the press by then had become divided according to the two Maronite factions they headed: apart from *Le Jour* of Michel Chiha (who had family ties with al-Khuri), the entire Lebanese French press supported Eddé, the Arabic press al-Khuri.[81]

Significantly, the fluctuations among the Sunni leaders in their affiliations with the two factions and the use the Maronite leaders made of the clan rivalries among the *zu'ama* of other communities show that personal and clan considerations took precedence over "confessional" interests. When Sheikh Muḥammad al-Jisr decided to enter the race for the presidency, 'Awaḍ remarked perceptibly:

> Probably the great surprise of this time proves to be that confessionalism was tactics and not strategy, as when the *aqṭāb* of the Maronite deputies such as Émile Eddé, Ḥabīb Pasha al-Sa'd, George Thābit, Rūkuz Abu Nādir, Yūsuf al-Khāzin and Sāmī Kan'ān … joined Sheikh Muḥammad against the High Commissioner … and the Patriarch … and when the Muslim deputies assembled around Sheikh Bshara [al-Khuri], not endorsing support for Sheikh Muḥammad.[82]

Although it is difficult to ascertain whether the Maronite *aqṭāb* 'Awaḍ mentions actually encouraged al-Jisr's candidacy, it is obvious that the political rift between the Maronite leaders and the deputies played a role in al-Jisr's decision. But by the summer, as al-Jisr appeared to be serious in his intentions, factionalism soon again made way for the "confessional game," all players, especially the *zu'ama*, aware that the only true basis of their legitimacy was "confessional." This shift back from personal, clan and factional to confessional attitudes was noted in passing in the 1932 report to the League of Nations:

> La politique libanaise a continué à être marqué par des intrigues intérieurs à la Cambre des députés … Adib Pacha, qui avait succédé en mars 1930 au Ministère Eddé, a passé sans encombres toute l'année 1931. C'est en vain que ses adversaires qui avaient un moment constitué un nouveau parti appelé 'parti réformateur républician' groupement d'ambitions plus que d'idées … Par aillleurs le jeu des institutions parlementaires, constamment influencé par l'effet des ambitions, des rivalités et des intérêts personnels, paraissait singulièrement peu adapté à l'oeuvre de redressement dont la nécessité était évidente pour tous l'inquiétude de l'opinion se trouva renforcé par les compétitions que fit naître l'approche de l'élection présidentielle … Des campagnes multiples … risquaient de faire porter le débat sur le terrain confessionnel.[83]

Although according to the constitution the presidency was open to all communities, the Patriarch and most of *zu'ama-aqṭāb* of the Maronite community felt the time had come to exercise their "right" to be given the highest post in the republic as their community, they claimed, was the largest in

Lebanon.[84] Inevitably this introduced questions of demography. On 27 May 1931, Sunni senator ʻAbdalla Bayhum presented an official demand to the Chamber to have a census conducted before the end of the year. Interestingly, a first demand for a census had been presented on 17 November 1928 by the Sunni, Shiʻi and Druze deputies.[85] Following an earlier demand by ʻAbdalla Bayhum, on 8 September 1930, the Minister of the Interior already had a draft of a census law ready. The law was affirmed in the Chamber on 19 December 1931, a few weeks before the census was carried out.[86] Alarmed by the prospect of a census, Émil Eddé made a trip to France in the summer of 1931, where he discussed with the French authorities the future of Lebanon especially in light of the approaching census and the presidential election. Eddé presented the fall of his government as a dangerous precedent that "serait appelé à se reproduire si les données démographiques, donc [!] politiques et confessionnelles, n'étaient pas remises en cause." The solution Eddé saw in *le rattachement* (restoration) prior to the census of Tripoli to Syria.[87]

The pro-Eddé press quickly picked up on this. George Naccache (Naqqāsh), editor of *l'Orient* and a close friend of Eddé, published an article on 22 August, which he called "Un sacrifice nécessaire," defending the idea in the following terms:

> Il y a un sacrifice nécessaire et plus tôt il sera fait, plus nous y gagnerons. Notre stabilité, notre tranquillité en dépendent. Un Luban, libéré des éléments séparatistes de la zone de Tripoli, sera un Liban plus homogène, plus viable, plus numériquement et ethniquement libanais. Trop petit peut-être? En tous les cas, moins périllieux.[88]

However, the Maronite patriarch and *zuʻama* such al-Khuri, al-Saʻd and al-Khāzin, but also al-Jisr, rejected any idea that threatened to weaken the Lebanese "nation," which for them included the coexistence of Christians and Muslims. Again, "nation" or "national unity" meant different things to different people, in this case reflecting the different sources of legitimacy politicians sought in their race for the presidency. Thus, *L'Orient* of Naccache continued to argue that

> Rêver d'une patrie islamo-chrétienne est une pieuse chimère, mais une chimère tout de même … Avec ces antagonismes religieux, ethniques, moraux et sociaux, on ne forme pas une unité nationale … En acceptant la suggestion d'une cession territoriale … nous avons conscience d'avoir opté pour la seule formule susceptible de renforcer notre unité nationale.[89]

In the event, Eddé failed in his attempt to gain the backing of the French government for his candidacy and the territorial revision he favored. Disappointed, he briefly considered leaving the field to al-Jisr and al-Khuri. In March 1932, after the census had confirmed that Lebanon's Christians had formed a majority, Eddé tried once more to win the support of the French authorities for his candidacy, but when he realized that the "attitude officielle qui fut ouvertement favorable Khoury reste non encourageante pour moi," he resorted to new tactics: so as to "abattre

definitivement son concurrent maronite, il faisait alliance avec le cheikh Djisr et soutiendrait de toutes ses forces sa candidature."[90]

From 1931, when Sunni *zu'ama* made it part of their confessional politics, demography became a crucial factor in the whole political system, as it decided the share of the communities in the distribution of power and wealth—a change in demography entailed a shift in this distribution. Subsequently, those who gained most by the 1932 basis for distribution would from now on stymie any attempt to hold another census. Soon after the publication of the census law which called for the census to be held on 31 January 1932, operatives of the Sûreté Générale (the French intelligence service) began to collect information about the "campaigns" the elites in different areas and communities were waging. First reactions came from Tripoli, where the draft of the law "a soulevé des protestations générales," notably against demands by the Maronites to include the emigrés in the census.[91] In contrast to almost all of Tripoli's Sunni *zu'ama* and *'ulama,* 'Abd al-Ḥamīd Karāmī called on the Muslims to boycott the census; while al-Jisr began mobilizing public opinion in the town in favor of the census, Karāmī called many of the notables of Tripoli and al-Minā (Tripoli's port) to a meeting against it, trying to convince them with the old argument from Ottoman times that the census served merely a prelude to military conscription.[92]

As the French authorities closely followed the activities of the Muslim *zu'ama*, whose loyalty they suspected, Sûreté Générale reports, not surprisingly, give the impression that the campaign of mobilizing the people en masse to register in the census was mainly a Muslim one. That the Maronite elite were not very active until the last minute is partly explained by the death of Patriarch Iliyās al-Ḥūwayk, who had been a prominent figure in Lebanese politics. Although Antoine 'Arīḍa was elected to succeed him as a compromise solution, the rivalries around the Patriarch's post could only deepen divisions among the various Maronite factions—as Maronite leaders went to greet the new Patriarch, the political allegiance of their delegations stood out clearly.[93]

On the Muslim, notably Sunni, side, it seems that almost all the *zu'ama* and the *'ulama*, even those who boycotted the state of Lebanon, such as Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ appeared united in their conviction that the masses ought to be mobilized for the census. On 12 January, Ṣulḥ, accompanied by Muḥammad Fākhūrī, held a rally at the premises of the Muslim Youth Society, a Sunni club headed by Muḥammad Bayhum where they called for maximum registration of Muslims in the approaching census. They also made it clear that in the Muslim areas the register should not be taken by Christians.[94] A week later, 20 January, about two hundred "representatives" of the Sunnis, Druzes and Shi'is responded to a combined invitation from Bayhum, Fākhūrī, and al-Ṣulḥ, at which the latter suggested "*la fusion*" of the Muslim communities in the census, which for some Shi'is and Druzes meant placing the interests of their communities in the hands of the Sunnis.[95] A leaflet was circulated calling on all Sunni, Shi'i and

Druze inhabitants not to repeat the mistake of the 1921 census, which many had boycotted: the new census was important to ensure the rights of the Muslim communities "because these rights are given in proportion to the number of the population."[96] According to the French High Commissioner, "Les milieux musulman ont pris l'intiative de cette mesure dans l'espoir que les statistiques officielles feront apparaître au Luban une majorité."[97]

Soon after his installation in Bkirki, Patriarch 'Arīḍa launched a campaign in favor of the census, notably when it was announced that the Chief Commission of the census had begun its work.[98] On 27 January the Sûrité Générale reported on the activities of the Maronite Church concerning the census as follows:

> [L]e Patriarche et les évêques maronites ont donné des instructions verbale et écrites à leur fidèles en vue des s'inscrire au recensement. Les curés maronites ont transmis ces instruction aux fidèles dans leur églises, avec un zèle remarqué. Les clergés … estiment que le Liban a été constitué de noyau à un état chrétien dont la communauté maronite est le principal élément et ils voudraient, par ce motif, barrer coûte que coûte la roûte au President Djissr ou tout autre personnage musulman désiraux d'arriver a la première charge de état.[99]

More than in any other location, in Tripoli the census preoccupied the leaders of all the communities. Al-Jisr's people and Muḥammad Bayhum's Muslim Youth Society had little difficulty in neutralizing Karāmī's boycott actions. In their Friday sermons, the *imāms* of all the mosques in Tripoli "ont conseillé aux fidèles de ne pas manquer de se faire inscrire pendant les operations du recensement. De son côté Loutfallah Klat [Lutfalla Khallāt] a donné les mêmes conseils aux Grecques Orthodoxes."[100] Three days later the Muslim Youth Society began distributing their leaflets. Meanwhile Nadīm al-Jisr, the *qā'immaqām* of 'Akkār, published a circular calling on the census takers not to include in their register children of emigrants born abroad, something that provoked the protest of the local Christians.[101] One week before the census, the "nationalists," supporters of Karāmī, dropped their rejection to the census, but decided to "s'inscrire sur les feulles de recensenment comme étant de nationalité syrienne."[102]

A few days later, a Sûreté Générale report mentions that the "nationalists" in Tripoli "n'ont pas laissé passer l'occasion de réclamer l'unité syrienne," and that the newspapers, *al-Aḫrār, al-Sayār,* and *al-'Ahad al-Jadīd* had published the telegram they had addressed to the High Commissioner to the effect that their participation in the census "n'est pas une preuve de notre naturalization libanaise." At the same time they published another leaflet in which they exhorted the "Peuple syrien arabe de Tripoli" to register in the census, but as Syrians.[103]

The Numbers Game

The confessional campaign continued after the census in an effort to contest or influence the results. The Maronite Church questioned why 'Alawis in the

'Akkār area had been registered as Sunnis or Shi'is and Syrian and Iraqi residents as Lebanese. Muslim leaders complained that relatives of emigrants could complete the census form without having to present any documents and that this had inflated the number of Christians. The "emigrant form" referred to the date of migration and the taxes being paid by the emigrants;[104] the commissions charged with examining the completed forms had to discount emigrants who had left Lebanon before 3 August 1924 even if they were paying taxes.[105]

Although the issue of the emigrants clearly occupied the attention of the Chief Commission of the census—many documents show this—it is difficult to trace the work of the commissions in each of the different areas of Lebanon. Mutual suspicions of Maronite and Muslim leaders are obvious but all one has to go by are total figures of emigrants. The census divided emigrants into two categories; taxpayers and non-taxpayers. Accordingly, the total Maronite emigrants in 1932 numbered 112,915 of whom 78,949 were taxpayers (ca. 70 percent). The Greek Orthodox numbered 60,023 of whom 30,404 were taxpayers (ca. 50 percent), and the Greek Catholics numbered 29,477 of whom 17,130 were taxpayers (ca. 58 percent). The total number of the Sunni, Shi'i and Druze emigrants was 33,403 of whom 14,338 were taxpayers (ca. 43 percent). Excluding the emigrants of small Christian communities, who appeared under the category of "others," the total number of taxpayers among the Christian emigrants was 127,054, more than 89 percent of the total taxpayers among the Lebanese emigrants.[106]

In other words, if the number of emigrants is subtracted from the total population of the communities, the demographic picture of the 1932 census changes. First, it may be of interest to look at different calculations of the total population and the breakdown of the communities as found in the French and the Lebanese documents (see Table 1). According to the Lebanese *Official Gazette*, the total population in the census numbered 793,396, the Christian communities accounting for 391,946, or 49.401 percent, the Muslim communities was 386,369, or 48.698 percent, Jews and "others" 1.90 percent.[107] French statistics after the census are different. For example, they

Table 1: Census of 1932—Various Calculations

	Total	Christians		Muslims			Miscellaneous
		N	%	N	%		%
Official Gazette	793.396	391.946	49.4	386.369	48.7	–	1.90
MAE, Beyrouth, 567, no. 1	785.729	392.730	49.99	383.200	48.78	–	1.25
MAE, Beyrouth, 567, no. 12	834.429	420.414	50.38	405.237	48.56	–	1.06

Sources: *Official Gazette*, vol. 1932, 5 October 1932, quoted in Atiyah, n. 4, p.107; MAE, Beyrouth, 567, no. 1, "*Population Libanaise, Recensement 1932,*"; MAE, Beyrouth, 567, no. 12. *Rapport adressé à la Commission supérieure de recensement au sujet des opération de recensement de 1932* (no date).

put the total population at 785,729 in which the Christians numbered 392,730, or 49.982 percent, the Sunnis, Shi'is and Druzes 383,200, or 48.769, and Jews and others 1.25 percent.[108] The report sent to the Chief Commission of the census gave the total population as 834,429, of which the Christians with 420,414 constituted 50.383 percent, the Muslims, with 405,237, 48.56 percent, and the others 1.059 percent.[109] Another calculation was provided by the Lebanese government to the French authorities in order to assess the share of each community in the number of posts in the Lebanese government and administration (see Table 2).

Here the total population is given as 875,252 distributed as follows: Sunnis 181,842 (20.78 percent), Shi'is 159,782 (18.26 percent), Druzes 56,584 (6.46 percent), Maronites 270,938 (30.96 percent), Greek Catholics 55,754 (6.37 percent), Greek Orthodox 93,781 (10.72 percent), Protestants 7,650 (0.88 percent), Armenian Orthodox 26,294 (3.01 percent), Armenian Catholics 5,919 (0.68 percent), Syrian Orthodox. 2,735 (0.31 percent), Syrian Catholics 2,828 (0.32 percent), Jews 3,601 (0.41 percent) Chaldean Orthodox 548 (0.06 percent), Chaldean Catholics 190 (0.02 percent), and others 6,806 (0.78 percent). As the breakdown of the population decides the distribution of posts among the communities the second calculation raised the percentage of the

Table 2: Lebanese Government Population Calculation

	N	%	N	%
Sunnis	181.842	20.78		
Shi'is	159.782	18.26		
Druzes	56.584	6.46		
Total Muslims			398.208	45.50
Maronites	270.938	30.96		
Greek Catholics	55.754	6.37		
Greek Orthodox	93.781	10.72		
Protestants	7.650	0.88		
Armenian Orthodox	26.294	3.01		
Armenian Catholics	5.919	0.68		
Syrian Orthodox	2.735	0.31		
Syrian Catholics	2.828	0.32		
Chaldean Orthodox	548	0.06		
Chaldean Catholics	190	0.02		
Total Christians	458.987	52.65		
Jews	3.601	0.41		
Others	6.806	0.78		
Total	875.252	99.34		

Source: MAE, Beyrouth, 785, Table 2.

Table 3: Emigrants: Census of 1932

	Emigrants	Taxpayers	% Taxpayers
Maronites	112.915	78.949	70
Greek Orthodox	60.033	30.404	50
Greek Catholics	29.477	17.130	58
Other Christians	–	571	–
Total Christians	–	127.054	–
Total Muslims	33.403	14.330	43

Source: MAE, Beyrouth, 567, No 12, *Rapport adressé à la Commission supérieure de recensement au sujet des opération de recensement de 1932* (no date).

Christians to 52.65 percent while it reduced that of Sunnis, Shi'is and Druzes to 45.50 percent.[110]

If we exclude the number of emigrants from the figures of the *Official Gazette*, we arrive at a total figure for the Lebanese population in 1932 of 652,012. The Christians, numbering 264,892, then constitute 40.62 percent and the Muslims with 372,032, 57.06 percent. It is difficult to trace the emigrants who held on to their Lebanese nationality after 1932. But it seems that migration from Lebanon continued to change the "demographic balance," as Lebanese authors like to call it.

If we look back at to the official figures of the 1921–2 census, the total population stood at 558,923, of which the Christian communities made up 293,980 (52.6 percent) and the Muslim communities 264,943 (47.4 percent).[111] Even if we leave out the fact that Muslims boycotted the 1921–2 census, a comparison of the latter figures with those of 1932, published in the *Official Gazette*, shows that population growth had changed dramatically. The growth of the Sunnis during the intervening decade was 31.48 percent, of the Shi'is 33.5 percent, and of Druzes 25.11 percent, growth of the Maronites was 22.87 percent, of Greek Orthodox 12.2 percent, and of the Greek Catholics 17.44 percent. Even if we add the number of the emigrants whom the census did not include in 1932, the percentage of natural growth remained approximately the same from 1923 to 1932, while distribution and growth are as follows: Maronites 262,366 with a growth of 33.03 percent; Greek Orthodox 106,929 with a growth of 36.54 percent, Greek Orthodox 59,056 with growth of 34.70 percent, Sunnis 187,080 with a growth of 34.80 percent, Shi'is 159,961 with growth of 35.58 percent, and Druzes 56,663 with a growth of 29.51 percent.

The above comparison of the population increases raises some questions. For example, did Muslims actually boycott the 1921 census? Why is the increase among the Greek Orthodox the highest? Why does the increase of the Druzes not correspond with the general level of natural growth in Lebanon? But the most important question concerned the emigrants, as leaving them out would tilt the results clearly in favor of the Muslims, notably the Sunnis.

Throughout the Mandate the matter continued to influence the "confessional" demographic dispute.[112] Sunni leaders also complained about the inclusion in the 1932 census of the Armenians living in Lebanon. The 1921–2 census had excluded them and a few hundred of them had probably been included among the "miscellaneous" (8,231). The first wave of Armenian fugitives after the first world war had reached Lebanon and Syria in 1922–23; thereafter most of those who fled from Anatolia or Armenia and arrived in Syria usually drifted to Beirut. The nationality law promulgated by the High Commissioner on 19 February 1925 facilitated their naturalization in Lebanon[113] while the French authorities and the Christian officials were in favor of such naturalization possibly out of sympathy with a Christian community that had suffered persecution, but more likely to improve the "demographic balance." Most Armenians, whose total number in 1932 was 31,992, were given Lebanese nationality after 1928, following the Sunnis' demand for a new census.[114]

The Maronite elites, notably the Patriarch, continued until the 1940s to complain about the "incompetence" of the census takers when it came to registering ʿAlawis, Syrians and Iraqis living in Lebanon. The Patriarch based his allegations on petitions from ʿAlawis sent either to the High Commissioner or to the ʿAlawis leadership; according to one such petition, addressed to the ʿAlawi leader, Ibrāhīm al-Kanj, the census staff had compelled the ʿAlawis of ʿAkkār to register themselves as Sunnis or Shiʿis.[115] Similar petitions estimated the number of ʿAlawis registered as Sunnis or Shiʿis at 1,554,[116] while Muḥammad al-Shānī, one of the ʿAlawi *mukhtār*s, paid a visit to Bkirki to complain that at least 10,000 ʿAlawis in ʿAkkār had been recorded as Sunnis.[117] Four days later a delegation of ʿAlawis left ʿAkkār for Beirut to present the same charge.[118]

On 7 December 1933, Patriarch ʿArīḍa alleged that the Sunni Syrians and Iraqis had swelled the number of Sunnis by 96,000. The Commission of the census rejected this claim, stating that "if there had been any mistakes" they would have been marginal.[119] Again in March 1934 the Patriarch declared that 23,000 Syrians, 4,000 ʿAlawis and 2,000 Iraqis and Palestinians had been registered as Lebanese Sunnis in 1932, adding that the census takers in Beirut had enlarged the number of the Muslims and reduced that of the Christians.[120] But his criticism this time can be explained by the changed political situation: on 9 May 1932 High Commissioner Ponsot, who had been responsible for implementing French Mandatory policies in Lebanon and Syria since August 1926, decided to suspend the constitution. Ponsot was replaced by M. de Martel, who arrived in Beirut on 12 October 1933. De Martel declared that his first priority was to restore constitutional rule, which meant new elections: with his attack on the census the Maronite Patriarch hoped to underscore his demand for a change in the ratio of deputies in favor of the Maronites. Within four days of his arrival the new High Commissioner found himself dealing with a renewed call from by Sunni *zuʿama* to reassess the territorial issue. The Patriarch's anxiety only increased when he learned that new High Commis-

sioner made some moves to satisfy the Sunni, Shi'i and Druze *zu'ama*, which meant concessions in the "confessional" distribution of power in their favor—on 2 January 1934 the High Commissioner issued a decision to partially restore constitutional life through the election of eighteen deputies and the appointment of another seven to make up the new Chamber (thirteen Christians and twelve Muslims).[121]

When three years later, in August 1937, Patriarch 'Arīḍa returned to the "shortcomings" of the census, the occasion was, again, approaching elections, to be held on 24 October. On 1 August he wrote to Meyrier, the delegate of the High Commissioner:

> Nous venons d'apprendre que, dans les élections prochaines, la base de la représentation des sièges des députés sera le recensement de 1932. Comme il a été prouvé officiellement, ce recensement est faux … Nous avons proposé de prendre pour base le recensement de 1921[-2] en attendant qu'on puisse corriger ou refaire celui de 1932 … Nous vous prions donc vivement, pour sauver les droits des chrétiens, de bien vouloir prendre un arrêté à ce sujet.

The Patriarch added that he intended to 'avoir, à Paris, entretenu de cette question le Ministère."[122] In his comments on 'Arīḍa's new demands, Meyrier wrote: "Je connais trop la manière dont on transforme, dans le Proche Orient, des amabilités en acquiescement pour m'être inquiété de cette phrase," adding that he understood the new demand was 'une habile manipulation des chiffres permett[ant] d'en faire sortir un député maronite de plus."[123] In September 1940 'Arīḍa was still seeking a revision of the results of the 1932 census.[124]

Meanwhile, the results of the census strengthened Muḥammad al-Jisr's resolve to run for president, especially as he knew he had the support of a number of Christian deputies and other significant personalities. Also important is that constitutionally this was a perfectly legitimate act. Thus, the Sunni "rebel," as the British consul described him, was no longer only an imaginary threat to the "Maronite-Christian legitimacy" on which the Lebanese entity had been founded. It was at this juncture that the Maronite *zu'ama* and Church turned to the High Commissioner, as he alone had the authority and the power to curb al-Jisr's activities. Ponsot himself was very much aware that if only the Maronite *aqṭāb* had set aside their rivalries and decided to unite, al-Jisr would not have persisted in his challenge. It would then also have been easier for France to continue to commit itself "morally" to Lebanon's Christian-Maronite "form." On 9 May 1932, Ponsot issued a decree temporarily suspending the constitution while he abrogated the work of the Chamber and made Charles Dabbās preside over an executive of "directors."[125]

To justify his action, the High Commissioner claimed that the Mandatory Statutes as set out by the League of Nations authorized the Mandatory state "to take the emergency measures that tend to safeguard the fundamental object of the Mandate, in the interest of the country." As neither the threat of al-Jisr's candidacy nor the "confessional" agitation provoked by the *zu'ama* were severe

enough as reasons for his decision to shove the constitution, Ponsot used the "economic world crisis which today endangers Lebanon's budgetary balance."[126] This sounded plausible because it seemed to corroborate the report to the League of Nations over 1931: "La rue a été agitée, à Beyrouth et à Tripoli, par une série de manifestations de caractère économique et politique." The rise of the prices of public transport, and electricity and more had provoked strikes in Beirut while students had gone on strike for three successive months in protest against the political situation. The report refers to "activities" of communists, Armenians and "nationalists," stating that

> Les conséquences de la crise économique se sont fait de plus en plus durement sentir à mesure que s'écoulait l'année 1931, elles ont affecté l'économie privée et encore plus les finances publiques. A la fin de l'année, l'équilibre budgétaire se trouvait gravement rapide des recettes douanières.

Significantly, though the report goes out of its way to highlight the worsening economic situation as one of the factors behind the political crisis of late 1931, it leaves out any mention of the presidential campaign, underway since mid-1931 and of the potential implications of the census law passed in December.[127]

When the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations came together to assess the situation in Lebanon, its members openly criticized France's decision to suspend the constitution. Asked what had led the High Commissioner to take this course of action, the French representative, M. de Caix, could only respond that "apart from certain persons [*zu'ama*] and their clients who benefited from the previous regime, public opinion in Lebanon had been in favor of the decision." When asked how he explained the fierce reaction there had been on the part of students against the suspension of the constitution, de Caix replied dismissively that students everywhere had a habit of reacting to political decisions in that way.[128] As it became clear to the Commission that France did not want a Muslim to become president in Lebanon, one member claimed that by favoring the Maronites the French were guilty of applying a strategy of *divide et impera*.[129]

What France hoped to achieve by suspending the constitution and the emergency situation this created was a chance to put its Mandatory house "in order." The worsening of the economic crisis during 1930–1933 brought increasing hardships for the population as a whole, but the urban lower and middle classes were harder hit than the rural population who could rely to some extent on a subsistence economy. The confessional agitation sparked by the presidential elections and the disputes over the census was also far more turbulent in the cities. Small groups of urban intellectuals—among them communists, secular nationalists and other "non-confessionalists"—tried to introduce some degree of political awareness and a measure of class/national consciousness among the striking workers in Beirut and Tripoli. French Mandatory rule, however, enabled the *zu'ama* without much difficulty to prevent an alternative elite of intellectuals from having much of an impact, let

alone threaten to cleanse Lebanese politics from its "confessional" and "clan" features. As the economic and political crisis wore on, confessional cleavages both in the towns and the countryside only deepened further. What we find next is a period of all-out competition among the leading strata of the different communities to get hold of as great a stake as they can in the distribution of power within the Lebanese system, not so much for the long-term good of a unitary state, but rather for the short-term benefits of their own political constituencies. In other words, though the rules may have changed somewhat, the game has remained the same.

CHAPTER FIVE

MARONITES AND SUNNIS SEEK COMMON GROUND

> Factionalism was possible, I thought, only because there was such a huge gulf between the nationalist political elite and everyone else … Now I am beginning to see that factionalism was a very useful tool with which to incorporate challengers. Factionalism conveys many-sidedness … What has often been interpreted to be a congenital weakness in the nature or character of nationalist elites—their being prone to intensive factionalism—may, in fact, have been an asset of Arab nationalism.
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> Philip S. Khoury, "The Paradoxical in Arab Nationalism," p. 287.

No Room for "Non-Confessional" Parties

As one of the countries under the Mandate system through which France and Britain exercised their control over the Middle East following the second world war, Lebanon could not escape the effects the global economic crisis, ushered in by the Wall Street crash of 1929, was having on all parts of the dependent world. The fall-out of the "Great Slump" hit Lebanon hardest during 1933, fanning the flames of the political unrest that the suspension of the constitution by the French on 9 May 1932 had only aggravated. Signaling not so much political desperation as well colonial arrogance, Ponsot's high-handed act should not be seen—which it sometimes is—as a watershed in France's relations with its Mandatory territories. At the most, it can serve as a useful marker for a point in time where the various factions in Lebanon are beginning to re-assess their stance vis-à-vis French rule and to re-align their attitudes vis-à-vis the "system" (*al-kayān al-Lubnānī*) and each other. While personal ambitions continued to play their obvious part, we find that leading politicians start shifting their positions on the political spectrum and adapting their discourse to the new allegiances they were now seeking, primarily of course so as to effectively safeguard their power base. For some this would only be a temporary move, meant to help them negotiate a course of events that momentarily seemed to have slipped out of hand. Others sought more genuinely to grapple with the complexities thrown up by the worsening economic downturn and the conflict—now more and more in the open—between French rule and growing

"Lebanese" nationalism. As periods of uncertainty always hold the promise of better things to come, it is no wonder that during 1932–1933 we see new political groupings emerging—among them an incipient Communist party, immediately declared illegal—that try to break the grip of the *zu'ama aqṭāb* and undo the hold of the confessional system over Lebanon's political destiny.

By early 1933 the French authorities were increasingly clamping down on channels of public information and social organization, as shown by their "temporary administrative suspensions" of newspapers and the restrictions imposed on trade union activities.[1] As the British consul in Beirut reported on 17 March:

> There has been marked evidence of growing uneasiness as to the economic future of this country in general and of Beirut in particular. It has by now been generally realized that the world Crisis could not and has not left unaffected the Lebanon and its capital. The most spectacular manifestation of the discontent has taken the form of a strike of motor-vehicle drivers, which is now in its twelfth day.[2]

The strike had been called in protest against the new heavy taxation the French had begun leveling on petrol and the drivers' main grievances typically concerned the

> privileges granted to two French companies of which one, the [Companie Auto-Routière du Levant], is their direct competitor in road transportation, and the other, the D.H.P. Railway Company, receives a kilometric guarantee under which, owing partly at least to road competition, it has to claim increasingly heavy amounts from public funds. The [Auto-Routière] company receives various exemptions from taxation, which, seeing that its main services are within Syria, undoubtedly give it an advantage which to many seems unfair.[3]

But the overall policy of favoring French companies, imposing new taxes, putting up high tariff barriers for transactions between French Mandatory Lebanon and Syria and the surrounding countries during a period of obvious recession was of course detrimental to the situation of the entire population. There was a marked increase in smuggling across the borders, especially with British Mandatory Palestine, and in the migration of not only unskilled laborers but also teachers, doctors and other professionals to Palestinian towns, especially Haifa and Jaffa. Between 20 and 23 March, a group of merchants representing the chambers of commerce of Damascus, Latakia and Beirut got together to hammer out a petition to the High Commissioner calling for a change in economic policy, particularly vis-à-vis custom duties, to try to alleviate the general hardship.[4] According to the British consul, the Syndicate of Lebanese Industrialists had already demanded that the High Commissioner allow the "duty free admission [into the country] of all material intended for industry," with a deputation of the Beirut Merchants Association highlighting "the harm

done to local trade by the difference between the Palestinian and Syrian rates of duty."[5]

Meanwhile, in February, Syrian nationalists had held a conference in Aleppo in which they spoke out against any forthcoming treaty between France and Syria that ignored the unity of the two "states" that made up the French Mandate. When it turned out that the treaty that was signed in April maintained the territorial status quo, they immediately rallied against it. Support came from a small number of Sunni *zu'ama* in Lebanon who had remained rejectionists and who now also called for strikes and demonstrations there.[6]

Political instability was further created by the factionalism among the Maronites that erupted during the campaign for the election of a new patriarch, in January 1932, when some disaffected Maronite clergy and intellectuals openly began calling for Syro-Lebanese cooperation. One faction supported the candidacy of Mgr. 'Abdalla Khuri, of Tyre, a second faction that of Mgr. Boulos 'Awād, of Cyprus. The Sûreté Générale put a third candidate in the field, Mgr. Yūsuf al-Khāzin, who hurriedly returned from Rome to take part in the election meetings for which all fourteen Maronite bishops had assembled in Beirut. Given these divisions among the Maronite clergy and *zu'ama*, it was almost inevitable that the choice of the new patriarch would form a compromise—a week after the election of Antoine 'Arīḍa on 7 January 1932, the High Commissioner reported to the French Foreign Minister that "la crise qui s'est ouverte à Bekerke, après la mort de Mgr Hoyek, n'a pas été facile à resoudre."[7] That the dispute was far from settled was obvious in the way the various delegations came to greet the newly installed patriarch at the end of the month. Of the two factions that stood out in particular the first, representing clans in the Matn and led by Deputies Abu Nādir and Naṣṣār, arrived in Bkirki to show that there was "great support" for Mgr. 'Abdalla Khūrī. The second delegation was led by Deputies Zakkūr and al-Sawdā, representing clans who supported Farīd al-Khāzin, a relative of Mgr. Yūsuf al- Khāzin, against Mgr. Khūrī.; they arrived ostentatiously in two hundred motor vehicles and on their way back made a point of visiting the residence of Farīd al-Khāzin.[8]

This split within the Maronite clergy and political elites had its impact on some Maronite leaders who around this time clearly can be seen changing their attitude away from support for the French Mandate and toward Syrian and Lebanese nationalists. Probably the most outspoken of these was Mgr. Ignatius Mubārak, as archbishop of Beirut one of the leading figures among the Maronite clergy, who in the summer of 1933 came out with strong criticism of French policies in Lebanon and started a campaign calling for strikes and rallies. He found support among a group of Maronite intellectuals and professionals who had gathered in the house of the poet Rashīd Nakhla for a "National Conference" which demanded to "substituer au Mandat un traité à conclure entre la France d'une part, la Syrie et le Liban d'autre part, sur la base de l'autonomie libanaise dans l'unité syrienne."[9] Some contemporary Lebanese historians have wanted to see in these activities a manifestation of Arab

nationalist sentiments and a clear retreat among at least some Maronite leaders from the idea that Greeater Lebanon and Syria ought to remain separate political entities.[10] As we shall see, part of the answer lies in the relative weight one gives to such terms as "Syrian unity" and "Lebanese autonomy."

Cooperation between Syrian nationalists and their Lebanese counterparts was strengthened by increasing demands from "unionists" on both sides for a complete revision of the territorial division the French Mandatory authorities had put in place. On 14 October, Syrian and Lebanese "Arab nationalists" held a "unionist" conference in Damascus at the home of Fāris al-Khūrī, a Syrian Christian "nationalist." And along a similar vein, but more important, there followed the initiative of Salīm ʻAlī Salām, one of the Beiruti Sunni *zuʻama*, to bring together a number of leaders from the three Muslim communities to reassess Lebanon's political situation and the future of the areas the French had "annexed" to form Greater Lebanon. Soon dubbed the "Coastal Conference," this was not only a continuation of a similar event held in 1928 but also reiterated the same demands made then for a revision of the territorial division enacted by the French when they created "Greater Lebanon."[11]

It is at this point that we also can notice "rejectionist" Sunnis, Shiʻis, Druzes and Greek Orthodox—i.e., mainly intellectuals and professionals unwilling to accept the "Lebanese system,"—beginning to set themselves up in competition with the *zuʻama aqṭāb* of their communities. This comes to the fore in the heightened activities of "non-confessional" parties, both those established in the 1920s and newly emerging ones. Operating clandestinely, Communists took advantage of the economic crisis to try to widen their political mobilization among the "working classes." Though it continued to be an underground organization at least until 1936, *Ḥizb al-Shaʻb al-Lubnānī*, the "Lebanese People's Party" established at the instigation of the Comintern by two Christian intellectuals, Yūsuf Yazbak and Fūʼād al-Shamālī, attempted to assume a political role during this period, in particular by intensifying their political activities among the workers of the main cities Beirut and Tripoli.[12]

Similarly, though of course not Communist, *Ḥizb al-Istiqlāl al-Jumhūrī* (the "Republican Party for Independence"), established in 1931, increased its activities among those who had gone on strike in 1933 and among the members of the Union of Lebanese Printing and Publishing Workers who had been hurt by the forced close-down of newspapers. The party comprised politicians from a number of leading Sunni and Druze families, such as ʻAdil al-Sulḥ and Zakaria Nuṣūlī (Sunnis) and Sāmī Arslān and Fūʼād Nakad (Druzes), who joined Christian intellectuals such as Dʻaybis al-Mur, Niqūlā Zuhayr, William ʻUsaylī, Michel Talḥamī and ʻAzīz al-Hāshim. Together they worked out a common stand on the suspension of the constitution and formulated the ideological position of the party, stressing the "unity between Christians and Muslims within the democratic republic of Lebanon," whereby they saw "Arabism" as the determining factor of the "national character of the Lebanese state."[13]

Rejecting the breaking up of the "Syrian nation" into "artificial" entities—as the French and British had done when they split up *Bilād al-Shām* (historical "Greater Syria") into "Syria," Lebanon," "Palestine" and "Transjordan"—was part of the political agenda of the National Syrian Party, established in 1932–33 by the Greek Orthodox Antūn Sa'āda. Here it is more difficult to point up a causal link with the deteriorating economic and political situation. Clear is that the "non-confessional" and secular ideas the party represented captured the imagination of parts of Lebanon's intelligentsia influenced by that generation of intellectuals who in the late nineteenth century had first introduced Syrian "nationalist" ideas; one could speak of the re-emergence, in a somewhat different garb, of Syrianism "challenging not only Lebanism and a separate Lebanon it stood for, but also Arabism and the unity of all "Arab countries" it preached.[14]

Finally, mention should be made of *Ḥizb 'Uṣbat al-'Amal al-Qawmī* (the "Party of the League of National Action"), established in August 1933 as the outcome of a conference of Arab "nationalists" from Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Egypt and Palestine, who had come together at the initiative of the Druze intellectual 'Alī Nāṣir al-Dīn. The party's ideological platform differed little from that of other "pan-Arab nationalist" organizations that sprung up during the Mandatory period in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine.[15]

What typifies the above developments is that these new political forces and parties that emerged during the crisis years of 1932–1933 succeeded in building their membership and attracting a following outside the strata of Lebanon's established political elites. As the latter occupied the high ranks and offices of the state apparatus and represented their "communities" in parliament, one concludes that their traditional position as *zu'ama aqṭāb* may have been somewhat weakened and their reputation diminished by the slide into political turmoil following the suspension of the constitution and the overall economic hardship plaguing the country. But what did not happen was for these newly emerging parties to coalesce into an "alternative elite" viable enough to form a threat to the existing elites and pose a challenge to their hegemony. Perhaps there had been too little time. During the final quarter of 1933 the economy showed signs of improving, but—more crucially—on 12 October a new High Commissioner had arrived in Beirut whose immediate task it was to address the political grievances that had arisen from the suspension of the constitution by his predecessor and ensure that calm was restored on both the political and economic front. De Martel went about his mission in two ways. First, he promised "partial restoration" of the constitution. On 2 January 1934, he issued four decrees introducing a "provisional" organization of the legislative and executive powers: the republic's president "exercises the executive power with the assistance of a secretary of state responsible to him alone," while the "legislative power is exercised by a Chamber of deputies" of a total of twenty-five members, seven of whom were appointed by the High Commissioner.[16]

Though clearly only very partial, these measures were sufficient for the established elites to feel reassured, if not fully satisfied. First of all, in order for him to go along with Ponsot's decision to suspend the constitution (as Bshara al-Khuri tells it[17]), the Maronite patriarch had extracted a promise from the French that whenever a next president was to be appointed this would be Habīb Pasha al-Sa'd; by the end of January de Martel had made good on that promise. Secondly, the way the Chamber was set up and the predictable outcome of the elections, held on 21 and 22 January, not only made that the *zu'ama* felt fully vindicated by the French but also effectively blocked the way for any form of competition from the political groupings that had arisen during the 1932–33 crisis. The general feeling of satisfaction among candidates for the new Chamber was hardly affected by the low turn-out of voters in Beirut itself, for example. As subsequently none of the many candidates received the necessary minimum of votes in the first ballot, a second ballot was held a week later.[18] The American consul, C.T. Steger, offers the following two factors by way of explanation:

> In the first place, the voters of Beirut are less direct under the influence of local officials [than in the rural areas] and the attempt to exert official pressure would probably have been much less successful than in the small villages … In the second place, the Beirut electors, including many political leaders and other politically active persons, have on the whole a better understanding of politics than the rural and mountain population, and would have been more likely to make known their resentment.[19]

Given their obvious apathy at the polls, this "better understanding of politics" on the part of the Beiruti voters may well have had something to do with their experiences over the previous two years of how both the French Mandatory authorities and their own *zu'ama* had been playing the political game. If so, they were not going to be "disappointed": besides the seven deputies nominated by de Martel, the other deputies who made it into the Chamber all had the approval of the Mandatory authorities who, furthermore, gave them the necessary back-up to ensure they were elected.[20]

The outcome was that the new Chamber was made up of practically the same figures (read: members of the same clans) who had been representing their communities and districts in the Chamber since the 1920s. What had not changed either was the practice of vote buying, "representative" of Lebanese elections since the first elections in 1921. Again, as the American consul has it:

> The week which intervened between the two [ballots] was occupied with rather feverish political bargaining carried on among the various candidates, resulting in several withdrawals. Three deputies were to be elected: one Moslem, one Armenian and one minority representative. The Moslem candidate [Khayr al-Dīn al-Aḥdab] was at the second ballot unopposed, except by a Communist … Only in the election of the minority candidate [Dr. Ayūb Thābit] was there much of interest to observe … The candidates who had expended considerable money at the first ballot found their resources exhausted. For Dr. Tabit, who

> had had little or no money to begin with, the circumstances remained unchanged [in the second ballot].[21]

The names of the elected and appointed deputies show that the new Chamber was dominated by the same elite of urban merchants and rural notables who had come to the fore as part and parcel of the economic and political system the French had promoted in Mandatory Lebanon.[22] On 29 January, to cap the rewards for the pro-French *zu'ama*, Privat-Aubouard, the provisional governor de Martel had appointed for the transition period leading up to the elections, signed a decree appointing as secretary of state 'Abdalla Bayhum, the prominent Beiruti Sunni leader and former deputy. Charles Dabbās was elected president of the Chamber the following day, and again a day later, Habīb Pasha al-Sa'id took the oath of office as president of the Republic. On the appointment of Bayhum the American Consul commented: "Being President of the Merchants' Association, he may be considered as a representative of commercial interests. He is friendly to the French, and very highly regarded by both Moslem and Christian circles." On Dabbās' election "by prearrangement," the consul observes that

> his seven years of public office have made it impossible for him to retire to obscurity … Mr. Dabbas, in his speech of acceptance, stated that he considers his election equivalent to an expression of the Chamber's devotion to the two principles to which he has consecrated his political life: the independence of the Lebanon in its natural frontiers, and the continuance of the French Mandate. [23]

The swearing-in of al-Sa'd seemed to bring everything full circle: "[a]pparently M. de Martel considers that this completes his immediate task, and that the new regime may be left to its smooth functioning for the time being."[24]

"For the time being"—because not only was the constitution still suspended, de Martel was up against a different constellation of political power groups than his predecessor. The first who quickly seized up the new situation was Bshara al-Khuri, who lost no time in trying to establish a parliamentary bloc for the restoration of the constitution.[25] At the same time, he and Émile Eddé, of course, were again already competing for the presidency which was due to become vacant with the expiration of al-Sa'd's term at the beginning of 1935.

However, all it took for things to become truly "unstuck" was the collapse of a balcony on the *Kawkab al-Sharq* premises, which resulted in a number of casualties. *Kawkab al-Sharq* was a club frequented by many Lebanese leaders, *qabadayāt* and generally visitors from Arab countries. Through the paper *L'Orient*, Émile Eddé's faction launched a blistering attack on Salīm Taqla, the mayor of Beirut, whom they accused of being responsible for the "fiasco" because his office had issued the construction license, and the affair became the main subject of the first sessions of the new Chamber in March 1934.[26] Explaining the repercussions of the *Kawkab al-Sharq* affair, 'Awaḍ writes that

Salīm Taqla had been appointed mayor of Beirut thanks to the recommendation of al-Khuri's who was very much aware "that the mayor holds the keys to the voting stance in Beirut, and Beirut is the heart and the factory of both the presidency of the republic and the government." ʿAwaḍ adds:

> However, the balcony of '*kawkab al-sharq*' was only a pretext [*qamīs ʿuthmān*]. The supporters of Émile Eddé saw it as a good opportunity to eliminate Bshara al-Khuri's influence in Beirut. The supporters of Bshara al-Khuri, who sprang to the defense of Salīm Taqla, recognized that in a campaign for the presidency the inevitable target is the head of Sheikh Bshara by way of the head of Salīm Taqla. Thus, political radar [*sic*] determined the presidential campaign rather than the persons.[27]

The *Kawtab al-Sharq* episode undeniably gave Émile Eddé's faction a welcome chance to direct its propaganda machine against "the corruption" of the mayor of Beirut and his patron al-Khuri. Not only Gabriel Khabbāz's *L'Orient* launched attacks against al-Khuri's faction, but also *al-ʿAhd al-Jadīd* of Khayr al-Dīn al-Aḥdab, long one of al-Khuri's closest friends among the Sunni elites but who now transferred his affiliation to Eddé, probably because he thought that de Martel would support Eddé's candidacy. Al-Khuri retaliated on two fronts: through the deputies' Bloc within the Chamber and through the newspaper *Le Jour* of his relative Michel Chiha. Although al-Khuri from the start calls his bloc the "Constitutional Bloc", there is no evidence that in early 1934 the bloc's target was to restore the constitution and not, primarily, to gather supporters for his presidency. *Le Jour*, which at this junction served to defend the position of al-Khuri's faction, later became the mouthpiece for Chiha's ideological principles concerning the "national features" of Lebanon.[28]

However, neither al-Khuri's "Constitutional Bloc" nor the ideological parties and extra-parliamentary political organizations of 1934–1935 were able to mobilize a "non-confessional" force powerful enough to produce radical change in the confessional system of the country. Al-Khuri, and even more so Eddé, never represented the "Lebanese nation" but always the Maronite community. That they created opposed alliances among the deputies of the different communities was because both leaders, as well as the French authorities, realized that the cooperation of the urban Sunni elite was vital if they wanted to maintain the Lebanese entity. However, since 1926 only some of the important figures among the urban Sunni *zuʿama*—for example, ʿUmar al-Dāʿūq, ʿUmar Bayhum, Khayr al-Dīn al-Aḥdab, his uncle Ḥusayn al-Aḥdab, ʿAbdalla Bayhum of Beirut, Muḥammad al-Jisr and Amīn al-Muqaddam of Tripoli—had shown any readiness to cooperate with the Christian and French authorities, and then only when such cooperation proved advantageous to them and their clans; otherwise they continued to follow the same political line as the Sunni *zuʿama* who were in the forefront of the campaign against the separation of Lebanon from Syria. In other words, while publicly they kept up the "unionist" discourse, it was factionalism that determined the political positions of these leaders.

"There is no God but Allah and Patriarch 'Arīḍa is His Beloved"

The Coastal Conference of 1933 reflects part of this urban Sunni factionalism. As we saw, the conference was held at the home of Salīm 'Alī Salām, a prominent leader of Beirut's Sunni merchants. Salām had succeeded in mobilizing two kinds of Sunni leaders for this "unionist" Conference: the first, exemplified by 'Abd al-Ḥamīd Karāmī of Tripoli, continued to reject any form of compromise over Lebanon's separation from Syria, while the second was more flexible, as exemplified by 'Umar Bayhum of Beirut who had accepted posts in both the administration and Parliament. Again, however, factional and clan considerations, couched in ideological terms, explain why the conference was set up by Salīm 'Alī Salām but also why certain main figures such as Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ, were not taking part.

Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ may have had his suspicions about the motives of the initiators of the conference: in a meeting with de Martel, early in 1934, he alludes to his readiness to accept the integrity of Greater Lebanon by supporting the retention of Tripoli within the Lebanese state.[29] That is, by then Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ's attitude on the territorial issue appears already closer to the stance of other members of the al-Ṣulḥ family. For example, through the *al-Istiqlāl al-Jumhūrī* party 'Adil al-Ṣulḥ adopted an "Arabism" that recognized the territorial integrity of "an independent Lebanon with sovereignty" (*Lubnān dawla 'Arabiyya mustaqilla dhāt siyāda*) in which Muslims and Christians shared the same destiny.[30]

If we look more closely at the political positions of the urban Sunni elite and the way they fluctuate from 1933 onward, we find three trends, each inspired by their own factional rivalries, economic interests, and attitude toward the French authorities. The first used the "Arab cause" to claim "unity" with Syria, but also spoke of "Muslim grievances" and the need for "equality" within the Lebanese state. In 1933, this faction was led by Salīm 'Alī Salām and 'Abd al-Ḥamīd Karāmi, both organizers of the Coastal Conference. Although rejecting the "division of the Syrian land into several states," the conference resolutions protested against the injustices the Muslims were suffering at the hands of Lebanese state officials and the Mandatory authorities. The demand for an end to "discrimination" against members of the Muslim communities by those in "high office" was one of its main resolutions. According to the participants, the "annexed areas," where the Muslims constituted the majority of the population, paid 82 percent of all taxes while Mount Lebanon received 80 percent of all expenditures.[31]

The second trend was represented by some figures from the leading Sunni families such as Bayhum, Dā'ūq and al-Aḥdab, who had agreed to take up official posts in the legislative and executive institutions of the Lebanese state, but continued to express a "unionist" ideology.

The third trend was led by some of the members of al-Ṣulḥ family belonging to *al-Istiqlāl al-Jumhūrī*, the party whose ideological framework sought to foster cooperation between Christians and Muslims based on "Arabism." The

president of the party was Sheikh ʿAzīz al-Hāshim, a Christian intellectual and scion of a notable family, who had gained a reputation for himself as defender of constitutional life in Lebanon.[32] The Christian members of the party wanted to preserve the integrity of Lebanon, but were highly critical of its "confessional" political system and therefore favored cooperation with the Muslim leaders. The position al-Hāshim and his Christian colleagues took up vis-à-vis the Mandate and the way they spoke of the "Arab face" of the country encouraged "unionists" such as ʿAdil al-Ṣulḥ to play a leading role in party activities. And it was this kind of cooperation between Christian and Muslim leaders that helped pave the way for the formula of the National Pact of 1943, when we find Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ, one of the most prominent "unionist" Sunni leaders, abandoning the "dream" of unity with Syria, and Bshara al-Khuri, one of the most influential Maronite leaders, abandoning the "anti-Arabist" discourse of his Maronite peers during the period 1920–1933.[33]

Highlighting the group who drew up this formula of cooperation, ʿAdil al-Ṣulḥ pictures them as leaders who were all convinced of the need for reform, but differed when it came to details:

> Among them there was the militant Arabist who from the first day [of the Mandate] opposed foreign control and continued to oppose it. There was also the loyal Lebanese citizen who had at one time seen the French Mandatory state as a friend and supporter of Lebanon … [for whom] the first ten years…of the French Mandate were sufficient to convince him of the [Mandate's] false portrait and lead him to coordinate his activities with the Arab [Muslim] citizen against the Mandate.[34]

As to the social background of these people, ʿAdil al-Ṣulḥ significantly finds that most of them were "businessmen who had been affected by the economic recession which the country had suffered" at the beginning of the 1930s.[35]

When in the course of 1934 the economic situation in Lebanon improved and appeared to show "brighter prospects than for some years past,"[36] the significance of this was lost on de Martel. His almost immediate decision to renewal the tobacco monopoly was to have a profound impact on the political life of the country and on the cooperation between Christian and Muslim leaders. By decree No. 275/LR at the end of 1934, de Martel amended the form of the tobacco monopoly, which only the year before had been reorganized through the *banderole* method, by turning the entire manufacture and trade of tobacco into a monopoly throughout the French Mandate, with no region any longer excepted.[37]

On 30 January 1935, decree No. 16/L.R granted a French company the tobacco monopoly for 25 years, from 1 March 1935. For the first time since the Mandate, the monopoly was also imposed on the tobacco production and industry of Mount Lebanon, where the Maronite Church owned a great deal of land. The upshot was that Patriarch ʿArīḍa soon became the defender of all

Lebanese tobacco growers, Christian as well as Muslim, against de Martel's policy, protesting against the restoration of the monopoly in two letters, of 9 December 1934 and 15 February 1935, addressed directly to the French government.[38]

At the end of January 1935 the patriarch invited the Maronite clergy to a meeting in Bkirki whose broad agenda included issues such as the personal status of the communities, the constitution, customs duties, the privileges of French companies and of the Banque de Syrie, and, of course, the tobacco monopoly. That conflict was looming is clear also from the ironic tone in which the French delegate of the High Commissioner to the Lebanese Republic commented on the events: "Il s'agit dans l'esprit de Mgr Arida d'affirmer les prétentions du patriarcat à continuer à jouer dans la politique libanais le rôle que la tradition d'avant guerre avait en somme concédé a Bekerke."[39] According to the British consul, in February, when it was still "uncertain whether the Monopoly would really be imposed…the Maronite Patriarch felt obliged to take some action to bring the unpopularity of the monopoly to the notice of the French Government." That was also why he sent his telegram to Paris via Haifa, in Palestine, to circumvent any obstacles placed in his way by the High Commissioner.[40]

This kind of political intervention by the patriarch rooted in a "doctrine of intervention" which Mgr Mubārak justified as follows: "Les représentants du clergé … ont comme n'importe qui, plus que n'importe qui, le droit et l'obligation de s'occuper de la chose publique, car ils sont en contact permanent avec les masses, ils en sondent les aspirations et ils en connaissent les besoins."[41] Unlike previous interventions which were always on behalf of "Maronite and Christian interest," the patriarch was now seen as defender of all the Lebanese against the monopoly. Whatever the motivation of the patriarch's campaign against the tobacco monopoly, important is that this time his political action gained the support of some of the Sunni *zu'ama* who previously had always criticized such intervention. The patriarch's position on the tobacco monopoly was appreciated by the Sunni and Shi'i deputies, who together with the Maronites voted against the monopoly law when it was put before the Chamber. A further significant development is that in his critique of de Martel's concerning the monopoly policy, the patriarch began developing a position which called for an "indépendance effective du Liban," which, in turn, led to rapprochement with the National Bloc in Syria and its supporters among Lebanon's Sunni leaders.[42]

The implementation of the tobacco monopoly quickly led to demonstrations and strikes in Beirut and the countryside in which merchants and landlords as well as workers and peasants participated. At the beginning of 1935 the Association of Merchants sent a telegram of protest to the High Commissioner with the request that it be forwarded to the French government. On 16 February 1935 "all shops [in] Beirut were closed as a demonstration against the monopoly." Four days later "placards were posted up in the universities and secondary schools calling for a demonstration of students." When street

demonstrations broke out, the complaints were addressed not only against the tobacco monopoly but also against customs duties and other taxes.[43] When the police intervened and applied excessive force in putting an end to the strikes and demonstrations, the patriarch intensified his attacks against the monopoly and justified his intervention as mediation to help resolve the new crisis. As he wrote to the French minister of Foreign Affairs:

> L'agitation contre le monopole des tabacs a commencé dans la population et dans la presse … Nous sommes appliqués à calmer les esprits et à poursuivre des pourparlers avec le H.C. pour l'engager à prendre en considération les plaintes et les doléances du Pays; que malgré les démarches présentés et les interventions multiples faites auprès de nous par tous les éléments de la population, nous ne nous sommes nullement départi du rôle de médiateur.[44]

Whether indeed strictly mediator or perhaps partly instigator, a sense of mutual trust began to develop between the patriarch and the "Syrian nationalists," including their allies among the Beirut Sunni elite. As Longrigg sees it, the patriarch "joined forces with Syrian nationalist leaders in protest and agitation—and even, some alleged, in vague projects of Syro-Lebanese unity," although his act "was short-lived."[45] For Atiyah, the relationship between the "Syrian nationalists" and the patriarch left the impression that the latter "had made a deal with [them] by virtue of which the Syrians agreed to abandon their demand for the reannexation of the disputed districts in return for the patriarch's support for the cause of the independence of both Lebanon and Syria."[46] While the existence of such a deal remains speculative, the attitude the patriarch shared with the National Bloc did lead to temporary cooperation *ipso facto* which more and more had an impact on the relationship between the two entities, Syria and Lebanon. As the patriarch came to be seen as champion of "the independence of the Arab State of Lebanon," some Sunni leaders and intellectuals hoped—too hastily, as we will see—that this would be the end of "Maronite isolation, and the beginning of their integration within the Arab nation."[47]

It may have been this openly declared position of Patriarch ʿArīḍa that led the Syrian National Bloc to adopt a flexible stand on the separation between Lebanon and Syria. For example, during the negotiations for the treaty of 1936 between the French government and the National Bloc, the latter withdrew its demand for the restoration to Syria of the four districts annexed in 1920 to Mount Lebanon. This shift in attitude of both the patriarch and the Syrian nationalists becomes important as one of the factors leading towards reciprocal recognition whereby both Syria and Lebanon would adopt "Arabism" as the "national" feature of their state. As already indicated, such recognition was to constitute the basis for the compromise achieved by Bshara al-Khuri and Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ, in 1943, which underpinned the principles of the National Pact. In a letter to the French minister of the Foreign Affairs in March 1935, the patriarch expressed his view of Syrian-Lebanese relations as follows:

> Les Syriens ont des revendications politiques que tous le monde connaît. La position prisé par le Liban telle que définie dans le Mémoire du Patriarch [Ḥūwayk] en date du 25 Octobre 1919 et confirmé par la lettre de…Clemanceau du 10 Novembre 1919 n'a pas varie, "Indépendant dans ses limites actuelles." le Liban entend vivre en paix avec ses voisins.[48]

In a meeting with leaders from the Syrian National Bloc in September 1935, the patriarch deepened his rapprochement with the "nationalists" by declaring:

> J'ai montré que je m'occupais avec l'intérêt de la Question syrienne. Liban et Syrie sont, en effet, liés par la communauté de langue, de moeurs, de traditions, d'intérêts économiques. C'est pourquoi il est difficile d'établir entre eux une séparation absolue.[49]

Early in 1936, a delegation of the National Bloc used the opportunity of the patriarch's birthday to visit Bkirki, where in a speech to mark the occasion they heard ʿArīḍa referring to Syrians and Lebanese as "membres d'une même maison, d'un même peuple, d'un même pays."[50]

Although PatriarchʿArīḍa was later to retreat from this position, his rapprochement toward the "nationalists" was taken up as a model for cooperation between some Maronite leaders, notably Bshara al-Khuri, and Sunni "nationalists" in Lebanon and Syria. Much like ʿArīḍa, who sought the support of the National Bloc in his fight against the tobacco monopoly, Bshara al-Khuri began to adopt an "Arabist" position to gain the backing of Sunni leaders for his candidacy for the presidency. By the end of 1935 both al-Khuri and Eddé were fully preoccupied with the election campaign for the Lebanese presidency; on 29 January 1936 the term of the appointed president al-Saʿd was to expire and a "free election" by the Chamber was to be held. As on previous occasions, the new campaign was accompanied by intrigues, alliances within the Chamber, and political debates on Lebanon's relations with the Mandatory power and the other Arab countries. Although this "free election" signaled a step toward the restoration of the constitution, Eddé's faction attempted to block it, as the American consul describes: "[A] campaign against a free election was opened by Gabriel Khabbaz, Deputy of Beirut and Editor of *L'Orient*, with an open letter to M. de Martel in which he sets forth his belief that the President should again be appointed." His argument was based on the fact that "the twenty-five Deputies of the Chamber, some of whom were in the first place appointed …, are not truly representative of the sentiment of the country; the number of the Deputies is too small, … [and] it would always be possible to buy three or four votes, so that the successful candidate would obtain his office by corruption."[51]

In voicing his opposition to a free election, Khabbāz may have been motivated by his feeling that the majority of the deputies would support al-Khuri. The balance of forces had been tested in October, when the Chamber elected a successor to Charles Dabbās, president of the Chamber, who had died

during the summer. While al-Khuri favored Amīr Khālid Shihāb, the Sunni leader from Ḥāṣbaiyā in the south, Eddé supported Khayr al-Dīn al-Aḥdab, the Beirut Sunni leader. "The vote which furnished an excellent opportunity for a test of strength, resulted in an imposing victory for Khouri's candidate."[52] However, the intrigues of the *zu'ama* and the intervention of de Martel then changed the balance of power within the Chamber in favor of Eddé. As early as twenty days before the election, with three candidates competing—al-Khuri, Eddé and al-Sa'd—the American consul already sounded skeptical as to al-Khuri's chances. Having analyzed the balance of power in the Chamber, in which there were about six deputies whose "votes are either subject to any covert influence which may be exerted indirectly by the High Commissioner, or are available to the highest bidder," the consul expected that "the first ballot will not bring a decision; and the result thereafter will be determined by trades among the various candidates. It is hardly conceivable that Bshara El-Khuri will agree to compromise with either Eddé or Saad; between the two latter, however, an agreement may very possibly be reached."[53]

When he tries to explain his failure in the election in his memoirs, al-Khuri refers to the "deals" through which the High Commissioner and the opposing faction succeeded in causing six deputies to shift their position.[54] 'Awaḍ gives the details of the deals which enabled Eddé to gain a majority in the Chamber, among which there is not only the role de Martel played but also the way merchants of Beirut's "Surquq quarter," such as Niqūlā Bestrus and Khalīl Ma'tūq, used their influence and money in support of Eddé. 'Arīḍa's rapprochement with the National Bloc is seen as linking him via Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ with al-Khuri, and it was this which stimulated de Martel to support Eddé. There was also talk of the "*maḥẓia* (mistress) of de Martel" as one of the go-betweens helping Eddé win over the deputies who had voted for al-Khuri's faction in October 1935. 'Awaḍ sees the deals and the intrigues in which the *zu'ama* involved themselves during the presidential campaign as the beginning of "an era in Lebnaon's history in which the political Mafia flourished on all fronts."[55]

The presidential election took place ten days after the visit of the Syrian National Bloc delegation to Bkirki. Al-Khuri seized the opportunity of the meeting in Bkirki to win over the Sunni, Shi'i and Druze deputies, by adopting—much like the patriarch—an "Arabist" discourse. Al-Riyāshī speaks of "the Arab festival of Bkirki," portraying al-Khuri as

> the first Maronite Lebanese leader who called for Arabism when making such a call was regarded by the French as [political] suicide … While Émile Eddé was in the Palace of the High Commissioner avowing his loyalty, the Syrian nationalists were in Bkirki declaring the Patriarch as "God's beloved" and Bshara al-Khuri as the bearer of the Arab banner in Lebanon.[56]

According to al-Riyāshī, both the Patriarch and al-Khuri made cynical use of "Arabism" for "Maronite Lebanon" to get back at the High Commissioner.

Highlighting the opportunistic features of the two rival Maronite leaders, he writes: "At that time many people said that if the French had supported Bshara al-Khuri and abandoned Eddé, the latter would have become the Arabist of Lebanon so as to be able to participate in the Bkirki festival."[57]

In a report he sent to the minister of Foreign Affairs one month after the election of Eddé as President, de Martel observed that al-Khuri and his supporters in the Chamber had failed in the election because they had adopted the principles of the "Muslim nationalists," and had joined the Maronite patriarch to "play the role of defenders of the national liberties" and the constitution. The patriarch had used "al-Khuri's paper *le Jour*" to demand full restoration of the constitution and the signing of an independence treaty between France and Lebanon, though he made sure to always confirm his attachment to the territorial integrity of Lebanon and his friendship with France.[58] In this sense, de Martel's analysis agrees with al-Riyāshī in that both link the failure of al-Khuri to be elected with his adoption of "Arabism" and the establishment of "his" party, the Constitutional Bloc.

In his memoirs, al-Khuri writes that at the time "the Constitutional Bloc had reinforced its base and had proven that it was a party whose guidelines were set by national goals" and not a "personal party [acting] against President Eddé." There were two clear orientations among the political Christian leaders: the first, represented by him and his followers, "are Lebanese who endeavor to achieve independence and the abolition of the Mandate, and the second [Eddé and his supporters] rely on the Mandatory authorities"; the difference was between those who "call for cooperation with the Arab countries, and the others who are attached to isolation … and are oriented exclusively, towards the West." Al-Khuri saw himself as representing "a genuine Lebanese spirit which does not distinguish between Christian and Muslim," while Eddé's faction represented "an opportunist spirit based on ugly confessional fanaticism."[59]

From December 1935 to February 1936, the Syrian National Bloc intensified its struggle for a Franco-Syrian treaty that would guarantee independence for Syria. Accompanied as they were by strikes and demonstrations in Damascus and other Syrian cities, the Bloc's activities led the High Commissioner, on 1 March 1936, to conclude an agreement with the Bloc's representatives, promising that negotiations for such a treaty would soon start. Both 'Arīḍa and al-Khuri, whose "Arabist" outlook had left positive impressions with some Sunni *zu'ama*, hastened to adopt their positions on Lebanon's relations with Syria and France. On 6 February, at the height of 'Arīḍa's honeymoon with the Syrian National Bloc, the patriarch presided over a meeting of Christian clergy in Bkirki which this time was intended to block the possibility of any territorial revision which the Franco-Syrian negotiations might introduce. There were five main demands:

> 1) Maintien de l'entité libanaise, dans ses frontières actuelles, sans modification d'aucune sorte; 2) Indépendance effective du Liban …, sans préjudice de la consolidation de ses "rapports fraternels avec la Syrie …"; 3) Etablissement

> d'une "nouvelle Constitution" sur la base de l'indépendance réelle du Liban …; 4) Conclusion d'une traité avec la France …; 5) Entrée du Liban dans la Société des Nations.[60]

One month later, seven Lebanese deputies (al-Khuri and his supporters, the core of the Constitutional Bloc)[61] presented the president of the Chamber with a petition demanding the same treatment for Lebanon as that promised to Syria, namely: "1) Resumption of constitutional government. 2) Conclusion of a treaty between France and the Lebanese Republic. 3) Admission of the Lebanese Republic into the League of Nations."[62]

Another Coastal Conference

As the Franco-Syrian negotiations approached, both ʿArīḍa and al-Khuri, for all their manifestations of "Arabism," began pressing for similar Franco-Lebanese negotiations whose outcome was to guarantee Lebanon's territorial integrity, that is, they dropped their "Arabist" discourse the moment "Greater Lebanon" appeared threatened. Other Maronite leaders, such as Ayūb Thābit and Khalīl Maʿtūq, of course went much further and believed that only a direct French protectorate could guarantee the future existence of Lebanon and protect it from threats by Syria and its Lebanese supporters. That of the established Maronite elites none was ready to cede any of the annexed districts that had gone into creating "Greater Lebanon" is not very surprising— as we already saw, much of their power and wealth depended on revenues accruing to them from these districts.[63]

More interesting and illuminating in this respect is the impact the expected Franco-Syrian negotiations had on the Muslim elites and on the Christian supporters of "Arabism" and "Syrianism." On 10 March 1936, i.e., nine days after de Martel's agreement with the National Bloc to enter into negotiations, another Coastal Conference was held at the home of Salīm Salām to discuss the Franco-Syrian negotiations and the closely connected question of the future of the districts "annexed to Mount Lebanon in 1920." As in 1933, the participants of the conference in 1936 were leaders and intellectuals who, at least in their political discourse, had rejected "Lebanism" as separate from "Syrianism" or "Arabism." Sunni *zuʿama* from Beirut and Tripoli made up the militant faction but participants came from several districts and communities and, going by the protocols, the conference was a lively affair.[64]

Almost immediately, the participants found themselves dealing not just with the future of "the annexed districts" but also with such equally pressing questions as the "national image" of Lebanon, the position of the patriarch, the implications of independence for both Lebanon and Syria, and how to overcome the "isolationist" notions of the Maronites who had wedded

themselves to France. In his opening address, Salīm Salām initially asked the participants to concentrate on the future of "the annexed districts" because he wanted them to submit a statement on the subject in the form of petition to the High Commissioner. Salām was then elected president of the conference and ʿAlī Nāṣir al-Dīn read out a draft of the planned petition. In response, the two Shiʿi intellectuals, Aḥmad ʿArif al-Zayn and Aḥmad Riḍa, suggested that "Arab unity" demanded that not only should the "annexed districts" be restored to Syria as "a step" in that direction, but Mount Lebanon as well. Thus, the debate swiftly turned to "unity," with Shawqī al-Dandashī, ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Karāmī, Fawzī Brudwil and Ṣalāḥ Labakī as the main speakers. For Labakī (1906–1955), a Maronite intellectual and member of the Syrian National Party, and for Brudwil, a Christian supporter of "Syrianism," unity meant only unity with Syria. For al-Dandashī and Karāmī, Sunnis from ʿAkkār and Tripoli, unity of "the Syrian entities" was no more than a step toward "Arab unity."[65]

Noting that the conference was now dealing with general issues such as "Arab unity," Yūsuf Yazbak, a Maronite intellectual and one of the founders of the Lebanese Communist Party, asked to be put in the clear about the objectives of the conference and its connection with the Syrian National Bloc. After being told by Salām that the objectives were the "annexed districts" and the upcoming Franco-Syrian negotiations, Yazbak resumed his speech, arguing that the independence of Lebanon should be seen as a step toward "Arab unity"—insisting that unity between Lebanon and Syria "will confuse the minds and alienate many or even all the [Christian] Lebanese who share with us the demand for national sovereignty and absolute independence [from France] but are still, unfortunately, unconvinced of the benefits of comprehensive unity." Hence, he urged the conference to focus on independence for Lebanon and leave all other subjects to the side for the time being.[66]

Yazbak's speech neatly reveals the prevailing views on the three alternatives: full unity between Syria and Lebanon, the "restoration" of the "annexed districts" to Syria, and independence for Lebanon while maintaining its territorial integrity, i.e., Greater Lebanon. Yazbak was quick to point up the confessional dimension of these options: "Frankly, there is no one who denies that those who demand Syrian unity are from among our Muslim brothers … and most of those demanding *al-kayān al-Lubnānī* (Lebanese entity) are from among our Christian brothers." Now that the Maronite patriarch was leaning toward cooperating with the Syrian nationalists, they ought to change their order of priorities. The first step should be full independence for both Lebanon and Syria, and only then should there be talk of uniting these two countries. He considered the change in Bkirki's position encouraging because in the past Bkirki had served as "the headquarters of propagating French influence in the Arab East and was the symbol of separation from Syria … [when] *al-ittiṣāl wal-infiṣāl* (unification and separation) was clothed in religious garb."[67]

A main point Yazbak was making in his attempt to persuade the conference participants was that the independence of two Arab countries, Lebanon and

Syria, would do away with the alienation of the Christians of Lebanon. In the end, however, Yazbak as well as his Christian colleagues Labakī and Brudwil, joined the other fourteen Sunni, Shi'i and Druze participants in signing a petition that called for comprehensive unity between Lebanon and Syria and for the reannexation of the disputed districts by Syria.

One day after the conference a long statement appeared in the press entitled *Mashkilat al-ittiṣāl wal-infiṣāl fi Lubnān* ("The problem of unification and separation in Lebanon"), written by Kāẓim al-Ṣulḥ. When he had wanted to speak at the conference, Kāẓim al-Ṣulḥ had been cut off by Salām.[68] Piqued at this, al-Ṣulḥ now went public with most of Yazbak's arguments concerning *al-ittiṣāl wal-infiṣāl.* While of course it was clear that the separation of Lebanon from Syria had been a French act, the political and economic developments instigated by French Mandate rule had created confusion as to what "separation of Lebanon" and "unification of Syria," actually stood for. While *al-ittiṣāl*, or unity, had become synonymous with "Islamism," *al-infiṣāl*, meaning a separate Lebanese entity, had assumed the exclusive sense of "Christianism." With time, however, the "true supporters of Syrian unity" were found willing to compromise with the Lebanese entity, especially after the rapprochement between "Bkirki and the National Bloc."[69] Because "Bkirki, which in the past was the justification for the French presence in Lebanon and Syria, has become … the site of opposition to this presence," and a large part of the Christian Lebanese were now supporters of independence, the Arab unionists in Lebanon should adopt a new nationalist concept in which "*al-ittiṣāl wal-infiṣāl* has secondary importance vis-à-vis [independence]." Al-Ṣuliḥ concluded that the Coastal Conference had failed to adapt its resolutions to this new situation, and instead had continued to "justify its *ta'līl ūjūdihi* (raison d'être) through confessional considerations."[70]

To encourage the new trend the Maronite patriarch had embarked upon, Kāẓim al-Ṣulḥ added, Muslim "unionists" should reconsider the whole issue of unification and separation. He then set out a new ideology which hinged on the differentiation between a "political concept" and a "nationalist concept." The political concept meant "a particular form of government and administration" for each of the two countries while the nationalist concept went beyond the confines of the "Lebanese entity" or "Syrian unity" into the a wider sphere of the "Arab nation," where there was no contradiction with the independence of "local entities." For him the polemics raging since 1920 on the legitimacy of annexing the disputed districts to Lebanon or restoring them back to Syria was a political dispute that could be resolved by political reconciliation between the adherents of Greater Lebanon and those of a united Syria. As long as this reconciliation—which could also include the other political entities of the Arab world—had not taken place, "Arab nationalism" continued to transcend local political concepts and subsequently would be the common denominator that would cleanse the smaller entities of *al-'aṣabiyāt al-ṭā'ifiyya* ("confessional solidarities"). As he put it:

> As an Arab [nationalist] of this type, I do not see a great catastrophe in maintaining the existing form of Lebanon, for any length of time, on condition that from now on it adopts Arab nationalism and the Arab idea. For me, its separation from Syria is similar to the separation of Arab Syria from Arab Iraq. That is to say, I do not consider *al-infiṣāl* (separation) a deficiency so long as this nationalism is growing…within each country until [the achievement] of complete unity [of the Arab countries].[71]

Kāẓim al-Ṣulḥ criticized the resolutions of the Coastal Conference as "hasty" and called for another meeting to work out "a national political program by which separatist Lebanese patriotism as and unionist nationalism will reach a compromise and will be liberated from their antagonism and ambiguity." Both the Syrian National Bloc (as we saw, Kāẓim's relative Riyāḍ was a member of the Syrian delegation negotiating the Franco-Syrian treaty) and Patriarch ʿArīḍa encouraged such a meeting.[72]

If Kāẓim al-Ṣulḥ in writing in this way was expressing the mood created by the temporary rapprochement between the National Bloc and the patriarch, his brother ʿAdil had been voicing similar ideas since 1932. Both were setting out a form of "nationalism" that could serve as the ideological justification for *al-kayān al-Lubnānī* as a separate political entity, i.e., for Lebanon as an independent country. Meanwhile, the most prominent member of the al-Ṣulḥ family, Riyāḍ, continued to adhere to Syrian unity. (He would come around only when the Franco-Syrian treaty left "Greater Lebanon" intact.) And it was this insistence of the Syrian delegation that all or part of the Lebanese republic be incorporated into Syria that was responsible for a radical change in the rapprochement between the Syrian nationalists and the Maronite Church. ʿArīḍa quickly came to the defense of the territorial integrity of Lebanon, the "Arabism" he had manifested in January 1936 having evaporated by the summer of that year. In May he came out with a "Green Book," a *Livre Vert*, entitled *Le Liban et la France*, in which he launched a campaign against "le mouvement séparatist au Liban," whose members he now flayed for seeking political unity with Syria. But the patriarch also cited documents in which he had earlier protested against the policy of de Martel. Briefly, the "Green Book" focused on "the historical relations between the Maronites and France" from the time of the Crusaders until the Mandate and reiterated "the self-image" the first Lebanese "nationalists" had created around 1920. The apparent inconsistencies[73] in ʿArīḍa's position disappear if we read his "Green Book" as an attempt to persuade the French to agree to a Franco-Lebanese treaty that would guarantee the future independence of the Lebanese republic as the Franco-Syrian treaty had done for Syria.[74]

ʿArīḍa's "Green Book" evoked severe criticism in the "Arabist" press. An editorial in one of these journals, *Abābīl*, scoffed at the Maronite patriarch for "seek[ing] the friendship of the French at the expense of the Muslims." As to the Maronite grievances the patriarch had listed. "If there is a part of the

population that has the right to complain, this should, in fact, be the Muslim community." For *Abābīl*, 'Arīḍa's "Green Book" "recalls regrettable memories to Muslim minds," notably its reference to the ancient connections between the Maronites and French going back to the Crusaders who had waged war against the Muslims.[75] This critique in the Muslim press of the "Green Book" conflicted with the belief of some Muslim leaders who were still convinced that the patriarch's attitude from 1935 would give "Arabism" a better chance to change the "nationalist" aspect of the Lebanese state

Thus, 'Arīḍa seems to have been talking a different language to each of his two audiences. And while he may have "fluctuated" in his stance on "Arabism" and the nature of Syro-Lebanese relations, he remained consistent in his defence of "Maronite interests." The tobacco monopoly affair may have pushed 'Arīḍa into a position as "Lebanese-nationalist leader," but even here he was clearly defending, first of all, the economic interests of his own community. When we look at the way he expressed himself when addressing French officials, it becomes quite clear that his attachment to Lebanism and the state of Lebanon concealed a fierce loyalty to Maronitism and an obdurate desire to secure Maronite supremacy (we already saw this in his criticism of the 1932 census which he was to keep up into the 1940s). In one of his letters to the French minister of Foreign Affairs 'Arīḍa expresses his conception of the nation as follows:

> Une nation, comme la nation Maronite, ayant dernière elle, dans le domaine politique, une tradition continue de onze siècles consécutifs, ne peut faillir a son histoire … Les Maronites constituent une minorité qui depuis des siècles vit dans un Orient musulman où la religion joue son rôle prépondérant dans les destinées des nations.[76]

It was for this reason that France ought to help the Maronite nation whose relations with the French, he added, had existed since Charlemagne and had been strengthened by the Crusaders.[77] In a memorandum he addressed to the High Commissioner at the beginning of 1935, he reminds the French of their "moral commitment" to come to the defense of the Maronites:

> En principe aussi, c'est à cause des Maronites que la Franc a pris le Mandat sur ce pays … En effet, les Musulmans, de par le Coran, ne veulent aucun étranger à leur religion … En principe également, le lien qui nous avait uni à la France c'est la religion, c'est l'espoir d'être protégé par la France contre les vexations de Musulmans.[78]

When he further writes that "nous demandon qu'on donne à chaque communauté ses droits," he means that members of the Maronite community deserve to occupy the more sensitive posts, such as "la direction de l'enseignement," which at the time was in the hands of a Shi'i.[79] The patriarch kept up and even intensified his demands for more posts for the Maronites from March 1936 until the signature of the Franco-Lebanese treaty in November that

year and continued to reiterate his views against the 1932 census according to which the number of the Maronites in Lebanon "a été diminué pendant que les commaunités non-chrétiens augmentaient."[80]

Toward a "Treaty of Friendship and Alliance"

Once the negotiations on the Franco-Syrian and Franco-Lebanese treaties were under way, Patriarch ʿArīḍa put an end to his cooperation with the Syrian leaders and their allies in Lebanon. Bshara al-Khuri, on the other hand, sought to benefit from the Franco-Lebanese negotiations in his rivalry with Eddé. As the exact nature of the national aspect of the Lebanese state did not greatly occupy his attention, he concentrated on the restoration of the constitution, which would give him greater freedom when it came to mobilizing not only the Christian elites but also leaders on the Muslim side in his competition with Eddé. On 20 June the latter received a telegram from the French undersecretary of state for Foreign Affairs, M. Vienot, affirming that France was willing to negotiate with Lebanon a treaty along the same lines as the one just then being negotiated with Syria. For Eddé, this was the sign to begin consultations with "influential bodies … including the Chamber of Deputies, the journalists, the heads of Government departments, the religious heads, and the Chambers of Commerce, as to the form of Constitution they would prefer."[81]

Al-Khuri meanwhile launched a "violent campaign against the Mandate and the Eddé Government" through *Le Jour* and other papers, while ten deputies petitioned Eddé to hold a special session of the Chamber.[82] On 7 July an unofficial session adopted a resolution calling for the restoration of the 1926 Constitution, although other ideas were mooted, e.g., adopting the American model.[83] While al-Khuri shared with the patriarch and Eddé their attachment to the territorial integrity of Lebanon, unlike them he avoided any confrontation with the Muslim elites who were still calling for Syrian unity. At the beginning of June rumors that the Syrian nationalists in Paris, as a condition for their acceptance of the draft Franco-Syrian treaty, were demanding that the four annexed districts, including Tripoli, should be restored to Syria, caused anxiety among the supporters of Greater Lebanon and telegrams of protest were immediately dispatched by Eddé and various bodies to the High Commissioner and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris. Archbishop Mubārak, then in Paris attending a religious conference, was granted an interview with Leon Blum in which he demanded that Lebanon's territorial integrity be maintained.[84] In a letter to Eddé, on 20 June, M. Vienot put the minds of the Maronite leaders at rest on this point.[85]

While the Maronite elites were able to display unity on the territorial issue, factionalism among the Muslim elites prevented a common stance. On 10 July,

the four Sunni deputies published a letter in the press thanking France "for preserving the territorial integrity of Lebanon," but only two days later the leaders of Sidon organized a demonstration in favor of "union" with Syria which, the British consul writes, "was badly handled by a Christian Gendarmerie officer and resulted in an ugly little riot in which four demonstrators met their deaths and several were wounded." Soon demonstrations and strikes extended to Tripoli, where the leadership still abided by the formal stance of the Coastal Conference. While in Sidon and Tripoli there was agitation caused by the "unionists," in Beirut the Muslim elites were in dispute over the election of the president of "the Muslim National Committee."[86] How deep these divisions among the Sunni elites were came to the fore especially in July in meetings organized by the factions that represented these elites.[87]

What further calmed the fears of the supporters of Greater Lebanon among the Maronite leaders was the fact that the issue of the "annexed districts" of Lebanon was excluded from the Franco-Syrian treaty, which was concluded on 9 September. This likewise reinforced the emerging tendency toward acceptance of the Lebanese entity among the disputing Sunni elites of Beirut. Early in October, not without the intervention of the High Commissioner, the Lebanese Chamber met to discuss the forthcoming Franco-Lebanese treaty negotiations and consider who would be part of the Lebanese delegation the British consul writes:

> The delegation comprised members of all the principal religious communities … Notable among them was Bechara el-Khoury … who had recently staged a reconciliation with President Eddé for the avowed purpose of defending Lebanon's independence against the real or imagined threat of absorption in the Syrian Republic.[88]

Although al-Khuri went to Paris as representative of his community in the Franco-Lebanese negotiations, his memoirs portray him as standing up for the "national interests" of Lebanon. Unlike Eddé, al-Khuri claims he wanted to obtain a treaty that paved the way for the independence of Lebanon and for recognition of Arabic as one of the official languages of the Lebanese administration. What he implies is that from 1936 he was devoted to "Arabism," insisting Arabic be counted as "our national language."[89]

However, during the negotiations the supporters of Greater Lebanon among the Christian leaders seem to have shied away from dealing with "the national portrait" of Lebanon. But, at the same time, as the Franco-Lebanese treaty shows, they made great efforts to defend "the Lebanon as an independent nation" (independent, that is, from Syria) during the 25 years of the treaty.[90] This also explains why a military convention was concluded between France and Lebanon. The French forces were accorded by Lebanon all possible facilities everywhere on its land, at sea and in the air, and in exchange "the French Government obligates itself to remain on Lebanese territory until the conclusion of a new agreement between the two … parties."[91]

Once they realized that France had decided to maintain Lebanon's territorial integrity the supporters of Syrian unity among the Sunni and Shi'i leaders began toning down their "Syrianist" discourse. On 23 October, with the Franco-Syrian treaty having been signed and the Franco-Lebanese treaty being negotiated, Sunni, Shi'i and Druze "representatives" from all regions of Lebanon, except Tripoli, attended a conference of the National Muslim Council at the home of 'Umar Bayhum. When it became clear that Salīm 'Alī Salām and Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ, two of the most prominent "unionists," had shifted positions, this led to a turning point in the attitude of the Sunni urban elites. The participants indirectly recognized the territorial integrity of Lebanon when they called for a confederative union between, but the administrative decentralization of Syria and Lebanon. They emphasized that "the Muslims, who constitute the majority of Lebanon's population," should be treated equally in the administrative system which the Franco-Lebanese treaty was to establish.[92] The way Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ began expressing himself at this time may be viewed as another move toward the National Pact of 1943. Here is Riyāḍ on *al-infiṣāl wal-ittiṣāl*:

> Would you [the Christians] and we [the Muslims] take steps to meet in the middle of the road? Would you yield somewhat regarding your Lebanon as we would [regarding Syrian unity]? Can [you and we] reach an understanding on a kind of union which would not harm your desire for separation? … Lebanon cannot be defended with dignity without Arabism, which serves as the basis for internal [cohesion] and as a fence against external [danger].[93]

Using the arguments of his relative Kāẓim, Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ said that recognizing Lebanon would allay the fears of the Christians, and thus integrate them within the "Arab nation." Retention within the state of Lebanon of "the four districts" inhabited by a Muslim majority would create a confessional balance that would abort the attempts of the isolationist forces to alienate Lebanon from the Arab world.[94]

When, from 1936 onward, al-Ṣulḥ's positions were adopted by most of the Beirut Sunni leaders, they were soon fully integrated in the political game of the Lebanese elites. This political integration, and the ideological justification that came with it, was, of course, preceded by their economic absorption into the merchant circles of Beirut. The only one of the Sunni elites, who, at least until January 1937, remained attached to "Syrian unity" and the restoration of the disputed districts to Syria was 'Abd al-Ḥamīd Karāmī, who may have taken up the cause of the Sunni merchants and elites of Tripoli who had been adversely affected economically by the annexation of their city to Lebanon. Arguments of the Beirut Sunni leaders concerning their new "Arabism," which did not clash with the territorial integrity of Lebanon, left Karāmī unconvinced. On his rejection of the views of Kāẓim al-Ṣulḥ, Karāmī states: "We in the district of Tripoli could not wait [for this future Arab unity] because the economic institutions of the city had been destroyed and there would be no salvation without restoration to Damascus."[95]

When it seemed that the Franco-Lebanese treaty would create unrest among the leaders and populace of Tripoli, Amīr ʻAdil Arslān, the Druze chief and "Arab-nationalist" activist, declared on 21 September: "Séparer du Liban des districts musulmans comme celui de Tripoli, ce serait lui ôter tout son cachet arabe et le rendre exclusivement maronite."[96] The position of Arslān, who belonged to one of the leading families of Mount Lebanon, was adopted by Amīr Raʾīf Abu al-Lamʻ, the Maronite chief, who stated that if the Muslim districts were separated, this meant the creation of a "national homeland for the Christians." Censuring the Muslim leaders who continued to support the restoration of the disputed districts to Syria, Abu al-Lamʻ asked: "Do our brethren the Muslims want to revive this old idea? Do they want to create in Lebanon a national homeland for the Christians?" Abu al-Lamʻ called for "a pact" to be drawn up between Christians and Muslims that would resolve the question of the relations between Syria and Lebanon.[97]

Still, when the Franco-Lebanese treaty was signed on 13 November, it was met with strikes and violence on the part of the Muslim masses of both Beirut and Tripoli. In the latter city there had already been a one-week strike in mid-September, in reaction to a visit by President Eddé. Soon after the beginning of the Franco-Lebanese negotiations in October, this strike was renewed and then continued for more than a month. Muslims in Tripoli and Beirut became even more violent in their actions after the conclusion of the treaty.[98] Soon the agitation among the masses turned into confessional strife between Christians and Muslims. The High Commissioner wrote that more than ten thousand Muslims, incited by their religious leaders in Beirut, had attacked the Christian quarters of the city.[99] The British Consul reported on the "stormy" reception of the treaty in Tripoli and Beirut: "In Beirut, Christian rejoicing on the 13th and 14th November was followed on the night of the 15th by a serious clash between Moslem malcontents and Christians … during which much damage was done in the town."[100] Intervention by the French military forces in the clashes left at least six dead in Beirut and three in Tripoli. Alarmed, the Sunni and Maronite leaders hastened to put an end to "the confessional conflict" before it escalated into "civil war." In their efforts "notables" in Beirut distributed a circular on 16 November, calling on "the inhabitants of the common homeland" to remain calm and "to overcome the consequences that had been introduced by the [confessional] events."[101]

The violent events that followed upon the conclusion of the treaty highlight the "confessional" aspect inherent in "Arabism" as well as "Lebanism." Again we see that, although they continued to adhere to a "nationalist" discourse, the elites almost always acted and reacted as "representatives" of their respective communities. In this sense, their "nationalist" discourse and ideology served as a cloak for their "confessionalism," forming the only way in which the elites could continue to represent the masses of their respective communities. However, for their part, the masses usually translated the "nationalist" concepts

of the elites into "confessionalist" terms, and thus into "confessionalist" action and reaction. One of the more sinister consequences of the "confessional strife" of November 1936 was the creation of two paramilitary organizations in Beirut. The first was al-Katā'ib, *les Falanges*, which set out to organize the Maronite masses for the defense of the particular nationalist characteristics and the integrity of Lebanon. The second was al-Najāda, a Sunni response to al-Katā'ib, organized by the Muslim Scout Society in order to safeguard the "Arab face" of Lebanon and the equal treatment of its Muslims. As the American consul wrote two days after the ratification of the treaty on 17 November 1936:

> Perhaps we have witnessed here the only case in history where the granting of independence was followed, rather than preceded, by civil disturbance … The troubles which broke out … were not indicative of any widespread dissatisfaction with the Treaty …The troubles arose from what may have seemed too great an insistence by the Christians on taking credit to themselves for having gained this type of independence, and for overdoing celebrations and manifestations in honor of it, without asking or even admitting any Moslem participation in their manifestations. It must likewise be recalled that Ramadan commenced on Saturday, November 14th and that therefore the Moslem population was found gathered in their mosques and ready to take umbrage at any fancied slight or indication that they were not considered an integral element of the Lebanon, with equal rights with the Christians.[102]

CHAPTER SIX

THE ENTRENCHMENT OF THE "LEBANESE SYSTEM": SUNNIS AND SHI'IS AFTER 1936

> Just as the mobilization of communities is rational in terms of their interests, so the choice of ideological positions is rational in terms of the power struggle within multi-communal states—with few exceptions. If one compares which ideology is chosen by which community under which conditions, both the rational and instrumental character of this ideology becomes abundantly clear. As a rule, it is a rational articulation of an identifiable strategy in the best interest of the community.
>
> Theodor Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon*, p. 35.

Signed on 13 November 1936, the Franco-Lebanese "Treaty of Friendship and Alliance" not only formalized the territorial boundaries of Lebanon as an independent entity (that is, separate from Syria), it also helped entrench "confessionalism" at the heart of the country's political system. The two, of course, hang together. By deciding to make the borders of 1926 the permanent borders of the Lebanese republic, the French foreclosed the aspirations of the Arab nationalists—Sunnis foremost among them—who wanted to preserve and struggled to defend the cultural and political unity *Bilād al-Shām* (Greater Syria) had known historically, i.e., throughout Ottoman times. Though "unity," with them, took a number of forms, Arab nationalists were keenly aware—the territorial *faits accomplis* of the treaty now an inescapable reminder—that instead of the promised independence of the Arab Middle East, France and Britain had been busy creating "client" states, their primary aim being continued control, their main strategy the old and tried formula of "divide and rule." In other words, the treaty reset the parameters of the political field, reconfigured the elements that made it up, and of the groups involved forced the Sunnis and Shi'is in particular to redirect their ways of "organisation, mobilisation, agitation and struggle."[1]

The 1936 Treaty came with a number of annexes appended to it that had been worked out between President Eddé and High Commissioner de Martel in an effort to placate Sunni, Shi'i and Druze leaders wary of any form of "Maronite hegemony" and to appease the inhabitants of the disputed areas, now part of Lebanon, who claimed that the government's fiscal policy favored the—mainly Maronite—population of Mt. Lebanon. Annex 6 guaranteed

> equality of civil political rights among all of its citizens without any distinction whatsoever, to ensure an equitable representation of the different elements of the

> country in the total number of state employees, and a just proportion among the different regions in the division of expenditures for public purposes,[2]

whereas Annex 6bis was intended to guarantee "as early as possible, and in any event prior to the entry into force of the treaty, the unification of the fiscal system" and called for a program of administrative reform to be introduced for all territories of the republic.[3]

Seizing up the situation, Arab nationalists began realizing that, with the road to Syrian unity blocked before them, confessionalism was the "only game in town." As Riyād al-Ṣulḥ is alleged to have concluded at one point: "Le titre de chef nationalist n'a aucun valeur aux yeux des Français."[4]

Though the nationalists were to maintain their Arabist discourse for some time, the focus of their activities perceptibly shifted toward demands for equality, and implementation of Annexes 6 and 6bis became the touchstone whereby Muslim elites would gauge their readiness to accept the "integrity" of Lebanon's territory as defined by the 1936 Treaty. In part, this may have been a matter of realpolitik—the stick of French colonial power was only too evident in the pages of the Treaty. If so, Annexes 6 and 6bis, of course, held out the carrot. To the French, this course of events may have signaled that their divide-and-rule policy was delivering dividends. But only in the short-term view. For, by playing off the interests of the various communities—or, rather, those of the elites—against one another, the Mandatory authorities consciously reinforced the confessionalist features of the new republic and thus had a clear hand in pre-empting attempts at nation-building.

Sunnis: "Our Rights in Lebanon"

Quoting the Sunni newspaper, *Beirut*, which until then had been the soundboard for the Arab nationalist and unionist sentiments of the urban Sunni elites, and *l'Orient*, generally identified with the faction of Émile Eddé, Pierre Rondot finds that at this period,

> Les Chrétiens craignent de ne trouver dans les Musulmans que des citoyens sous conditions. Tandis que Beyrouth, organe "officiel" de la communauté musulmane, estime que celle-ci après abandon de la "politique négative," n'a pas trouver au Liban les avantages et les emplois administratifs mérités, l'Orient demande: "Le ralliement des citoyens musulmans à l'Etat libanais … n'est il conditionné que par l'annexe 6 du Traité? …Est-il admissible … que le loyalisme de cette categorie de citoyens … soit en fonction et en proportion directe du nombre de postes et privilèges qui leur seront attribués? … Le Liban ne peut pas faire l'objet d'un marché![5]

But that was more or less what happened. If a seat in Parliament already provided clan leaders with a license to secure or extend their power base as

respresentatives of their respective communities, the same principle now inspired the race for jobs in government—not only did it turn the country into a "market place" where opportunists made their deals, it became the pole around which a near triumphant ethnopolitics drew its ever-widening concentric circles. Allegedly protecting the "legitimate rights of the community" on the grounds of Annex 6 and the results of the 1932 census, the more as well as the less powerful leaders from the different communities set out to secure administrative posts for themselves, their relatives and their clients.

What facilitated these developments was a reorganization the High Commissioner instigated of the legal status of Lebanon's communities intended to turn them into independent religious entities. This was done by organic law, enacted in two stages (decree 60/LR, dated 13 March 1936, and decree 146/LR, dated 23 November 1938), which not just institutionalized the internal organization of each community, their clerical hierarchic structure and juridical framework, but also laid down the nature of the relationship between them and the institutions of the state.[6] A distinction was made between two categories: "les communautés de statut personnel" and "les communautés de droit commun." The first were "légalement reconnues, en tant que Communautés à statut personnel," the second "les Communautés historiques dont l'organization, la juridiction et la légalisation sont fixés par un act législatif."[7] When Muslims opposed the introduction of the organic law as "an act of division between the different communities *of the same nation*," the response of the High Commissioner was decree 53/LR, March 1939, which simply again returned them to the status quo ante—Lebanon's Sunni, Druze and Shi'i communities had to wait until after independence for them to be reorganized by law.[8]

The second category pertained to people who wished to organize themselves as a group but could not refer to any form of recognition as a "historical community" when it came to being granted the right of political representation.[9]

What happened was that as the "historical" communities were given recognition as separate entities and the right of proportional representation within Lebanon's official institutions, their representatives interpreted this as legitimizing whatever action they undertook to address the grievances of their respective communities. In other words, they increasingly used their political position to promote, not the greater good of the nation, but the more narrowly defined interests of their own particular religious community. For example, until the "crisis of 1936" the Sunnis of Lebanon had had no traditional religious leader, but "[e]n 1936 le Mufti de la République libanais est ainsi investi par divers notables de la communauté [sunnite] 'de tous les pouvoirs spirituels et temporels' en vue de le mettre à égalité avec les chefs des communautés chretiens pour la défense des droits des Musulmans."[10] The role Rondot points to here of the notables in taking the initiative is already noticeable in mid-1936 when some Beirut Sunnis began setting up Muslim organizations with the express purpose of defending the "interests of the Muslims" in Lebanon. One of

these was the so-called "Committee of the Twelve," whose members included Salīm ʻAlī Salām, ʻUmar Bayhum, Aḥmad al-Dāʻūq and Muḥiy al-Dīn Nuṣūlī.[11] Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ joined the Committee on 22 October and the following day, with 4,000 others, took part in a Muslim conference at the residence of ʻUmar Bayhum where they established *al-Majlis al-Qawmī al-Islāmī* (the National Muslim Council, NMC). Most of those present were Sunnis, but, according to a French report, "aucun des membres musulmans de la Chambre, aucune des personnalités sunnites de Tripoli n'ont pris part à la réunion."[12] Christians were not represented at all while only "un seul Druze, une vingtaine de chiites avaient repondu à l'appel" of the organizers.[13] When in the beginning of November the NMC set up an executive committee, Salīm Salām was elected as president and Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ became their liaison with the Lebanese delegation to the Franco-Lebanese negotiations where he was to press the "Muslim demands."[14] Actually, the NMC was mainly out to defend "Sunni interests" and as such it formed a clear turning point in the way the Sunnis would become institutionalized as a community. Meanwhile, on the face of it, the mufti and the members of the NMC continued to act as representing the interests of all Lebanon's Muslims, i.e., also those of the Shiʻis and Druzes.

That the participants in the Muslim conference decided to combine the terms "national" and "Muslim" in the name they gave to their newly established Council is not without significance as it highlights the duality of their approach. Until 1936, many of the Sunni leaders had shared Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ's and Salīm Salām's Arab nationalist and non-confessional stance. But now, while "national" continued to signal adherence to Arabism, making a point of including the term "Muslim" served to stress their readiness to fight for and secure "equality" within the new republic of Lebanon. The first may have been to reassure their own political following, the second was a clear message to the French. For example, three days before the conference at Bayhum's home, Muḥiy al-Dīn Nuṣūlī published an article that ends in a thrice repeated "Unity!" and outlines the "eighteen years" of struggle it had taken to achieve that unity. The Sunnis had made an historical mistake, he laments, when they decided to boycott the state institutions—as the Lebanese system was based on "confessionalism," the way forward was to demand that government and state jobs and positions be proportionally distributed among Lebanon's various communities. He continues:

> La Constitution en vigueur stipule que les fonctions doivent être répartiés provisoirement entre les commuunautés; or le mot provisoire signifie: durée illimitée. C'est pourqoui, en nous basant sur la Constitution, nous continuerons à réclamer des fonctions jusqu' à ce que la compétence remplace la répartition confessionnelle … Nous aurions pourtant voulu qu'ils [Muslims] occuppassent des fonctions afin de sauvegarder nos interêts que les autres n'ont pas ménagés."[15]

There is also the correspondence Salām carried on with de Martel in October and November to give us an idea of when and how this dualist attitude in the

Sunni "unionist" elites emerged, i.e., with the Franco-Lebanese treaty looming on the horizon. For example, on 28 October, Salām writes:

> Les Musulmans qui forment la majorité de la population libanaise, n'ont cessé dès le commencement de l'exercice du Mandat de faire connaitre … leur profond attachement à l'Unité Syrienne … Toutefois, étant donné qu'un certain nombre de nos compatriotes ne jugent pas encore le moment venu de réaliser une telle Unité, les Musulmans … ne voient aucune objection qu'une Confederation soit crée entre les pays sous Mandat.[16]

After protesting against the choice of the delegates to the Franco-Lebanese negotiations, Salām outlines the grievances of "the Muslims" within the Lebanese state.[17] Soon after the conclusion of the Treaty, de Martel went out of his way to reassure the executive committee of the NMC that the Treaty would introduce "*la laicité et l'égalité.*" In his response, Salām sounds skeptical about the attainment of secularism in a state which is "exclusively Lebanese," i.e., without close ties with Syria and the Arab world. Such a state could only be based on confessionalism:

> Le Comité Exécutif du Congrès National Musulman, a l'honneur de vous exprimer sa satisfaction de voir la politique française dans ce pays s'acheminer, enfin vers la laicité et l'égalité. Toutefois … le comité constate que la création d'un État exclusivement libanais au sein de cette patrie, se justifie que par des raisons confessionnelles.[18]

However, he added, as president of a "confessional" executive committee he recognized the "confessional" state, and expected "equality" to come about through the principles stipulated in Annexes 6 and 6bis. To forestall any the impression that he and his colleagues might no longer follow the "non-confessional" discourse, Salām explains that: "Le Congrès était National avant d'être Musulman comme en fait foi sa propre dénomination," while in a forthcoming national conference, Muslims and Christians would elaborate a plan for a confederation between Lebanon-and Syria.[19]

For Sunni leaders of the National Muslim Council "national" and "nationalism" meant several things, e.g., (a) unity between Syria and Lebanon, (b) unity of all Arab countries, or (c) unity among the different communities in Lebanon under the banner of "Arabism." The term "Muslim" was less ambiguous: they used it in the restricted sense of the "community," i.e., when pressing their demands for equal rights within the Lebanese state. For others, such as Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ, who until October 1936 advocated "non-confessional" Arabism and the union of Lebanon and Syria, the combination "national" and "Muslim" served a different purpose—frustrated by the position of the Christian leaders during the Franco-Syrian and Franco-Lebanese negotiations, Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ used this kind of discourse to justify his "non-confessional" activities, and he did so on several occasions. This in return annoyed those Arabist Christians who at the beginning of 1936 still adhered to a "non-

confessional" Arabism. As de Martel explains their reaction to "le fanatism" of Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ: "Çeux qui croyaient suivre avec lui [al-Ṣulḥ] depuis plusieurs années une politique fondée sur l'abandon des rivalités confessionnelles n'ont pas manqué de le prendre vivement à partie." Not surprisingly, de Martel was only too pleased with the new position of ʿAzīz al-Hāshim, one of the founders of the Republican Party for Independence which since 1931 had followed an Arabist ideology and engaged in a "non-confessional" struggle for the independence of Lebanon.[20] In a letter to Patriarch ʿArīḍa, al-Hāshim had expressed his frustration with the shifting position of Muslim leaders, notably Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ who since his return from France in September had abandoned his "national" posture and adopted a "Muslim" stance:

> Nous avons cru, un moment, avoir réussi à poser le problême libanais sur un terrain nettement national. Malheursement nous venons de constater avec peine que nos espoirs ont eté décus. Depuis le retour de notre ami Riad Solh de Paris, j'ai senti avec mes amis une recrudescense de fanatism islamique à Beyrouth.[21]

There then follows a detailed commentary of his discussions with al-Ṣulḥ and of a subsequent meeting with a group of "non-confessional Christians":

> 1) J'ai été chargé de publier, sous ma signature, un article exposant la responsabilité des chefs musulmans dans cette période. 2) Nous défendrons en tant que patriotes libanais, sans différence confessionnelle, l'intégrité libanaise en renforcant l'autorité du govrnement. 3) Nous soutiendrons, sans réserve, l'amitié et la collaboration franco-libanaise.[22]

Al-Hāshim had been disappointed by al-Ṣulḥ's objection to a "Lebanese nation" as long as it continued to be separate from the "Arab nation." Al-Ṣulḥ was also dismayed with Christian leaders who, he claimed, were in the pay of the French ("*à la solde de France*)." Al-Ṣulḥ had told him, al-Hāshim added, that he had read in Paris "les lettres de votre Patriarche Maronite, d'Émile Eddé, Bechara Khoury et même de Michel Zaccour, lettres qui trahissent leur sentements anti-islamique." This had led him to adopt the following position: "Dorénavant je ne penserai et n'agirai qu'en musulman. J'estime que si l'on me craint et si l'on à des égards pour moi ç'est uniquement à cause de ma qualité de chef musulman. Le titre de chef nationaliste n'a aucune valeur aux yeux des Français."[23]

Al-Hāshim's letter typifies the different impact the turbulent political developments of 1936 had on the mood of the Christian and the Muslim leaders, especially if we look at those who since at least 1931 had sought to base cooperation on "national" and "non-confessional" principles. In the long speech he gave at the National Muslim Conference, al-Ṣulḥ tried to save the day by outlining his notion of an encompassing Arab nation within which Lebanon would be recognized as a separate state,[24] while for al-Hāshim Lebanon formed a separate nation just as "Syria" was now an independent, separate nation. Sunni leaders quickly learned that within the changed parameters of Lebanon's political field after 1936 their role had been reduced to that of representing a

"confessional" community, and their activities limited to securing their "Muslim rights." Even 'Abd al-Ḥamīd Karāmī lost hope of an immediate re-annexation of any part of Lebanon to Syria. Two days after de Martel's decision, on 4 January, to restore the constitution, and of Eddé to invite Khayr al-Dīn al-Aḥdab to preside over a new cabinet, Karāmī did not just accept al- Aḥdab's nomination as prime minister, he even gave him his full support, admitting that the Sunnis of Lebanon had no alternative but to concentrate on one thing only, i.e., to struggle for civil rights: "Because our brethern of Damascus abandoned us, we have the obligation to demand our rights in Lebanon."[25]

Exactly one month after the restoration of the constitution, on 4 February, the government came out with a ministerial proclamation to the effect that the question of the citizenship of "Lebanese émigrés will be solved." According to Salām, this alluded to a decision of the government to grant these *émigrés* Lebanese citizenship in order to increase the proportion in the Lebanese population of the Christians. Such a decision would affect the Muslims, Salām stated in a long protest he sent to the High Commissioner, because "Your Excellency knows that the main principle on which the political system in Lebanon stands is the proportion of the populations of the communities to each other." Because the size of the communities determined "the distribution of the rights," the demographic issue "is vital from the view point of the Muslims." To make sure "the scheme," as he called it, would not be implemented Salām insisted on applying the Treaty of Lausanne (signed between Turkey and the Allies on 24 July 1922) which had granted a two-year "right of return" period to Lebanese expatriates who before 1920 officially had been Ottoman subjects.[26] Salām's memorandum neatly formulates the position and demands of Sunni leaders who, from 1937 to 1943, found themselves in opposition to the government. "Unity" appears only once: "Although the Muslims continue to be attached to the principle of unity, they are willing to postpone its achievement until its elements and conditions are within reach."At the heart of his protest lay an insistent demand for:

> achieving rights and equality … [which] the assurances of the French government, of you personally and the Franco-Lebanese Treaty guarantee. Relying on this, the Muslims awaited the [new] circumstances with hope and optimism. But the ministerial proclamation has come as … a surprise, restoring feelings of anxiety and pessimism to the heart of the Muslims for whom it signals a return to an old and fixed plan.[27]

In Salām's subsequent letters to the French authorities the issue of unity drops out of sight completely and all focus is instead on achieving equality. For example, in a "requête" dated 23 April, Salām reminded de Martel that "le système du mandat vient d'être remplacé par le Traité d'Alliance franco-libanais" which guaranteed "l'égalité entre les diverses communautés" through the constitution and Annexes 6 and 6bis. But by its actions, the government had violated the French assurances and the guarantees of the treaty.[28]

Actually, from January until June, letters and memoranda from Salām and his colleagues, carry the same message of protest against "la non-application au bénéfice de la communauté islamique des annexes 6 et 6bis au traité franco-libanais." As these missives contained no precise demands, ("[l]es auteurs restent d'ailleurs dans les généralités et n'énoncent aucun grief précis à l'appui de leur plaine"), a French official in Lebanon opined that the clamor of Salām and his colleagues was related to clan rivalry among the Sunni elites of Beirut: "Il ne consitute à mon sens qu'une nouvelle manoeuvre du clan Salam-Riad Solh contre Kheirrddin Ahdab en prévision des futures élections législatives." That Salām was critical of al-Aḥdab's government was, the author thought, because the latter had refused to appoint Salām's son Ṣā'ib as mayor of Beirut: "Salam ne pardonnait pas à Ahdab de n'avoir pas nommé son fils—un jeune homme de 26 ans—à la présidence de la Municipalité."[29]

With elections scheduled for 7 October, vying for government posts gave further impetus to the way the Sunni urban leaders took to the political game. Of course, their rural counterparts had gone down this same path much before them, as the Christian elites and the French Mandatory authorities had succeeded in integrating them into "confessional" or "communal" politics already in the 1920s. Now the Sunni urban elites used the same pretext of "community's interests and rights" in order to promote advantages for themselves, their clans and their clients. The pay-offs involved determined the unstable nature of the coalitions and factions they formed. Since the appointment of al-Aḥdab as prime minister— inaugurating the tradition whereby a Maronite would always be president and a Sunni premier— the powerful Sunni clans in Beirut and Tripoli increasingly used membership of the Chamber and high administrative posts as key positions to help themselves, their clans and their clients become full partners in the political game and adopt the "confessional" rules according to which it was played.

In preparation for the elections, the High Commissioner increased the number of deputies from 25 to 60; after the elections this was then increased to 63 when the High Commissioner appointed three members who had lost in the ballot. As in previous elections, electoral lists were put together as a result of compromises and deals among the candidates from the various communities. Factionalism in each community rather than political platforms determined the lists in each constituency, as, for example, al-Khuri and Eddé continued to lead two opposite camps. In Beirut, furthermore, two lists including "confessional" candidates competed, one backed by Khayr al-Dīn al-Aḥdab and the second by Riyād al-Ṣulḥ. Neither Riyād al-Ṣulḥ nor 'Abd al-Ḥamīd Karāmī stood as candidates, but they did openly support and even sponsor candidates in their constituencies. The candidacy of Shafiq Karāmī in these elections signaled a turning point in the political activities of the Karāmī family, as their foremost leader had until then always completely boycotted the Lebanese institutions. When, prompted by the faction leaders in Beirut, and probably with the

consent of French authorities, the opposing factions mobilized the *qabadayāt*, this introduced an element of violence and led to casualties.[30]

In sum, during 1936 the "nationalist" Sunni elites in Beirut but also in Tripoli were obliged to acknowledge that they stood to lose if they did not switch the weight of their political activities behind the "confessional" demands of their community within the Lebanese entity. But by thus becoming part of Lebanese politics as "confessional" representatives, they in effect had come around to adapting the Lebanese political system. Even more so, by legitimizing their political activities as being in the defense of "Muslim interests," the "nationalist" Sunni elites actively contributed to the refashioning of the inter-communal relations of the country, i.e., to the entrenchment of the "Lebanese system." The impact of their activities was especially profound on the Shi'i and Druze *zu'ama*. Although among Shi'i and Druze elites some had frequently responded, before 1936, to the call of "nationalist" Sunni leaders, the new situation created that year highlighted where Sunni, Shi'i and Druze *zu'ama* differed rather than converged in their interests.

Shi'is: Raising the Banner of Grievances

As we saw in Chapter One, to prevent Sunni and Shi'i leaders from taking a common political stance vis-à-vis the Mandate and the Lebanese entity, the French authorities together with the established Maronite leadership had, from 1920 onwards, been "rewarding," i.e., coopting, Shi'i leaders who sided with the Mandate and the Lebanese state the French were setting up, while marginalizing those who remained loyal to Syrian unity and cooperated with the "nationalists." This policy would prove especially useful after 1933. In a letter to the French delegate of the High Commissioner to the Lebanese republic dated 19 May 1934, the French administrative adviser of southern Lebanon wrote that the time was now propitious to start appointing Shi'is in the administration of southern Lebanon gradually to replace Christians who until then had occupied most of these posts. Attaching a list with the names of Christians holding especially sensitive positions in the Tyre area, he criticized an appointments policy which, for example, had enabled the Christian Sālim familly to occupy "presque toutes les fonctions municipale et gouvernement à Tyre" thanks to the support of Yūsuf Sālim, a former deputy and the vice-director of "*la Compagnie des Eaux de Beyrouth.*"[31] Rewarding "loyal" Shi'is was good policy for both the Mandate and the Christians:

> Les chiites depuis 1920 sont restés les partisans les plus fidèles du Mandat et dans l'avenir, dans le jeu des communautés du Liban, cette masse de deux cent mille habitants peut rendre des services les plus importants non-seulement à la puissance Mandataire mais ausssi à tous les chrétiens de la Republique Libanaise.[32]

Why this was important for Lebanon's Christians is quickly made clear:

> [C]es deux communautés musulmannes formeront alors la majorité dans l'Etat libanais. Nous n'avons aucun intérêt de forcer les chiites de se jeter dans les bras des sunnites, car cette union ne peut amener … qu'à la prépondérance de l'élément musulman du Liban.[33]

If we look somewhat closer at the attitudes powerful Shi'i clan leaders displayed toward the Mandate, Greater Lebanon, Syrian unity and Arab "nationalism" between 1920 and 1936, we find that the majority of the Shi'i leaders and '*ulama* early on decided to seek advantage from the socioeconomic and political changes that had followed the imposition of the Mandate in Lebanon and Syria. Apart from a small group of "intellectuals" and frustrated leaders who used "nationalist conferences" as an outlet for protest, the main clan chiefs not only went along with the "confessional" system but actively contributed to its crystallization. Like the Sunni and Druze chiefs in the countryside, from 1920 members of the al-As'ad, al-Zayn, 'Usayrān, al-Faḍl, Ḥaydar, Ḥamāda and others Shi'i clans generally responded affirmatively when the French authorities invited them to take part in Lebanon's institutions and there to "represent" the Shi'i community. While some may have fluctuated until 1922—Shi'i areas in Jabal 'Amil and Biqā' were prone at the time to the aggression ot the "bands", addressed in Chapter Three—the moment Yūsuf al-Zayn and then Kāmil al-As'ad decided to join the Lebanese institutions, the door was open to the "integration" of other leaders from the major Shi'i families.[34]

As "representatives" of the Shi'i community, these leaders now had to vindicate their choice by showing they could bring tangible improvement to the economic situation of their localities and raise the number of Shi'i employees in Lebanon's administration, all the more as the group of Shi'i "intellectuals" and other dissidents within the community, albeit small, seized every opportunity to point out that a "Lebanese entity" separate from Syria would never be able to solve the "grievances" of the community as these stemmed from the "discriminatory" attitude of exactly these Lebanese institutions their leaders wanted them to join. The main organ to articulate "*ḥuqūq al-Shi'a al-maḥḍūma*" ("the Shi'i grievances") was *al-'Irfān*, the journal established and edited by Aḥmad 'Arif al-Zayn whose strongly Arab nationalist activities and writings were captivating many educated Shi'is. Because for these "intellectuals" these "grievances" were directly linked with the issue of the disputed territories,[35] the French authorities and the established Maronite elites were bent on preventing any form of cooperation arising between them and Shi'i clan leaders, fearing this might foster an alliance between the Shi'i elites and the urban Sunni elites who from 1920 had been rejecting France's breaking up of the "Syrian lands." In 1922 the French authorities had succeeded in restoring order in Shi'i areas, but the spread of the Syrian Revolt of 1925–26 renewed the threat of Shi'i rebellion.[36]

Prompted, apparently, by the French authorities, a group of Shi'i leaders held several meetings in 1925 intended to establish a Shi'i communal council which

was to manifest their independence from the Sunnis. Although the council's establishment was delayed by internal factionalism, the High Commissioner issued decree 3503, on 27 January 1926, which declared that "les musulmans chiites forment au Grand Liban une communauté religieuse indépendante." That this was mainly on the declarative level is clear from its continuation: "Ils sont jugés en matière de statut personnel selon les principes du rite connu sous le nom de rite jaafarite [Ja'fari]." Article 3 of the decree stipulates the creation of Shi'i *qāḍi*s and a religious Court of Cassation (the Supreme Ja'farī Court).[37] Only two years later, "au moment même oû ils sont travaillés par la propagande séparatiste" of the first Coastal Conference, was the above decree implemented and the Ja'farī Court of Cassation established.[38] In an attempt to institute a religious high office similar to that of the Maronite Patriarch and the Sunni mufti, a group of Shi'i '*ulama* in 1929 asked the High Commissioner to recognize Sheikh Ḥusayn Mughaniyya, of Dūbā near Tyre, as their "religious representative" vis-à-vis the authorities. But here, too, owing to factional disputes Sheikh Mughaniyya's position continued to be contested by other groups of the Shi'i '*ulama* and *zu'ama* until his death on 14 March 1940.[39] When, in 1933, nineteen '*ulama* and sixty notables met at Sidon to discuss Shi'i "grievances" and "claims," one of their demands was "La nomination d'un grand chef religieux au même titre que les grands chefs sunnites et chrétiens."[40] As at least three *'ulama* continued to present themselves as the supreme religious heads, the attempts to obtain an official appointment for one of them suggests again that the French may well have decided they could only gain from the ethnicization process of the Lebanese religious communities that was now under way.

Not coincidentally, a debate erupted in 1926 on the "racial origin" and the "religious particularism" of the Shi'is, when Henri Lammens "discovered" that the Shi'i were of "Persian racial origin." Tensions rose when shortly thereafter Kurd 'Ali, a Syrian Sunni and one of the prominent "scholars" of the Mandate period, published his book, *'Aṣr al-Khalīfa al-Ma'mūn.* In it, 'Ali links the origin of the Shi'a with the movements of *al-shu'ūbiyya,* suggesting that this might explain the Shi'i "particularist and separatist" attitude vis-à-vis "Syrian unity" and the "Arab nation" during the Mandate.[41] Shi'i intellectuals reacted angrily and launched a campaign in *al-'Irfān* to defend their "Arabism and Islamism" against any suspicion. Shi'i '*ulama* and *zu'ama*, on the other hand, applauded the appearance of the book and used Kurd 'Ali's writings to justify their "separatist" attitude vis-à-vis the Sunni "nationalists."[42]

In 1933, at the height of the economic crisis and the political turmoil that followed the suspension of the constitution, French "experts" eagerly picked up this thread of Shi'i "particularism." A lengthy report mentions "racial origin," religious schism and social structure as factors underlying a Shi'i "particularism" profound enough to enable alienating the Shi'i elites from their Sunni counterparts. Allegedly speculative theories on *l'origine ethnique* of the Shi'is makes them descendants of Kurdish exiles brought to the region by Saladin (Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn) from Mesopotamia who were then later converted by Persian missionaries

to Shi'ism, or claims that they were simply Persians who for some reason had settled in Jabal 'Amil. They could also have been of Yemeni Arab origin. After explaining that the "particularist" characteristics of the community arose from a schism within Islam, the author outlines the four classes that constitute the community's social structure: "les notables ou beys, les bourgeois ou effendis, les ulamas et le peuple … Les gens du peuple … cultivent la terre pour le compte des beys, des effendis et des ulamas." The majority of the peasants lived, as the writer has it, "dans un état de quasi esclavage" and many were migrating toward the coastal cities and Africa. Migrants who after some years returned to their villages began introducing certain changes in the traditional life there. The only class which "benefited from modern education" was that of the notables: "[La] majority des notables chiites envoient leurs enfants dans des écoles chrétiennes." The report then mentions that although the Mandatory regime had granted the Shi'is religious independence, "les sunnites essayent depuis quelque temps d'associer les chiites à toutes les manifestations pan-islamiques," which had had some success among small groups of '*ulama* and intellectuals. For example, "Pendant le Congrès pan-islamic de Jerusalem [7–17 December 1931], un cheikh chiite a été invité de dire des prières dans la Mosque de Jerusalem." Neither does the author forget Aḥmad 'Arif al-Zayn and his journal, *al-'Irfān,* "tout devoué à la cause pan-islamique." On the whole, however, the report concludes, reassuringly, the population of Jabal 'Amel is still "attached to France."[43]

Clearly intended to put the minds of the French authorities at rest, the report came at a time when the Shi'i elites were being courted by their Sunni counterparts to join their nationalist activities, much intensified since the emergence of the Syrian National Bloc at the end of 1931, as this had raised hopes among the Lebanese nationalists that a revision of the 1920 territorial division might be in the cards. One week after the Syrian nationalists had held a conference in Aleppo, on 17 January 1933, Shi'i elites held two meetings, one in Sidon and one in Kafr Rummān, factionalism now being an inescapable corollary of the politics of the pro-French Shi'i elites:

> Afin de countre-balancer l'attitude de Youssef bey Zein [Yūsuf al-Zayn], autorisé à tenir une réunion à kfar Roummane, le 24 courant, pour traiter avec les chefs religieux des intérêts de la nation chiite, le deputés Nejib bey Ossayran [Najīb 'Usayrān] et Fadl bey Fadl … ont été autorisés à tenir de leur coté une réunion à Saida, le 23 Février au domicile du premier.[44]

To compete with al-Zayn—among the group of prominent *'ulama* he was able to mobilize were such people of al-Sayd Muḥsin al-Amīn al-Ḥusaynī, 'Abd al-Ḥusayn Sharaf al-Dīn and Aḥmad Riḍā[45]—'Usayrān and al-Faḍl brought together a no less impressive gathering of nineteen '*ulama* and over sixty "notables." Although the '*ulama* Muṣa and Muḥammad 'Izzeddīn, Amīn al-Ḥusaynī and Ḥusayn Nūr al-Dīn "ont assisté aux deux réunions," the two meetings did not only reflect the factionalism among the *zu'ama* but also among

the Shi'i *'ulama.*[46] The resolutions that came out of the two meetings dealt mainly with the "grievances" of the Shi'i community. Confusion arose as to the authenticity of the text of the Sidon petition as two different petitions were sent to the French authorities, both under the title *La revendications de la communauté chiite.* Shu'ayb, the well-known Shi'i historian, argued that as one of these petitions referred to "Shi'i attachment and loyality" to the Mandate and Greater Lebanon, it could not represent the Shi'i position in 1933. Relying on the nationalist press of the time, Shu'ayb claims that the Sidon meeting never discussed the subject and suggests that this petition was actually a letter sent by Riḍa Tāmir, one of the participants, who did not at all represent the general position of the Shi'i participants. Its opening statement ran as follows:

> 1) La communauté chiite profite de cette occasion pour manifester … son indéfectible attachement et son amitié sincère et loyale, pour la France Mandataire au Liban et en Syrie. 2) Les chiites sont des libanais, dont le principal désidératum est le mantien du Liban dans ses frontières actuelles.[47]

The text Shu'ayb recognizes as the authentic petition is that signed by twelve *'ulama* and listing the Shi'i community's demands, among them the nomination of a "Grand Chef religieux ayant qualité pour représenter" the community, the opening up of new schools and roads in the area and improving existing ones, increasing the number of official posts allocated to the Shi'is, encouraging tobacco cultivation and reducing taxes.[48] The French report on the Sidon meeting, in addition to the texts of the two petitions, also provides parts of speeches by Dr. Fū'ād 'Usayrān, Riḍa Tāmir, Muḥammad Jābir and 'Alī Bazzī. Presenting an account of every single stage of the meeting, the report states: "M. Kazem Khalil de Tyre [one of the Shi'i *zu'ama*] après avoir renouvelé l'expression des sentiments d'attachement de la nation chiite envers la Puissance Mandataire et le Liban, a donné lecture d'un projet de mazbata [petitions] adopté." The text of the petition that then follows lists the "grievances" of the Shi'i community in the way Shu'ayb does.[49]

It seems that neither al-Khalīl nor Tāmir expressed the positions of all participants at the two meetings, as these could reach common ground only on the subject of their "grievances." In other words, both men may well have been expressing sentiments the French wished to spread among the participants both at Sidon and at Kafr Rummān. This was clear at the Kafr Rummān meeting where the *'ulama* evaded such general issues as Syrian unity and the territorial integrity of Lebanon, which is why the Kafr Rummān petition could be accepted by the majority of the Shi'i elites, including the Arab nationalists among them who cooperated with the nationalist Sunni elites. The petition opens by stating: "Nous … ulema et chefs religieux de la communauté musulmanne chiite sommes réunis" at the home of Yūsuf al-Zayn on 24 February 1933, and continues: "Jusqu'à présent, nous, qui formons le 20% de la population de cette Republique, nous ne sommes pas vus dans une situation d'égalité avec les autres, depuis le rattachement de notre contrée à l'ancien Liban."[50]

As part of their demands, the petitioners asked for four to five wide roads to be paved in Jabal ʻAmil, complemented by the extensions of small roads the inhabitants could open themselves; the only two existing roads dated back to the Ottoman period, namely the coastal Tyre-Sidon Bayāḍa road and the Sidon Nabaṭiyya and Marjʿiyūn roads. The Abu al-Aswad-Jizzīn and Tyre-Bent Jbayl roads were projects that had never been implemented. The petitioners requested the establishement of new schools in the area, especially secondary schools. They complained against the taxation policy as it discriminated against Jabal ʻAmil. The *wirko* tax imposed during the first world war had never been removed, and Jabal ʻAmil, "ne cesse, avec la Bekaa et Akkar, de payer, à l'exclusion des autres contrées de la Republique Libanaise, l'impôt des dimes [tithe]." In Jabal ʻAmil the duties imposed on property exchanges were still higher than those in Mt. Lebanon. While the Sidon meeting called for the appointment of a religious chief for the community, the Kafr Rummān meeting demanded equal respect for the dignity of the community:

> Sauvegardé la dignité due à notre communauté, chose qui prime tout chez les âmes nobles; nous constatons que la dignité due aux diverses communautés libanaises est respectées pour leurs fêtes et leurs cérémonies religieuses. Le Haut Commissaire a rendu visite au Cheikh Akl de la communauté Druze. Le Président de la Republique Libanaise lui a rendu également visite ainsi qu'au Président de la cour de Cassation Chrei [of the Sunnis][51].

Following the turbulent events of 1932, French reports reflect anxiety over the dissatisfaction among the Syrian and Lebanese nationalists as well as the Sunni urban populace, and obvious wish to prevent Shiʻi involvement that could lead to cooperation between Shiʻis and the Sunni elites of Beirut and Tripoli. Seen in this light, the two meetings indicate a gain for French efforts to encourage Shiʻi particularism. Though it is true that Shiʻi petitions highlighted their "grievances" vis-à-vis the Lebanese state, these "grievances" now became the pivot around which the pro-French Shiʻi faction evolved its political activities and which—more importantly even—it could use to legitimize its "confessional" leadership.

But even the much smaller group of Shiʻi nationalists used "grievances" as an instrument to mobilize other Shiʻis for the "cause" of Syrian unity. About a month after the Shiʻi meetings, Ibn Zayn al-Dīn al-ʻAmilī (a clear pseudonym) published an article in *al-Qabas* in which he rejected the Maronite patriarch's arguments concerning the integrity of Lebanon: "Jabal ʻAmil is not a part of Lebanon and has its specific territorial entity … It was part of Greater Syria." In another article, this time in *Lisān al-Ḥāl*, of 28 March, al-ʻAmilī declared: "In the first place I am an Arab, in the second a Syrian and in the third an ʻAmilī [Shiʻi]," effectively denouncing the resolutions of the two Shiʻi meetings because their participants, as he saw it, did not represent the Shiʻi community.[52]

Apart from Aḥmad ʻArif al-Zayn, the editor of *al-ʻIrfān*, none of the Shiʻi elites took part in the Coastal Conference of November 1933. Al-Zayn seized

this opportunity to intensify his activities among the Shi'i nationalists. Although some of the latter had no connection with al-Zayn, in French official reports the whole group of Shi'i nationalists appears as "*les partisans de Zein*." Ten days before the Coastal Conference, a group of young Shi'is, responding to an invitation from Ḥasan al-Amīn, a law student at Damascus University and son of al-Sayd Ḥusayn al-Amīn, who had good relations with al-Zayn, held a "Conference of Jabal 'Amil's youth" in the Syrian capital.[53] On 26 December Ḥasan al-Amīn went to Nabaṭiyya to circulate a petition "approuvant les revendications" of the Coastal Conference: "Nous, enfants de la communauté chiite, jeunes gens, étudiants, commercants et agriculteurs appuyons les résolutions du Congres du littoral, demandons la réalisation de l'unité syriènne et la sauvegarde des droits des chiites en particulier et des musulmans en general."[54] According to the French official report on al-Amīn's activities, only fourteen signatories responded to his petition, and not the at least one hundred he had meant to collect. Still, the petition was sent to Salīm Salām and the French authorities in South Lebanon, and published in the Arab press in 28 December, and even though the signatories are described as "partisans de Zein" and as a marginal group, al-Amīn's petition "a été assez vivement commenté dans les milieux chiites et sunnites de Saida."[55]

To what extent the parameters of Lebanon's political field had by now been redrawn and ways of "organisation, mobilisation, agitation and struggle" within it redefined is made clear by the following. While the pro-French *zu'ama* concentrated exclusively on the "grievances," Shi'i nationalists continued to combine the "Shi'i cause" with the "national cause," not only so as to be able to compete with the former but also to prevent themselves from being marginalized, as the French desired. At the end of 1933 this rivalry evoked a campaign of petitions involving "nationalists," on the one hand, and supporters of the established *zu'ama*, on the other.[56] Although, naturally, they followed their Sunni counterparts in the "struggle" against the separation of Lebanon from Syria, the Shi'i nationalists found themselves adopting the same "confessional" discourse as the *zu'ama* they were fighting, thus ironically contributing their share to the process of ethnicization of the Lebanese communities. For example, in a letter to the High Commissioner Niẓār, the son of *al-'Irfān*'s editor and the prominent Shi'i nationalist Aḥmad 'Arif al-Zayn, raised no issues other than complaints against high taxation and the poor state of roads and schools in the Shi'i areas. His "confessional" discourse prompted him to add that he placed his trust in the French, who at least had "the desire to treat the Shi'is equally whereas the Lebanese government has neglected them."[57]

By the end of 1933, the newspaper *al-Balāgh*, edited by Muḥammad al-Bāqir, the son of Muḥsin al-Amīn, one of the prominent *'ulama* of the Marj'iūn's area, was quickly becoming the mouthpiece for the Shi'i to voice their "gievances" and their cause. Al-Bāqir himself joined in presenting this "cause" when he submitted a "*requête*" to the High Commissioner, on 5 November.[58] In December al-Bāqir writes in *al-Balāgh* that the backwardness

and the feudal regime he saw as typical of the Shi'is stemmed from the discrimination on religious grounds the community had suffered during the Ottoman period. When the French Mandate was established and

> la politique a été obligée de proclamer le Grand Liban et de former un Gouvernement sur des bases confessionnelles, les chiites furent la seule communauté dont les droits ont été notablement méconnus dans les fonctions publiques. La raison en est que les chiites ne disposaient pas alors de fonctionnaires capables qui puissent assumer des charges publiques.[59]

But now when a new generation of educated people was emerging, the historical injustice could be corrected: "[N]ous avons le ferme espoir que le Mandat … est içi pour assurer la justice."[60] Prompted by al-Bāqir, Shi'i intellectuals came up with calculations showing that by the end of 1933 there were about 5,000 public posts out of which, proportionately to their demographic size, the Shi'is deserved to fill twenty percent, i.e., 1,000.[61]

For the following two years—i.e., until the crisis of 1936—the Lebanese government and the Mandatory authorites did little to correct the "historical injustice" set out by al-Bāqir. Instead, they tried to appease the *zu'ama* by granting them a free hand in enlarging their personal fortunes and reinforcing their clannish powers. The leading families of Jabal 'Amil, al-As'ad, al-Zayn, 'Usayrān, Khalīl and al-Faḍl, began establishing factions that best suited their clan rivalries whereby the "general interests" of the community were no more than a vehicle for them to promote their own "specific interests." An example of this was the salary of Munīr 'Usayrān, the President of the Ja'farī Court of Cassation who had been given this position in 1928. During 1934–1935, petitions submitted by Shi'is of the 'Usayrān faction requested the High Commissioner and the president of the republic to intervene and have 'Usayrān's salary of 140 Syro-Lebanese lires made equal to that of the president of the Ḥanafī Court of Cassation (the Supreme Sunni Shar'ī Court), namely 227 lires[62]. On 1 November 1935, Najīb 'Usayrān, one of the Shi'i deputies, was able to collect seventeen signatures from the Chamber "representing" the different communities. Because the salary for a goverment post was determined not only by rank but also by seniority, the deputies arbitrarily put Munīr 'Usayrān's seniority at more than ten years.[63]

In the Biqā' and Hermel the two families of Ḥaydar and Ḥamāda dominated Shi'i affairs. Because on the whole they appeared to subscribe to the notion of Lebanon's territorial integrity, the Ḥaydars benefited more easily from the policies by which the French and Lebanon's Christian elites sought to coopt the Shi'is. Ṣubḥī Ḥaydar's participation, while a member of government, in the 1928 Coastal Conference is a case in point. As we saw in Chapter Four, he was rapped on the knuckles for this—but not more than that—by President Dabbās because the Conference had called for the "disintegration" of Lebanon. During the 1920s Subḥi had "represented" the Shi'is of Biqā' in the Chamber. In the

early 1930s he took over for a short period as director of Finance and Agriculture, and then was appointed director of Public Education. In January 1934 the Ḥaydar family was able to advance its already powerful position among the Shi'is of the Biqā' when Ibrāhīm, a cousin of Ṣubḥī's was appointed deputy of the Chamber. From here on both Ṣubḥī and Ibrāhīm took care to have their relatives appointed in the different sections of the Lebanese administration and police. According to a Shi'i complaint against the two that reached the French authorities, the number of public posts taken up by members of the Ḥaydar family by January 1934 was more than 50, most of them in the Department of Public Education. Accordingly, the total of annual salaries paid out by the government to the members of the family amounted to over 30,000 Syro-Lebanese lires. In addition to this sum, "Le loyer de la maison de [Ṣubḥī Ḥaydar] est de 500 L.L.S. et est payé par le Service de l'Instructions Publiques. Une autre maison est loué à Beyrouth par les Haidars pour le montant de 225 L.L.S. par an." The petitioner asked:

> Comment les Haidars ont-ils perdu de vue que le Gouvernement ne saurait tolerér un pareil état de choses? Le Gouvernement peut-il accepter de sacrificer toute la communauté pour les Haidars et laisser Ibrahim et Sobhi Haidar désigner leurs parents aux fonctions de l'Etat et persécuter les autres familles?.[64]

Three years later, a "Shi'i youth organization" in the Biqā' claimed that on account of Subḥī and Ibrāhīm Ḥaydar, the number of "*fonctionnaires*" of the family had reached 170. They petitioned the High Clommissioner for his direct intervention so as to bring in other Shi'i young people: "Jusqu'à quand les Haidars continueront-ils à accaparer tous les droits de la communauté chiite?"[65]

When, in April 1934 the government decided to transfer Yūsuf Asad Ḥaydar from his post in the Census office in Beirut to a new position in Ba'lbak, this evoked the protest of Ṣabrī Ḥamāda, the Shi'i Deputy from the Hermel whose family were rivals of the Ḥaydars in the Biqā'. Mobilizing Iliyās Skāf, the Greek Catholic deputy of Zaḥla, Ḥamāda brought the case of Yūsuf Ḥaydar before the Chamber to "déclencher une campagne contre le Gouvernement pour protester contre pareille mesure" that would increase the number of Ḥaydars within the administration of the Biqā'. However, checking out the case of Yūsuf Ḥaydar, one of the French officials in the Biqā' claimed that between 1926 and 1932 most of the important posts in the Hermel and Zaḥla had been occupied by the "men" of Ḥamāda and Skāf:

> Sans les combinations et la politique des divers ministères qui se sont succédés dans l'ancien regime (1926–1932), M.M. Hamada et Skaff n'auraient pas pu agir de sorte que presque tous les postes de Zahle et de Hermel ont été pourvus par des fonctionnaires qui leur sont redevables. Ayant fini de pourvoir les postes de Zahle et de Hermel de fonctionnaires dociles, le deux deputés se sont retournés vers Baalbek."[66]

Like other Shi'i *zu'ama* of Jabal 'Amil, Ṣabrī Ḥamāda and Ibrāhīm Ḥaydar showed themselves eager defenders of the "interests" of the Shi'i community in

the Lebanese Chamber and willingly set aside their rivalry if this served their purpose. In debates they frequently seized the opportunity to press for the "Shi'i quota" within the Lebanese adminstration. For example, when the government decided to reorganize the notarial services of Beirut—which at the end of 1935 were under the supervision of a Shi'i director—into four sections with four directors from different communities, Ṣabrī Ḥamāda was quick to react angrily during the debate in the Chamber on 23 December 1935:

> M. Hamada considère cette intiative comme une atteinte aux droits de sa communauté, et en profite pour réclamer en faveur des ses coreligionnaires une répartition plus équitable des fonctions publiques … M. Ibrahim Haidar s'associe pleinement aux paroles de son collegue.[67]

Dissatisfaction in the South

In March 1936, Shi'i nationalist groups submitted at least three petitions to the High Commissioner which all called for "Syrian unity" and declared Shi'i support for the Coastal Conference.[68] In April these Shi'i elements intensified their nationalist activities in protest against the "harsh measures" with which the French authorities had suppressed the peasant "uprising" in the Bent Jbayl area. Some of them joined Syrian and Lebanese Arab nationalists in demonstrations in support of the peasant revolt that had broken out in Palestine. At the beginning of July the Shi'i nationalists led by Aḥmad 'Arif al-Zayn, Aḥmad Riḍā, and Mūsā al-Zayn Sharāra, united with Sunni and Christian nationalists again to underscore "Syrian unity" in a conference in Sidon.[69] Ten days after this conference, the High Commission reported skeptically:

> Seuls quelques jeunes gens ayant, pour la plupart, fait leurs études à Damas, seraient acquis à l'unité syrienne dont ils escompteraient des benefices immédiats, notamment des emplois administratives … Au contraire, les éléments conservateurs et singulièrement les chefs religieux chiites seraient foncièrement hostiles à l'intégration dans l'Etat de la Syrie.[70]

Actually it was only in March that the powerful Shi'i *'ulama* had confirmed their loyality to Lebanon: "We, the '*ulama* representing the Shi'i community in south Lebanon … hope that your excellency will remember [the community] in the future Franco-Lebanese Treaty" which they expected to grant Lebanon the same independence as had been given to Syria.[71] In August 1936, when the Sunni nationalist elites were trying to win the Shi'is over for Syrian unity, Meyrier, the general delegate of the High Commissioner, remained reassuring:

> Certes les derniers événements survenus dans le Liban Sud, à Saida comme à Mardjayoun ou à Bent Jebail ont montré que parmi les perturbateurs se trouvaient des éléments chiites gagnés à la mystique [sic] de l'unité syrienne, voire même de l'unité arabe. Mais ces éléments sont fort peu nombreux. Ils se red-

> uisent à quelques individus, tous jeunes, pour la plupart anciens élèves des écoles de Damas à qui le rattachement à la Syrie permettrait la réalisation d'ambitions personnelles qui, au Liban, sont condamnées à rester sous le boisseau.[72]

For Meyrier it was the *'ulama,* as the most powerful element among the Shi'i elites and who were "entièrement acquis à la cause de l'intégrité et l'indépendance libanaises," who determined the political stance of the feudal strata of the *zu'ama.* Ignoring the factionalism that divided the *'ulama,* Meyrier took the position of Sayid Ḥusayn Mughanniyya, "the principal religious chief," as being representative of the Shi'i elites who controlled the peasantry which "marche d'instinct et aussi de coeur avec ses chefs spirituels et temporels."[73]

Only when the press reported that Aḥmad al-As'ad, the powerful *za'īm* of Jabal 'Amil, had declared his support for unity with Syria and accepted the resolutions of the National Muslim Conference of 23 October, did French and Lebanese officials become somewhat apprehensive. Although a powerful leader, Sheikh Aḥmad al-As'ad had never held any public position either in government or parliament, working rather through the clients he patronized among the Shi'i leaders. His position was close to the nationalist views Sheikhs Aḥmad 'Arif al-Zayn, Aḥmad Riḍā and Sulaymān Ḍāhir had expressed during the Coastal Conference of 1936. In a "manifesto" published on 27 October in *al-Balāgh*, and addressed mainly to the inhabitants of Jabal 'Amil, al-As'ad first of all distanced himself from the "déclarations que certains journaux m'ont attribuées et qui sont contraires à la présente déclaration" and continued by saying that he represented his own community in its struggle for equality in Lebanon:

> J'ai demandé, en votre nom, la réalisation de nos droits méconnus et la réalisation de l'indépendance et de la liberté du pays. Je suis à Beyrouth depuis une semaine. J'ai vu leurs Exllences le haut-commissaire et le président de la Republique libanaise. Je leur ai demandé de bien vouloir traiter avec équité le Djebel Amel dont la population atteint le quart environ de la population totale.[74]

Apart from small groups of intellectuals, most of the Shi'i elites adopted roughly the same attitude, i.e., while manifesting their loyality to the Lebanese entity they continued to press "demands" for equality. If this was one way to vindicate their leadership, they found additional "justification" for their attitude in the annexes to the Franco-Lebanese treaty. Najīb 'Usayrān, who presided over the parliamentary session of 20 November, six days after the approval of the treaty by the Lebanese government neatly illustrates this:

> Nous venons de conclure un traité en tout point semblable à celui que la Syrie a conclu avec la France … Tandis que les syriens recervaient leur délégation avec joie …, cetrains intéressés ont voulu accompagner des troubles la signature de notre traité … Ils … ont faussé l'interprétation d'un texte qui garantissait clairement les droits de toutes les confessions dont se compose ce pays, sans accorder à aucune d'elles la moindre préférence ni le moindre privilèges.[75]

As by now most of Lebanon's elites, including the Sunnis, had decided to play along and accept the new circumstances created by the reinstitutionalization, in 1936, of the confessional "regime," and voices demanding unity with Syria had become all but muted among Lebanese "nationalists," the Shi'i *zu'ama* and *'ulama* actively joined the race for a "fair" distribution of the political and administrative posts. For many of them, "loyality" to France and the Lebanese republic served as their entry ticket, as Sheikh Ḥasan Ṣādiq, the Shi'i *mufti* of Sidon, put it in December of 1936: "Parmi les différentes parties de la population libanaise il n'existe pas de plus devouée à la France que la communauté chiite." But this was only an introduction to his claim that since the 1932 census the Shi'is had become the second largest community after the Maronites, and now accounted for a quarter of the total population. In other words, they deserved 25 percent of all available posts and at least in parliament and in government their share ought to equal that of the Sunnis.[76] When the government increased the number of Shi'i magistrates in April 1937, Munīr 'Usayrān, as president of the Ja'farī Court of Cassation, expressed his gratitude to the High Commissioner for this increase, but duly added that "l'augmentation accordée ne satisfait pas ses collègues ni lui même, ces derniers n'ayant pas encore été mis, en fait, sur un pied d'égalité avec les juridictions similaires sunnites."[77]

At the end of April, Muḥammad al-Bāqir, *al-Balāgh*'s editor, in a petition to the High Commissioner claimed he had collected 10,000 signatures which he said entitled him to represent the Shi'is. Moreover, there was his ancestry: "Attendu que je suis le réprésentant de cette communauté en ma qualité de fils du plus grand leader spirituel chiite en Orient [Mirza al-Bāqir]." He then continued: "Que les deux communautés maronite et sunnite se partagent les fonctions de l'Etat, les autres communautés le font proportionnellement sauf la notre, qui, d'après le dernier recensement se place au troisième rang mais qu'en fait elle est la seconde." To back up his arguments he meticulously listed the number of all office-holders of each community in the various branches of the state apparatus, parliament, government and administration.[78] Again writing to the High Commissioner in May, al-Bāqir became more straightforward when, after briefly mentioning the general "grievances" of the community, he highlighted the merits of his own family, "une très vieille famille dont le premier ancestre, l'Emam Mohamed Baker, [etait] un petit fils du prophète." His father was an imam "à l'esprit moderne dont la réputation était mondiale" (the *Encyclopedia Brittanica* had devoted several pages to him). There then followed a record of his own political "missions" as representative of the Shi'is from the Ottoman period to his membership of the municipal council in 1934, and mention of the fact that he had been editing *al-Balāgh* since 1913. When pointing out that he was thus well-equipped to assume important posts within the state apparatus, al-Bāqir believed above all that the community needed his reformist approach.[79]

In this attempt to persuade the High Commissioner that now was the time to encourage "reformist" Shi'is, al-Bāqir was countering the growing criticism young Shi'is were leveling at the Shi'i *zu'ama* for their failure to safeguard the

"interests" of the community ever since the constitution had been restored in January 1937. Of course, the *zu'ama* themselves had aroused expectations among many Shi'is that the new "regime" would guarantee each community its "rights," but the ascent of two Sunnis, Khayr al-Dīn al-Aḥdab and Khālid Shihāb, to the presidency of the government and the parliament respectively, were a clear sign to the contrary. According to 'Awaḍ, that the two Sunni *zu'ama* had been able to take over the two presidencies had everything to do with the competition between Eddé and al-Khuri who each tried to win over the Sunni elites by manipulating their different factions. The long and short of this was that actually there were just two communities controlling the republic: "There are two confessions [but] there is no confessionalism."[80] During the campaign for the legislative Chamber elections in October, Shi'i *'ulama* and other leading figures speeded up their actions against the "unjustifiable" way the authorities treated the Shi'is. While jobs for the Ḥaydar family were still high on the agenda of young Shi'is,[81] Sayid Muḥammad Faḍlalla, whom the High Commissioner described as the religious chief of Jabal 'Amil's *'ulama,* together with Muhammad al-As'ad, met de Martel on 16 October, i.e., eight days before the elections, to protest against "the difficult economic situation of Jabal 'Amil."[82]

Neither the new government presided over by al-Aḥdab, nor the new Chamber, presided over by Petro Ṭrad, acted in any way that could satisfy the seven Shi'i deputies of South Lebanon, viz., Aḥmad al-As'ad, Yūsuf al-Zayn, 'Alī 'Abdalla, Najīb 'Usayrān, Bahīj al-Faḍl, Kāzim al-Khalīl and Rashīd Bayḍūn. Bayḍūn asked de Martel to personally intervene to help correct the situation of the Shi'i community "qui, quoique faisant partie de la majorité, n'est pas représentée dans les fonctions même autant que les minorités."[83] Simultaneously, Bayḍūn sent a petition to the League of Nations denouncing the low number of Shi'is in the Lebanese administration.[84] On 14 December Bayḍūn and al-Khalīl convinced the other Shi'i deputies that they should start boycotting the Chamber's sessions.[85] At the opening of the Chamber's session the following day, they first expressed their utter frustration with the government's "neglect" of Shi'i demands for "equality" and then left the Chamber in protest, saying they meant to disrupt the "travaux de l'assembleé, tant que leurs revendications ne seraient pas considérées par le Gouvernement."[86] That same day, Bayḍūn got thirty-six Shi'i merchants in Beirut to sign a petition in support of their boycott.[87] The behavior of the seven deputies generated a wave of solidarity among the Shi'is, who petitioned the High Commissioner seconding the deputies' demands "relative à la sauvegarde des ses droits aux fonctions et aux projet d'intérêt public."[88]

A report of the Sûreté Générale saw the boycott as solely motivated by the deputies' personal considerations: "Les deputés chiites en ont profité pour faire des revendications d'ordre général intéressant leur communauté." The moment the government failed to respond to their personal demands, they started waving the banner of the community's "grievances" to justify their boycott. For

example, Kāẓim al-Khalīl "avait demandé un poste à la justice pour son beau-frère Selim Haidar" which the government had ignored.[89] The French adviser in South Lebanon meanwhile observed a change in the politics of the Shi'is with the entry into the Chamber, of Bayḍūn and al-Khalīl, as he divided the seven Shi'i deputies into three categories:

> D'abord, ceux qui disposent d'une clientèle personnelle importante et font figure de chefs quasi-feodaux. C'est le cas de Ahmed El Assad et de Youssef Zein, auxquels il convient d'ajouter Ali Abdalla, petit notable de village et satellite de Assad. Ceux-ci, pour maintenir leur prestige et l'accroitre si possible, doivent se poser en defendeurs du petit peuple et en serviteurs devoués et attentifs de la cause publique. La deuxième categorie comprend Nejib Osseiran et Bahige El Fadl, personnages paisibles, attachés au Gouvernement quelqu'il soit, sans grande influence, mais jouissant de la considération de leurs compatriotes en raison de leur caractère et de leur situation de fortune … Les deux derniers, Rachid Beydoun et Kazem Khalil, représentent l'élément jeune, actif, évolué. Çe sont les veritable animateurs du mouvement. Rachid Beydoun habite Beyrouth. Peu connu au Djebel Amel, il doit son siège de deputé à un concours heureux de circonstances. Kazem Khalil, de la ville de Tyre, est licencié en droits de Damas … Ils ont besoin de se faire un nom de se créer une popularité.[90]

The French adviser warned the authorities that the permanent dissatisfaction in the south, which had only grown deeper in 1937 owing to the low tobacco prices as they had been fixed by the *régie*, the French Concessionary company, would lead to violent acts, "susceptiples de dégénérer en mouvement politique de nature à faciliter les entreprises des éléments attachés a l'unité syrienne et, dans un avenir plus ou moins éloigné, à mettre en peril l'integrité libanaise." The attitude of the Shi'i deputies, and the support the Sunni elites were giving to the Shi'i demands during their boycott, the French adviser saw as "un avertissement qui ne doit pas être négligé."[91]

Confessionalism Prevails

January 1937 to March 1938 was a period of successive crises, with al-Aḥdab forming no less than five different cabinets. Growing economic hardship hit again especially hard the poor sectors of the population, rural as well as urban. Between September 1937 and early 1938, strikes erupted in many parts of Lebanon, not least in the Shi'i areas.[92] Al-Aḥdab had succeeded in alienating the Shi'i elites of Jabal 'Amil by March 1937, when it became clear that the government favored members and clients of the Ḥaydar family in handing out jobs in the various political and administrative institutions.[93] It was during al-Aḥdab's ministries that the Sunni paramilitary organization of al-Najāda was founded, on 10 October 1937, in the wake of the creation, on 21 November 1936, of the Maronite paramilitary group of al-Katā'ib. The activities of, first, al-

Katā'ib during the summer and then also al-Najāda, in the autumn of 1937, added to the difficulties al-Aḥdab's government was facing and it therefore decided to dissolve both of them in November.[94] Although the Shi'i elites were reluctant to take part in the confrontation between the two organizations, the heightened "confessional" atmosphere the situation helped create prompted the Shi'is to intensify their demands for "equality." When al-Aḥdab was succeeded in the premiership by two other Sunnis, Khālid Shihāb on 21 March 1938 and 'Abdalla al-Yāfī on 1 November 1938, this added fuel to the flames, especially as the presidency of the Chamber continued to be closed before the Shi'is, despite the fact that their community, as their leaders continued to insist, had become the second largest after the Maronites.[95] When, on 7 January 1939, de Martel was replaced as High Commissioner by Gabriel Puaux, Bayḍūn, as ever the most active of the seven Shi'i deputies, renewed his campaign against the government's "discrimination" of the Shi'is. In a petition of 6 January, Bayḍūn explained to the new High Commissioner how French Mandatory rule had raised hopes among the Shi'is that they would be seeing the end of the "feudalism" that had been their legacy since Ottoman times. But: "Malhereusement jusqu'au moment actuel les … réformes ne sont pas realisées." The Shi'i areas of Jabal 'Amil and Biqā' continued to suffer "les ténèbres de l'ignorance et dans un état pire que celui de l'avant guerre … Les fonctions et les crédits sont répartis entre toutes les communautés libanaises saufe la communauté chiite." Listing the many "grievances" the Shi'is harbored, Bayḍūn quoted the Maronite patriarch who in a meeting with Premier al-Yāfī allegedly had said:

> La justice est indispensable dans la répartition des fonctions et des charges au Liban, la communauté chiite est la seule communauté libanaise négligée à ce point de vue. Il faut lui donner sa part et lui restituer ses droits.[96]

To show his credentials as a "non-confessional" patriot, Bayḍūn added: "Nous sommes pas partisans du principe de la communauté, nous sommes les premiers à crier que le libanais doit tre libanais avant tout, malgré toutes communautés, toutes tendences."[97]

Still, later, in July, Bayḍūn invited a group of Shi'is to his home in Beirut in protest against the municipality which had prohibited a number of Shi'i apprentices from working in the city.[98] It is only one of many indications that since the reinstitutionalization of the "confessional" regime in 1936, the elites seemed gradually to have resigned themslves to the reality this entailed, even more so than in the previous period of the Mandate. In a survey Rondot gives of people attacking the "confessional" regime since 1926, one observes that some of them were simultaneously playing the "confessional" game. Ironically, even the "Phalanges Libanaises … met la suppression du confessionalisme au nombre des ses objectifs." After 1936 Rondot finds that the non-confessional camp indeed became somewhat louder: "La vague de 'confessionalisme' qui suit, dans l'hiver 1936–1937 la publication de l'annexe 6, entraîne de vives réactions dans la presse." Two of the more typical quotations he brings from the press are:

"Dans quel autre pays du monde peut-on voir la religion à la base de l'adminstration, de la politique et même de l'unité de l'état ?" and "La Carthage qu'il faut absolument détruire, ç'est la politique confessionnelle."[99]

Very much aware of the problems that continuation of the "confessional" regime would saddle the country with in the future, Yūsuf al-Sawdā, one of the founders of Lebanism—to recall Lebanese nationalism that sought to base its origin on the Phoenician myth and was traditionally against the Arab-Muslim participation— invited, on 18 March 1938, a group of Christian and Muslim leaders to his home to set out their ideas of what the relations ought to be among the different communities in an "independent Lebanon." According to al-Sawdā, the outcome was a "non-confessional" program, in the form of a "National Pact" signed by thirty of the participants. There were three central ideas: full independence of the "Lebanese entity" (*al-kayān al-Lubnānī*) vis-à-vis the other Arab countries; safeguarding equality among all Lebanese, and recognition of Arabic as the country's only official language.[100]

A similar event took place on 27 November 1938, when a group of Christian intellectuals, led by Gabriel Menassa and George 'Aql, held a "National Democratic Conference" at which also were present 'Adil 'Usayrān, one of the outstanding Shi'i *zu'ama*, and Rafiq Barrāj, a well-known Sunni intellectual. In the 13-page report which contains the conference's resolutions, Menassa and 'Aql, significantly, first give a historical survey of what they called "the unjustifiable intervention" of the French in the democratic process in Lebanon. They then presented the ideas that had come out of the conference as to the reforms that needed to be taken in order to "salvage" the poor economic and political conditions prevailing in Lebanon. The mainstay of the economic policy they proposed was to encourage productivity through equal allocation of resources among the different parts of the country. This called for a new administrative apparatus membership of which ought to be based solely on merit and no longer on "confessional" appointment. The president of the Republic should be elected directly by the people, and the system of appointing (a certain number of) deputies should also be abolished. A Cabinet of three to four technocrats needed to be made up of members from outside the Chamber so as to prevent political deals among the elites.[101] Like the National Pact group of al-Sawdā, the National Conference of Menassa and 'Aql stopped short of calling for the abolition of the existing system whereby high offices of the state were distributed among the "representatives" of the various communities. Although both stressed the importance of building a nation in which all Lebanese would be equal, they tip-toed around such controversial aspects as what exactly would be the nature of this "Lebanese nation," for the simple reason that for the majority of the Christian elites and intellectuals nationalism meant Lebanism and not Arabism.

Still, both groups remained marginal in a political field largely dominated by forces riding the new wave of confessionalism. While al-Sawdā was able to mobilize some of Beirut's Sunni elites, among the established Shi'i elites there

were many who feared that a Sunni-Maronite power distribution following al-Aḥdab's cabinet could set a precedent for the future of the country. Groups of Shi'i *'ulama* and leaders from outside the established elites began to seek new ways and platforms to continue the struggle for more civil rights. Thus, in late March, 'Alī Bazzī, of Bent Jbayl, and Sheikhs Aḥmad Riḍā and Sulaymān Ḍāhir brought together a group of Shi'is to establish an "independent party" that was to stand up for Shi'i rights, given the failure of the established elites in the parliament and the administration to do so. One week later, on 2 April, al-Sawdā, accompanied by Taqiy al-Dīn al-Ṣulḥ and two other colleagues, visited Nāẓim al-Khalīl, brother of Kāẓim, the Shi'i deputy, at his Tyre home where they met other Shi'i, Christian and Sunni leaders. The idea was to establish a branch of al-Sawdā's party in the area as many Shi'is in south Lebanon seemed to have lost all hope of any improvement in their situation.[102] But neither the independent "confessional" party of Bazzī, Riḍā and Ḍāhir, nor the "national" party of al-Sawdā could shake the dominance of the established Shi'i elites, powerfully entrenched as they were in the same state institutions that had fostered their rise.

Finally, to what extent the return to "confessionalism" as ushered in by the French in 1936 meant that the elites of all Lebanon's communities turned to exploiting real or even invented "grievances" is exemplified by the behavior of the Greek Catholic and Greek Orthodox leaders. Unlike the Shi'is, the elites of both these communities had for more than two centuries benefited from the economic and cultural penetration by the West into the Middle East. During the 1920s merchants and intellectuals belonging to the two communities found easier access to the political and administrative institution of the state than their Shi'i, Druze or Sunni counterparts. But here, too, the "confessional" representatives began complaining after 1936 of the "discrimination" against their correligionists when it came to government jobs. On 6 April 1937, Maximos Ṣāygh, the Greek Catholic archbishop, protested that "[d]ans un pays comme le nôtre où un traité Franco-Libanais et une constitution prévoient et exigent que les fonctions publiques soient répartiés avec équité et justice," the Greek Catholics could not tolerate the disproportional distribution of posts which showed a clear bias against their community.[103] One of Ṣāygh's many complaints indirectly showed how the "confessional" regime of 1936 had made it impossible for "non-confessional" forces to be successful in halting "la vague de confessionalisme." If, as Ṣāygh observed, "[p]lusieurs voix se sont élevées, ces derniers temps, en faveur d'une répartition proportionnelle dans fonctions publiques entre les différentes communautés," the government had justified its "confessional" distribution of posts on the pretext that "il devenait impossible de gouverner sans une séparation definitive entre le spirituel et le temporel." Now Ṣāygh found that even though he supported an appointments policy based only on a person's merit, he had to contradict his "vérités" and present a complaint

> au nom de la communauté et en faveur d'une répartition confessionnelle … précisement parce que ces vérités ont été méconnus et que le système de nomination et d'avancement suivi par le gouvernement ne s'est inspiré ni du souci de la compétence individuelle ni de la représentation confessionnelle.[104]

Ṣāygh's solution for a fair appointments policy combined clan and confessional elements:

> La politique de clan qui a présidé jusqu'à présent à tous les mouvements judiciares ou administratifs, nous a donné le spectacle de trop d'injustices pour ne pas élever notre voix en faveur d'un moindre mal qui d'ailleurs cadre parfaitement avec l'esprit de nos institutions politique actuelles.[105]

Ṣāygh did not accept the statistics the government had provided about the proportional distribution of state posts among the communities, as "ces statistiques ne donnent aucune garantie de sincérité."[106]

Precisely to illustrate the "discrimination" their community, too, suffered, the archbishop and other "representatives" of the Greek Orthodox regularly included in their complaints statistical tables they themselves had produced.[107] When other communal "representatives" followed suit, al-Aḥdab's first 1937 Cabinet countered by publisheding "official" statistics of the distribution of posts. The arrival in Beirut of the new High Commissioner, Gabriel Puaux, in January 1939, some Lebanese leaders thought, could mean the turning of a new leaf, offering hope that the "mistakes" of the relatively long regime of de Martel would be corrected. Soon after, Bshara al-Khuri suggested in the Chamber that the deputies publish a declaration expressing their confidence in France as the "defender" of the Lebanese republic, which they all accepted.[108] One senses that up to the outbreak of the second world war, the established Lebanese elites simply decided to play a waiting game before resuming their "confessional" demands for their "fair" share in the state apparatus. However, on 1 September Hitler walked his troops into Poland, and three weeks later, declaring a state of emergency, Puaux suspended the Constitution and dispersed both the Cabinet and the Chamber. Decree No. 246/LR retained the presidency of Eddé, but placed full executive powers in the hands of a secretary of state assisted by a French adviser and a council of senior officials.[109] Simultaneously, Puaux circulated an outline of how he intended to reform the economy and administration. According to the American consul, Puaux stressed that for his reforms to be successful, it was "more than ever important that delays be avoided and that political jealousies and party strife be forgotten." That the appointment of 'Abdalla Bayhum as secretary of state "ha[d] been welcomed by Moslems and Christians alike, with the exception of President Eddé himself and a few of his more ardent supporters," seemed to be a step in that direction.[110]

CHAPTER SEVEN

TOWARD INDEPENDENCE

> Most of us do not want to or need to go back to the 1880s to explain what was troubling the world in the 1980s or 1990s. And yet the world of the late twentieth century is still shaped by the bourgeois century, and in particular by the Age of Empire … Shaped in the literal sense … The last important statesmen or national leaders who had been adults in 1914 died in the 1970s … But more significantly, today's world was shaped by what one might call the historical landscape left behind by the Age of Empire and its collapse.
>
> Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire, 1875–1914*, p. 336.

Enter the British

The new administration put in place by Puaux' regime of "reform" was to be provisional and, as the High Commissioner himself phrased it, "will be free from partisanship and political intrigue."[1] It did not take long for the Maronite Patriarchate to remind Puaux of the importance of "la part qui doit revenir aux Maronites … à la confidance des Autorités," when it came to maintaining the status quo in Lebanon, i.e., of the "confessional" balance of power. This meant, in particular, that "étant donné que le Sécrétaire Général est musulman, la Direction de l'intérieur ne peut étre confiée qu'aux Maronites."[2]

Quite soon Puaux also received four petitions from Lebanese notables in Beirut expressing thanks for Puaux' attempt to cut back on state expenditure and for the appointment of 'Abdalla Bayhum as secretary of state. As the text of all four petitions was identical they may well have had one and the same source. The petitions hoped for an end to "*al-maḥsūbiyya* (the patron-client system) and the spirit of anarchy which had prevailed among the representatives of the people, who had shown no respect for the public interest by introducing into the government apparatus a great number of unqualified civil servants and officials." The majority of the petitioners were Sunnis from Beirut for whom 'Abdalla Bayhum's appointment as secretary of state equalled that of *ra'īs al-dawla* (head of state) in significance.[3]

Economic measures Puaux' introduced were intended to get control of the major industries, stabilize prices and secure an adequate supply of foodstuffs for

the population. None of these moves did much to ease the economic hardship the war was causing in Syria and Lebanon but news of military developments in Europe held back *la vague de confessionalisme* among the Lebanese elites. In June 1940 France fell to the Germans, with Marshal Petain's request for an armistice inaugurating the Vichy government. Because he did not see eye to eye with Vichy, Puaux was recalled in November, to be replaced, on 16 December, by General Henri Dentz, a loyal Vichy follower. Meanwhile, early January 1941 saw the first demonstrations against food shortages in Damascus and Allepo which in March spread to Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon, and which Dentz attempted, without success, to suppress by force. Dentz then forced President Eddé and his secretary of state to resign, replacing them with a new administration of a head of state and four under-secretaries. Alfred Naqqāsh, a Maronite judge and writer, became the new head of state—probably through the influence of the Jesuits, as Bshara al-Khuri claims. Naqqāsh was supported by Aḥmad al-Dā'ūq, a leading Sunni figure, as prime minister, Philipe Khuri, a young Greek Catholic judge, as minister of Education, and Fū'ād 'Usayrān, a Shi'i doctor, as minister of Health and Economics.[4]

By March, the British army in the Levant were preparing for military intervention in Syria and Lebanon in order to remove the Vichy administration and prevent both from being occupied by Germany. The British coordinated their actions with General Charles de Gaulle and his representative in the Levant, George Catroux, a relationship that would be fraught with friction. On 19 March, British military headquarter in Cairo imposed a full economic blockade on Syria and Lebanon.[5] By the end of the month sections of the Syrian and Lebanese urban populations there were suffering growing food shortages. For the British consul, it was these economic and political factors that explained Dentz' move to appoint the new administration: "[A] riot took place in Beirut on April 1st after a crowd of Moslem women had demonstrated before the Municipality as a result of shortage of native bread; there was one death and several injuries." How grave the situation had become for the Lebanese could be gauged from the fact that the Maronite Katā'ib (*Phalanges Lebanaises)* and the Sunni Najāda "had joined forces … with the encouragement of the Jesuits and the Lebanese President."[6]

Through their common action, the Katā'ib and the Najāda succeeded in mobilizing Christian as well as Muslim inhabitants in protest against the food shortages and "French policy." The strike that began on 1 April turned two days later into violent demonstrations. Describing the anti-French atmosphere, which clearly had taken it by surprise, the Sûretê Générale mentions rumors circulating in Beirut to the effect that the French authorities had been responsible for the "fiasco" of the bread shortages because they had been shipping food products from Lebanon and Syria to France.[7] The Lebanese officials responsible for food supplies were accused of being *marionnettes* in the hand of the High Commission, while inhabitants of the Sunni al-Basṭa quarter

expressed pro-German sentiments: "Nous ne voulons ni Monsieur, ni Mister, nous voulons Abouna Hitler."[8] Moreover, Luis Bāz, of the Katā'ib, and Jamīl Makkāwī, of the Najāda, organized a gathering of hundreds of Christians and Muslims to protest against French policy in Lebanon.[9]

In addition to Katā'ib-Najāda cooperation, a joint committee of Christian and Muslim students, formed to deal with the bread crisis, published a leaflet on 11 April, deploring the weakness of the "nation," and the negligence of the authorities that was at the bottom of it. Only through "national consciousness" could Lebanon reach a point where other nations and states would accept "us as a nation." Significantly, as so often when Christians and Muslims acted together, they did not qualify "nation" further as either Lebanese or Arab.[10] Not surprisingly, the changing political tide seemed to augur well for those political parties and organizations who from 1933 to 1936 had stood for Syrianism or Arabism, i.e., unity among Christians and Muslims in Lebanon. In addition to the Syrian Popular Party (PPS), the League of National Action (LNA) stepped up its "non-confessional" activities. Led by the Druze intellectual 'Alī Nāṣir al-Dīn, the LNA gained some success when it mobilized Christians and Muslims in Beirut against the "harsh" measures the French had taken to quell the "hunger demonstrations." The Sûreté Générale followed closely the activities of Nāṣir al-Dīn, who stressed that only "non-confessional" Arab nationalism could wrest Lebanon from the French and who saw the "bread crisis" as a "catalyst" for uniting all Lebanese under the banner of "Arab-nationalism." Nāṣir al-Dīn called upon Christian and Muslim figures such as Anīs al-Sghayr, As'ad Harīz, Aḥmad al-Dā'ūq, Qusṭanṭīn Yannī, Muḥammad 'Alī Bayhum and others to establish what he called a "National Committee of Beirut" to deal with the crisis thrown up by the "food shortage."[11]

Frustration among the Druzes

On the other hand, in al-Shūf the crisis threatened to provoke "confessional" conflict between Druzes and Christians. The Sûreté Générale's reports quoted "Druze frustration" at having been excluded from the new administration established by Dentz, but as they relied on Christian informers, the resulting picture is obviously one-sided:

> Des agitateurs, des franchophobes travaillent nuit et jour à mettre dans la tête des gens simples et crédules l'idée que la France nous arrache notre blé … Parmi ces agitateurs deux prototypes sont à signalers: le nommé Ahmad Salman Abou Chacra, ex-chasseur libanais resilié du service pour battu un officier, et le nommé Hossein Mahmoud Abou Chacra qui à prit part à la Révolution de 1925 [The two were going from village to village in al-Shuf and Biqa',] éxécutant leur propagande anti-mandataire poussant les … villageois a l'insurrection.[12]

Druze agitation in al-Shūf in April 1941 was undoubtedly real, the culmination of the frustration the Druze elites and intellectuals had felt ever since the 1920s when their role in political life had become marginal, only to pick up again in the second half of the 1940s.

On 1 August 1940, the then adviser to the Lebanese secretary of state, E. Schoffler, sent Puaux a report he had asked Pierre Brat, *délégué-adjoint* of the High Commissioner to the Lebanese state, to submit on the political situation in the Druze area of al-Shūf.[13] Its tone typical of the way France's Mandatory officials, its so-called "experts," approached the region, Brat's report may serve as another example of the kind of "information" the French were basing their policies on. In his introduction, Brat writes:

> Dans les délicates circonstances du moment, la question des Druzes du Chouf retient à juste titre l'attention des autorités responsables. De l'attitude de cette communauté, dont on connait le penchant pour l'action violente menée en secret, dépend dans une mesure importante le maintien de la sécurité au Liban.[14]

The Druze elites could be divided into two clans or factions; the Yazbakī and the Junblāṭī, who had been leading the Druzes for the last two centuries of Ottoman period. The Yazbakī faction comprised the families ʿImād of Bārūk, ʿAbd al-Malik of Btātir, and Talḥūq of ʿAlay, while the Junblāṭī comprised the families Junblāṭ of Mukhtāra and Abu Nakad of ʿBay, and such second-rank families as ʿĪd of ʿAyn Zḥalta. The *amīrs* of Arslān of Shūaifāt were placed "[*à*] *l'écart de ces deux clans."* Although traditionally the Junblāṭs favored the British, from 1920 they had shifted their support to the French. Until the Mandate, two chiefs had led the Junblāṭs, Fūʾād, the husband of Naẓīra (who would lead the faction until the end of the Mandate), and ʿAlī, father of Ḥikmat (who was to serve in several Lebanese governments). Referring to *sit* (Madame) Naẓīra, Brat claims:

> On a beacoup exagéré le rôle et l'influence de Mme Jounblatt. Ses sentiments francophiles ne sont pas en cause … Mme Jounblatt compte un certain nombre de partisans, mais encore d'avantage d'adversaires surtout chez les notables qui la critiquent pour la place qu'elle s'arroge et la jalousant pour les attentions dont elle est l'objet.[15]

Although women had played a part in the history of the community, Druze adherence to tradition meant that Naẓīra had to limit her activities to local politics. Her son Kamāl, who after 1947 became one of the leading figures of the Lebanese elites, Brat described as "[un] jeune homme d'une vingtaine d'années, ètudiant en droit à Beyrouth, semble avoir peu du goût pour la politique et observe une attitude effacé." Mme. Naẓīra herself apparently was preventing her son and Ḥikmat from leading the Junblāṭ faction, i.e., the Mukhtāra branch. The Junblāṭ family had another branch in Bramiya near Sidon, led by Rashīd and ʿIzzat, who "détestent cordialement Mme. Nazira."[16]

While Brat ranked the Junblāṭ leaders among the *francophiles,* he defined the Arslān family as problematic, primarily because of two of its members, Shakīb and ʻAdil Arslān. The Arslān family had six *amīrs*: (1) Sāmī, who abstained from politics; (2) Tawfīq, mainly preoccupied with retaining his post in the administration and looking after his "personal interests" and those of his son, Majīd, who in the late 1930s became the most active Arslān leader in Lebanese politics; (3) Amīn, uncle of Tawfīq, an Arab-nationalist and "publiciste violemment francophobe"; (4) Amīn Muṣṭafā, "fatigué à tous égards, est devenu inoffensif"; (5) Shakīb, son of Maḥmud, who before the first world war had been the governor of al-Shūf. Shakīb had enjoyed good relations with the Ottomans and the Germans, but since the establishment of the Mandate had made his home in Europe, preaching pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism and through his ideas and prestige exerting great influence among the Druzes; (6) ʻAdil, who like his brother Shakīb had lived abroad, and propagated the same cause. He had returned to Lebanon the year before (1939). According to Brat, the Arslān faction had become the most powerful among the Druze thanks to its active leaders, although Naẓīra preserved strong influence in the south of al-Shūf.[17]

Each Druze faction, Brat continued, "dispose d'une clièntele fidèle et en quelque sorte permanente, recrutés surtout parmi le petit peuple, paysans attachés de père en fils à leur seigneurs et qui reçoivent aide et protection." In each Druze village all small and secondary families had their affiliation to either of the two main opposing factions. Because the leaders of the factions completely dominated Druze affairs, the influence of *mashyakhat al-ʻaql* (the religious leaders) was limited to "leur entourage immédiat," and equally divided into two factions: Sheikh Ḥusayn Talīʻ was supported by the Junblāṭs and Sheikh Ḥusayn Ḥamāda by the Yazbaks. When Brat concludes with advice on "effective" treatment of the Druzes: ("Pour etre vraiment realiste, efficace et respecté, il importe qu'elle (the French administration) tienne la balance égale entre les differents clans"), he simply reasserts French policy, which since 1920 had centered on these "traditional" elites.[18]

In effect, since 1860 the Druze factions had been reconfigured by various factors and along different lines, the full scope of which is too intricate to be traced here. Briefly, the ʻImād family, which for centuries had led the Yazbakī faction, at one point lost its position to the Arslāns whose foremost figures made up the leadership of the new Yazbakī faction which then produced the first generation of intellectuals, such as Shakīb and ʻAdil Arslān, eminently equipped to propagate Arab nationalism among the Druzes. Like the two branches of the Shiʻi Zayn family—that of Aḥmad ʻArif who favored Arab nationalism and cooperation with other Muslim sects, and the other of Yūsuf Zayn, who collaborated with the Mandate as representative of his Shiʻi faction within the Lebanese state—the Arslāns had two branches which led the faction. One was that of the two brothers Fū'ād and Tawfīq, who since 1920 had promoted collaboration with the Mandate and the Lebanese Christian elites, the other that of Shakīb and ʻAdil. The anti-colonial stance and activities of the latter two

convinced many Druze intellectuals to adopt Arab nationalism, especially as the movement saw the Druze community as one of the several *madhāhib* (sects) that made up the Muslim *umma*. The significance of the two Arslān branches enabled the family to consolidate its leadership of the Yazbakī faction when ʿImād, Talḥūq, ʿAbd al-Malik and Abu Nakad could no longer keep up the competition with the powerful Junblāṭ family.[19]

Druze Elites: Between Particularism and Arabism

Following France's defeat by Germany, frustrated Druze elites and intellectuals hoped that the end of French rule in Syria and Lebanon might also be near, and al-Shūf became fertile soil for various forms of Arab nationalist "propaganda" not likely to leave the Mandatory authorities unperturbed. Shakīb and ʿAdil Arslān and ʿArif al-Nakadī were allegedly behind the idea of a pan-Arab confederation led by a Hashemite king, while names were given of other people from al-Manāṣif area who were involved. Bashīr al-Nakadī from Dayr Bābā, Sulaymān Fayād from Bshatfīn, Fāris Masʿūd Ḍaū and ʿAlī Milḥim Ḍaū from Dayr Kūshī as the chief organizers of "agents fixés opérant dans le Chouf," who were also listed by name. Moreover, in mid-August there had been a meeting in the village of Bārūk to recruit people to the movement. Here the main participants had been *amīr* Amīn Muṣṭafa Arslān, the consul of ʿIraq, Dr Yūsuf Rawḍa, a Sunni from Beirut, Arab nationalists from Hama, Sheikh Farḥān Abu ʿUlwān from Bārūk, and Bashīr al-Nakadī.[20]

In one of the leaflets they distributed in the Druze areas in August 1940,[21] this group of Druze Arabists called upon all "Arabs" to adopt a common stance in their "struggle for Arab unity," though not before setting out their ideological differences with the PPS: "Certains du parti populaire syrien ont distribué au peuple syro-libanais des tracts que l'opinion arabe a desapprouvé en raison de leur théorie confuse et vénéneuse qui donne à chaque adepte une couleur differente de çelle d'autre, çe qui a suscité un doute chez les sages et devoués." The leaflet goes on to "refute the veil" that the members of PPS "veulent jeter sur les yeux, prétextant une analyse scientifique" of nationalism. Instead, "historical and cultural" arguments are brought in to "prove" the Arabism of all Syro-Lebanese inhabitants, in an effort to persuade their target audience that the new circumstances created by the war have given the Arab nation the opportunity to close ranks and unify: "Cette nation prête à se lever, travaillant pour son indépendance et sa souverainité prendra sa place haute parmi les nations vivantes … Notre situation et nos circonstances nous portent à considérer les étrangèrs (British, French and Germans) sous le même angle ne donnant de préférence à l'un d'eux que pour çe qu'il présente en compréhension à notre cause."[22]

None of the leaders of this group of Arab nationalists openly stated to which side in the war they were leaning, but French reports claimed that when ʿAdil

Arslān visited Kafr Nabrakh to meet Sheikh Farḥān ʻImād, the villagers had welcomed him with an anti-French demonstration accompanied by *muḥawraba* (a kind of collective songs) in praise of the Germans. Despite contradictory bits of information about ʻAdil Arslān's reaction and the people involved,[23] the French decided to dismiss Muṣṭafa Abu Ghānim as *mukhtār* of the village.[24] As we already saw, by the end of 1940, both the PPS and the LNA were competing for membership among the Druzes, exploiting the situation created by the armistice agreement between Germany and Vichy and by the food crisis in the country. While the LNA was losing followers in Bʻaqlīn to the PPS, it made up for this by winning forces in al-Manāṣif. By now, competition between the two parties had all the features of the traditional Junblāṭ-Yazbak divide.[25] However, when at the beginning of 1941 the food shortage became ever more grave, the parties and factions temporarily set aside their political dispute.[26]

The food crisis, together with the fact that Dentz's administrative "reform" had excluded the Druzes from being represented in Naqqāsh's government, united almost all Druze factions in their protests against the new government. In response to a call by Dr. Farīd Zayn al-Dīn and Qaḥṭān Ḥamāda, hundreds of Druze members of the PPS held a protest meeting, on 9 April 1941, denouncing French policy in Lebanon in general and the exclusion of Druze representation in the government in particular.[27] Impressed, the British consul wrote on 12 April: "The Druze community, which is larger than the Greek Catholic, is up in arms at the lack of a Druze member (in Naqqāsh's Government); on this point being united for the first time for years, and a Druze member may be added."[28]

Apparently prompted by Majīd Arslān, who had his eyes on a seat in government, the issue of a "Druze minister" fired the imagination of the elites and ordinary Druzes alike, as indicated by a leaflet distributed in al-Shūf around this time: "O beni Maaruf (synonym for the Druzes), l'histoire de ce pays a été écrite par le gloire et le sang de vos pères qui n'ont jamais accepté la honte et l'humilation et qui n'ont pardonné à aucun de çeux qui voulu s'opposer à eux." Only the resolution and unity of "une grande communauté glorieuse de son passé, se son rôle, de son présent et des ses hommes" could force the authorities to take account of "Druze demand."[29] Another leaflets was exhorting the Druzes by reminding them that they "ont écrit l'histoire de çe pays avec leurs épées et leur sang" and that they "ne pouvaient pas admittre la soumission."[30] That Majīd Arslān was using Druze mobilization to his own advantage is reflected in several petitions sent to Dentz between 17 and 21 April by notables from the Arslān faction which all demanded the inclusion of a Druze minister in the government.[31] Druze "agitation" reached its peak on 21 April when a Druze delegation led by ʻAdil and Majīd Arslān, Ḥamdān Ḥamdān and Fāyz Mukārim went to Beirut to meet General Arlabosse, the French officer who was advising the Naqqāsh government, while simultaneously about 8,000 Druze demonstrators from al-Shūf converged on Beirut.[32] In an unsuccessful attempt to put further pressure on Arlabosse, the Druze delegation visited Shafīq al-Ḥalabī, a

newly appointed Druze administrator in the Beirut municipality, asking him to resign as an act of protest.[33]

Given the proportion of the Druze population, the Druzes were informed, their demands—to increase the number of the Druze deputies to five and to have a Druze minister included in the government—were rejected.[34] Moreover, the French saw ʿAdil Arslān as the chief "instigator of the Druze delegation." To be able to speak for all Druzes and not just his own faction, ʿAdil Arslān had tried, without success, to include Ḥikmat Junblāṭ in his delegation. Also, to prevent the Druze "agitation" from being seen as a threat to Maronite-Druze relations ʿAdil Arslān had paid a visit to Bkirki, on 19 April, to discuss the implications of the wartime circumstances for the future of Lebanon with Patriarch ʿArīḍa: "[I]l a exposé que les circonstences internationales allaient certainement amener une revision du statut de pays arabes et que le sort du Liban serait en jeu à la fin de çette guerre." ʿAdil Arslān told the Patriarch that he was willing to see Lebanon as an independent state with special relations with Syria. ʿArīḍa responded by saying he would support special "economic relations with Syria." However, ʿAdil Arslān's clan interest surfaced clearly when in a subsequent meeting with Mgr. ʿAbdalla al-Khuri he expressed his frustration with the way the French had neglected the Arslān clan:

> Les Français … n'ont cessé de négliger les Arslan et de méconnaitre leur situation prépondérante dans le monde Druze, tandis que les Djounblat … étaient l'objet de toutes leurs prévenances. Aucun Haut Commissaire, aucun General n'est arrivé au Liban sans aller rendre visite à Mme Nazira … La mesure prise récemment au sujet de l'emir Rafik Arslan, auquel les fonctions de Directeur de l'Economie Nationale ont été retirées du mauvais vouloir des Françcais à l'égard de la famille.[35]

Finally, the High Commissioner was informed that, as it was easy to fanaticize ("*facile à fanatiser*") them, "dissatisfaction" among the Druzes in the areas of al-Shūf and al-Matn could turn into a real threat to public order—there had already been one armed attack against the guards at al-Shūf prison.[36]

On 21 April, more demonstrations against the French and attacks on their military forces took place in several places. Led by Fāris Salīm al-Maṣrī, and Sharīf Abu Raslān, about 1,000 Druzes demonstrated in Qarnāil against the French Mandate, clamoring that the time had come to get rid of the hegemony the French had held in Lebanon since 1860: "L'heure est venue, la Tyrannie française arrive à sa fin. Rien ne nous empêche d'être indépendant. Malheur à la France, l'an 1860 est devant nous … demain la France sera jetée à la Mer."[37] That same day two gendarmes were injured by Druze gunfire in Kfarḥīm, while about 300 armed Druzes had been spotted in a forest near Dayr al-Qamar.[38] Regular troops were sent to Kfarḥīm on 22 April while the delegate of the High Commissioner hurried to Bʿaqlīn in an attempt to calm the situation. When the Druze reaction was negative, 300 armed people blocked the road at Dāmūr near the coast.[39] A total of 600 demonstrators marched in the city of ʿAlay in protest

against Mandatory rule,[40] while on the Beirut-Damascus road a number of "confessional" incidents had taken place in which two Christians and six Druzes had been injured.[41]

Assessing the impact the Druze "agitation" was having on the general political situation in Lebanon, the Sûrete Générale reported on 24 April that the Maronite faction of Bshara al-Khuri was apparently exploiting the situation in its rivalry with Eddé's faction as Kamīl Sham'ūn (Camil Chamoun) and Sheikh Farīd al-Khāzin "ont été chargé de voir l'Emir Adel (Arslān) pour l'assurer de l'accord et de l'appui de leur parti dans la lutte contre le governement. Pour de cet appui, l'Emir Adel s'est empressé de réunir les leaders Druzes," i.e., Majīd Arslān, Ḥikmat Junblāṭ, Sāmī and Ibrāhīm 'Abd al-Malik and others. On the other hand, Muslim leaders also could profit from and thus encouraged Druze "agitation": "Ils s'y intéressent particulièrement par suite d'une propagande entreprise par l'Emir Adel en vue d'englober l'élément druze dans l'entité musulmane." 'Adil Arslān's objectives were explained along the same lines: "1-) Fortifier le Bloc Mahometan (the Muslim Bloc) de la politique panarabe par l'adjonction des druzes hostiles à la puissance mandataire. 2-) Annihiler l'activité des druzes pro-anglais."[42]

As almost all French reports claim that the Druze "agitation" was provoked by the issue of wanting a Druze minister in the government and reduced it to the Druzes as a group being "*facile à fanatiser*," one could well ask why the absence of a Druze minister in the various government before 1941 had never seemed to bother them much. Of greater impact on many Druze than the issue of a Druze minister may well have been France's defeat in the war. Significantly, 'Adil Arslān stepped up his political activities in April 1941, and 'Alī Nāṣir al-Dīn began uniting the Arab nationalist forces in Lebanon against the French Mandate. When the demonstrators at Qarnāil happily anticipated that France *sera jétée à la mer*, their slogans reflected the general mood in the Druze areas. Qarnāil was a stronghold of Nāṣir al-Dīn's LNA and the site of the League's first conference in 1933. Inspired by the position Nāṣir al-Dīn and 'Adil Arslān were taking up, leaflets distributed throughout the Druze areas called for full independence and the delegitimization of the French Mandate. One leaflet, addressed to French Mandatory officials, runs:

> We know that you no longer have any right to this title (of Mandatory officials) under international law … Because the League of Nations has collapsed… (as a result) of the military victory of the League's enemies and the establishment of their order …, French control of the Mandate in Lebanon is considered to be abolished and without legitimacy, and consequently the nation under the Mandate has become the possessor of the right to direct its affairs. We know, too, that the time is ripe for us to achieve our self-determination … but, as dictated by our Arab ethics, we deem it shameful to hurt the French in their current situation and so consider them our guests … Similarly, you (the French) have to recognize the reality and to declare the full independence of the country without delay and condition."[43]

From the end of April until June 1941, French official reports give the impression that the demand for a Druze minister had been set aside, as the Druze "agitation" was channeled toward insurrection, if not "confessional" strife, between Maronites and Druzes, as two Druzes from the village of Qubay' in al-Matn had already been killed and several others injured by armed Christians.[44] Convinced that the French had a clear interest in stirring up Maronite-Druze friction, 'Alī Nāṣir al-Dīn hastened, on 30 April, to mobilize his colleagues, Fahīm al-Khuri, Qusṭanṭīn Yannī (two Christian Arabists) and Muhammad 'Ali Bayḍūn (Muslim) in an effort to pre-empt any "conspiracy" in that direction. The four signed a leaflet calling for calm and cooperation between the Lebanese communities in their "struggle" for independence.[45] Another leaflet, distributed at the beginning of May, significantly called for "l'union sans distinction de religions."[46]

As the French continued to speculate whether the Druzes indeed would attack Christians or were arming themselves,[47] the incidents in which the two Druzes had been killed and several others injured did not set off "confessional strife." From the end of May the subject highest on the agenda of the Druze elites was which stance they ought to take up vis-à-vis the two camps locked in a war the outcome of which could determine the future of Lebanon and the other Arab countries. In an attempt to abort the possibility of Druze collaboration with the British—who were preparing to oust the Vichy forces from Syria and Lebanon—Sheikh al-'Aql Ḥusayn Ḥamāda at the end of May called together "une grande réunion" of Druze religious sheikhs and notables from Lebanon and Syria.[48] This obvious gesture toward Vichy was probably "inspired" by Dentz, who realized that in the approaching military attack against Syria and Lebanon by the British the Druzes would play a not insignificant part.[49] The "gesture" failed to create a common stance: instead three tendencies emerged. Ḥasan al-Aṭrash and Rashīd Ḥamdān came to "plaider la cause anglaise" while the Arslāns and others, mostly young members of the PPS, came to defend "franchement la cause allemande." Sheikh Ḥamāda then planned another general Druze conference in Rāshayiā.[50] But, on 8 June, when the British launched their operation against the Vichy forces in Syria and Lebanon, taking part in the attack was a Druze Legion that had been set up by Edward Spears, the British officer whom Churchill had assigned in March a "mission" of cooperation between Great Britain and Free France.[51] By 14 July all of Syria and Lebanon had been occupied by the British and the Free French forces.[52]

France vs. Britain

On 8 June, simultaneously with the British-Free French offensive, the British, through their ambassador in Cairo, declared that Britain would guarantee the independence of Syria and Lebanon while British aircraft dropped copies of a

leaflet over the main cities in Syria and Lebanon in which General Catroux declared he abolished the Mandate and promised independence for the peoples of both countries:

> Syriens Libanais! A l'heure où les forces de la France libre, uniés aux forces de la Grand-Bretagne, sont alliée, pénétrant sur votre territoire, je déclare assumer les pouvoires, les responsabilités et les devoirs du représentant de la France au Levant … En agissant comme tel, j'abolis le Mandat et je vous proclame libres et indépendants. Vous êtes donc désormais des peuples souverains et indépendants et vous pourrez, soit vous constituer en deux Etats distincts, soit vous rassembler en un seul Etat.[53]

Catroux had little difficulty in replacing Vichy with Free French officials and transferring power to de Gaulle, but both Frenchmen had to recognize that France was no longer alone in deciding Syro-Lebanese affairs. Both Syria and Lebanon were now subordinated to the "colonial" politics of the French and the British and their rather different agendas for the Levant. In many respects the latter were set by the two main actors, Spears and Catroux, personal rivalry between the two further complicating matters. Important for our purposes is especially the different attitudes Spears and Catroux adopted toward the "independence" of Lebanon and the impact competition between them had on the political behavior and activities of the Lebanese elites.

On 27 September 1941 Catroux proclaimed "formal" independence for Syria, as promised, but then appeared in no hurry to do the same in regard to Lebanon, where he retained Naqqāsh's government. This was because—as al-Khuri alleges de Gaulle had told him personally during his visit to Beirut at the beginning of September—de Gaulle preferred as a prelude to "independence" first to restore constitutional life so as to unite all Lebanese leaders, notably al-Khuri and Eddé, in their stance toward the political future of the country.[54] Catroux later wrote that, in 1941, he had wanted to prevent a renewal of the rivalry between al-Khuri and Eddé, which he realized placed an obstacle in the way of normal political life.[55] For the British, delay in the proclamation of Lebanon's "independence" meant that the Free French were reneging on the obligations de Gaulle had undertaken in his agreements with the British before and after the occupation of Syria and Lebanon.[56] British impatience led them to turn to the United States, as the American consul reports about twenty days before the formal French proclamation of Lebanon's independence finally came through on 26 November 1941:

> [T]he British Embassy here (Beirut) recently gave oral expression to the hope of the British government that [the US] would formally recognize the independence of Syria, for reason that our recognition would strengthen the position of Great Britain and her allies in the Arab countries and would [have a] stabilizing effect in the Near East generally … Apparently similar considerations would apply with at least equal force to the question of [US] recognition of the independence of the Lebanon which presumably will be proclaimed in the near future.[57]

Exasperation with the French also comes out clearly in a 22-page memorandum Spears wrote in 1954, about his "mission" in Syria and Lebanon. Spears makes no bones about his reservations vis-à-vis the way de Gaulle was behaving:

> [F]ew are those to tell the tale of the way in which De Gaulle and the French misused their position and consistently thwarted the war effort in the Levant, and jeopardized the position of the Allies in the Arab world … He became set on the idea of obtaining power and this to him became more important than winning the war itself … I was completely convinced that if Germany once gained a firm footing in Syria [i.e., also Lebanon], the war would indeed be lost, for we should have been cut off from Russia and we should not have been able to apply to her … I have said…that De Gaulle was very good at obtaining promises beforehand and he set about obtaining every sort of guarantee from the British concerning their future action in Syria [and Lebanon]. They, always reluctant to seem to take advantage of France's weakness, complied willingly enough, but the way in which De Gaulle used promises and undertakings was to prove later a cause of great difficulties … As soon as he came to Syria [and Lebanon] he tended to assume the attitude of dictator and a sovereign to his States. This was popular neither with the English nor with the Arabs.[58]

As a formal proclamation of independence was urgent so as to win more support in Lebanon and the Arab world as a whole, from September 1941 Spears and other British officials intensified "pressure" on the French to live up to their promise. According to the American consul, this "pressure" Catroux and other French officials interpreted as a British attempt to harm French interests:

> So long as the Free French suspected the British of intriguing and of wishing to harm French interests it would be difficult to bring about the whole-hearted cooperation which the security of Syria [and Lebanon] demanded … [This] was encouraging the pro-Axis sympathizers among the natives and was facilitating Nazi propaganda.[59]

As an outsider, the American consul at first speculated that the dispute between the British and the French was "psychological rather than political" in nature.[60] But he then learned that Catroux had rejected two principal suggestions the British had made regarding the proclamation of Lebanon's independence:

> One. The Foreign Office had suggested that reference to the treaty of 1936 be omitted because the Lebanese did not like it and it had never been ratified by France. Catroux presumably under instructions from De Gaulle states that reference to the treaty is necessary because it satisfies Free France and cannot harm British interests … He then explains that France needs the right to station troops in the country [which the treaty stipulates] for protection of Christians and other minorities in Syria and the Lebanon. Two. The Foreign Office had objected to the statement that the Lebanon constituted "a politically and territorially indivisible entity whose integrity must be protected against all encroachments." It feared lest an irrevocable fixing of boundaries cause dissatisfaction in Syria and disturb the relations between Great Britain and the Arab world. Catroux replied

> that … [a] compact Lebanon was necessary for the interests of France and useful to Britain and other western powers as a bridge-head vis-à-vis the independent Muhammedan [Muslim] countries.[61]

At the end of October, Catroux informed Spears that he would give him at least eight days notice before issuing his proclamation of Lebanese independence and that he intended to appoint Naqqāsh as president and Aḥmad al-Dā'ūq as prime minister.[62] The British headquarters in Cairo told Spears that he should ask to see the draft of the proclamation before it was issued: "Please ensure that he [Catroux] does so, since it is important that we should avoid seeing it only at last moment as occurred with the Syrian proclamation."[63] In the British view, Catroux's appointees were unlikely to gain the support of the Lebanese population and "our own objectives, particularly military and economic, may not be served." The British consul in Cairo, Sir Miles Lampson (Lord Killearn), wrote to London "I feel … that the details of the declaration [of independence] and selection of personalities should be left for discussion between General Catroux and myself."[64] While he asked Lampson to provide him with the full text of Catroux's proclamation before it was issued, Foreign Minister Anthony Eden instructed the British officials in the Middle East to make sure that the issue of boundaries between Syria and Lebanon would be on the table. In this Eden may well have been influenced by Spears. While in the Levant, the latter used to consult frequently with British "experts" in Arab affairs, such as George Hamilton, Colonel Geoffry Furlonge and other, and had arrived at a position which de Gaulle could only define as pro-Arab.[65] To counter France's conception of "Greater Lebanon," Eden quoted George Antonius' book, *The Arab Awakening,* so as to show that when French policy had established Greater Lebanon in 1920, it had done so by "artificial" means; he added:

> Consider[ing] that now that His Majesty's Government has recognized Syrian independence and that a proclamation of Lebanese independence is imminent, something should be done regarding the boundary between Syria and the Lebanon, which is artificial and impossible to defend on historic, ethnological, or economic grounds.[66]

On 5 November Lampson sent London the draft of the French proclamation, whose paragraph 16 set out the integrity of Greater Lebanon: "Free France considers that the Lebanese state is politically and territorially an indivisible unit, the integrity of which is to be preserved from all dismemberment" and paragraph 17 guaranteed equality: "The Lebanese government will guarantee equality of civil and political rights to all her subjects without any distinction," ensuring "a fair distribution among the different elements in the country of the high offices of State, and in the general service of the Government." As for relations with Syria, paragraph 18 states that "Free France undertakes to use her good offices for examination and setting up of a basis of economic collaboration between Syria and the Lebanon."[67] Because the French and the British could

not reach agreement over paragraph 16, the proclamation of independence was delayed. The British continued to argue that paragraph 16 would aggravate Arab nationalist sentiments, and demanded it be omitted from the declaration; "[if] the Free French show signs of being recalcitrant … we should have to make it plain that our recognition of the independence … will contain a reservation about this clause."[68] As Lampson saw it, paragraph 16 enshrined the principle of the "Lebanese nationalists" and rendered impossible any "future" negotiations for adjustment of Lebanese frontiers with the Syrians: "The latter, of course … are seeking for return of certain territories containing main Moslem populations and in particular port of Tripoli."[69]

The dispute over paragraph 16 again raised the issues of legitimacy that had been around since 1919 when the Lebanese delegation to Versailles had claimed "*la restauration*" of Greater Lebanon, the integrity of whose territory was then reaffirmed by the Franco-Lebanese treaty of 1936 and, most recently, by the proclamation of Syrian independence in September 1941. As the French saw it, the 1936 treaty had put an end to the question of the frontiers—and a reference to this treaty would remove all doubt on this point.[70] On 11 November the British, it seems, began retreating from their starting position.[71] Three days later the Foreign Ministry informed British officials in the Middle East that a compromise had been reached with the French on the text of the proclamation, meaning that the British had withdrawn their rejection of the reference to the 1936 treaty and to the integrity of Lebanon. Spears had been behind the idea that "reference to the 1936 treaty would be unwise since its inclusion might give rise locally to controversy which it was to our mutual [British and French] interest to avoid." As result of de Gaulle's insistence "that its inclusion will have a better effect in Lebanon than its omission …, Mr Eden told General de Gaulle that we did not wish to press the matter further." The British attempted in vain to have the word "indivisible" deleted from the text of paragraph 16, and now accepted "that the boundary question is a contentious issue and that it would probably be inopportune to raise it at the present."[72] However, until 23 November Spears and Lampson continued dealing with the text, hoping to gain the backing of the War Office for amendments that would satisfy their minimum reservations.[73] In the end the text of Catroux' Proclamation as read out on 26 November hardly differed from the original draft and Spears expressed little satisfaction when he wrote on the evening of 26 November to Lampson that "final amendments were made by Catroux [and the] Proclamation was duly read as amended at 11 a.m. today."[74] For Catroux, that he had been able to hold his own in the matter and was furthernmore going ahead with reappointing Alfred Naqqāsh as president and Aḥmad al-Dā'ūq as prime minister, meant that he had shown he could match the British challenge and had been successful in preserving some degree of continuity in the Mandatory regime.

The Game Resumes

If French and British officials had expected the declaration of Lebanon's formal independence to be greeted with jubilation, they were disappointed. Rather, there was a general show of indifference, if not apathy, as Spears reported on the day itself: "At the ceremony there were certain notable absentees,"[75] and three days later Lampson indicated that "[c]omplete lack of enthusiasm was shown during and after the proclamation. The majority of the notables and Christian religious leaders were absent from the ceremony."[76] The American consul is, again, more perceptive: "There has been no sign of popular enthusiasm … On the contrary most Lebanese are disappointed with Catroux's proclamation and resent his reference to the treaty of 1936 and other passages indicating that France will insist upon a privileged position which may prove incompatible with real independence." Not before long apathy began to turn into active opposition because with the proclamation of independence came Catroux's intention to reappoint Naqqāsh as president. The Maronite patriarch was "particularly bitter in his opposition to [Naqqāsh] whom he considers a creature of the Jesuits even though he [himself] is a Maronite."[77] By early December, Spears was noticing

> considerable political excitement … throughout, both as regards declaration of independence and composition of new ministry to be announced shortly. Opposition both to France and to Naccache [Naqqāsh] is tending to centre around Maronite Patriarch who is annoyed that General Catroux, after having promised to consult him regarding choice of President, did not inform him … On November 28th he sent a prominent Maronite politician to Colonel [Geoffry] Furlonge with a message to effect that having renounced the traditional connexion of the Maronites with France he wished to place the Maronite community under the protection of Great Britain.[78]

During December the Maronite patriarch's stance became clearer when he joined forces with Bshara al-Khuri, whose political ambitions had been blocked by the new regime of Catroux. The two began mobilizing *zu'ama* from different communities whom the new regime had "neglected" and who were ready for action. In a letter addressed to the British prime minister, these *zu'ama* and representatives of the Maronite and Greek Catholic churches protested against the "unachieved" independence, and called for effective intervention on the part of Great Britian to aid the Lebanese people in their struggle for free elections and genuine independence. In addition to Mgr. Mubārak, the Maronite archbishop of Beirut, Mgr. Ma'ūshī, the Maronite archbishop of Tyre and Mgr. Ṣāygh, the Greek Catholic archbishop of Beirut, the *zu'ama* signatories described themselves as "representatives" of al-Khuri's Constitutional Bloc, but if we look at the list of names, it becomes clear that what had brought them together was their frustration at the way the new regime had adversely affected them. For example, Majīd Arslān, who had stirred up the Druzes at the beginning of 1941 in his efforts to get into government, was an active member

of the group while Rashīd and ʻIzzat Junblāṭ of the Bramiya branch of the Junblāṭ family apparently had joined in protest against the inclusion in the new cabinet of Ḥikmat Junblāṭ from the Mukhtāra branch. Realizing that the cabinet included none of the ʻUsayrāns as representing the Shiʻis, Najīb and ʻAdil ʻUsayrān had joined in, as had Rashīd Bayḍūn, who was seeking a role for the *nouveaux riches* in Shiʻi politics which was still largely dominated by "quasi-feudal" *zuʻama* such as al-Asʻad.[79]

The Maronite patriarch took the opportunity of Christmas to invite "representatives" of all the Lebanese communities to Bkirki to celebrate the feast with him and his community and to work out a "common stance" toward the situation created by Cartoux's new regime. As in January 1936, the Bkirki meeting turned into another political "festival," culminating in the Maronite patriarch calling for "absolute independence" of Greater Lebanon. The resolutions adopted stated that:

> 1) The Lebanon must have absolute independence to enable it to shape its own destiny with full freedom. 2) The Lebanon must be free to contract treaties with foreign powers. 3) The Lebanon must be free to enact constitutional laws protecting personal and public liberties and separating the executive authorities from the legislative; this to be guaranteed by a freely elected political body representing equitably all Lebanese religious communities and regions.[80]

According to al-Khuri, "the national conference" at Bkirki was the result of the "opposition" which he and other leaders had been able to build up in their fight for the "restoration of the constitutional life" and independence. Al-Khuri admits that during the summer "the political situation [had been] in complete stagnation." But Catroux's nomination of Naqqāsh as president and Aḥmad al-Dāʻūq as prime minister had had the inevitable effect of galvanizing the elites.[81] Spears describes the Bkirki meeting as a "political demonstration" of about 700 persons, most of them members of the "Constitutional Bloc" from different communities.[82] According to the American consul, about 600 persons had attended the meeting with Bshara al-Khuri, George Thābit and Khalīl Abu Jawdī as the main leaders "head[ing] delegations to the Patriarchate." The resolutions of the meeting in Bkirki "should therefore be read in connection with other similar manifestations, notably for example a letter Mr. Riad Solh, a Moslem Nationalist leader, addressed to me."[83] Meant is a memorandum Riyāḍ had addressed to Catroux, with copies also sent to the British, the Turkey and the Arab states. Although a "lone wolf," as the British portrayed him, Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ's protest ran along the same lines as al-Khuri's criticism of the proclamation of Lebanese independence. For al-Ṣulḥ, it "does not satisfy the national aspiration" as it is no more than "substituting Free France for Vichy France."[84]

In spite of the general indifference, as early as October some of the Lebanese elites had already begun exploring what possibilities the anticipated Catroux

administration could hold for them, the Shi'is being the most active. At the beginning of 1940, a dispute over the nomination of a Shi'i judge had occupied the leaders of the As'ad, Zayn and 'Usayrān's factions.[85] Although generally documentation of events between March 1940 and September 1941 is scarce, the names of actors showing up when factional competition resumed for the nomination of Shi'i ministers and adminstrators in the anticipated Catroux regime, suggest that this dispute was still alive. The 'Usayrāns solicited the recommendation of the Maronite patriarch for the appointment of Dr. Fū'ād 'Usayrān as secretary of state for the national economy.[86] When Catroux did not respond, the 'Usayrāns mobilized a petition signed by seventeen '*ulama*, this time demanding that Catroux appoint Fū'ād as the Shi'i minister in the forthcoming cabinet.[87] The As'ads and Zayns also began a campaign to mobilize support for candidates from their clan or faction already in October. Aware that the Lebanese cabinet would comprise one or, at the most, two Shi'i ministers, one of whom would be Aḥmad al-As'ad, the powerful *za'īm* in the Shi'i community, the Zayns and 'Usayrāns appeared united in presenting the candidacy of Muḥammad Kāmil Shu'ayb al-'Amilī, one of "the most respected '*ulama*," as a future minister.[88] At the beginning of December when al-Dā'ūq's newly formed cabinet indeed returned out to include As'ad,[89] the rival faction was still hoping to promote al-'Amilī as a counterbalance:

> Point n'est besoin de dire que Ahmed Bey El-Assad est beaucoup plus fort que ses adversaires. Toutefois, la seule solution à la crise de la communauté chiite de Sud, serait l'octroi d'un siège ministériel au grand maître [al-'Amilī]. En effet, la partie opposé à [al-As'ad], a chargé bien son Excellence [Habīb Pasha al-S'ad] d'intervenir à cette fin auprès des Autorités Françaises.[90]

In addition to arguments of "counterbalancing," al-'Amilī came with the blessing of the Maronite patriarch and Mgr. Mubārak: "adoptant la solution sollicitée, satisfaction serait donné à la fois à la conmmunauté chiite et au clergé maronite qui appuie le dit candidat."[91]

After a long absence from the political arena, Habīb Pasha al-Sa'd, the senior Maronite *za'im,* selected the formation of Catroux's administration as an appropriate moment to signal, by endorsing al-'Amilī, that he wanted to revive his clan's role in Lebanese politics. On 21 October he wrote to Catroux asking him to set aside a high-ranking post in the new Lebanese administration for his nephew Amīn. Besides being a doctor-lawyer, his nephew had "close acquaintance" with the internal politics of the country: "de par sa position familiale et sociale, il connait les principaux notables de toutes le communautés, les clans, les rivalités locales, la mentalité et les tendances des differentes fractions de la population … il aime la France … J'ai à coeur de le voir accéder à un poste politique important."[92] Similar letters requesting the inclusion in the new cabinet and administration of "representatives of the community" streamed into Catroux's office until 1 December.[93]

When, on 2 December, al-Dā'ūq presented his cabinet, it turned out that Catroux had responded to Habīb Pasha al-Sa'd's request by nominating his

nephew as minister of the public works. However, al-ʻAmilī was not to counterbalance Aḥmad al-Asʻad but another Shiʻi religious leader, Sayd Aḥmad al-Ḥusaynī from ʻAqūra in the Biqāʻ, who was nominated interior minister. Reporting on the new cabinet, Spears' vignette of Aḥmad al-Asʻad, who became ministry of Agriculture and Post, included the following description: "a robber baron from Taibe in the Djebel ʻAmel, who has blackmailed his way into the ministry by running a secessionist movement in this district, where he has some feudal influence. Has been lavish in profession of pro-British sympathies since our arrival and is well known to British officials in North Palestine." For Spears, he was clearly "untrustworthy," adding that "he was suspected of gun-running and hashish smuggling across the border."[94]

When, at the end of February 1942, the bread crisis proved far from resolved, demonstrations again erupted in almost all Syrian and Lebanese cities.[95] Al-Khuri's Constitutional Bloc was "busily … extending its contacts, especially in Moslem circles with the view to turning this situation to the advantage of its members"; it reiterated its demand for elections, on the grounds that only a constitutional government could cope with the political and economic crisis of the country.[96] While the events helped bring al-Khuri's faction closer to some Sunni elites of Beirut, notably Riyād al-Ṣulḥ, they led to a "confessional" dispute on the popular level when the Najāda and Katā'ib renewed their paramilitary activities. Because of the food shortages, the urban neighborhoods, especially the Sunni quarters of Tripoli and Beirut, became fertile soil for strikes and demonstrations. In Tripoli troubles broke out "due to a maladjustment in the method of wheat distribution to the poorer classes," Spears reported, while in Beirut the Najāda had launched a campaign against the government as part of which the Najāda's leader, Jamīl Makkāwī, had gone to Aḥmad al- Dāʻūq on 20 February and had "asked him to resign on the grounds that he was not properly defending Moslem rights. He refused, and the leader [Makkāwī] left breathing fire and slaughter which have not, so far, eventuated."[97]

Successive demonstrations by the Najāda and the Katā'ib led to a government decision to dissolve all political parties and organizations.[98] But both organizations continued their activities unabatedly, and on 29 March the Najāda held a parade in the Sunni part of Beirut where "l'hyme national syrien a été joué dans le moment où le Governement interdit toutes les manifestations politiques."[99] The Najāda had planned their parades to coincide with the Muslim celebration of *al-mawlid* (the birthday of the Prophet) with the predictable result that they quickly turned into political demonstrations. Besides Makkāwī and other Sunni personalities, Zuhayr ʻUsayrān accompanied by Shiʻi supporters was reported to have joined the Najāda in their demonstrations, as was even the prime minister: Aḥmad al- Dāʻūq "a assisté … à la cérémonie du 'Maouled' organisée par la 5ème section de Najade et qu'il a été accuelli à son arrivée par l'hyme arabe," a gesture which had produced "une mauvaise impression et un grand étonnement dans les milieux patriotes libanais."[100] Who

these *patriotes libanais* were became clear on 2 April when the delegation of Free France (Catroux's Department) registered Pierre Gemayel's protest against the parades of the Najāda and the fact that al-Dā'ūq had been present at them, claiming that the government was discriminating against the Katā'ib as it "fermait les yeux sur les agissements des Najjades." While with his gesture Aḥmad al-Dā'ūq no doubt had wanted to "regagner quelque prestige auprès de la communauté musulmane," Alfred Naqqāsh "qui se trouve dans une situation analogue vis-à-vis de Phalanges," was clearly "more embarrass[ed]."[101]

At the end of March, at a point when the Katā'ib and the Najāda began threatening to inject "confessional" strife even between the adherents of the Maronite president and those of the Sunni prime minister, Spears returned from London where he had been nominated as the British minister to the Levant countries. In a conversation with de Gaulle on 11 March, Spears said he wanted to use his new post to help guarantee "true independence" for Syria and Lebanon.[102] From April 1942, with the backing of Spears, al-Khuri's faction and other oppositional groups stepped up their campaign for holding elections as the necessary first step toward full independence. The American consul analyzed the situation as follows: while Spears "was in favor of holding elections or at least fixing a definite date for them within the next six months," Catroux "feared an election would bring out a good deal of latent pro-British sentiment and thus weaken the position of Free France."[103] For Catroux, it was clear that al-Khuri's faction came under the protective umbrella of the British. Spears and others were thought to be extending their sponsorship so as to create a bloc of pro-British Arab countries in the Middle East to help ward off the German threat—the German army was poised to cross from Libya into Egypt. With British backing, Muṣṭafā al-Naḥḥas, Egypt's prime minister, began to set out a "new Arab policy" in which Jamīl Mardam in Syria and Bshara al-Khuri in Lebanon were to play an important role. According to the American consul, Catroux had informed de Gaulle that "he would no longer permit Spears to intervene in any internal matters [of Lebanon and Syria], that he would only inform Spears of his decisions but would reserve complete liberty of action." But because the British looked "upon the entire situation largely from the point of view of military security" and they considered themselves as the responsible for defense of the Levant,"[104] indifference to internal issues was out of the question. As another American official saw the situation very clearly: "The British [were] aware of Arab resentment against the French … The most immediate means of winning Arab sympathy would be actually to implement the independence promises."[105]

Toward the Elections

Prompting the call for elections Spears did not see as intervention: "Spears indicated that despite his unwillingness to intervene in the internal … politics,

there were may things he had to take notice of. [These] seemed to entail damage to British interests or to prejudice the future of the Levant contrary to British promises."[106] When the elections became the focus of the political and economic crisis in Lebanon, Naqqāsh announced on 19 April that he wanted to resign. The British realized that the political vacuum this would create would harm the war effort, but by the end of the month it was already clear that Naqqāsh "did not seriously intend to resign but [had] merely used the threat of resignation as a lever to gain concessions or extra support from the British." Spears then renewed his suggestion to set a date for elections, for the good of all Lebanese.[107]

The contrary positions taken up by Spears and Catroux on independence and elections, British efforts to create an Arab bloc in the Middle East in which al-Khuri's faction would take an obvious part, together with the "confessional" dispute sparked by the activities the Katā'ib and the Najāda, as outlined above, could not fail to have their impact on the way leading Lebanese politicians and intellectuals began to think of "the national portrait" they envisaged for an independent Lebanon. As in 1936–37, the issue was soon at the heart of the debates over the elections, independence and Lebanon's relations with the Arab world and the West. In the reports of the British and American officials, at least three tendencies were now emerging among the Maronite leaders. Continuing in his belief that President Naqqāsh represented the interests of the Jesuits and the French more than those of the Maronites,[108] Patriarch 'Arīḍa launched a campaign for "real national independence" which would create room for a "certain degree" of cooperation with Muslim leaders, though never foregoing the principal concepts of Lebanism and the Maronite "self-image" as these had developed during the Mandate. Although he joined the Maronite patriarch in his campaign, al-Khuri led a group of Maronite leaders who had been quick to adapt to the new circumstances thrown up by the war. Conscious of the British role in inter-Arab relations and of the importance of cooperating with Lebanon's Muslims, al-Khuri's Maronite group let go of the old concepts of Lebanism and instead set out to sketch a "national portrait" in which the Arabism of the Muslim elites could be harmonized in some way with Lebanon as an independent entity. Confronted by al-Khuri's and the patriarch's opposition, Naqqāsh found support in Eddé's faction as it continued to rely on the French to ensure that the "national" concepts on which Greater Lebanon had been established would not risk erosion.[109]

Although the Sunni leaders remained divided among themselves, they welcomed the "positive" attitude of al-Khuri and the Patriarch 'Arīḍa towards Arabism and the chance it seemed to offer to unite Christians and Muslims. Apart from the "irredentist" 'Abd al-Ḥamīd Karāmī, who reiterated that he wanted to see Tripoli re-annexed to Syria, the Sunni elites had come around to believing that it would be possible to cooperate with al-Khuri and the patriarch toward Lebanon as "an Arab independent country." Unlike in 1936–37—when the French were still able to dictate the status quo in the distribution of political

power among the "communities"—Britain's intervention, especially its encouragement of an "Arab" policy, convinced the Sunni elites that time had come to try to re-arrange the distribution of power. In the beginning of 1942, Muḥammad Jamīl Bayhum initiated the establishment of *al-Kutla al-Islāmiyya* (the Muslim Bloc) which brought together Shi'is and Druzes. Although in his writings Bayhum focuses on Arab nationalism, i.e., uniting Christians and Muslims on a "national" and not a "confessional" basis, he now resorted to "confessionalism" for the purpose of "equality" in Lebanon. On 20 July 1942, the Sunni, Shi'i and Druze members of the Muslim Bloc presented a memorandum to the Lebanon's president in which they called for distribution of political power so as to arrive at parity between Muslims and Christians. What they wanted was a new census, as its outcome would show that such parity was grounded in reality.[110]

From the outset, the Muslim Bloc rallied around the view that "bread" and politics could not be separated. They joined Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ and other Sunni leaders in their criticism of al-Dā'ūq's cabinet which they held responsible for the bread crisis and for its failure to respond to the "rededication" of the Muslims. This opposition of Sunni leaders to al-Dā'ūq was picked up by the British who were looking for a strong Sunni leader who could cooperate with al-Khuri. An interesting twist to events came when al-Dā'ūq appealed to the British for assistance. In mid-May he met Spears, Hamilton and Furlonge to coordinate positions on the elections, French "intrigues" and possible compromises between the Maronite patriarch and Catroux. Spears concluded: "In general, it seems important to avoid giving any impression that we have proteges whom we intend to keep in office … Certainly Ahmed Daouk is not worth any of it." Referring to the elections, al-Dā'ūq had asked for British intervention to help conduct a new census. But the issue most urgent for al-Dā'ūq had been the "possibility of a rapprochement between General Catroux and the Maronite patriarch" which he feared would result in the dismissal of his cabinet. Spears also knew that in a meeting between Catroux and Naqqāsh concerning the Sunni opposition to al-Dā'ūq, Catroux had indicated that: "if he [al-Dā'ūq] was the stumbling block in the matter, General Catroux could have his resignation."[111]

By June, with the government pressed further by a worsening bread crisis, Bshara al-Khuri and Jamīl Mardam visited Naḥḥas Pasha in Egypt, to discuss—always under the auspices of the British—plans for an "Arab" stance in the war and for the future of Syria and Lebanon. The main issue was full independence of the Levant states. But "in Lebanon this could not be done as no Constitutional Parliament existed and it was therefore proposed that the elections should be held under a Provisional Government headed by Bechara as head of the Constitutional Bloc."[112] Arab coordination and full independence for Syria and Lebanon became ever more urgent as news from the Libyan front began reaching the Arab capitals. One of Spears' reports highlights the link between the war and the way the political and economic situation was evolving in Lebanon:

> The recent British reverses in Libya have had considerable repercussions in the Lebanon. The price of gold … has risen sharply. The Beirut Christians are, as usual, scared for their own skins … Many of the Sunni Moslems have shown the cloven hoof and have come out with active pro-Axis propaganda talk; it is however satisfactory to note that certain of their leaders, notably Riad as-Solh (who was at one time highly suspected), have displayed a commendably calm and friendly attitude which must react favourably on their co-religionists. President Naccache, knowing himself to be unpopular in the Lebanon as a whole, is more than ever doubtful of his chance of survival after the elections. Unlike Jamil Mardam, Bechara el-Khoury seems to have refrained since his return from Egypt from exaggerated descriptions of "negotiations" in Cairo regarding the future of Lebanon, but he has let it be understood … that Nahas Pasha regards his Constitutional Party as the Lebanese counterpart of Damascus National Bloc and has hinted pursuing a genuine Lebanese national policy.[113]

In mid-July, "the holding up of the German advance in Libya had calmed the Lebanese public opinion," which meant that the "incompetence" of Naqqāsh and the government of al-Dā'ūq could again take center stage among Lebanon's political circles and others. Lawyers in Beirut went on strike for more than a week against the government as it had cancelled "certain concessions hitherto made to them in the application of the … (professional) tax."[114] At the same time, the bread shortages brought more strikes and demonstrations in Beirut, and rumors began to spread that "two rival illegal political parties Phalanges and Najjada have temporarily joined forces and have made use of above mentioned cause of discontent to focus popular dissatisfaction on Lebanese President and Government with the object of securing their resignation."[115]

Al-Khuri's party now launched an all-out campaign for the resignation of Naqqāsh and for new elections. On 11 July, the Sûrete Générale reported on several meetings between Sunni, Shi'i and Druze leaders intended to define a common position on the elections. After one such meeting, Salīm Salām, Muḥammad Khālid, Jamīl Talḥūq, Jamīl Bayḍūn, Muḥammad 'Alī Ḥamāda and others had sent a memorandum to the French authorities and the president reiterating demands for parity representation in the Lebanese institutions and administrations and "equality" in the distribution of state resources between the different regions.[116] The Najāda meanwhile stepped up their criticism of the "moderate" Sunni leaders who had "knelt" before the Maronite patriarch so as to be rewarded with official posts.[117] They pressured al-Dā'ūq, whom most Sunni leader saw as "impotent," to promote Muslim interests and finally to resolve the bread crisis. Aware that opposition to al-Dā'ūq had been spreading among almost all Sunni elites and the entire Sunni populace, Catroux decided to sacrifice his Sunni prime minister in an effort to save his regime and its president. On 23 July, Naqqāsh charged Sāmī al-Ṣulḥ with the formation of a new cabinet, hoping that this would appease the Sunni elites and block the "intrigues" of Spears, who naturally favored a pro-British Sunni prime minister, e.g., Khālid Shihāb. Sāmī al-Ṣulḥ moreover was a relative of Riyāḍ, the "nationalist" leader

who never for a moment ceased to criticize the French for having breached their independence assurances. Spears and Cartoux now became more deeply involved with "the particular politician or politicians whom [they wished] to see excluded or included in the new Government."[118] Apart from Musā Nammūr, a Maronite compromise between the Eddé and al-Khuri factions, the new cabinet was no more than a reduced version of al-Dā'ūq, comprising as it did—in addition to Sāmī al-Ṣulḥ—Aḥmad al-Ḥusaynī, Ḥikmat Junblāṭ, Philipe Bulus, and George Khuri, all ministers in the previous cabinet. Although the British were able to ensure that Aḥmad al-As'ad, who had shifted his affiliation to the French, was excluded this time, Spears had his reservations about the new cabinet.[119]

Soon after the new cabinet had been installed, Spears began to seek cooperation with Sāmī al-Ṣulḥ through whom he hoped to reach Riyāḍ and other influential Sunni leaders. On 25 July, the French learned, he met with the *mufti*, Muḥammad Tawfiq Khālid, who expressed his support for new elections which he expected would change the political situation in favor of the Muslims.[120] For Spears, Sāmī al-Ṣulḥ was "probably the least unsatisfactory of a poor choice" and his significance lay mainly in the fact that he was the cousin of Riyāḍ who "recently has shown signs of marked improvement in our favour." Sāmī, too, during negotiations for the "formation of [his] Ministry has displayed unexpected firmness [of] desire to co-operate with us."[121] In tackling the bread crisis, Sāmī al-Ṣulḥ sought out cooperation with other Sunni leaders in Beirut—three days before he started negotiations to form his cabinet, Sunni *'ulama* and *zu'ama* had joined the Najāda in calling for unification with Syria as the only solution to the crisis in Lebanon. According to the Sûreté Générale, this new wave of "Muslim separatism" worried the *Phalanges*, who began pressing for a definitive solution to the crisis.[122] "Influential" leaders such as Salīm 'Alī Salām, Jamīl Bayhum, Muḥammad Najā, Mukhtār Ṭayiāra, 'Umar Bayhum, 'Abd al-Raḥmān Nuṣūlī and others now decided to cooperate with the Najāda and the *'ulama'* council.[123] Meanwhile, Sāmī al-Ṣulḥ joined a Sunni initiative to a "High Muslim Assembly" to defend "Muslim interests," in which the different Sunni leaders would be represented. As the Sûreté Générale saw it, its real object was to defend the interests of the Ṣulḥs rather than those of all Muslims.[124] But Sunni factionalism put paid to the idea. In October 1942 Ḥusayn Sharaf al-Dīn and Sheikh Tawfīq Hibrī, two of the originators, met with the *mufti,* Tawfīq Khālid, in a fresh attempt to get the Assembly off the ground. Both the *mufti* and Sāmī al-Ṣulḥ remained reluctant, at least until January 1943 when the Ṣulḥs came around because of the approaching elections.[125] In an attempt to stymie possible competition by the Salām family, Sāmī al-Ṣulḥ suggested in August 1942 that Salīm 'Alī Salām be appointed president of the Beirut municipality, at the same time promising he would improve the infrastructure of Beirut's Muslim quarters.[126]

At the beginning of August, Spears had reason to be optimistic as the "new Government has received a fair measure of support, especially from the

Moslems"[127] which facilitated fostering a pro-British bloc of Arab countries. Spears' partial success was probably behind the unexpected visit de Gaulle paid to Beirut on 12 August. During his stay de Gaulle succeeded in reversing some of Spears' achievements by letting it "be known in conversations (with the Lebanese elites) that as a result of consultations he has had with [the British Government], elections in Syria and Lebanon are unlikely to be held for an indefinite period."[128] De Gaulle was behind another important political move when, on 15 August, at a tea party given by the patriarch and "after several months of incessant wooing of the Maronite Patriarch General Catroux succeeded in effecting a reconciliation between the two of them." The Patriarch "is believed to have included a demand for the resignation of M. Naccache amongst a list of requests which he presented to General Catroux."[129] Despite the patriarch's consistent opposition to Naqqāsh, the general outcome of de Gaulle's visit was a blow to al-Khuri, who had counted on the elections to take place soon and who relied on the animosity between Catroux and the patriarch to guarantee his candidacy for the presidency.[130]

However, from its formation until January 1943, Sāmī al-Ṣulḥ's cabinet was under attack from certain segments of the Maronite elites who claimed that the prime minister was conducting a "confessional" policy and promoting the idea of unification between Syria and Lebanon. When the Katā'ib renewed their activities and a confrontation with the Najāda seemed imminent, the British again began pressing for elections. On 24 January 1943 the *Comité français de la liberation nationale* finally agreed, and on 18 March Ayūb Thābit replaced Naqqāsh to prepare the country for elections that would be held three months later.[131] French involvement in the compilation of the electoral lists and British counter moves can be gleaned from the reports Spears submitted starting in February. For example, on 10 February, Spears relates that French officials were openly talking of a "French list of candidates." Although he never admits there was also a "British list" of candidates, his involvement is clear from the way he describes the activities in every district of Lebanon of British officials and from the comments he appended on the candidates and their relations with the British.[132]

The way the lists were prepared, the ongoing controversy between the president and the Muslim elites over the proportional representation of each community, the way coalitions were struck between candidates of the different communities and, not least, the interference of outside forces, the French as well as the British, are all factors that help shed light on the problems that would continue to plague Lebanon after the country had attained full independence. In the following chapter I offer a brief analysis of how these elections were conducted in order to point up the lasting impact 23 years of a colonial regime have had on the new territorial state of Lebanon. The 1943 elections over which Lebanon crossed from the colonial era independece. Some wonder until today whether Lebanon, as a nation, ever fully made it across.

CONCLUSION
1943

Elections

When it came to preparing the country for general elections, Catroux proved "extremely responsive to [the British] suggestions." On 18 March 1943, he re-established the Lebanese constitution, appointed Ayūb Thābit, Britain's "first choice as head of state," and promised that elections were "to take place within three months."[1] In a speech broadcast by *al-Sharq* radio the following day,[2] Spears sounded clearly satisfied at having prompted the French to take "the decision necessary to this end."[3] Catroux then issued an amendment of the constitution which did away with the system of appointing deputies, but otherwise left it largely unchanged. In other words, the constitution of 1926 continued to form the constitutional basis also for the Lebanese republic after independence[4].

Though their "first choice," Thābit showed himself determined to "resist British pressure for early elections,"[5] claiming he first wanted to reform the fiscal system and improve the economy, and wait until the Syrians had set a date for their elections.[6] But rumors soon began circulating that the new head of state was intent on changing the proportional distributions of the seats in the Chamber in favor of the Christians. This coincided with a reduction of the flour and rice rations the government was distributing. Beirut came to a halt between 20 to 24 May, with huge demonstrations in the Sunni quarters of the town, as well as in Sidon, Marjʿiyūn and Tripoli. According to Spears "there is some evidence that the closure [of the town] was exploited and prolonged for political ends by certain Moslem elements, amongst whom the Solhs were often mentioned."[7] Thābit's proposals to change the "proportional confessional" distribution of Chamber seats may have been intended as not more than a gesture toward the Maronite patriarch who continued to claim that the census of 1932 "aurait été fause en vue d'accroître la proportion" of the Muslims in Lebanon—al-Riyāshī called Thābit a "Protestant" who knew "when to be Protestant and when to be Maronite."[8]

Since neither the constitution nor the decree by which the head of state was appointed dealt with the electoral law, Thābit, as head of the executive and legislative branches, was authorized to issue decrees determining the number of deputies for each of the "recognized communities." Thus, on 17 June, the government duly published two decrees, Nos. 49 and 50,

> amending the electoral law. The first changed the method of calculating the number of deputies to be allotted to each district and introduced new principles to be taken into account when computing total population. The second laid down distribution of seats between the districts and communities and showed total number of Deputies to be raised from 42 (22 Christians and 20 Muslims) to 54 (32 Christians and 22 Muslims).[9]

Both were, of course, a sleight of hand, meant to ensure that the Christians continued to make up the majority of the Lebanese population. Decree No. 49 defines which Lebanese had a right to vote, article 4 declaring that the total number of the citizens of the country "comprises the registered residents since 31 December 1942 and the non-registered Lebanese who are abroad [but] had chosen [to keep] their Lebanese citizenship."[10] Many Muslim leaders refused outright to accept this article as it ignored their demand for a new census. It is at this point that "demography" becomes a key element in the entire "confessional" debate. As a British report indicated:

> [T]he decrees [of Thābit] roused the violent opposition of the Moslem community on the ground that the new division of seats … was manifestly unfair, since the total number of Moslems and Christians is generally believed to be equal. A gathering of prominent Lebanese Moslems in the Mufti's house June 19th took the opportunity of courtesy call by the *Délégué Générale* to demand his intervention to have the decrees rescinded, failing which they threatened that the Moslems would boycott the elections.[11]

Participants at the "Muslim Congress" called upon the French to abolish the decrees, and if not to conduct a new census. If their demands were not fulfilled, they threatened to boycott the elections and to send their protest to the representatives in Lebanon of Great Britain, the USA, Egypt and Iraq. To expedite matters, the congress established a committee comprising the *mufti,* Muḥammad Tawfiq Khālid, Riyād al-Ṣulḥ, Aḥmad al-Dā'ūq, 'Abdalla Bayhum, 'Abdalla al-Yāfi, Jamīl Makkāwī and seven others. In follow-up meetings of the congress not only Sunni but also Shi'i and Druze leaders took part while the Najāda distributed a leaflet adopting the resolutions of the congress.[12]

While Thābit's decrees succeeded in antagonizing most of the Muslim elites and consequently threatened to lead to "confessional" strife, they also prompted external intervention, notably by the British and the Egyptians. A British official reported that on 21 June a Muslim deputation "handed [him] a formal protest against the decrees … the French, US, Iraqi and Egyptian representatives have received similar notes. I expressed sympathy with the Moslem case."[13] Moreover, although Thābit at one point had promised to hold a census before the elections, there was no let-up in Muslim agitation,[14] which suggested there would be great "difficulties to hold the elections in the near future without risk of disturbances."[15] An official announcement that "the census will be held before the elections" was greeted as unrealistic because people recalled that the 1932 census had taken some eight months to prepare.[16]

To the British it was clear that this official announcement to hold a census was no more than tactics intended to pacify the Muslim leaders. Meanwhile, Thābit was "endeavouring to use the Najada leader, Jamil Makawi," who "for some time past [has been] under the influence of the Sûreté Générale," to stir up opposition to the Muslim Committee.[17] While most of the Muslim leaders remained firm in their stance, attempts by Makkāwī to express support for Thābit led to a split within the Najāda itself when Anīs Sghayr's followers revolted against him[18] This gave the British officials further reason to speculate that all Thābit tactics aimed at was to postpone the elections. They need not have worried. Faced by Thābit's "maneuvers," the Muslim leaders became more united than at any time over the past twenty years and some of them, notably Riyād al-Ṣulḥ, were "endeavouring to induce them as a community not only to boycott the elections, but also to demand the resignation" of Thābit. Meanwhile, Thābit's "behaviour" led some of the Muslim leaders to "contemplate putting forward the following two alternative demands: 1) that Lebanon be federated with Syria into one state retaining only a measure of local autonomy; or if this is unacceptable to Christians, 2) that the four districts added to Lebanon in 1920 (including Tripoli) be re-attached to Syria."[19]

To the patriarch and other Maronite elites this signaled that some of Sunni elites were ready to revert to their previous rejection of the Lebanese entity. But putting forward alternatives may have been a measure of last resort to get Thābit's decrees reversed. More significant is that, supported by Shi'is and Druzes, the Sunni elites now turned to "external" intervention either from the British or the Egyptians and Iraqis, to get Thābit's decrees scrapped. On 4 July Naḥḥās Pasha, Egypt's prime minister, addressed a letter to Catroux suggesting a new formula for the distribution of seats that might satisfy the Muslim leaders. The subject was raised also by Nūrī al-Sa'īd, the Iraqi prime minister, who visited Lebanon at the beginning of July. Knowing themselves backed by the two prime ministers, the Muslim Congress sent the British, American, Egyptian and Iraqi representatives copies of a second protest on 8 July addressed to Catroux in which they claimed that Thābit's government in promulgating the new electoral law had "(a) gone beyond the powers of their Mandates from Catroux and (b) committed an illegal act in including 159,000 Lebanese residing abroad in the total population figures."[20] The following day, for the first time since the issue of the decrees had erupted, Cartoux met with the *mufti* and other leaders of the Sunnis. As a result, also because of Egyptian intervention, Catroux adopted a new formula of distributing the seats according to the ratio Naḥḥās had suggested, i.e., giving the Christians 29 and Muslims 24. Meanwhile, Catroux promised to appoint a Muslim ('Abdalla Bayhum) as head of government to take over from Thābit. Catroux even went so far as to promise to hold a new census in order to solve the problem of the emigrants. But that proved too much for the Maronite patriarch and other Maronite leaders: "Unfortunately, however, a violent counter-agitation was started by Maronite Patriarch, Christians including clergy and Emile Edde … These

threatened to boycott elections depriving [them] of advantages afforded them by Tabit's decrees … Maronite Patriarch sent a message to Tabit promising full support."[21]

Before matters escalated into a full "confessional" dispute, both Sunni and Maronite elites realized too much was at stake here and began moving toward a compromise. Under the auspices of Catroux, negotiations on the distribution of seats began in mid-July between the patriarch, Thābit and Bayhum. Bayhum wanted to revert to the original total of 42 (22 Christians and 20 Muslims), while 'Arīḍa insisted that Tawfīq 'Awād, "his universally despised political factotum, should be given a portfolio" (of the Interior Ministry) to conduct the elections. 'Awād was from a prominent Maronite family of northern Lebanon, known as pro-French, and a cousin of the patriarch.[22] In an effort to ease the situation, the French authorities issued two decrees appointing Petro Ṭrāḍ, the elder Greek Orthodox politician, as head of state and 'Abdalla Bayhum and Tawfīq 'Awād as secretary and assistant secretary of state respectively.[23] However, the dispute over the distribution of seats continued for another two weeks, when a proposal by Spears, suggesting a ratio of 6:5 (30 Christians, 25 Muslim) was accepted by both the French and the Muslim Congress on condition that a complete census would be held within two years and Chamber seats would then be readjusted according to the results.[24] But the proposal was unacceptable in the eyes of the patriarch and some of the Maronite leaders who, "incited by Emile Eddé [were] … showing an increasingly uncompromising spirit in support of the Maronite Patriarch."[25] 'Arīḍa's first reaction was to call "his cousin ['Awād] and direct him to resign his post of Assistant Secretary of State."[26] However, pressure of the French authorities and British and Egyptian diplomatic intervention resulted in having 29 August fixed as the date of the elections. This left the patriarch and Eddé's faction little choice but to set aside their frustration and anger and recognize the new compromise formula as a *fait accompli*.[27] Patriarch 'Arīḍa duly announced that, although the Christian circles had their reservations about the formula, it was best to postpone the discussion on the subject until the next Chamber.[28]

The controversy over the distribution of Chamber seats that characterized the run-up to the elections of 1943 is a feature of all later elections in independent Lebanon. It has its roots in the "secrecy and sensitivity" surrounding the demographic issue. For the elites, well-versed in the game of ethnopolitics, "demography" is the key to "confessionalism," every one fully aware that certain red lines should not be crossed. Thus, since 1943 the distribution of seats in Lebanon's Parliament among the different communities depends, not on any "real demography," as reflected on the ground, but on the ability of the different elites to manipulate the issue of "demography" for their own "confessional cause."

That, until today, the "power-sharing" at the bottom of the Lebanese political system is presented by its "supporters" as based on "consensus," is only

possible because the issue of Lebanon's "real demography" is kept at bay. From 1932 until today, for some Christian elites "demography" has become a "sensitive" issue because it can affect or threaten this "consensus," while for certain Muslim elites it has become a weapon in their struggle to have the balance of power changed. Because the elections of 1943 serve as the model for all latter elections, it is this split between "real" and "virtual" demography that has kept the "Lebanese nation" divided into "communities." What is more, as the political system hinges on the "confessional" distribution of power among the elites, the "secrecy and sensitivity" invoked by the demographic issue have themselves become factors through which the system perpetuates itself.

As I argue, the pattern was set in 1943. As soon as a compromise had been reached on the distribution of the seats, the elites of the various communities returned to factionalism and picked up again their traditional rivalries. For example, the Sunni leaders had been united in their opposition to Thābit's electoral law, but, as Spears observed, when a compromise was reached at the beginning of August: "The unity which was shown by the Lebanese Moslems during the recent crisis is now being somewhat threatened by the electoral rivalries of the principal members."[29] Neither the British officers in Lebanon, nor the French Sûreté Générale report on any direct involvement on their part in the elections, the latter describing the game as internal competition between the various candidates. But when it reports on the formation of the lists, the Sûreté Générale provides a picture which, again, reinforces that factionalism within each community, and not sectarianism between the communities, was the decisive factor. For example, when mentioning the two principal lists of Beirut, the Sûreté Générale speaks of "les deux clans," the first headed by Sāmī al-Ṣulḥ, whose "présence à la chambre …serait un péril pour l'indépendance du Liban," and the second headed by 'Abdalla al-Yāfi, "appartenu au clan Eddé. Modéré dans ses sentiments politiques, malgré qu'il est musulman, il n'est pas à craindre pour l'indépendance du Liban." Significantly, the writer of the report is at a loss for an explanation when Ayūb Thābit and Alfred Naqqāsh, two "loyalist Lebanese," decide to join the nationalist list of Sāmī al-Ṣulḥ. Similarly, he finds it "étonnant de voir Saab Salam sur la liste de Abdalla Yafi, et non sur celle de Sami Solh dont il partage les principes (i.e., of nationalism)."[30] Other reports on the composition of the lists of Mt. Lebanon, southern Lebanon, Biqā' and northern Lebanon also indicate that clannish consideration played a major role in how they were put together. The people who appeared on the two lists of Mt. Lebanon, one headed by Bshara al-Khuri and the other by Emile Eddé, were given a slot in accordance with the factions that represented the different religious communities. Clannish division is clearer in the north and its major city, Tripoli, where there were two competing lists, that of the Muqaddams and that of the Karāmīs.[31] Each candidate on one list had a rival belonging to his own community on the opposite list. For example, the Maronite candidates, Jawād Bulus, Tawfiq 'Awād, Charles al-Khūrī, Nadra 'Isā

al-Khūrī and Antoine Shāhīn on Muqaddam's list have as their rivals Ḥamīd Franjiyya, Yūsuf Istephan Joseph Ḍaū and Wahīb Ja'ja' on Karāmī's list. Khālid 'Abd Qādir, Nadīm al-Jisr, Mu'īn Qaddūr and Naṣṣūḥ al-Faḍl, the Sunnis candidates on Muqaddam's list, competed with Muḥammad al-'Abbūd, Sulaymān al-'Alī, Muḥammad al-Muṣṭafā and Sa'dī al-Manla on Karāmī's list. The rivalry between the two lists also invited intensive British and French intervention, while violence led to casualties on both sides, especially in Tripoli. As supporter of Karāmī list, Spears reported that the followers of Rāshid Muqaddam had "indulged in a series of aggressions against the followers of ['Abd al-Ḥamīd] Karāmī," which had resulted in two deaths. Spears accused the French of backing Muqaddam, whose implication in drug dealing was known to both the French and the British. British pressure led to Rāshid Muqaddam being put under house arrest which raised the question whether he could at all present his candidacy in the elections.[32] According to Spears, the British action had "convinced the population in general and the Mokaddems in particular, that the British authorities will eventually have their way." Ten days before the elections, Muqaddam's clan hastened to nominate Dr 'Umar Muqaddam instead of Rāshid at the lead of their list.[33] During the elections, Rāshid Muqaddam was supposed to remain under house arrest, but still succeeded in playing an active role in the elections, in spite of British protest:[34]

> They were pro-French because they had, by bribing minor officials, amassed fortunes generally in the drug traffic. Vaunting their pro-French views they enjoyed high protection. The [Rāshid] Mokaddem case may be quoted as an example … This gangster (also accused of several murders) had been caught by the British Army in possession of vast quantities of drugs. What made the case so serious was that he had bribed British soldiers to get his drugs into Egypt. The French insisted on trying him by a French Court Martial. When the British Army found it was intended to release him, they declared they would re-arrest him. So serious was the position that Churchil had to intervene. Finally a typical compromise was achieved. He was to be kept under house arrest at his home in Tripoli until after the elections so that he could exert his influence as the French Authorities desired.[35]

Two days before the elections Spears becomes even more vociferous in his protests against French intervention and the way they were forming pro-French lists all over Lebanon,[36] while the French Sûreté Générale was busy collecting any information they could find on British involvement in the election campaign.[37] In one particular case, Spears admitted that a British officer "had spoken at several election meetings in favour of Sami Solh"; he promised to investigate the affair, though he considered the intervention of this officer as a "private" one.[38]

In order to promote their supporters among the candidates, the French Sûreté Générale routinely collected as much information as they could on every candidate, i.e., age, economic situation, education, political affiliation, family relations and popularity. While in the peripheral areas they were usually satisfied

with information on clan division and factionalism, in Beirut intelligence reached all the way down to divisions among the *qabadayāt.* Already in February 1943, one month after the French had accepted to hold elections, the Sûreté Générale came up with a report listing eighty-one names of *qabadayāt* within nine Muslim quarters of Beirut and indicating who their patrons were among the *zu'ama.* As it turned out fifty-six of these *qabadayāt* were clients of the Ṣulḥs while the others were supporters of 'Abdalla al-Yāfī, the Dā'ūqs, Ayūb Thābit, Henri Far'ūn, Nuṣūlī, Makkāwī, or were simply "*profiteurs.*"[39]

There are no details on how the French authorities used this information on the *qabadayāt*, except for an undated note entitled "*Pour un projet d'action dans les quartiers musulmans*" which shows how the French mobilized the *qabadayāt* against the Ṣulḥs. First, they chose someone by the name of Michel Shiḥādī to head the project, because the family of Shiḥādī "avait des rélations et des amitiés dans les familles musulmannes." Shiḥādī was to contact Ḥasan al-Fīl and Abu 'Afif Ba'darānī, two influential *qabadayāt* who "auraient pour mission de faire échec aux agents de Riad [al-Ṣulḥ] ou de freiner leur actions." The note gives them instructions on the "mode de propagande" and "moyen d'action," always in consultation with the Cabinet Politique. So as to then translate these instructions into action directed against the Ṣulḥs, the note gives the names of "neutral" *qabadayāt* in each quarter and spells out how Shiḥādī could buy their support.[40]

The National Pact

Nonetheless, it was clear that by now the French had lost their predominant position as the sole colonial player in Lebanese politics. There now were the British whose agenda in Lebanon was dictated by their overall colonial policy in the Middle East. Not only was their sphere of influence much larger than that of the French, the strategic and economic interests the region had for the British—as the land route to India and because of the oil reserves in Iraq, for example—made it politically far more significant for them than it was for the French. Thus, while the French tried to preserve their erstwhile position through their traditional supporters among the Lebanese elites, the British realized it made better political sense to try and effect rapprochement between Christian leaders loyal to Lebanese independence and Muslim leaders whom the French had always rejected as "Arab nationalists" since their ideas and activities undermined the existence of Lebanon as a separate state. The 1930s, however, had shown that Muslim as well as Christian elites could work together and find a formula for cooperation. The presence of the British military force but, more importantly, British policy to see Lebanon as an integral part of the Arab Middle East formed a natural backdrop against which Muslims and Christians could strengthen cooperation between them.

In other words, in the early 1940s, when Maronite-Christian and Sunni-Muslim leaders renewed their cooperation, they could do so on much the same basis which in the 1930s had brought together "Lebanonising Muslims and Arabising Christians." Lebanese historiography generally portrays the National Pact as the natural outcome of these efforts, which were then sealed in a meeting between Bshara al-Khuri and Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ before al-Khuri's election as president on 21 September 1943. This version gained currency upon the publication of Rabbath's *La formation historique du Liban*, which endorses Yūsuf Ibrāhīm Yazbak's claim that in their meeting the two leaders had successfully worked out a compromise formula bringing together the Lebanism of the Maronites and the Arabism of the Muslims.[41]

A somewhat more cynical approach suggests that behind it all was mainly al-Khuri's drive to mobilize enough supporters among the deputies of the new Parliament for his presidential candidacy. When he wrote his memoirs seventeen years later the "National Pact" was a fact of Lebanon's political life, but even then al-Khuri places it unequivocally within the context of his campaign for the presidency. One day before his election, al-Khuri completed the round of meetings that would give him his victory. He then "spent all the night preparing [his] speech" which set out the "new approach which [he] insisted to follow … that is to say, a declaration of the National Pact … and leaving behind Lebanon's isolationism from the Arab countries."[42] The situation is highly reminiscent of 1932–33: then, too, al-Khuri reverted to Arabist discourse in order to secure being elected. Spears, who followed the campaign for the presidency closely, saw this clearly: "Eddé was known to enjoy French backing and to favour a reactionary and isolationist national policy, whereas al-Khuri, who had been chief sufferer from French election intrigues advocated a policy of reasonable co-operation with neighbouring states—though he is far from being an out and out pan-Arab."[43]

What remains is to try to spell out the logic in the game Lebanon's elites were playing. As we have seen, sectarian and regional disputes among them prevailed prior to the composition of the electoral lists. Clannish competition then took over when alliances needed to be forged between leaders so as to secure successful lists. Finally, after the results were in, national discourse came to the fore and for a while would blur the sectarian and clannish dispute. If we look at the candidates in the elections of 1943, their previous political activities, their social background and the maneuvers they resorted to while running in the elections, we find that national ideologies played only a minor role in the composition of election lists. Without following every single list that took part in the elections of 1943, it is quite clear that negotiations differed little from previous ones, nor would lists for later elections be set up in any other way. Because they continued to be confessional and regional, the alliances that leaders formed were almost exclusively motivated by the chances their list would give them to become elected. Taking, for example, Mt. Lebanon and the South,

regions in which Bshara al-Khuri and Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ respectively ran in the elections, we find on the list of their opponents leaders whose political stances concerning Lebanism and Arabism deviated little or nothing from theirs. Apart from al-Khuri and Eddé, whose rivalry went back to the 1920s, candidates on the two lists in Mt. Lebanon were primarily concerned with the internal balance of forces within their region and their respective community. Even in their choice of allies, al-Khuri and Eddé never took in consideration a candidate's position vis-à-vis the national dimension of the elections. One day before the elections, the French administrative consultant in Mt. Lebanon admitted that a French categorization of the lists between pro-French, pro-British or pro-Arab made little sense: "Every candidate was looking for his own private interests, though Spears paid lots of money to promote the success of al-Khuri's list."[44] It also seems clear that negotiations for Eddé's list had been going on since April. Naẓīra Junblāṭ's refusal to have Amīn Nakhla appear on the same list as Ḥikmat Junblāṭ, in which she was supported by Ayūb Thābit, the Maronite patriarch and Mgr. Mubārak, provided one of the snags, as Naẓīra intimated that the Junblāṭs of al-Mukhtāra might otherwise support al-Khuri's list.[45] Subsequently, Ḥikmat was duly replaced by Kamāl Junblāṭ.[46] The same picture arises in southern Lebanon. The political position toward Arabism and Lebanism of Yūsuf al-Zayn, Jawād Sharaf al-Dīn, ʿAbd al-Raʾūf Amīn, Saʿīd ʿUsayrān and Kāmil Ḥalāwī, the Shiʿi candidates, was no different from that of Aḥmad al-Asʿad, ʿAdil ʿUsayrān, Kāẓim al-Khalīl, ʿAlī ʿAbdalla, Muḥammad al-Faḍl and Rashīd Bayḍūn. If there was a difference, it had to do with the fact that Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ appeared as a candidate on the list of Aḥmad al-Asʿad. On 18 August, Spears wrote that he had been relieved to see Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ and ʿAdil ʿUsayrān joining Asʿad's list. ʿAdil ʿUsayrān had become "convinced of the impossibility successfully fighting the strong list composed by Ahmad el-Asad in conjunction with Riad es-Solh (who, somewhat unexpectedly, decided to stand for the South Lebanon instead of Beirut) … which has aroused the ire of the French Conseiller of Sidon."[47]

Thus, even if in nationalist discourse the "National Pact" is still frequently explained as a successful meshing of Arabist and Lebanist ideas, there remains the irony that it came about only thanks to the confessional and factional dimension of the game played out under the French and the British colonial regime between the elites of Lebanon's different communities among themselves and between them and the Mandatory powers. In other words, the National Pact is the product of a balancing of forces on two levels, internal and international, in which finally it was Great Britain and not France, which had the upper hand in determining the fate of the country. The National Pact, as a formula for the distribution of state power between confessional and factional elites, was not a new phenomenon. However, if in historical perspective this formula is portrayed as irreversible, this is because Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ and ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Karāmī's integration within the Lebanese system meant the

culmination of the long process that saw the Sunni Muslims elites gradually adapting to the rules of the confessionalist game that—now more than ever before—kept the system in place. That the formula could survive until the Ṭā'if agreement of 1989 was because basically the rules never changed, not even during the crises of 1952, 1958 and the protracted civil war of 1975–1989. Significantly, the latter were solved through the intervention by outside forces and through compromises between the players on the basis of the 1943 formula—even the amendment in the Ṭā'if agreement about power sharing failed to transcend it in basic outlines. Until today, though proportional distributions among the communities and regions have changed, elections continue to be confessional and regional. In other words, as for every election they maintain the general characteristics of 1943, the elites and the political system reproduce themselves but they can only do so as long as Lebanon's "real demography" is kept at bay.

As his integration within the system could be interpreted by some as though he had jettisoned his Arabism, Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ, in his Ministerial declaration of policy, reiterated that he remained committed to seeing Lebanon as an integral part of the Arab world and to abolishing "confessionalism."[48] Two weeks earlier, al-Ṣulḥ had spoken in more symbolic terms of the policy he favored when he "declared [that the] Lebanese flag, which is the tricolour, having a cedar of Lebanon on white bands, should be replaced by the Arab colours, the cedar alone being retained from the old flag."[49] In the event, neither his promise to do away with confessionalism, nor his suggestion to adopt "Arab colors" for the Lebanese flag were ever followed up. On 11 November 1943, during a time when Parliament was on the whole occupied with changing the Constitution, five deputies—Sa'dī al-Manla, Henri Far'ūn, Ṣā'ib Salām, Rashīd Bayḍūn and Mārūn Kan'ān—presented an amendment to Article 5 proposing that the French tricolor would be replaced by red bands, but with the green cedar retained in the middle against a purely white background.[50] When, later that month, the Chambers approved the new Article 5, to what extent may they have been aware that the Cedar of the Lebanon was now throwing its shadow far beyond the region that formed its original home?

NOTES

Preface

1 Barbara J. Smith, *The Roots of Separatism in Palestine. British Economic Policy, 1920–1929* (Syracuse 1993), p. 4.
2 Cf., for example, Reeva S. Simon, "The Imposition of Nationalism on a Non-Nation State. The Case of Iraq during the Interwar Period, 1921–1941," in Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski (eds.), *Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East* (New York 1997), pp. 87–104.
3 Cf. Barbara Smith, pp. 3–4: "That the Zionist Settler movement, unable to make much headway under Ottoman rule, was nurtured and eventually thrived within the British Colonial context is undeniable. Within a few years of the inception of the British Administration, the Zionists had the beginnings of a national economic base underpinning their demonstrably nationalistic ideology."
4 Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism. A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism* (London and New York 1998), p. 4.
5 Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge 1983), p. 13.
6 Ibid.
7 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London and New York 1991, revised ed.), p. 5; the other two are of course: "(2) The formal universality of nationality as a socio-cultural concept—in the modern world everyone can, should, will "have" a nationality, as he or she "has" a gender —vs. the irremediable particularity of its concrete manifestations, such that, by definition, "Greek" nationality is sui generis. (3) The "political" power of nationalisms vs. their philosophical poverty and even incoherence. In other words, nationalism has never produced its own grand thinkers: no Hobeses, Tocquevilles, Marxes, or Webers." (ibid.).
8 Gershoni and Jankowski, *Rethinking Nationalism*, p. xiv.

Chapter one

1 Bishop Murad served as envoy of the Maronite Patriarch first to Istanbul, in 1842, and then, two years later, to Paris in a mission to obtain support for the restoration of the Shihābī princes. Murad's treatise opens with a letter addressed to King Louis Philippe in which he sets out the close economic and religious relations that tie the French and Maronite "nations," in the hope of winning the king's personal support for the Maronite "principality." As Murad wrote in French, "nation" reflected French usage of the term and stood for "community" or "race." Cf. Iliya Harik, *Political Changes in a Traditional Society: Lebanon, 1711–1845* (New Haven 1968), pp. 140–141; cf. Carol Hakim-Dowek, "The Origins of the Lebanese National Idea 1840–1914," (D.Phil. Dissertation, St Antony's College, Oxford 1997).pp. 86-102.

2 In late May 1860 civil strife erupted in Mount Lebanon between Muslims and Christians which spilled over to Damascus where, on 9 July, a number of Christians were killed. Interference of the European powers led to the Beirut Committee of 1861-62 which, chaired by Fū'ād Pasha, the Ottoman foreign minister, decided on the establishment of the independent *mutaṣarrifiyya* of Lebanon. On the 1860 civil strife, see Kais M. Firro, *A History of the Druzes* (Leiden 1992), pp. 119-126; on the riots in Damascus, see Linda S. Schilcher, *Families in Politics. Damascene Factions and Estates of the 18th and 19th Centuries* (Stuttgart 1985), pp. 87–106; cf. also Leila Fawaz, *An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860* (London 1994).

3 Kamal Salibi, *Maronite Historians of Medieval Lebanon* (American University of Beirut Faculty Press, Beirut 1959), pp. 23–87; Harik, *Political Changes*, p. 13. Cf. also D. Chevallier: "In the case of the Maronite Christians, they have explained, or justified, their geographical and human association with the ancient and Biblical designation of 'Lebanon,' and the extension of the latter over the whole of the country," "Lubnān," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 2nd ed. (Leiden 1986), vol. 5, p. 791. See also Ahmad Beydoun, *Identité confessionelle et temps social chez les historiens libanais contemporains* (Lebanese University, Beirut 1984), pp. 25-127, and Kamal Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions. The History of Lebanon Reconsidered* (London 1985). The first Maronite author, outside the circles of the clergy, to formulate notions of a Maronite self-image as "nation" was probably Ṭannūs al-Shidyāq in his, *Kitāb Akhbār al-A'yān fī Jabal Lubnān*, history of the main notable families of Mt. Lebanon's different communities. Al-Shidyāq's Lebanon is more pluralistic than that of the Maronite clergy. Significantly, in the geography given early on in the book Mt. Lebanon corresponds more or less with the *mutaṣarrifiyya* established a year later. But when he speaks of "the Lebanese Phoenician cities" of the coast, he makes Lebanon already extend beyond the Mountain (and Phoenicia into the hills). For al-Shidyāq the Mardaites, ruling the northern parts of the Mountain, were subsequently subsumed in the Maronite community.

4 Cf. Sa'īd Murād, *al-Ḥaraka al-Waḥdawiyya fī Lubnān Bayna al-Ḥarbayn al-'Alamiyatayn, 1914–1946* (The Nationalist Movement in Lebanon between the Two World Wars, 1914-1946) (Beirut 1986), pp. 15–76. Cf. also Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, p. 70: "As an adjective of Lebanon, the term Lebanese is exclusively modern. After the creation of the Mutesarrifate of Mount Lebanon, the term came to have a limited administrative use. Most of the people of the mutesarrifate simply called themselves Syrians, and only the most ardent among the early Christian advocates of Lebanese national particularism spoke of themselves as Lebanese." Bilād al-Shām, "Greater Syria," denotes those parts of the Ottoman empire that today make up Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine and Israel.

5 See Edmond Rabbath, *La formation historique du Liban politique et constitutionnel, Essai de synthèse* (Beirut 1973), p. 220. Albert Hourani, "Lebanon: The Development of a Political Society," in Leonard Binder (ed.), *Politics in Lebanon* (New York, London and Sydney, 1966), p. 23; Meir Zamir, *The Formation of Modern Lebanon* (London 1985), p. 18.

6 Kamal Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon* (London 1965), pp. 157-158.

7 Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939* (London 1962; repr. Cambridge 1988), p. 275.

8 M. Jouplain [Bulus Nujaym], *La question du Liban* (Paris 1908), pp. 589–590 (2nd ed. [Jounieh, 1961]: p. 545).

9 Jouplain, p. 582. On the relationship between Jouplain's arguments and the creation of Greater Lebanon, see Zamir, pp. 15-16; see also 'Iṣām Khalīfa, *al-Ḥudūd al-Janūbiyya li-Lubnān, Bayna Mawāqif Nukhab al-Tawā'if wal-Ṣirā' al-Dawlī, 1908-1936* (The Southern Frontiers of Libanon, between the Positions of the Communal Elites and the International Struggle), (Lebanon 1985), p. 20.

10 Henri Lammens, "Tasrīḥ al-Abṣār fī ma Yaḥtawīhī Lubnān mina al-Athār" (Overview of Lebanese Archaological Sites), *al-Mashriq*, Revue Catholique Orientale Bimensuelle (1902), vol. 5, nos. 1, 2, 8, 10, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18 (pp. 21–26, 106–114, 361–367, 440–445, 584–588, 640–646, 759–763, 804–809, 826–831, resp.). As to how he saw the

relationship between Lebanon and Syria, Lammens argued that "a Lebanon for Syria is like the Nile for Egypt" (10, p. 441). Lammens' articles were later published in two volumes under the same title, *Tasrīḥ al-Abṣār* (2nd ed., Beirut, 1982). In the first edition of his *Fī Sabīl Lubnān* (Alexandria 1919, pp. 290-291), Yūsuf al-Sawdā quotes Lammens from *al-Mashriq* in order to justify extending the frontiers of Lebanon. In a second edition (1923) the quotation from Lammens has disappeared because the author now extends the southern border all the way to Rās al-Nāqūra; see ibid., 3rd ed. (Beirut 1988), p. 327.

11 Zamir, pp. 22–23.

12 Rabbath, *La formation historique*, p. 281.

13 Yūsuf al-Sawdā, *Istiqlāl Lubnān wal-Itiḥād al-Lubnānī fī al-Iskandaria* (The Independence of Lebanon and the [Party of] Lebanese Unity in Alexandria) (n.d.), p. 49. For a survey of the latter's activities, see the reports of the French delegates in Egypt in 'Iṣām Khalīfa, *Abḥāth fī Tārīkh Lubnān al-Mu'āṣr* (Studies in the History of Modern Lebanon) (Beirut, n.d.), pp. 100-109. Since al- Sawdā wrote his book a few years later, it is difficult to ascertain whether indeed *al-Itiḥād al-Lubnānī* had already in 1909 adopted what in 1919 became the "nationalist ambitions" of these Lebanese societies for Greater Lebanon. What is certain is that more than any other Lebanese society, from 1912 and notably in 1919, *al-Itiḥād al-Lubnāni* carried the expansion of Lebanon in its banner.

14 Demands of the society presented to the French on 14 May 1919, cited in al-Sawdā, *Istiqlāl Lubnān*, ibid., p. 112.

15 On the territorial question of Greater Lebanon and the maps presented by the Lebanese delegation, see 'Iṣām Khalīfa, *al-Ḥudūd al-Janūbiyya,* pp. 40-46; 182–185.

16 *Le Matin*, 23 August 1919, quoted in Rabbath, *La formation historique*, p. 304. On Mukarzil's activities see Khalīfa, *Abḥāth*, pp. 110–115.

17 Zamir, p. 55.

18 Archives of Chamber of Commerce of Marseilles, *Congrès français de la Syrie, Séances et Travaux*, 3 vols. (Paris and Marseilles 1919). The first volume contains the *Compte rendu de la mission française en Syrie*, written by its head, Paul Huvelin, under the title *Que vaut la Syrie*. The second volume contains the *Section d'archéologie, histoire, géographie et ethnographie,* mainly dealing with the "traditional relation" between France and Syria since the time of the Crusaders. The third volume contains the *Section de l'enseignement*, in which one may find valuable information on the role of the French and Western schools in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. On the activities of the chambers of commerce, see MQ.5.4, *Commerce international, Syrie et Liban, 1885-1926*; *Série L. IX, no 774; Série L, no 775, Correspondence* & *documents no. 37-50.* In all these *dossier*s, one can find the correspondences between the chamber of commerce of Marseilles with other French chambers of commerce, with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and with other French institutions concerning "*La Syrie, que la France doit réclamer*" from Taurus to al-'Arīsh. In the dossier *Correspondence* & *documents* No. 37–50, there is a map "*Croquis de la Syrie et de la Mésopotamie*," showing this *Syrie française*. The same *Syrie* was accepted by the chamber of commerce of Lyon. See *dossiers Syrie vol. 2029, Documents divers, 1918-1924*, Mission en Syrie, 1919–1920 F(2029); *Congrès français de la Syrie.*

19 For the American missionaries, "Syria" was a territorial unit (*waṭan*) whose culture, ethnography and history had fostered the discrete characteristics of the "Syrians"; "Phoenicia" is a significant component; see Khalīl Khurī, *Kharābāt Sūriā* (The Syrian Ruins), (Beirut 1860); Mikhā'īl Mishāqā, *al-Jawāb 'Alā Iqtirāh al-Aḥbāb* (The Answer for Lovers' Suggestion) (eds. Asad Rustum and Subḥi Abu Shaqrā), (Beirut 1955); Iliyās Maṭr, *al-'Uqūd al-Duriyya fī Tārīkh al-Mamlaka al-Sūriyya* (The Pearly Necklaces in the History of the Syrian Kingdom), (Beirut 1874); George Yannī, *Tārīkh Sūria* (History of Syria), (Beirut 1881).

20 Nadra Moutran, *La Syrie de demain,* (Paris 1916), p. 97.

21 See Rabbath, *La formation historique*, pp. 279–280; Zamir, p. 23; Khalīfa, *Abḥāth*, pp. 74-75; 116.

22 Quoted in Zeine N. Zeine, *The Struggle for Arab Independence* (New York, 2nd ed., 1977), p. 68, and then in Rabbath, *La formation historique*, p. 280.
23 On the activities, personalities and publications of the committee in Egypt, see Khalifa, *Abḥāth*, pp. 81-84.
24 MAE, Levant, 1919–1929, Syrie-Liban-Cilicie, vol. 6; quoted in Khalīfa, *Abḥāth,* pp. 85. Among those who signed were Ayūb Thābit, Jubrān Khalīl Jubrān, ʻAbd al-Masīḥ Ḥaddād, and Nasīb ʻArīḍa; absent are the names of Mikhāʾīl Nuʻayma, Amīn al-Riḥānī and Iliyā Abu Māḍī.
25 On the demands of the Committee of Brazil, see Khalīfa, *Abḥāth,* pp. 87–88.
26 On the development of the Arab nationalist ideas during the last decades of Ottoman empire, see Mahmud Hadad, "The Rise of Arab Nationalism Reconsidered," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 26(1994), pp. 201-222.
27 On the Arab Congress and its relations with the Beirut Reform Society, see Zeine Nur Zeine, *Arab-Turkish Relations and the Emergence of Arab Nationalism* (Beirut, 1958), pp. 73-95; Philip Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate, The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945* (New Jersey 1987), pp. 29-30; Stephen M. Longrigg, *Syria and Lebanon under French Mandate* (London-New York-Toronto 1958), pp. 29-30; Zamir, pp. 30-33; Ḥassān Ḥallāq, *Dirāsāt fī Tārīkh Lubnān al-Muʻāṣr 1913-1914* (Studies in the Modern History of Lebanon, 1913-1943) (Beirut 1985), pp. 13-41; Fūʾād Saʻdūn, *Al-Ḥaraka al-Islāḥiyya fī Bayrūt fī Awākhir al-ʾAṣr al-ʾUthmānī* (The Reformist Movements in Beirut at the End of the Ottoman Period), (Beirut 1994), pp. 49-126.
28 E.g., Iskander ʻAmmūn, brother of Dāūd ʻAmmūn who headed the first Lebanese delegation to the Peace Conference, shifted his political affiliation from Greater Lebanon in 1912 to Greater Syria in 1913, to Arab unity in 1917, and then back to Greater Syria in 1919; see Khalīfa, *al-Ḥudūd,* p. 25; Ḥallāq, *Dirāsāt* p. 36. Naʻūm Mukarzil similarly shifted his position several times — in the Arab Congress he spoke of the Arab Revival (see Ḥallāq, *Dirāsāt*, p. 36), while in 1911 he supported Greater Lebanon (see Khalīfa, *al-Ḥudūd,* pp. 20-21); others, like Charles Dabbās and George Samné became, in 1919–20, some of the most important figures supporting Greater Lebanon.
29 See Ḥallāq, *Dirāsāt*, pp. 31–33; on the French interest in the Congress, see Khoury, pp. 29-30.
30 This classification, first adopted by Rabbath, *La formation historique*, pp. 276-287, is then followed by many Lebanese historians; see, e.g., Murād, *al-Ḥaraka al-Waḥdawiyya*, p. 101; Khalīfa, *Abḥāth,* pp. 73-120; *al-Ḥudūd,* pp. 19-29, and Wajīh Kawthrānī, *al-Itijahāt al-Ijtimāʻiyya was-Siyāsiyya fī Jabal Lubnān wal-Mashriq al-ʻArabī* (The Social and Political Trends in Mt. Lebanon and the Eastern Arab Countries), (2nd ed., Beirut 1986) pp. 221-297, who locates it within the imperialist intervention in the region and the differing impact the latter had on the intellectuals and leaders of the period.
31 Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions,* p. 200.
32 See Rabbath, *La formation historique,* p. 285.
33 See, e.g., Ḥallāq, *Dirāsāt*, pp. 45-54; Murād, *al-Ḥaraka al-Waḥdawiyya*, pp 79-112.
34 Although these historians share the idea that the history of "Lebanon" runs separately from that of the "Arabs," their interpretations differ in ways that reflect confessional historiography; for an analysis of the confessional dimension of Lebanese historiography, see Beydoun, pp. 129–157, 513–565.
35 Ibid., pp. 69–73; Ḥallāq, *Dirāsāt*, pp. 13-41.
36 See especially Chapter 2, notes 20–60.
37 Khairallah Khairallah, *La Syrie* (Paris 1912). Khairallah's oscillation led to a debate among the Lebanese historians; in his *Paysans et institutions féodales chez les Druses et les Maronites du Liban du XVIIe siècle à 1914,* 2 vols (Beirut 1971–2), Toufic Touma writes (vol. 1, p. 680) that even though he titled his book *La Syrie*, Kairallah was one of the supporters of Greater Lebanon; Kawtharānī (*al-Itijāhāt,*pp. 99, 210–211) considers Khairallah as propagating the French colonial point of view on Syria and Lebanon, hinting that his Syrianism was no more

than *naz'a infiṣāliyya* (an isolatistionist trend). 'Iṣām Khalīfa sees Khairallah as one of the first intellectuals who saw no contradiction between Greater Lebanon and pan-Arabism and thus combined the Lebanism of Greater Lebanon with an Arabism that would "secure a dynamic Arab unity based on common language and spirit, and on common strategy, economy and history"; 'Iṣām Khalīfa, *Fi Mu'tarak al-Qaḍiyya al-Lubnāniyya* (On the Struggle for the Lebanese cause), (Lebanon 1985), pp. 67-68 (Khalīfa considers Kawtharānī's interpretation as inspired by the author's confessional position and thus lacking the necessary logic to back up his arguments; n. 58, p. 83).

38 Moutran, *La Syrie,* "Introduction," p. i.
39 Ibid., p. 29.
40 Ibid., p. 137.
41 Ibid., "Introduction," p. vi.
42 Ibid., p. 30.
43 Ibid., p. 33.
44 Georges Samné, *La Syrie,* (Paris 1920) "Introduction by Ghānim," pp. xvii–xviii.
45 Ibid., p. xi.
46 Ibid., p. xix.
47 Ibid., p. 25.
48 Ibid., p. 216.
49 The map gives as the southern frontier the Qasmiyya river, ibid., p. 224, and may well have been "invented" during 1919 because some of those who relied on this map extended the southern frontier to Rās al-Nāqūra or the present frontier of Lebanon; see e.g., Na'ūm Mukarzil's version of the French map of 1860.
50 Samné, p. 230.
51 Samné devoted large sections of his book to three factors he sees as having destroyed Syria: *l'impérialisme hedjazien,* British policy, and the Zionist project; ibid., pp. 375-581.
52 Ibid., p. 254.
53 Ibid., pp. 258–259.
54 Jacques Tabet, *La Syrie* (Paris 1920), p. 15.
55 Ibid., p. 16.
56 Ibid., p. 29.
57 Ibid., p. 34.
58 Ibid., p. 35.
59 Ibid., p. 44.
60 Ibid., p. 58.
61 Ibid., pp. 63–64.
62 Quoted from M. R. Ristelhuber, whom Tabet considers a "prominent orientalist," ibid., pp. 65-66.
63 Ibid., p. 66.
64 Ibid., p. 88.
65 Ibid., p. 94.
66 Ibid., pp. 94–95.
67 Ibid., pp. 96–97.
68 Ibid., p. 151.
69 Ibid., pp. 257–258.
70 Ibid., p. 259.
71 On al-Qilā'ī and al-Dūwayhī, see Beydoun, pp. 161-208; Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions,* pp. 77–86.
72 Lammens traces the Mardaites to a military group of 12,000 people who settled in Mt. Lebanon in the seventh century, brought there by the Byzantines to help defend the coastal region of Syria; *al-Jarājima* is the name they were given by the local Arabs. For Lammens Mardaites and Maronites are two different groups. Using the same sources but reaching the opposite conclusion, Dibs holds that Mardaites (Arabic for *marada*, insurgents who revolted

against the Byzantine empire) was the name the Maronites were given in the seventh century by their enemies. According to Diriān, another name for the same people is *mardyun* and they are neither Maronites nor *al-Jarājima* but came from Armenia, "the land of the Mardaites." Diriān then argues that Mardaites and *al-Jarājima* at one point fused to become the Maronite people. Diriān's intervention in the debate led Dibs later to add that *al-Jarājima* were Maronites too, see Beydoun, pp. 161-208.

73 Yūsuf al-Sawdā, *Tārīkh Lubnān al-Ḥaḍārī* (History of Lebanon's Civilization), (Beirut, 1972), p. 153; see also the chapter on Lebanon in the Mardaite period in his *Fī Sabīl Lubnān* (For Lebanon), (3rd ed., 1988), pp. 43-52, where he praises the resistance of the "Lebanese Mardaites" against the Arab-Muslims: "Instead of respecting the inclination of its [Lebanon's] people for freedom and independence …. by their desire for domination and conquest, they [the Arabs] seized every available opportunity to engage in war against the Lebanese," whose resistance prevented the Arabs from achieving their goal to occupy Constantinople, the capital of Byzantium; ibid., pp. 44-48; Cf. Buṭrus Ḍaū, *Tārīkh al-Māwarina al-Dīnī wal-Siyāsī wal-Ḥaḍārī* (Religious, Political and Cultural History of the Maronites), 5 vols. (Beirut, 1970-1980), vol. 1, pp. 283-287.

74 Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge 1982, repr. 1992), p. 13.

75 Ibid., pp. 13-14 (italics added).

76 Ibid., p. 14, and, of course, Anderson, p. 5.

77 For several Muslim leaders and intellectuals the French were guilty not only of having divided Syria but also of having served some "separatist elements" within the Maronites; see, e.g., Muḥammad J. Bayhum, *Lubnān Bayna Musharriq wa-Mugarrib, 1920-1969* (Beirut 1970), pp. 14–50.

78 Chiha's sister was married to Bshara al-Khuri while he himself had married the sister of Henri Far'ūn, his partner in the Far'ūn-Chiha bank they owned together (from 1919 to his death in 1954, Chiha was director of the bank).

79 Further on Michel Chiha's ideas and activities, see Evelyne Boustos, *Michel Chiha; Evocations* (Beirut 1956); Fawaz N. Traboulsi, "*Identités et solidarités croisées dans le conflit du Liban contemporain*" (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Paris VIII, Paris 1993), pp. 298-363.

80 For further details on the opposition, see Rabbath, *La formation historique*, pp. 378-379; Murād, *al-Ḥaraka al-Waḥdawiyya,* pp. 129-188; Zamir, pp. 182-196.

81 See: Amīn Sa'īd, *al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya al-Kubrā,* 3 vols. (Cairo n.d.), vol. 3, p. 433; Zamir, p. 196; Michel Van Leeuw, "*Pour le Liban avec la France, Biographie d'Emile Eddé, 1884–1949*," MA Thesis University of Rennes (1986), pp. 113-115; Murād, *al-Ḥaraka al-Waḥdawiyya*, p. 184.

82 The Representative Council was the successor of the Administrative Council of the *mutaṣarrifiyya* of Mount Lebanon. Established by the French in 1922, the Representative Council consisted of two chambers representing the communities in accordance with the population's census of 1921; see Rabbath, *La formation historique*, pp. 355–357; Raymond Saygh, *Le parlement libanais* (Beirut 1974), pp. 23–24.

83 See Zamir, p. 192.

84 For further information and details on the historical background to the constitution, see Rabbath, *La formation historique,* pp. 365-286.

85 Describing and explaining the work of the Constitution Committee, Rabbath quotes extracts from *al-Nahār*; see Edmond Rabbath, *La constitution libanaise, Origines, textes et commentaires* (Beirut 1982), 32-43.

86 For an analysis of the different sources of "inspiration" behind the Lebanese constitution, see Rabbath, *La constitution libanaise,* pp. 49-58; see also, Antoine Azar, *Le Liban face à demain: Modèle communautaire à équilibre instable. Problématique de l'Etat moderne* (Paris 1978), p. 18.

87 Bshara al-Khuri's memoirs, *Ḥaqā'iq Lubnāniyya,* 3 vols. (Beirut 1960), vol. 1, p. 133.

88 Quoted in Rabbath, *La constitution,* p. 37.

89 See Azar, pp. 13-17, the quotation of Chiha's on p. 15.
90 Borrowed from Carl J. Friedrich, Antoine Messarra used the term to differentiate the Lebanese system from other sorts of federalisms, such as territorial federalism; Chiha himself uses "federalism", without qualifying adjective; see Antoine N. Messarra, *Théorie générale du système politique libanais* (Paris 1994), pp. 60–63.
91 On these articles and their amendment after 1926, see Rabbath, *La constitution,* pp. 65-78.
92 Michel Chiha, *Liban d'aujourd'hui (1942),* (Beirut 1949), p. 7. Chiha's chief writings in poetry and his political, economic and ideological articles and lectures were collected in the following: *La Maison des champs et plain-chant* (Beirut 1954) (poetry); *Essais 1* & *2* (Beirut 1950), *Politique intérieure* (Beirut 1957); *Propos d'économie libanaise* (Beirut 1965); *Visage et présence du Liban* (Beirut 1964), *Palestine* (Beirut 1965); *Propos dominicaux* (Beirut 1970) (articles and lectures). A selection of his writings has been translated into Arabic by Fū'ād Kan'ān and published under the title *Lubnān fī Shakhṣiyatihi wa Ḥuḍūrihi* (Beirut 1962); by Antoine Ghattās Karam, *Falasṭīn* (Beirut 1960, 2nd edition 1995), by Aḥmad Beydoun (Bayḍūm), *Lubnān al-Yaūm* (Beirut 1995), and by Jabr Ḥaydar, *Khawāṭir* (Beirut 1992).
93 Chiha, *Liban d'aujourd'hui,* p. 13.
94 Ibid., pp. 13–15.
95 Ibid., p. 23.
96 Ibid., pp. 30–39.
97 Ibid., p. 39.
98 Ibid., pp. 41–42.
99 Ibid., pp. 43–48.
100 Ibid., pp. 48–49.
101 Ibid., pp. 54–56. Although Chiha was aware that the Zionists in Palestine were reviving Hebrew for their nationalist purposes, he is not in favor of the "*résurrection du phénicien*" as some Maronite intellectuals of the 1920s and 1930s suggested: "*Nous sommes ici des gens raisonnables et j'espère bien que nous ne pousserions pas la passion jusque là*"; ibid., p. 59.
102 See especially ibid., pp. 62–66.
103 Ibid., p. 66.
104 Traboulsi claims that in Chiha's concept the nation is "*une nation géographique*," which assumes that "*la géographie crée l'histoire et commande les politiques des nations et leurs stratégies … La détermination géographique* [*est*] *la nature des choses*"; Traboulsi, p. 305.
105 Chiha, pp. 62–63.
106 Theodor Hanf, *Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon, Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation* (London 1993), pp.28–29.
107 M. Chiha, *Visage et présence du Liban,* (Beirut 1964), quoted in Hanf, p. 70.
108 Chiha, *Le Liban d'aujourd'hui*, p. 66.
109 The first term refers to the Arab Syrian nationalists, the second to the Lebanese Arab nationalists who considered Lebanon as part of Syria.
110 Chiha, *Le Liban d'aujourd'hui,* 67–73.
111 See for example, Munir Khoury, *What Is Wrong with Lebanon?* (Beirut 1990), pp. 49–57. Following Western scholars, Khoury divides nationalism in the Middle East into four types: Arabo-Islamic, secular pan-Arabism, the parochial nationalism of the new state, and the "highly sophisticated type of nationalism, the essence of which is based on the cultural personality of the group." This latter type, "irredentism," divides the Arab world into four cultural areas: the Maghrib, Egypt-Sudan, the Arabian Peninsula and the Fertile Crescent. Like the Egyptian nationalism of the years 1880–1952, the Lebanism of Michel Chiha, Charles Corm, and many others belongs to the parochial type; ibid., p. 52.
112 This "defense" against the two "dangers" of Islam and Arabism characterizes many Lebanese Christian writings, from the founders of Lebanism to the present. See e.g., Nabīl Khalīfa, *Al-Katā'ib wa-'Urubat Lubnān* (The Phalanges and Arabism of Lebanon), 2 vols. (Beirut 1983), who resorts to the same arguments of the founders of Lebanism, Chiha and Pierre Gemayl, to underpin his claims for the uniqueness and integrity of history and geography of Greater

Lebanon, ibid., vol. 1, pp. 68-78. As to the "racial origin" of the Lebanese people, he relies on Ruffie Jacques and Talib Nagib's *Etude hématypologique des ethnies libanaises* (Paris 1965) to illustrate the "great difference" between the Lebanese and the Arabs of Arabia. On the cultural level, Khalīfa considers the modern Lebanese, like their ancestors the Phoenicians, bilinguists and polyglots: although the Lebanese use Arabic, they do so with exclusive associations based on the specific culture of Lebanon, ibid., pp. 45–68.

113 A good exmaple of this approach is a book by Walid Pharis, *Lebanese Christian Nationalism* (Boulder, CO 1995), pp. 11–92.

114 Muḥammad J. Bayhum, '*Urubat Lubnān, Taṭawruha fī al-Qadīm wal-Ḥadīth* (The Arabism of Lebanon, Past and Modern Development) (Beirut 1969), pp. 9–13. Throughout his writings, Bayhum is concerned to refute any historical justification of a Lebanism separate from Arabism; see, e.g., idem, *Lubnān, bayna Musharriq wa-Mugharrib,* pp. 31–41, 69-78; idem, *al-Naza'āt al-Siyāsiyya fī-Lubnān, 'Ahd al-Intidāb wal-Iḥtilāl, 1918–1945* (The Political Trends in Lebanon, the Period of the Mandate and Occupation), (Beirut 1977), pp. 14–17.

115 Bayhum, '*Urubat Lubnān,* pp. 14–26.

116 Ibid., p. 28–29.

117 Ibid., pp. 91–93.

118 Ibid., p. 82.

119 In Greater Syria, Bilād al-Shām, the vernacular is the *shāmī* dialect. In modern Lebanon as well in other parts of Greater Syria this dialect has different nuances in different places. Naturally, in the south of Lebanon the dialect is closer to that of northern Palestine than to those of other parts of Lebanon, while in the area of Wādī al-Taym people speak the same dialect as on the Syrian side of the current border.

120 Bayhum, *Lubnān bayna Musharriq wa-Mugharrib,* pp. 118–120.

121 Bayhum, *'Urubat Lubnān,* P. 83.

122 On the imperialist division of the Arab world, see Bayhum, *al-Naza'āt al-Siyāsiyya,* p. 9; Bayhum elaborates his notion of the unity of the Lebanese people under the banner of Arab nationalism in his *'Urubat Lubnān*, see especially pp. 207-209.

123 Bayhum, *Lubnān bayna Musharriq wa-Mugharrib,* pp. 31-35; idem, *al-Naza'āt al-Siyāsiyya,* pp. 11–13.

124 Bayhum, *Lubnān bayna Musharriq wa-Mugharrib,* p. 34.

125 Hobsbawm and Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition*, p. 13.

126 Paul R. Brass, "Elite Groups, Symbol Manipulation and Ethnic Identity among the Muslims of South Asia," in David Taylor and Malcolm Yapp (eds.), *Political Identity in South Asia* (London 1977), as quoted in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism* (Oxford-New York 1994), p. 87.

Chapter two

1 Cf. Nazih N. Ayubi, *Over-stating the Arab State. Politics and Society in the Middle East* (London-New York 1995), p. 190: "[T]here may be grounds, when studying certain societies for resurrecting the more traditional notion of corporation circling around communities of 'natural' internal solidarity (*Gemeinschaft*). This, it may be recalled, is a concept that has an affinity with Ibn Khaldūn's *'aṣabiyya*, and could be rewardingly applied to societies where the 'lineage mode of production' (and/or its social and political relationships) still exerts a distinct impact on society. Thus it may be useful to introduce a third category in addition to state-centred corporatism and society-centred corporatism: that of community-centred corporatism (whether based on the *qabīla*, the *millet* or whatever)."

2 Kamal Salibi, "The Personality of Lebanon in Relation to the Modern World," in L. Binder

(ed.), *Politics in Lebanon* (New York 1966), p. 268; published the year before, Salibi's well-known book, *The History of Lebanon*, carries the same message of success.

3 Ibid., p. 265.
4 Ibid., p. 270.
5 Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, p. 2 (emphasis added).
6 Ibid., p. 55.
7 Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, p. 15.
8 Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, p. 55.
9 Kamal Salibi, "Tribal Origins of the Religious Sects in the Arab East," in Halim Barakat (ed.), *Toward a Viable Lebanon* (London and Sydney 1988), p. 15.
10 Ibid., p. 20.
11 Ibid., pp. 24–25.
12 Ibid., pp. 25–26.
13 Salibi, *A House of Many Mansions*, p. 217: "To gain the degree of solidarity that is needed to maintain viability, their best chance [of divided societies] lies in getting to know and understand the full truth of their past, and to accommodate to its realities. … Lebanon today is a political society condemned to know and understand the real facts of its history if it seeks to survive."
14 Ibid., p. 219.
15 Ibid., p. 222.
16 Messarra, p. 12.
17 Ibid., p. 3.
18 Ibid., pp. 23–27
19 Ibid., p. 268
20 See also Antoine Messarra, "Al-Namūdhaj al-Siyāsī al-Lubnānī wa-Istimrāriyyatuhu-Baḥth fī al-Ṭawā'ifiyya wa-Tanẓīmiha" (The Lebanese Political Model and its Continuity), *al-Wāqi'* 5/6 (October 1983); Antoine Messarra, "Jadaliyat al-Dīn wal-Siyāsa" (The Dialectic of the Religion and Politics), in *al-Thaqāfa wal-Dīn wal-Siyāsa wa-I'ādat Binā' Lubnān* (Culture, Religion, Politics and the Reconstruction of Lebanon), published by The Cultural Movement of Antelias, 2 vols. (Antelias 1985), vol. 1, pp. 172–182.
21 Iliya Harik, *Man Yaḥkum Lubnān* (Who Rules Lebanon?) (Beirut 1972), pp. 61–65.
22 Ibid., pp. 65–66.
23 Ibid., p. 77.
24 Iliya Harik, "Al-Ta'adudiyya Ẓāhira Tārīkhiyya 'Arīqa" (Pluralism is a Historic and Primordial Phenomenon), *Mawāqif* 40 (Spring 1983), pp. 18–19.
25 Ibid., p. 20
26 See, e.g., Nāsīf Naṣṣār, "Lubnān bayna al-Infijār wal-Inṣihār" (Lebanon between Explosion and Fusion), and Bassām al-Hāshim, "Al-Ṭā'ifiyya wal-'Ilmāniyya fī Lubnān: Naḥwa 'Aṣrana Mukhaḍrama be-Ṭā'ifiyya Marḥaliyya" (Confessionalism and Secularism in Lebanon: Towards Transitory Modernity with Transitory Confessionalism), *al-Wāqi'* 5/6 (October 1983).
27 Messarra (*Théorie,* pp. 328–329) here quotes Amīn Jumayl, president of Lebanon during 1982–1988, to the effect that "*L'appartenance du Liban à son environnement arabe n'est pas une condition imposée mais un choix libre.*" As the spoken language of the majority of the Lebanese communities, for Harik Arabic facilitates integration between them; Harik, *Man Yaḥkum Lubnān,* p. 65
28 Munaḥ al-Ṣulḥ, "Al-Taraddī al-Thaqāfī wa Ḥayātunā al-Siyāsiyya" (Cultural Decline and Our Political Life), in *al-Thaqāfa wal-Dīn*, p. 221. Munaḥ al- Ṣulḥ is the son of 'Adil al-Ṣulḥ, who with Arab nationalists established, in 1931, *Ḥizb al-Istiqlāl al-Jumhūrī* (The Independent Republican Party), whose members were Muslim and Christian supporters of Lebanon as an Arab and independent state; see 'Adil al- Ṣulḥ, *Ḥizb al-Istiqlāl al-Jumhūrī* (The Republican Party for Independence), (Beirut 1970), pp. 7–25.
29 Munaḥ al- Ṣulḥ, "Al-Taraddī," p. 223.

30 al-Faḍl Shalaq, "Baʿḍ Ishkāliyyāt al-ʿIlmāniyya fī Waʿiy al-Lubnāniyyīn" (Some Problematics of Secularism in the Consciousness of the Lebaneses), in *al-Thaqāfa wal-Dīn,* pp. 187–188.
31 Ibid., pp. 190–191.
32 Anīs al-Ṣāygh, *Lubnān al-Ṭā'ifī* (The Confessional Lebanon), (Beirut 1955), p. 17.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., p. 20.
35 Ibid., pp. 20–21.
36 See ibid., pp. 25–128.
37 Ibid., pp. 130–131.
38 Ibid., pp. 132–156.
39 Ibid., pp. 133–134.
40 Joseph Mughayzil, *Lubnān wal-Qaḍiyya al-ʿArabiyya* (Lebanon and the Arab Cause), (Beirut 1959), pp. 74–75.
41 Ibid., pp. 26–30.
42 See Joseph Mughayzil, "Taʾthīr al-Ṣirāʿ al-Siyāsi ʿAlā al-Ḥayāt al-Dīniyya fī Lubnān" (The Impact of the Political Dispute on Religious Life in Lebanon), in *al-Thaqāfa wal-Dīn,* pp. 125–133.
43 Charles Shartouni, "Remarks" in *al-Thaqāfa wal-Dīn,* pp. 138–139.
44 Ibid.
45 See Ziyāda's introduction to the book of Saʿīd Murād, *Al-Ḥaraka al-Waḥdawiyya fī Lubnān Bayna al-Ḥarbayn al-ʿAlamiyatayn, 1914–1946* (The Nationalist Movements in Lebanon between the Two World Wars, 1914–1946), (Beirut 1986), pp. 5–8.
46 Ibid.
47 Maʿn Ziyāda, "Madkhal li-Dirāsat Lubnān wal-Masʾala al-Ḥaḍāriyya" (Introduction to the Research of Lebanon and the Question of Civilization), in *Lubnān: al-Ḥaḍāra al-Wāḥida* (Lebanon: One Civilization), (Publications of al-Nādī al-Thaqāfī al-ʿArabī, Beirut 1977), pp. 9–15.
48 Ibid., p. 20.
49 Ibid., pp. 17–20
50 Ibid., p. 16; Ziyāda differentiates between "colonialism", as a form of economic, political and cultural domination, and "the West", as a force of progress, democratization and rationalization.
51 Ibid., p. 29.
52 Ibid., p. 37.
53 Ibid., pp. 18–19.
54 Kawtharānī, *al-Itijāhāt,* pp. 11–35.
55 Kawtharānī underpins his explanations with detailed descriptions of quantitive and qualitative economic changes in the rural and urban areas, the European investments, the influence of the missionary institutions, the colonial debate, and other issues; cf. ibid., pp. 36–102.
56 Wajīh Kawtharānī, "Lubnān, Takaunuhu al-Tarīkhī fi Iṭār al-Tajziʾa al-Istiʿmāriyya lil-Mashriq al-ʿArabī" (Lebanon, Its Historical Formation within the Framework of the Colonial Division of the Arab East), in *Lubnān: al-Ḥaḍāra al-Wāḥida,* pp. 61–65.
57 Ibid., p. 66.
58 The Capitulations were agreements between the Ottoman Sultan and European powers which granted the latter certain privileges in their commercial dealings with the empire's regions, the first of these being signed with Francis I in 1525 and then, in the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, extended to almost all the European countries. The Capitulations were the "judicial basis" of European trade with the Ottomans, facilitated the presence of European "subjects" in Ottoman territories, and in the nineteenth century were seized upon by the Europeans to extend their protection to Ottoman religious minority communities and individuals.
59 Kawtharānī, "Lubnān, Takaunuhu", p. 67.

60 Ibid., p. 79; "*al-waṭan al-ʿArabī*" generally stands for the "Arab nation."
61 Ibid., p. 81.
62 For Kawtharānī's use of these terms, see ibid., pp. 80–82.
63 Ibid., p. 82.
64 Beydoun considers Kawtharānī's historical description of the period 1860–1920 as an example of Muslim historiography whose narrative runs counter to that of Christian historiography; see Beydoun, pp. 478–501.
65 Masʿūd Ḍāhir, *Tārīkh Lubnān al-Ijtimāʿī 1914–1926* (The Social History of Lebanon 1914–1926), (Beirut 1974).
66 See Masʿūd Ḍāhir, *Lubnān, al-Istiqlāl, al-Ṣīgha wal-Mithāq* (Lebanon, Independence, System and Pact), (2nd. edn, Beirut 1984), pp. 121–151, 201–223, 234–251
67 Ibid., p. 303
68 See especially ibid., pp. 299–316.
69 Ibid., pp. 316–318.
70 See ibid., pp. 234–235.
71 Ibid., p. 235.
72 Ibid., pp. 237–239;.254–255
73 See Raghid Solh, "Lebanon and Arab Nationalism 1936–1945," unpublished D. Phil. thesis (St Antony's College, Oxford, 1986), pp. 41–42; 289–296.
74 Ḍāhir, *Lubnān*, p. 205, and note 10, p. 224.
75 Ibid., p. 244.
76 Ibid., pp. .241–242.
77 See, e.g., ibid., pp. 242; 245.
78 Ibid., p. 238.
79 Masʿūd Ḍāhir, *al-Judhūr al-Tārīkhiyya lil-Masʾala al-ṭāʾifiyya al-Lubnāniyya, 1697–1861* (The Historical Roots of the Lebanese Confessional Problem, 1697–1861), (Beirut 1981), p. 8.
80 Ibid., p. 266.
81 Ibid., p. 12.
82 Ibid., p. 28. His term *al-tajziʾa al-iqlimmiyya* literally means territorial division. That throughout his entire text Ḍāhirʿs Arabic articulation and terminology often remain vague may well be because of his French education: writing Arabic would always retain its stylistic difficulties for him.
83 Ibid., pp. 12; 27.
84 Ibid., p. 27–37.
85 See ibid., pp. 306, 318, 444.
86 Ibid., p. 320.
87 Ibid., p. 18.
88 All ideas which recur in many of his articles; see, e.g., Masʿūd Ḍāhir, "Mithāq Lubnān al-Wāḥid li ʿĀm 1943" (The Pact of the United Lebanon in 1943), in his *Lubnān: al-Haḍāra al-Wāḥida,* p. 123.
89 See, e.g., Ḍāhir, *al-Judhūr*, pp. 15, 19, 32, 173.
90 Ibid., p. 8
91 See ibid., pp., 101–102, 131–172, 209–210
92 Ibid., p. 426; the way Ḍāhir articulates his thoughts was rather harshly criticized by his Marxist colleague, Mahdī ʿAmil, who chided him for his ambiguities, especially his unorthodox use of Marxist concepts; see Mahdī ʿAmil [pseudonym of Ḥasan Ḥamdān], *Fī al-Dawla al-Ṭāʾiffiyya (*Beirut 1986), p. 179.
93 Brought on by the civil war in 1975, it encompasses Lebanese historians, social scientists, and ideologues and extends over many subjects, e.g., the political system, "Arabism," "Syrianism" and "Lebanism," nation-building, the confessional conflicts, and others; see, for example, the theoretical journal of the Lebanese Communist Party, *al-Ṭarīq* 6 (1978), 4 (1979), 4 (November 1983), 1 (March 1985); ʿAmil, *Fī al-Dawla,* pp. 139–275; see also, for a survey of part of this debate, Traboulsi, *Identités et solidarités croisées*, pp. 5–35.

94 Born a Shi'i, Mahdī 'Amil became one of the most prominent Marxist theoreticians in the Arab world. Highly consistent in his Marxist "philosophy," he wrote not only on the Lebanese political system but on most topics that preoccupied the Marxists of the Arab world since 1967. For example, *Azmat al-Haḍāra al-'Arabiyya Am Azmat al-Burjūwāziyya al-'Arabiyya?* (A Crisis of the Arab Civilization or the Crisis of the Arab Bourgeoisies?), 2 vols. (the first called *Fī al-Tanāquḍ* (Contradiction); *Muqadimāt Naẓariyya li-Dirāsat Athar al-Fikr al-Ishtirākī fi Ḥarakat al-Taḥarur al-Waṭanī* (Theoretical Introductions to the Study of the Socialist Thought in the Movement of Arab Liberation); *Fi Namaṭ al-Intāj al-Kuluniālī* (On the Colonial Mode of Production), *Madkhal Ilā Naqḍ al-Fikr al-Ṭā'ifi* (Introduction to a Refutation of the Confessional Thought); *Marx Fī "Istishrāq" Sa'īd* (Marx in Said's "Orientalism"); *Fī 'Amaliat al-Fikr al-Khaldūnī* (On the Process of Ibn Khaldūn's Thinking), and others. To date, only a small research pamphlet has been dedicated to his philosophy and theory, i.e., J. Couland & Fawaz Traboulsi, "Êtat et conflits sociaux dans les societés à solidarités plurielles: le cas du Liban. Les apports du philosophe Mahdī 'Amil (1936–1987)" *Cahiers du GREMAMO,* 6 (Paris 1989); for a summary of this research, see Traboulsi, *Identités et solidarités croisées,* pp. 21–28.

95 Aḥmad B'albaki traces confessionalism back to the Faṭimīd period (tenth and eleventh centuries); see Aḥmad B'albakī, "Mulaḥaẓāt 'Alā al-Kitaba Mārksiyya fī al-ṭā'ifiyya" (Observation on Marxist Writing on Confessionalism), *al-Ṭarīq* 1 (March 1985), p. 112; see also 'Amil, *Fī al-Dawla,* p. 209

96 'Amil, *Fī al-Dawha*, p. 254.

97 Ibid., p. 256; in almost all his theoretical works the author focuses on the "crisis in world capitalism" to explain the crisis in Lebanon's dependent capitalism; see, e.g., Mahdī 'Amil, *al-Naẓariyya fī al-Mumārasa al-Syiāsiyya: Baḥth fī Asbāb al-Ḥarab al-Ahliyya fī Lubnān* (Theory in the Political Practice: Essay on the Causes of the Civil War in Lebanon), (Beirut, n.d.), pp. 15–18, 42–43, 178–179.

98 'Amil, *Fī al-Dawla*, pp. 228–232.

99 Ibid., p. 222.

100 Ibid., p. 221.

101 Ibid., p. 209–210.

102 Ibid., p. 211

103 'Amil, *al-Naẓariyya,* pp. 253–260

104 'Amil, *Fī al-Dawla,* pp. 237.

105 'Amil, *al-Naẓariyya,* pp. 255–256. The connotation of the term *al-kayān*, "entity," from the verb *kān*, "to be" is multiple; most often it simply stands for the Lebanese system (*al-kayān al-Lubnāni*).

106 See 'Amil, *Fī al-Dawla,* pp. 11–13.

107 'Amil, *al-Naẓariyya,* p. 524.

108 Ibid., pp. 237–239.

109 Ibid., pp. 240–248.

110 Ibid., pp. 258–263.

111 'Amil, *Fī al-Dawla,* p. 257.

112 Ibid., p. 181.

113 Ibid., p. 205.

114 Ibid., pp. 189–192.

115 These ideas are elaborated in 'Amil's *Azmat al-Haḍāra al-'Arabiyya Am Azmat al-Burjūwāziyya al-'Arabiyya?* (A Crisis of the Arab Civilization or a Crisis of the Arab Bourgeoisie?), 2 vols. 3d. edn. (Beirut 1981); a summary of the book in connection with the Lebanese case can be found in his *al-Naẓariyya,* pp. 50–83; 129–170.

116 This notion is expressed in many of his writings, notably in *Azmat al-Haḍāra.*

117 It is with this hope that he ends *Fī al-Dawla*, p. 275.

118 Brass, in Hutchinson and Smith, *Nationalism*, p. 84.

119 Ibid.

Chapter three

1 Stephen H. Longrigg, *Syria and Lebanon under French Mandate* (London, New York and Toronto 1958), pp. 143–144.
2 "Chittehs," in French reports; the term *shaqiy*(s) is derived from the Arab verb *shaqa,* to wander.
3 FO 371, 9055, E 6331/2204/89, no. 44, Smart to FO Aleppo, 31 May 1923; no. 47, same to same, 5 June 1923; see also FO 371, 9055, E 7012/2204/79, no. 53, Aleppo, 8 June 1923 and in 7147/2204/89, no., 57, Aleppo, 25 June 1923.
4 FO 371, 9055, E 9622/2204/89, no. 91, Russell to FO Aleppo, 10 September 1923.
5 FO 371, 9055, E 8176/2204/89, no. 1, Russell to FO Aleppo, 25 July 1923 and E 9128/2204/89, no. 87 Russell to FO Aleppo, 28 August 1923.
6 FO 371, 9055, E 7231/2204/89, no. 58, Smart to FO Aleppo, 28 June 1923.
7 FO 371, 9055, E 7231/2204/89, no. 61, Smart to FO Aleppo, 30 June 1923.
8 Christian Lebanese historiography claims that this was done deliberately in order to cause the famine, see, e.g., Samné, *La Syrie,* pp.336–440; Yūsuf al-Ḥakīm, *Bayrut wa-Lubnān fī 'Ahd Āl 'Uthmān* (Beirut and Lebanon in the Ottoman Period), (3rd. edn. Beirut 1991), pp. 249–252; Ḥikmat A. al-Ḥadād, *Lubnān al-Kabīr* (Greater Lebanon), (2nd. edn. Beirut 1994), pp.39–40.
9 FO 371, E 630/117/89, Fontana to FO Beirut, December 21, 1920.
10 From 1920 to 1930, the French made a series of unsuccessful attempts to restore the silk industry.
11 FO 371, 9055, E 2858/2204/89, no. 39, Satow to FO Beirut, 5 March 1923.
12 On the distribution of the official posts among the Druze clans, see Ḥasan B'aynī, *Durūz Sūriā wa-Lubnāan fī 'Ahd al-Intidāb* (Druzes of Syria and Lebanon in Mandatory Period), (Beirut 1993), pp. 98–99.
13 On the Shi'i bands, see Shafiq Juḥā, *Ma'rakat Maṣīr Lubnān fī 'Ahd al-Intidāb al-Faransī 1918–1946* (The Struggle for the Destiny of Lebanon in the French Mandatory Period), 2 vols. (Beirut 1995), vol. 1, pp. 155–157; Zamīr, p. 135.
14 Zamir, pp. 146–147.
15 FO 371, 9055, E 4976/2204/89, no. 57, Acting Consul General Russell to FO 3 May 1923.
16 Ibid., E 6416/2204/89, no. 47, Smart to FO 5 June 1923.
17 B'aynī, *Durūz*, p. 147.
18 FO 371, 9055, E 5554/2204/89, no. 67, Satow to FO Beirut, 15 May 1923; E 6100/2204/89, no.80, same to same, Beirut, 29 May 1923; and FO 371, 9055, E 7150/2204/89, no. 57, Palmer to Satow, Damascus, 23 June 1923.
19 FO 371, 9055, E 6098/2204/89, Palmer to FO, no. 102/84 P., Damascus, 24 May 1924.
20 FO 371, 9055, E 6098/2204/89, no. 102/84 P., Satow to FO, copy to Palmer, Beirut, 31 May 1923.
21 To the present day many older people in the Shūf remember the "ferocity" of Mghabghab towards the Druze villagers; see B'aynī, *Durūz*, p. 148.
22 FO 371, 9055, E 4976/2204/89, no.57, Russell to FO Beirut, 3 May 1923.
23 FO 371, 9055, E 5288/2204/89, no. 61, Satow to FO Beirut, 9 May 1923.
24 FO 371, 9055, E 5554/2204/89, no. 67, same to same, Beirut, 15 May 1923.
25 FO 371, 9055, E 6100/2204/89, no. 80, same to same, Beirut, 29 May 1923
26 On the role and the names of the Lebanese Druze leaders and intellectuals who joined Amīr Fayṣal and then took refuge in Transjordan or Europe, see B'aynī, *Durūz*, pp. 61–88.
27 B'aynī collected oral and written testimony which describes "Druze dissatisfaction" resulting from the reorganization of the administration and the French policy in al-Shūf, cf. B'aynī, *Durūz,* pp. 89–110, 144–150.
28 With slight changes, these administrative units continued to be the basis of the Lebanese administration.

29 On the regional reorganization and national administrations, see Rabbath, *La formation historique,* pp. 355–57; Juḥā, *Maʿrakat Maṣīr Lubnān*, vol. 1, pp.236–247.
30 FO 371, E 630/117/89, Fontana to FO, 21 December 1920.
31 FO 371, 7847, E 6514/274/89, Satow to FO Beirut, 20, June 1922.
32 Lebanese historians attempt to present this rejection as the manifestation of an independent attitude among the Francophiles of that period but they omit mentioning that any cut in expenditures of the main departments meant a cut in the number of jobs and even in the salaries of the directors of these departments; Juḥā, *Maʿrakat Maṣīr Lubnān*, vol. 1., pp. 243–244.
33 Murād, *al-Ḥaraka al-Waḥdawiyya,* Annex no. 11, p. 334.
34 Some Lebanese do see the bands as confessional, operating against the Christians; cf., e.g., Juḥā, *Maʿrakat Maṣīr Lubnān*, vol. 1, pp. 155–157; others see them as Arab nationalist operating against the French, e.g., Murād, *al-Ḥaraka al-Waḥdawiyya*, pp. 158–159.
35 Here, too, Christian historians portray these bands as "criminals" attacking the Christian villages, while others, mainly Muslim historians, refer to them as nationalist acting against the French and those who collaborated with them, whether Christian or Muslim; cf. Muhīb Ḥamāda, *Tārīkh ʿUlaqat al-Biqāʿiyyīn bil-Sūriyyīn wa-Istrātijiat al-Biqāʿ fī al-Muwājaha al-Sūriyya al-Isrāiliyya* (The Historical Relations between the Inhabitants of Biqāʿ and the Syrians and the Strategy of Biqaʿ in the Syrian-Israeli Confrontation), 2 vols. (Beirut 1983), vol. 1 (1918–1936), pp. 113–114; Ibrāhīm Ḥarfūsh, *Dalaʾil al-ʿInāiya al-Ṣamādiniyya* (Indications of God's Surveillance), (Juneh 1935), p. 634; Būlus Masʿad, *Lubnān wa-Sūriā Qabal al-Intidāb wa-Baʿdihi* (Lebanon and Syria before and after the Mandate), (Cairo 1929), pp. 71–72; Yūsuf Muzhir, *Tārīkh Lubnān al-ʿĀm* (General History of Lebanon), 2 vols. (n.d.), vol. 2, p. 907; Juḥa, vol. 1. pp. 155–157.
36 On the establishment by the French of these four states, see Longrigg, pp. 123–147.
37 For further details on the election law, see Rabbath, *La formation historique,* pp. 355–356.
38 FO 371, 7847, E 5994, no. 81, consulate general to FO Beirut, 1 June 1922. The report gives the names of the members of the firsrt Representative Council according to constituencies and communities: (Beirut) Sunnis - Dr. Ḥalīm Qaddūra and Muḥammad Muftī, Maronites - Êmile Eddé and Dr. Ayūb Tabet (Thābit); Greek Orthodox - Michel (bey) Tuwaynī; (Mount Lebanon) Maronites - Ḥabīb Pasha Saʿd, Sheikh Yūsuf Khāzin, Naʿūm Bakhūs, Naʿūm Labakī, Dr. Nakhla Ashqar; Druzes - Rashīd (bey) Junblāṭ, Amīr Fūʾād Arslān; (Tripoli) Sunni - Nūr [al-Dīn] (bey) ʿAlamaddīn; (Northern Lebanon) Maronites - Wadīʿ Ṭarabay, Dr. Masʿūd Yūnis; Sunni - ʿAbbūd ʿAbd al-Razzāq; Greek Orthodox - Yaʿqūb Naḥḥas; (Southern Lebanon) Sunni - Amīr Khālid Shihāb; Shiʿis - Faḍl (Bey) Faḍl, Najīb ʿUsayrān, Yūsuf Zayn; Maronite - Naṣrī ʿAzūrī; Greek Catholic - Rizqalla Nammūr; (Biqāʿ) Greek Catholic - ʿAbdalla ʿAbu Khāṭir; Maronite - Mūsa Nammūr; Greek Orthodox - Shibl Dammūs; Shiʿis - Aḥmad Ḥusaynī, Ibrāhim Ḥaydar; Sunni - Ḥusayn Kazʿūm. In his list of the Representative Council members Walīd ʿAwaḍ adds Ibrāhim al-Mundhir as representative for Jabal Lubnān and omits all representatives for Biqāʿ; see Walīd ʿAwaḍ, *Aṣḥāb al-Fahkāma, Rūʾasāʾ Lubnān* (Their Excellences, The Presidents of Lebanon), (Beirut 1977), p. 144.
39 FO 371, 7847, E 5994, no. 81, general officer commanding Egyptian Expeditionary Force to the Secretary of War office, Cairo, 6 June 1922, Information received from the British Liaison officer, Beirut.
40 al-Khuri, vol. 1, p. 116; al-Sawdā, *Fī Sabīl al-Istiqlāl,* pp. 417–421. Significantly, al-Khuri criticizes the French for intervening in favor of the list of Êmile Eddé in Beirut. The latter was al-Khuri's main political opponent as of the late 1920s. At the same time, al-Khuri describes the role he played in creating alliances between the candidates of the elections in 1929; see al-Khuri, vol. 1, pp. 165–168. On the elections of 1943, in which al-Khuri used the same clan rivalries to form his list, see below. Yūsuf al-Sawdā took the seat of Naʿum Labaki in the Representative Council following the latter's death, see ʿAwaḍ, p. 26. In 1929 al-Sawdā surrendered to the pressure of his friend Charles Dabbās to retract his candidacy in

the elections in return for a promise to be appointed as one of fifteen members who were added to the thirty elected members of the Parliament; see al-Khuri, vol. 1, p. 165.

41 ʻAwaḍ, pp. 32–34.

42 Ibid., p. 34; see also al-Khuri, vol. 1, p. 130.

43 On the origin, spread and repercussions of the Syrian Revolt, see Kais M. Firro, *A History of the Druzes* (Leiden 1992), pp. 288–298; cf. also Zamīr, pp. 168–183.

44 On these plans and the reactions of the supporters of the integrity of Greater Lebanon, see Zamīr, pp. 186–199.

45 For the full text of the Mandate for Syria and Lebanon, see Longrigg. pp. 376–380.

46 The title of a report written by Professor Paul Huvelin, *Que vaut la Syrie?* (Paris and Marseilles 1919). Huvelin was professor of law in Lyon and the director of *la mission française en Syrie et en Cilicie* after the first world war. The report was first presented at the *Congrès français de la Syrie* on 3–5 January 1919, and was then published in the *section économique* of the congress by the chamber of commerce of Marseilles. Because it was to serve as the basis of a French economic policy the report was republished in the colonial journal *l'Asie française, supplément,* December 1921.

47 Cf. Barbara Smith, *The Roots of Separatism,* p. 4.

48 The tithe was a tax on the gross produce of *miri* land (land in which the right of use was in the hands of the peasants, but the title vested in the Ottoman state). At the end of the nineteenth century the tithe increased to 12.5 percent. The gross produce was determined annually by the authorities. In 1925 the new tax abolished the tax farming system and imposed a fixed one on every village determined by the average of the tithe returns during the previous four years. Only in 1929 could villages ask for a re-assessment of their crops. The *werko* was determined by general assessment in 1903 which then remained in force until 1933. Neither tithe nor *werko* were applied on Mt. Lebanon; even in 1933, when the two taxes were replaced by one unified land tax applicable to all of Greater Lebanon, a difference between the annexed areas and Mount Lebanon continued to affect the peasants of the former areas adversely. The rate of the unified tax was increased in 1942. For further details, see Raja S. Hamadah, *The Fiscal System of Lebanon* (Beirut 1961), pp. 1–6.

49 On the monopolies and other duties, see ibid., pp. 6–8. The political agitation provoked by the re-institution of the *regie* will be dealt with later.

50 Norman Bruns, *The Tariff of Syria 1919–1932* (Beirut 1933), pp. 3–4; on the economic apparatus (departments, commissions, advisers, etc.) at the beginning of the Mandatory period, see esp., pp. 12–39.

51 See ibid., pp. 52–142.

52 Ibid., p. 264.

53 Ibid., pp. 276–277

54 See the number of bankruptcies since 1920–1931 in Ḍāhir, *Lubnān, al-Istiqlāl, al-Ṣīgha wal-Mithāq,* p. 54.

55 Gabriel Menassa, *Plan de reconstruction de l'économie libanaise et de reforme de l'état* (Beirut 1948), p. 13.

56 Ibid., pp. 16–17; also for a list of the industries which were established during the years 1926–1940.

57 See Ḍāhir, *Lubnān, al-Istiqlāl, al-Ṣīgha wal-Mithāq,* pp. 20–28; also Bruns, p. 9.

58 IRFED Mission 1960–61, Republique Libanaise, Ministère du Plan, *Besoins et possibilités de développement du Liban,* 2 vols. (n.p., n.d), vol. 1, p. 137.

59 Ḍāhir indicates that in 1957 there were about 17 silk factories 16 of which were in Beirut; Ḍāhir, *Lubnān, al-Istiqlāl, al-Ṣīgha wal-Mithāq,* p. 29.

60 Najla Wadih Atiyah, "The Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis Towards the State of Lebanon" (D. Phil. thesis, University of London 1973).

61 See ibid., pp. 12–61. Atiyah also mentions Shakīb Arslān in this context, though he, of course, was not a Sunni but a Druze.

62 Ibid., pp. 62–66.

63 Ibid., p. 137.
64 Najla Atiyah, *Lubnān: al-Mashkila wal-Ma'sā* (Lebanon: Problem and Tragedy), (Beirut 1977), pp. 30–36.
65 Zamīr, p. 126.
66 Ibid., pp. 1–37.
67 Ibid., p. 126; see also, for the same argument, Atiyah, "Attitude," pp. 63–67.
68 Beirut, no.2, vol.1, 28 July 1936, quoted in Atiyah, "Attitude," p. 62
69 See Michael Johnson, *Class and Client in Beirut, The Sunni Muslim Community and the Lebanese State 1840–1985* (London 1986), p. 23
70 FO 371, 7847, E 5994, no. 81, acting secretary for H.B.H, Consulate General to FO Beirut, 1 June 1922; FO 371, 7847, E 6400/274/89, Palmer to FO Damascus, 7 June 1922; see also 'Awaḍ, p. 144. On Khurshid's assassination and the repercussions it had, see Ḥallāq, *Dirāsāt*, p. 114; Zamīr, p. 13; Meo, Leila, *Lebanon: Improbable Nation* (Indiana 1965), p. 50.
71 On the internal politics of the Shi'is and Druzes, see below.
72 Huvlen, p. 4; on French economists and French interests in the Syrian raw materials, see Bruns, p. 144. See also J. Luquet, *Mandat A et l'organisation du Mandat français en Syrie* (Paris 1923), p. 163; and Michael Gilsenan, *Lords of the Lebanese Marches, Violence and Narrative in an Arab Society* (London-New York 1996), p. 79.
73 J. Luquet, *La Politique des Mandats dans le Livant* (Paris 1923), p. 162. See also Michael Gilsenan, "A Modern Feudality? Land and Labour in North Lebanon, 1858–1950," in Tarif Khalidi (ed.), *Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East* (Beirut 1984), p. 459.
74 Bruns, p. 8.
75 IRFED's Mission, vol. 1, p. 122.
76 *Rapport à la Société des Nations*, *Année 1938*, p. 95
77 Ibid., p. 96.
78 On the *muqāta'jiyya* (the Lebanese feudal system), see, e.g., I. Harik, "Iqta' System in Lebanon. A Comparative Political View," *Middle East Journal* 4 (Autumn 1964), pp. 405–421. Cf. D. Chevallier, *La société du Mont Liban à l'époque de la révolution industrielle en Europe* (Paris 1971), pp. 80–105.
79 See Kais Firro, "Silk and Agrarian Changes in Lebanon, 1860–1914," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 22(1990), pp. 152–169.
80 See Claude Dubar and Salim Nasr, *Les classes sociales au Liban* (Paris 1976), pp. 35–36; Ḍāhir, *Lubnān, al-Istiqlāl, al-Ṣīgha wal-Mithāq,* p. 17.
81 Andre Latron, *La vie rural en Syrie et au Liban* (Beirut 1936), p. 212–218.
82 From Latron's analysis of diverse tenancy contracts of *muzāra'a, musāqa,* and *mughārasa*, the different *mushā'* lands and other elements arises a rather bleak picture of the peasantry of 'Akkār, Biqā' and Jabal 'Amil compared with other places in Syria and Lebanon; Latron, pp. 47–88, pp. 107–140; pp. 220–243.
83 In the first chapter of his book "*Les mesures agraires*," Latron describes the difference between rural measurements from one place to other, ibid., pp. 7–28. As late as 1971–72, Gilsenan, who considers Latron's observation as equal to those of an anthropologist, encounters difficulties when he wants to measure the 'Akkari landlords' properties; Gilsenan, *Lords of the Lebanese Marches,* pp. 80–81
84 Ḍāhir, *Lubnān, al-Istiqlāl, al-Ṣīgha wal-Mithāq,* p. 17. See also Ḍāhir, *al-Tārīkh al-Ijtimā'ī*, pp. 192–256.
85 Most regional histories had till then been written by Christians. There now is a new wave in which Shi'is, Sunnis and Druzes have begun collecting oral and written materials on their regions; see, for example, Muḥammad Kāmil Bābā, *Ṭarāblus fī al-Tārīkh* (Tripoli in History), (Tripoli-Lebanon 1995); Fārūq Ḥubluṣ, *Tārīkh 'Akkār al-Idārī wal-Ijtimā'ī wal-Iqtiṣādī, 1800–1914* (The Administrative, Social and Economic History of 'Akkār), (Beirut 1987); Ḥasan Qbaysi, *Taṭawr Madīnat Ṣūr, 1900–1975* (The Development of the City of

Tyre), (Beirut 1986); Ḥasan Naṣralla, *Tārīkh Ba'lbak,* (History of Ba'lbak), 2 vols. (Beirut 1984); Nazīh Ḥasna, *Ṣaidā wa Mas'alat al-Za'āma al-Siyāsiyya, Ma'rūf Sa'd* (Sidon and the Question of the Political Elite, Ma'rūf Sa'd), (Saida 1982), Ḥusayn Muḥammad Ḥajjar, *Tārīkh Iqlīm al-Kharrūb* (History of Iqlīm al-Kharrūb), (Lebanon 1978), Ḥasan Za'rūr, *Bayrut, al-Tārīkh al-Ijtimā'i, 1864–1914* (Beirut, The Social History), (Beirut n.d.), Yaḥiya 'Ammār, *Tārīkh Wādī al-Taym* (History of Wādī al-Taym), (Ynata , Lebanon 1985).

86 The *mushā* 'is not a type of land ownership; as in other parts of the Middle East, in Lebanon there were three types of land tenure or ownership: *miri* (state land), *waqf* (religious endowment), and *mulk.* The *mushā'* entails collective use of *miri* land.

87 Farḥān Sāliḥ, *Janūb Lubnān, Wāqi'hu wa-Qaḍāyāhu* (South Lebanon, Its Reality and Cause), (Beirut 1973), pp. 25–26.

88 Latron, pp. 54–55.

89 Ibid.; describing this *servitude,* in areas such as south Lebanon 'Akkār and Biqā' Latron indicates that the new *code foncier* introduced by the Mandate prohibits such servitude.

90 In order to avoid confusion between different type of *mushā'*, Latron presents descriptions of almost all categories of lands: (A) *immeuble communautaire*: *parcelle comprise dans un ensemble organisé spontanément à l'intérieur de la circonscription villageoise, il est toujours soumis à des servitudes collectives.* (B) *immeuble individualisé.* (C) *propriété collective: droit qu'un groupement social supérieur à la famille possédé sur un territoire inorganisé réservé à l'usage exclusif des ses members. Leurs droits de membres ne sont pas précises par des quote-part. Cette propréité collective est représentée par les biens communaux.* (D) *propriété communautaire*: *droit qu'un groupement social, supérieur à la famille possédé sur un territoire organisé, tandis que les droits des membres sont précises dans des qoute-parts qui portent sur l'ensemble du territoire. Cette propriété peut etre instable, la possession étant precaire et soumise à une rotation périodique entre les members; elle peut étre stable, ce qui leve toute distiction entre la possession et la propriété.* (E) *propriété individuelle*; ibid., pp. 182–183. All of these categories could be found in the south of Lebanon and Biqā', but almost all *mushā'* lands there belonged to the categories of *propriété collective* and *propriété communautaire* which called for periodical rotation between the tenants.

91 Ibid., p. 198.

92 See ibid., 81–82; Gilesnan, *Lords of the Lebanese Marches*, p. 82.

93 See Menassa, *Plan,* pp. 271–272.

94 FO 371, 12306, E 2253/426/89, no. 96, Satow to FO, 6 May 1927.

95 See the text of the reform program of Êddé which was read out in parliament by Najīb Abu Ṣuwān, the minister of justice, session no. 3, 22 November 1929; in Yūsuf Qusma Khuri, *Mashāri' al-Islāḥ wal-Taswiya fī Lubnān* (Reform's Projects and Compromises in Lebanon), 2 vols. (Beirut 1989), vol. 1, p. 10.

96 Menassa, *Plan,* p. 271.

97 Khālil Aḥamad Khalīl, "al-Janūb Qaḍiyat Waṭn wa-Umma" (The South, the Country's and the Nation's Cause) in Farḥān Ṣāliḥ, *Janūb Lubnān,* pp. 9–10, 14.

98 Aḥmad 'Arif al-Zayn, *Tārīkh Ṣaida* (History of Sidon), (publication of *al-'Irfān,* Sidon 1913), pp. 155–165.

99 On the rise of the family during the Ottoman period until the Mandate, see Muḥammad, al-Ṣafā, *Tārīkh Jabal 'Amil* (History of Jabal 'Amil), (2nd. edn. Beirut 1981: first edition was probably published in the late 1930s.) Together with Aḥmad Riḍa, Sulaymān al-Ḍāhir, Aḥmad 'Arif al-Zayn, the author himself belonged to the first generation of Shi'is intellectuals who formulated the arguments of the "Arabism" of the Shi'is; cf. Hānī Farḥāt, *al-Thulāthī al-'Amilī fī 'Aṣr al-Nahḍa* (Three Shi'is in the Age of the Awakening), (Beirut 1981).

100 On the origin of the rivalry between Riḍa al-Ṣulḥ and Kāmil al-As'd, see al-Ṣafā, pp. 211–215.

101 Ḥasan Qbaysi, *Taṭawr Madinat Ṣūr, 1900–1975* (The Development of the City of Tyre, 1900–1975), (Beirut 1986), pp. 133–137.

102 Gilsenan, pp. 67–111.
103 See Sāliḥ, pp. 90–92.
104 For a comparison between the geographical conditions of the different areas of Lebanon and the great influence these had on the agricultural development of each, see IRFED's mission, vol. 2, pp. 64–85.
105 Latron, pp. 81, 185–186, 188,191, 193–194. Latron writes for example that in the area of Zaḥla "*huit villages ont été emmurés entre 1929 et 1932 et ces travaux continuent",* p. 198.
106 IRFED's mission, vol. 2, p. 84; Latron (p. 54) gives a description of such seasonal contacts : *"Dans la plaine de Houlé (Palestine) oú la culture est extensive et irrégulière d'année en année, des métayers viennent de la région de Djezzine (Liban); ils labourent, sèment, puis remontent à leurs villages; ils redescendent pour la moisson …Ce mouvement est plus constant entre la plaine de Akkar et les coteaux du Dreib."*
107 There is little written history on the Ḥarfūsh family or on other Shi'i families of the Biqā'. A detailed political and military record of the Ḥarfūsh family, however, can be found in Ḥasan Naṣralla's book on Ba'lbak, who mentions the factionalism that developed in the Mandatory period between the families Ḥaydar and Ḥamāda; see, Ḥasan Naṣralla, *Tārīkh Ba'lbak* (History of Ba'lbak), 2 vols. (Beirut 1984), vol. 2, pp. 223–515.
108 On the Junblāṭ properties in the Biqā', see Firro, *A History of the Druzes*, pp. 106, 161–162, 164.
109 Latron, pp. 217–218.
110 al-Riyāshī, *Rū'asā'*, p. 5, 205–206 and 212.
111 The decision to send an American Commission of Inquiry to the former Ottoman province was taken in March 1919 by the representatives of the Four Powers (Britain, France, the USA and Italy) at the Versailles Peace Conference; see, e.g., Longrigg, pp. 87–93.
112 al-Riyāshī, *Rū'asā'*, pp. 231–253.
113 Ibid., pp. 285–292.
114 See Ibn Manẓūr, *Lisān al-'Arab,* 20 vols. (Cairo, n.d.), vol. 15, p. 158; the verb *za'ama* can also mean "to claim and promise unreal things," or "to lie." (pp. 156–157). On *za'īm* in the specific case of Lebanon, see *The Oxford encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World,* 4 vols. (New York 1995), vol. 4, pp. 365–366.
115 *EI,* first edn., vol. 4, p. 1322.
116 Information based on oral accounts of elders from the Golan Heights who claim that the Druze chiefs of Ḥawrān in general attempted to make contact with the *za'īm* of the Maydān quarter who generally lead the *qabadayāt* of his and other quarters. On the *qabadayāt* and their political role in Damascus and other Syrian cities, see Philip Khoury, *Syria and the French Mandate, The Politics of Arab Nationalism 1920–1945* (New Jersey 1987), pp. 302–310.
117 Harik, *Man Yaḥkum Lubnān*, p. 16, 19–20.
118 Arnold Hottinger, "*'Zu'ama* and Parities in the Lebanese Crisis of 1958," *Middle East Journal* 15/2 (Spring 1961), pp. 127–140.
119 Arnold Hottinger, "*'Zu'ama* in Historical Perspective," in Binder (ed.), *Politics in Lebanon,* pp. 85–94; 100–101.
120 Ibid.,; Hottinger argues (p. 90) that the majority of the modern *zu'ama* belonged to the Christian communities.
121 Iliya Harik, "Political elite of Lebanon," in Lenczowski, George (ed.), *Political Elites in the Middle East* (Washington, D.C. 1975). Harik uses the term *za'im* as a title for people who have *al-isti'thār bil-nufūhd* (i.e., influential people) but not *al-isti'thār bil-sulṭa* (i.e., are not monopolizing the regime); see Harik, *Man Yaḥkum Lubnān,* pp. 9 and 23.
122 Harik, "Political elite of Lebanon," p. 202, n. 6.
123 Ibid., p. 201.
124 Studying elites as an instrument for an analysis of the political life of a given society became popular in the late 1930s, when the works of two Italian scholars were first translated into English, i.e., Vilfredo Pareto, *The Mind and Society*, 4 vols. (New York 1935), and Gaetanbo

Mosca, *The Ruling Class* (New York 1939).
125 Cf. T.B. Bottomore, *Elites and Society* (New York, 1965) and Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Study of Elites, Who's Who, When, and How," *World Politics*, 18/4 (July 1966), pp. 690–717.
126 Harik, "Political elite of Lebanon," p. 202.
127 Cf. for Pareto and Mosca, the elites are an active and organized small group who rule a passive and unorganized majority (the non-elite); Lasswell developed this into a dichotomous division between the elite and masses as shown by the title of his *Politics: Who Gets What, When and How* (New York 1950), p. 233–250; for Rustow's critiques, see Rustow, "The Study of Elites," pp. 690–696.
128 Harik, "Political Elite of Lebanon," pp. 203–207; idem, *Man Yaḥkum Lubnān*, pp. 30–43.
129 Ibid., p. 46, idem, "Political Elite of Lebanon," p. 208.
130 Ibid., p. 210, idem, *Man Yaḥkum Lubnān*, pp. 50–51.
131 Idem, "Political Elite of Lebanon," p. 209.
132 Idem, *Man Yaḥkum Lubnān*, p. 146.
133 Ibid., pp. 66–76.
134 Ibid., pp. 61–137.
135 Hottinger, "*Zu'ama* in Historical Perspective," pp. 102–103.
136 Samir Khalaf, *Lebanon's Predicament* (New Yor 1987), pp. 22–72; approximately the same analysis can be found in his *Persistence and Changes in 19th Century Lebanon: Sociological Essay* (Beirut 1979).
137 Khalaf, *Lebanon's Predicament*, p. 20.
138 In painting his portrait of *za'īm,* Khalaf provides a sketchy overview of the headlines then appearing in the Lebanese press on the scandals and corruption in public funds and the violence carried out by *qabadayāt* and other groups that had the protection of their local *zu'ama*; see ibid., pp. 73–75.
139 Ibid., p. 85.
140 Ibid., pp. 94–95; see Malcolm H. Kerr, "Political Decision Making in a Confessional Democracy," in Binder (ed.), *Politics in Lebanon*, p. 190.
141 Harik, *Man Yaḥkum Lubnān*, p. 89.
142 Khalaf, *Lebanon's Predicament*, p. 94.
143 Apart from Harik, he uses Antoine Messara, "La structure sociale du parlement libanais" (Ph.D. thesis, University de Strasbourg, 1974); for tables and figures on the circulation of the Lebanese elite, see Khalaf, *Lebanon's Predicament*, pp. 124–133.
144 Ibid., pp. 131–132.
145 Ibid., pp. 134–135, quoting Messara, "La structure sociale du parlement libanais," p. 20.
146 Ibid., pp. 135–136.
147 Ibid., p. 139.
148 Johnson, *Class and Client in Beirut,* p. 3.

Chapter four

1 Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, pp. 4 and 47–65 (emphasis added).
2 Cf. Antony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism* (London and New York 1998), p. 5. Smith lists Gellner's approach as the first of four "main varieties of the [modernist] paradigm of the 1970s and 1980s"; as the second he mentions "the socioeconomic models of Tom Nairn and Michael Hechter which derive nationalism from the rational workings of the world economy and the social and economic interests of individuals."
3 Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford 1983), p. 52
4 Ibid., p. 55; cf., for the same thought, the quote at the head of Chapter One.

5 Barbara Smith, *Roots of Separatism*, p. 4
6 Anderson's "modular" nationalism reached the Middle East after the first world war, in what he calls "the last wave" (*Imagined Communities*, p. 113): "By 1922, [the dynasties of] the Habsburgs, Hohenzollerns, Romanovs and Ottomans were gone. In place of the Congress of Berlin came the League of *Nations*, from which non-Europeans were not excluded. From this time on, the legitimate international norm was the nation-state" (emphasis in original). Another thinly disguised pretext of the Mandate period was the assumption that the "nation-states" the French and British had carved out of the former Ottoman Arab provinces would be guided toward independence under their tutelage.
7 Sami Zubaida, *Islam, The People and the State* (London and New York 1993, revised ed.), p. 148 (emphasis added). For the "new cultural and technical processes" Zubaida refers to here ("The book, then the newspaper and the magazine, are infinitely reproducible commodities, which by the logic of 'print-capitalism' are pushed to every possible market"), see, of course, Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, pp. 33–46.
8 Zubaida, *Islam, The People and the State*, p. 146.
9 Cf. al-Riyāshī, *Rū'asā'*, pp. 36–47; see also al-Khuri, vol. 1, pp. 134–135.
10 By decree no. 305 the High Commissioner named the following senators: Maronites—Émile Eddé, Alpierre Qashū', Ḥabīb Pasha al-Sa'd, Yūsuf Istiphan and Yūsuf Nammūr (after the death of the latter Bshara al-Khuri replaced him); Sunnis—'Abdalla Bayhum, Muḥammad al-Kastī and Muḥammad al-Jisr; Shi'is—Ḥusayn Zayn, Faḍl al-Faḍl, Ibrāhīm Ḥaydar, who was soon replaced by Aḥmad al-Ḥusaynī as result of the Ḥaydar family's part in the insurrection of Ba'lbak in 1926; Greek Orthodox—Jubrān Naḥḥās and Michel Tuwaynī; Greek Catholic—Salīm Najjār; Druze—Sāmī Arslān; and Minorities—Ayūb Thābit; see Juḥā, *Ma'rakat Maṣīr Lubnān,* vol. 1, p. 304; 'Awaḍ, p.166.
11 See Juḥā, *Ma'rakat Maṣīr Lubnān*, vol. 1, p. 307; al-Khuri, vol. 1, pp. 139–141.
12 See, for the early phases of his personal life and his political involvement in "Lebanon," al-Khuri, vol. 1, pp. 19–108.
13 al-Riyāshī, *Rū'asā'*, pp. 126–129. In his memories al-Khuri writes about how he sought the support of the delegate of the High Commissioner; see al-Khuri, vol. 1, p. 141.
14 FO 371, 12306, E 1651/ 426/ 89, no. 68, Satow to FO, Beirut 30 March 1927. See, also al-Khuri, vol. 1, p. 140.
15 al-Riyāshī, *Rū'asā'*, p. 131.
16 Ibid., p. 288.
17 For further details, see Juḥā, *Ma'rakat Maṣīr Lubnān*, vol. 1, pp. 308; Rabbath, *La formation historique,* pp. 379–380; Rabbath (p. 380) seems to confuse between Bshara al-Khuri and Ḥabīb Pasha al-Sa'd when he refer to the new premier.
18 al-Khuri mentions, but does not explain, that within two days after his acceptance Sheikh al-Jisr declined; al-Khuri, vol. 1, p. 147. According to 'Awaḍ, al-Khuri won the race because President Dabbās was wary of the rise of Eddé's star in Lebanese politics; see 'Awaḍ, p. 167. According to Ḥallāq, it was the French themselves who invited al-Jisr to form the government but then, simultaneously, created obstacles for him by inciting their supporters against him in the Parliament; Ḥallāq, *Dirāsāt fī Tārīkh Lubnān al-Mu'āṣir,* p. 121.
19 al-Khuri, vol. 1, pp. 147–148; Juḥā, *Ma'rakat Maṣīr Lubnān*, vol. 1, p. 309; 'Awaḍ, p. 167; under the title *ghalṭat al-shaṭir* (the "mistake of the smart"), al-Riyāshī claims that al-Khuri at first may well have underestimated the predominant role of the French in "Lebanese" politics, unlike Émil Eddé who used al-Khuri's independent tendencies to his advantage; al-Riyāshī, *Rū'asā'*, p. 130.
20 FO 371, 12306, E 3058/426/89, no. 126, Snow to FO, Beirut, 30 June 1927.
21 See the full text of the project in Yūsuf Quzmā Khuri, vol. 1, pp. 1–3.
22 More details on the reform, on the position of the French authorities, and the 1932 report of the French Mandatory authorities to the League of nations, in Rabbath, *La formation historique*, pp. 379–381.
23 See al-Khuri, vol. 1, pp. 149–150. ; Juḥā, *Ma'rakat Maṣīr Lubnān*, vol. 1, p. 311.

24 On al-Jisr and his relations with the French, see al-Riyāshī, *Rū'asā'*, p. 44.
25 See Murād, *al-Ḥaraka al-Waḥdawiyya,* p. 191,
26 Ḥallāq, *Mu'tamar al-Saḥil,* pp. 159–165; *Dirāsāt fī Tārīkh Lubnān al-Mu'āṣir,* pp. 121–122; on the election of al-Jisr in the Parliament, see al-Khuri, vol. 1, p. 150.
27 Ibid., p. 152.
28 al-Riyāshī, *Rū'asā'*, p. 131.
29 al-Khuri admits that his decision to have Thābit join his cabinet was likely to "embarrass many people"; al-Khuri, vol. 1, p. 155; see also 'Awaḍ, p. 168. Although *al-'Ahd al-Jadīd* reflected the Muslim elite's opposition vis-à-vis Lebanon, it gathered Muslims and Christians under the same banner of secular nationalism; see Atiyah, "The Attitude of the Lebanese Sunnis Towards the State of Lebanon," pp. 116–118.
30 'Awaḍ, p. 168; al-Khuri, too, mentions the nervousness and shifts in position of Thābit as the reason for the fall of his government; al-Khuri, vol. 1, pp. 155–156; al-Riyāshī admires Ayūb's honesty and calls him *rajul al-ṣaghīra wal-kabīra* (a "man who cares for both the small details and the big picture"); al-Riyāshī, *Rū'asā'*, pp. 94–102 (also for anecdotes on his spontaneous and nervous disposition).
31 al-Khuri, vol. 1, pp. 155–160; for his speech in Parliament on 9 August 1928, one day before his resignation, see pp. 158–160.
32 Ibid., pp. 162–163; 'Awaḍ, pp. 168–169; Juḥa, *Ma'rakat Maṣīr Lubnān*, vol., I, p. 314; al-Riyāshī lucidly describes Lutfalla's campaign as the attempt of the merchants to translate their wealth into political power; Lutfalla, whose father had contributed funds to Sharīf Ḥusayn during the first world war, was granted the title of amir—with both his title and his money he then tried to become Lebanon's "Napoleon III"; al-Riyāshī, *Rū'asā'*, pp. 298–301.
33 The report of the British consul on constitutional reform, i.e., the law of the second amendment, intimates that it was prepared by French officials before being presented in the Chamber; see FO 371, 13802, no. 52, Satow to FO, 1 May 1929, and the annexed French text of the proposed law. The law was passed by the Chamber on 8 May 1929 and gave the president a six-year term and increased power vis-à-vis parliament; see, FO 13802, E/3741/182/89, no. 1081, Satow to FO Beirut, 13 July 1929. For details on the extension of Dabbās' presidency and the amendment of the constitution, see Rabbath, *La formation historique,* pp. 385–386; on the opposition to the separation of Lebanon, see Murād, *al-Ḥaraka al-Waḥdawiyya*, pp. 191–201.
34 See Juḥa, *Ma'rakat Maṣīr Lubnān,* vol. 1, pp. 326–328; for this dual strategy in more detail, see below.
35 For the text of the decisions of *Mu'tamar al-Saḥil* (the "Coastal Congress") held in Damascus on 23 July 1928, see Ḥallāq, *Mu'tamar al-Sāḥil,* pp. 166–168; see also below, Chapter Five.
36 *Lisān al-Ḥāl,* no. 27, July 1928, quoted by Juḥā, *Ma'rakat Maṣīr Lubnān,* vol. 1, p. 330.
37 On Subḥi Ḥaydar's career and activities, see below, Chapter Six.
38 On Ḥabīb Pasha al-Sa'd, see al-Riyāshī, *Rū'asā'*, pp. 48–60; on his family, see Khāṭir Laḥd, *Āl al-Sa'd fī Tārīkh Lubnān* (The Clan of Sa'd in the History of Lebanon), (Beirut 1988), pp. 207–310.
39 FO 371, 13803, E 2823/182/89, no. 54, Satow to FO Beirut, 14 May 1929.
40 al-Khuri, vol. 1, pp. 165–167.
41 'Awaḍ, p. 170.
42 Ibid.; for the violence in the north al-Khuri blames the High Commissioner's delegates and al-Jisr who had arranged all the lists of the elections; al-Khuri, vol. 1, p. 165. Among the 45 deputies, one finds the names of the following people whose families played, and still play, an important role in the history of the country: Christians—Iliyās Iskāf, Iliyās Fayāḍ, Iskander al-Bustānī, Anīs Khuri, George Ya'qūb, Rūkuz Abu Nādir, Sāmī Kan'ān, Shibl Dammūs, Qabalān Franjiyya, Michel Zakkūr, Yūsuf Isṭiphan, 'Abdalla Isḥāq, Mas'ūd Yūnis, Niqūlā Ghuṣn, 'Abadalla Nawfal, Yūsuf al-Khāzin Jubrā'il Naṣṣār, Yūsuf Sālim, Petro Ṭrād, Yūsuf al-Sawdā, Najīb Abu Ṣuwān, Musā Nammūr, Ḥabīb Pasha al-Sa'd, Émile Eddé and

Bshara al-Khuri; Sunnis—Ḥalim Qaddūra, ʿAbdalla Bayhum, Muḥammad Fakhūrī, Muḥammad al-Jisr, ʿAbbud ʿAd al-Razzāq, Khālid Shihāb, Rashād Adīb, Ḥusayn Qazʿūn; Shiʿis—Ibrāhim Ḥaydar, Ṣabrī Ḥamāda, Najīb ʿUsayrān, Faḍl al-Faḍl, ʿAlī Naṣrat al-Asʿad, ʿAbd al-Latīf al-Asʿad, and Yūsuf al-Zayn; Druzes—Rashīd Junblāṭ, Tawfīq Arslān, and Salīm Talḥūq.

43 al-Khuri, vol. 1, p. 167.
44 Rabbath, *La formation historique,* p. 384.
45 Ibid., p. 391.
46 al-Riyāshī, *Rūʾasāʾ,* pp. 132–133. The lands acquired by the consortium of merchants of Beirut were situated in an area called al-Jamhara; following the expansion of Beirut, the site was called Najma's Square.
47 FO 371, 13803, E 5828/182/89, no. 99, Satow to FO Beirut, 11 November 1929.
48 al-Riyāshī, *Rūʾasāʾ,* p. 133.
49 For details on his youth, education and family, see Michel van Leeuw, "Pour le Liban avec la France, Biographie d'Émile Eddé 1884–1949" (unpublished thesis, University of Rennes, 1986), pp. 34–50.
50 See ibid, pp. pp. 51–100.
51 FO 371, 13803, E5828/182/89, no. 99, Satow to FO Beirut, 11 November 1929; on the ridicule by his critics, see ʿAwaḍ, p. 170; al-Khuri, vol. 1, p. 168.
52 FO 371, 13803, E5828/182/89, no. 99, Satow to FO, Beirut, 11 November 1929.
53 Ibid.
54 Juḥa asserts that the Arabic text and not the French was displayed in the Chamber, but that it was translated from the French, Juḥā, *Maʿrakat Maṣīr Lubnān,* vol. 1, n. 28, p. 317.
55 The British consul sent a summary of the planned reform to London with his comments; see FO 371, 13803, E6580/182/89, no. 111, Satow to FO Beirut, 26 November 1929; for the full text in French under the title *Déclaration ministérielle, Séance du 22 Novembre 1929,* Annex no. 8, see Van Leeuw; for the text in Arabic concluding the protocols of the sessions 22 November 1929, 16 December 1929, and 17 December 1929, see Yūsuf Qusmā Khuri, vol. 1, pp. 3–80.
56 Ibid., pp. 3–9, and the French text of *Déclaration ministérielle,* pp. 1–11.
57 See ʿAwaḍ, pp. 174–175. On the proposition for the revision, see Yūsuf Qusmā Khuri, vol. 1, p. 9, and *Déclaration ministérielle,* p. 11.
58 See, e.g., the text in ibid., pp. 9–10; and *Déclaration ministérielle,* p. 12–14.
59 See, e.g., the paper *Alif-ba* of Damascus of 8 November; the "nationalist" paper of Khyr al-Dīn al-Aḥdab launched its attack against Eddé's educational reform on 12 November; see Ḥallāq, *Dirāsāt fī Tārīkh Lubnān al-Muʿāṣir,* p. 123.
60 Protocol of the session, on 17 December 1929, in Yusuf Qusmā Khuri, vol. 1, pp. 58–59.
61 Ibid., p. 62.
62 See ibid., pp. 57–80.
63 *al-Aḫrār*, 11 and 26 February 1930, quoted in Murād, *al-Ḥaraka al-Waḥdawiyya*, p. 206.
64 See Hallāq, *Dirāsāt fī Tārīkh Lubnān al-Muʿāṣir,* p. 207.
65 Bayhum, *Bayna Musharriq wa-Mugharrib,* pp. 118–119.
66 *Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban, Année 1932* (Paris 1932), p. 135.
67 Ibid., pp. 135–137, 143.
68 Ibid., p. 143.
69 FO 371, 14557, E972/972/89, no. 24, Satow to FO, 11 February 1930.
70 Ibid., E204/972/89, no. 28, Satow to FO Beirut, 25 February 1930; in an annex the consul appended the translation into French of the message Ḥajj Amīn al-Ḥusaynī sent to al-Ghalāyinī on 15 Ramadan 1347 (17 February 1930).
71 MAE, Séries E, Syrie-Liban 1930–1940, Carton 412, vol. 497, pp. 28–31; see also Murād, *al-Ḥaraka al-Waḥdawiyya*, pp. 207–208.
72 ʿAwaḍ, p. 175.

73 al-Riyāshī, *Rū'asā'*, pp. 68–69; see also ʿAwaḍ, p. 176.
74 *Rapport à la Société des Nation sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban, Année 1932*, p. 12.
75 See above, n. 7.
76 al-Riyāshī, *Rū'asā'*, pp. 68–69; ʿAwaḍ, pp. 176–179.
77 ʿAwaḍ, pp. 176, 178.
78 See Atiyah, note 118, p. 137, ʿAwaḍ, p. 181, al-Khuri, vol. 1, pp. 170–171.
79 In the second government he formed, Adīb replaced only the Shiʿi minister Aḥmad al-Ḥusaynī with his corelegionist Subḥī Ḥaydar; the other three were again Mūsā Nammūr, Ḥusayn al-Aḥdab and Jubrān Tuwaynī.
80 Oral testimony quoted by Van Leeuw, p. 160
81 See ʿAwaḍ, pp. 182–186.
82 Ibid., p. 186; al-Khuri also mentions that the candidacy of al-Jisr came as surprise and sees it as a conspiracy by Eddé; see al-Khuri, vol. 1, pp. 175–176.
83 *Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban, Année 1932*, p. 9.
84 al-Khuri alludes to this "right" when he describes the campaign for the election of Dabbās in 1926; for the role of the new Patriarch, Antoine ʿArīḍa, whose see in Bkirki became the site of the political bargaining among of the Maronites prior to the presidential elections of 1932, see al-Khuri, vol. 1, pp. 134, 177.
85 See Juḥā, *Maʿrakat Maṣīr Lubnān,* vol. 1, p. 334–335.
86 MAE. Syrie-Liban, Carton 567, *Affaires politiques, Population libanaise,* no. 12, *Rapport adressé à la commission supérieure de recensement au sujet des operation du recensement de 1932.* No date.
87 Van Leeuw, pp. 162–163.
88 *L'Orient*, 22 August 1932, quoted in Van Leeuw, pp. 163–164.
89 Ibid., p. 164.
90 MAE, Syrie-Liban, Carton 497 E413–2, *Direction des affaires politiques et commerciales, politique intérieure-exercice du mandat, janvier 1930–9, mai 1932, Lettre de René Cassin à Paul Boncour,* Paris, 12 April 1932; see also, Van Leeuw, pp. 168–170.
91 MAE, Beyrouth, Carton 567*, Affaires politiques, Population libanaise,* no. 40, Sûreté Générale*,* Beirut, 16 December 1931 (Information no. 4786*,* Tripoli, 15 December 1931).
92 Ibid., no. 39, Sûreté Générale, Beirut, 23 December 1931 (Information no. 4923, Tripoli, 22 December 1931).
93 Ibid., no. 38, Sûreté Générale, Beirut, 13 January 1932, (Information no. 216).
94 Ibid., no. 37, no. 3, Liban, 16 January 1932, including Sûreté Générale (Information no. 251, Beirut, 14 January 1932).
95 Ibid., no. 35, *Affaires politiques,* no. 4, 23 January 1932; the main objections to Ṣulḥ's suggestions came from some of the Druze *zuʿama*, Majīd Arslān, Fāyz al-ʿImād and Sheikh Amīn al-Qāḍī .
96 Ibid., no. 22, Arabic copy of leaflet of *Itiḥād al-Shabiba al-Islāmiyya* (the Muslim Youth Society), "*To our Muslim brothers; Druzes, Shiʿis and Sunnis*," 20 January 1932.
97 Ibid., no. 20, High Commissioner to Minister of Foreign Affaires, Beirut, 22 January 1932.
98 By decree no. 8837 of 15 January 1932, the Commission of the Census included of Ḥalīm Abu Shaʿār as *chef du Service de Recensement*, Musā Nammūr, Minister of the Interior, Ṣubḥī Ḥaydar, Minister of Finance, Shafīq al-Ḥalabī, *avocat général* of the Appeal and Cassation Court, and Ṣubḥī Abu Nāṣir, Director of the Interior. The first session of the commission was held on 16 January 1932; ibid, no. 13, *Procès Verbal de la Séance de la commission supérieure de Recensement,* 16 January 1932.
99 Ibid., no. 33, Sûreté Générale, Beirut 27 January 1932, (Information no. 471).
100 Ibid., no. 36, Sûreté Générale, Beirut, 20 January 1932, (Information no. 334, Tripoli).
101 Ibid., no. 34, Sûreté Générale, Beirut, 25 January 1932, (Information no. 439, Tripoli, 23 January 1932) .
102 Ibid., no. 32, Sûreté Générale, Beirut, 30 January 1932, (Information no. 534, Tripoli, 29 January 1932).

103 Ibid., no. 30, Sûreté Générale, Beirut, 2 February 1932, (Information no. 569, Tripoli, 1 February 1932), annex no. 31, "*Appel du peuple syrien arabe de Tripoli*" (French translation of original Arabic).
104 Ibid., No 5, *Cabinet Politique, Haut Commissaire* to the *Commissaire résident général de France au Maroc,* Beirut 28 January 1937; at the latter's request, the High Commissioner sent him '*un exemplaire des bulletins utilises au Liban du dernier recensement'* (the forms used in the census).
105 Ibid., no. 24. *'Recueil des Lois, Décrets et Instructions relatives au Recensement de l'année 1932,* p. 21, and ibid., no. 26, The Lebanese Republic, no. 1886, Director of the Interior to the delegate of the High Commissioner, 18 October 1932.
106 Ibid., No 12, *Rapport adressé à la Commission supérieure de recensement au sujet des opération de recensement de 1932* (no date).
107 *Gazette Officièlle,* vol. 1932, 5 October 1932, p. 5, quoted in Atiyah, n. 4, p. 107. These figures were also transmitted to the High Commissioner. 13 December 1933. Juḥā, in his book of 1995, uses the same source, but changes the figures in favor of the Christians whose total he gives as 404,400; Juḥā, *Maʿrakat Maṣīr Lubnān,* vol. 1, p. 338. What this again shows is that demography remains one of the most sensitive issues in Lebanon and that the "numbers game" is being played until today.
108 MAE, Beyrouth, 567, *Affaire politique, Population libanaise*, no. 1, "*Population Libanaise, Recensenement 1932*"; this dossier contains the distribution of the population in the different districts of the country.
109 MAE, Beyrouth, 567, no. 12, *Rapport adressé à la Commission supérieure de recensement.*
110 MAE, Beyrouth, 785, Table 2.
111 The distribution is the following: Sunnis 121,964, Shiʿis 103,038, Druzes 39,941, Maronites 175,702, Greek Orthodox 67,856, Greek Catholic 38,561, Protestants 3,630, Miscellaneous 8,231; MAE, Beyrouth, 567, no. 10, *Rapport adressé à la Commission supérieure de recensement.* The same figure is found in ibid., no. 10, Delegate of the High Commissioner in the Lebanese Government to the High Commissioner, 13 December 1933, "*Note pour le H.C., Cabinet Politique*". The British Consul gives the following figures of the census of 1921–2: Sunnis 124,786, Shiʿis 104,947, Druzes 43,633, Maronites 199,181, Greek Orthodox 81,409, Greek Catholic 42,462, Protestants 4,215, and Miscellaneous 8,436. FO 371 7846, E324/274/89, Satow to FO, 13 March 1922.
112 In many documents during the 1930s Sunnis continue to complain about the inclusion of the emigrants in the census.
113 See the nationality law and the amendments in Shafiq Juḥā, *al-Dustūr al-Lubnānī* (The Constitution of Lebanon), (Beirut 1991), pp. 33–98.
114 The Armenians in Lebanon are divided into two communities, Armenian Orthodox, whose number in 1932 was 26,102, and Armenian Catholics, 5,890.
115 MAE, Beyrouth, no. 16, petition in Arabic addressed to Ibrāhīm al-Kanj signed by Ḥassān ʿAlī Khalīl and sons, 11 February 1932.
116 MAE, Beyrouth, 567, no. 14, Procès verbal of the commission, 14 September 1932.
117 Ibid., Sûreté Générale, no. 28, Beirut, 26 February 1932 (Information no. 1030, Tripoli 25 February 1932). In 1934 the delegate of the High Commissioner to the government estimated the number of the ʿAlawis registered as Sunnis at 3,000. According to him this was done at the initiative of Nadīm al-Jisr, the *qāʾimmaqām*, ibid., no. 6, Delegate of High Commissioner to the government, *Cabinet politique* (Information no. 176, Beirut, September 1934).
118 Ibid., no. 27, Beirut, 4 March 1932 (Information no. 1186, Tripoli 3 March 1932).
119 Ibid., no. 10, Delegate of the High Commissioner to the government, 13 December 1933, "Note pour le H.C."
120 Ibid., no. 9, translation of Letter of *Vicaire Patriarchal, Elias Ricah (Evèque)* to the president of the republic, 23 March 1934.
121 Significantly, al-Khuri and Eddé were among the seventeen appointed deputies of the new

chamber; on the elections, see al-Khuri, vol. 1, pp. 180–185; according to al-Khuri, it was after the election of the new Chamber of 1934 that his Constitutional Party was formed; ʻAwaḍ, pp. 199–201.

122 MAE, Beyrouth, 567, no. 4, Maronite Patriarch to Meyrier, 1 August 1937.

123 Ibid., no. 3, *Cabinet politique*, Meyrier to MAE, Beirut, 25 August 1937.

124 Ibid., no. 2, *Cabinet politique*, Conty to the French adviser to the secretary of the Lebanese state, Beirut, 9 September 1940.

125 FO 371 16085 E/2319/171/89, no. 4, Satow to FO Beirut, May 1932. In this report the British consul summarizes the decree of the High Commissioner but without his usual comments. The Arabic text of the decree was published in the Official Publication of the High Commission for Administrative Affairs, Year 11, no. 9, 15 May 1932, pp. 95–96 quoted in Juḥā, *Maʻrakat Maṣīr Lubnān*, vol. 1, pp. 353–354. On the opponents and supporters of al-Jisr, the position of the Maronite Church, the French position, and reaction of Sunni intellectuals and *zuʻama* to Jisr's candidacy, see ibid., vol. 1, pp. 340–355, Ḥallāq, *Tārīkh Lubnān al-Muʻāṣir*, p. 128–138; Murād, *al-Ḥaraka al-Waḥdawiyya*, pp. 211–217.

126 Quoted from the Arabic text of the decree.

127 *Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la situation de la Syrie et du Liban, Année 1932*, pp. 9–11.

128 FO 371, 16973, E/908/120/89, 20 January 1933, which includes text of "*League of Nations, Examination of Report on Syria and Lebanon for 1931 by Permanent Mandates Commission (Protocol of Meeting No. 36 held on 1st December 1932)*", pp. 290–291.

129 Ibid., p. 275.

Chapter five

1 For further details, see Rabbath, *La formation historique*, pp. 394–398; ʻAli ʻAbd al-Munʻim Shuʻayb, *Tārīkh Lubnān min al-Iḥtilāl ilā al-Jalā' 1918–1946* (Beirut, 2nd ed. 1944), pp. 50–53.

2 FO 371, 16976, no. 27, Satow to John Jimon, Beirut, 17 March 1933.

3 Ibid; Satow added that after "the drivers had been on strike for a week or so, the shopkeepers and the retail dealers were induced to show their sympathy by closing their places for the best part of forty-eight hours. At Tripoli traders also showed their solidarity with those of Beirut by a strike for one day."

4 Report of the Executive Commission of the Syro-Palestinian Congress (Cairo), p. 47, quoted in Shuʻayb, *Tārīkh Lubnān,* p. 52.

5 FO 371, 16976, no. 27, Satow to John Jimon, Beirut, 17 March 1933.

6 See Murād, *al-Ḥaraka al-Waḥdawiyya,* pp. 217–220.

7 MAE, Beyrouth, 595, no. 1, High Commissioner to MAE, 15 January 1932; on the ceremony of the election, see Buṭrus Fahd, *Batrakiat al-Mawārina wa-Asāqifatuhum* (The Maronite Patriarchates and their Clergy), 4 vols. (Beirut 1987), vol. 4 ("The Twentieth Century"), pp. 207–212.

8 MAE, Beyrouth, 595, Sûreté Générale, no. 6, Beirut, 18 January 1932; (information no. 331), Beirut 20 January 1932; no. 5 (information no. 431), Beirut 25 January 1932; on the election of ʻArīḍa, see Fahd, vol. 4, pp. 208–211.

9 Rabbath, *La formation historique*, p. 398; Rabbath does not give the source of his quotation but he may be referring to Nakhla's version of the decisions taken by the "National Congress"; see Rashīd Nakhla, *Kitāb al-Manfa* (The Book of Exile), (Beirut 1956), p. 78.

10 See Farid el-Khazen, *The Communal Pact of National Identities, The Making and Politics of the 1943 National Pact* (Centre for Lebanese Studies, Oxford, October 1991), p. 89; Shuʻayb, *Tārīkh Lubnān*, p. 52.

11 For the demands of the Coastal Conference and their repercussions among Muslim leaders, see Murād, *al-Ḥaraka al-Waḥdawiyya,* pp. 220–226.

12 Communist efforts attracting intellectuals from the different communities to Marxist ideology can be traced to the early 1920s, with the illegal organization of *Ḥizb al-'Ummāl al-'Ām fī Lubnān al-Kabīr* (the "Labour Party of Greater Lebanon") which tried to set up trade unions and a socialist press. On the history of the Communist Party in Lebanon, see Shu'ayb, *Tārīkh Lubnān*, pp. 102–144.

13 On the organization of the party, see 'Adil al-Ṣulḥ, *Ḥizb al-Istiqlāl al-Jumhūrī* (The Republican Party for Independence), (Beirut 1970), pp. 7–11 and 37–39; on its political position and ideology, pp. 41–69.

14 See Shu'ayb, *Tārīkh Lubnān*, pp. 89–102.

15 On *Ḥizb 'Uṣbat al-'Amal al-Qawmī*, see Solh, pp. 37–40. 'Ali Nāṣir al-Dīn (1888–1974) was a Druze intellectual who had joined the Arab Revolt. In 1922 he established in Beirut an anti-French paper, *al-Minbar*, which was soon banned by the French authorities. After his release from prison in 1924, he left for Palestine where he began writing for the Palestinian paper *al-Karmil*. Returning to Tripoli in 1928, he edited the nationalist paper *al-Liwā'*. From 1931 to 1933 he was again in Palestine, continuing his political activities and "Arab nationalist" writings. For biographical information on Nāṣir al-Dīn, see Najīb B'aynī, *Rijāl min Bilādī* (Men from My Country), (Beirut 1984), pp. 199–213; see also below, ch. 7 (n. 11).

16 For further details, see Rabbath, *La formation historique*, pp. 399–400; the quotation from American Consul C.T. Steger, dispatch no. 624, in Walter L. Browne, *The Political History of Lebanon, 1920–1950*, 2 vols. (Salisbury, N C 1976), vol. 1, p. 161.

17 al-Khuri, vol. 1, p. 184; see also 'Awaḍ, p. 197.

18 FO 371, 17946, E 1178/525/89, Acting Consul-General Havard to FO, Beirut, 3 February 1934. The number of the voters in the first ballot was only 11,758 out of a total of 33,800 registered voters; see report of Steger to Secretary of State, no. 634, Beirut, 25 January 1934 and 7 February 1934, in Browne, vol. 1, pp. 170, 173. See also Rabbath's explanation for the two ballots in Beirut, *La formation historique*, p. 400.

19 Steger to Secretary of State, no. 634, Beirut, 25 January 1934, in Browne, vol. 1, pp. 169–170.

20 On 2 January 1934 the High Commissioner issued Decree no. 1 (Art. 4) stipulating that the nominated deputies should be chosen from lawyers, doctors, pharmacists, professors, engineers, journalists, merchants, industrialists and agriculturalists: see American Consul, no. 624, in Browne, vol. 1, p. 162. On the French intervention and the role of the Maronite patriarch in these elections, see the description of Steger to Secretary of State, no. 634, Beirut, 25 January 1934, in ibid., pp. 168–172.

21 Steger to Secretary of State, no. 643, Beirut 7 February 1934, in Browne, vol. 1, pp. 173–74. A similar account can be found in FO 371, 17946, E 1178/525/89, Acting Consul-General Havard to FO, Beirut, 3 February 1934. 'Awaḍ (pp. 200–201) alludes to a deal between al-Aḥdab and Dr. 'Abdalla al-Yāfī, a Sunni newcomer, who withdrew his candidacy in the second ballot.

22 The appointed deputies were Bshara al-Khuri, Emil Eddé (the two Maronite competitors and representatives of Mount Lebanon), Charles Dabbās (Greek Orthodox representing Beirut), Gabriel Khabbāz (Greek Catholic, proprietor and editor of the newspaper *L'Orient,* representing Beirut, Amīr Majīd Arslān (Druze notable, representing Mount Lebanon), Ibrāhīm Bek Ḥaydar (Shi'i notable representing Biqā'), and Amīr Khālid Shihāb (Sunni notable representing southern Lebanon). The eighteen elected deputies representing their districts and communities were:
Beirut: Ayūb Thābit (Minorities), Wahram Lelakyan (Armenian), Khayr al-Dīn al-Aḥdab (Sunni); Mt. Lebanon: Farīd al-Khāzin, Kamīl Sham'ūn (Maronites), Mechil Zakkūr (Greek Catholic) and Ḥikmat Junblāṭ (Druze); Northern Lebanon: Ḥamīd Franjjiya, Niqūlā Ghuṣn (Maronites), Shibl 'Isā al-Khuri (Greek Orthodox), Amīn Muqaddam and Mūhammad al-'Abbūd (Sunnis); Southern Lebanon: Najīb 'Usayrān, Faḍl al-Faḍl (Shi'is); Biqa': Ṣabrī Ḥamāda (Shi'i), Iliyās al-Skāf (Greek Orthodox) and Muḥammad Amīn Qaz'ūn (Sunni).

23 Steger to Secretary of State, no. 643, Beirut, 7 February 1934, in Browne, vol. 1, pp. 174–178; see also al-Riyāshī on al-Dabbās, "the merchant who was ready to accept an office such as the speaker of the Chamber after a long service as president of the Republic;" al-Riyāshī, *Rū'asā'*, pp. 46–47.
24 Steger to Secretary of State, no. 643, Beirut, 7 February 1934, in Browne, vol. 1, pp. 174–178.
25 In his memoirs al-Khuri writes that his "Constitutional Bloc" came into being when his ally Sheikh Farīd al-Khāzin presented a proposal to the Chamber for the full restoration of the constitution; al-Khuri, vol. 1, pp. 189–190.
26 Ibid.; see also ʿAwaḍ, p. 202.
27 ʿAwaḍ, pp. 202–203.
28 According to al-Khuri, Khayr al-Dīn al-Aḥdab, whom al-Khuri "supported to get into the Chamber," changed his affiliation because he believed he could win an appointment as prime minister only through Eddé as al-Khuri already had other Sunni candidates for this office; see al-Khuri, vol. 1, p. 190.
29 MAE, Série E. Levant (1930–1940); Syrie-Liban, Carton 412–3, vol. 497, pp. 226–227; see also Murād, *al-Ḥaraka al-Waḥdawiyya,* p. 225.
30 ʿAdil al-Ṣulḥ, p. 109.
31 For the resolutions of the Coastal Conference, see *al-Qabas*, 27 November 1933, quoted in Ḥassān Ḥallāq, *Mudhakkarāt Salīm ʿAli Salām, 1868–1938* (Memoirs of Salīm ʿAli Salām, 1868–1938), (Beirut 1982), annex no. 30, pp. 293–296; see also Ḥassān Ḥallāq, *Muʾtamar al-Sāḥil wal-ʾAqḍiya al-Arbaʿa, 1936* (The Coastal Conference and the Four Districts, 1936), (Beirut 1983), annex no. 39, pp. 17–178; Murād, *al-Ḥaraka al-Waḥdawiyya,* pp. 221–222.
32 The criticism by al-Hāshim of the suspension of the constitution and the economic policy of the authorities elicited an angry response from the editor and writers of the pro-Mandatory paper *L'Orient*; see ʿAdil al-Ṣulḥ, pp. 48–51.
33 According to ʿAdil al-Ṣulḥ, the party had suggested this kind of formula for the identity of the country in 1933, when it had been presented to the Maronite patriarch; see ibid., pp. 109–110.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 FO 371, 17946, E 6813/927/89, Havard to FO, "Economic Condition in the Lebanon," Beirut, 1 November 1934.
37 English translation of the decree in FO 371, 17946, E 7466/7466/89, N. 67, Havard to FO, Beirut, 6 December 1934.
38 Pierre Rondot, *Les institutions politiques du Liban, des communautés traditionelles à l'état moderne*, 2 vols. (Paris 1947), vol. 1, p. 115.
39 MAE, Beyrouth, 596, Cabinet Politique, 1926–1941, no. 5, Information no. 5 of the delegate of the High Commissioner to the Lebanese Republic, 24 January 1935.
40 FO 371, 19021, E 1880/899/89, Havard to FO, Beirut, 25 February 1935.
41 *Le Jour*, 12 February 1938, quoted in Rondot, p. 115
42 For further details on the rapprochement with the National Bloc and the Sunni leaders, see Rabbath, *La formation historique*, pp. 406–407; Atiyah, pp. 140–142; Murād, *al-Ḥaraka al-Waḥdawiyya,* pp. 232–233; Iskander al-Riyāshī, *Qabla wa-Baʿd* (Before and After), (Beirut 1953), pp. 136–138.
43 FO 371, 19021, E 1880/899/89, Havard to FO, Beirut, 25 February 1935.
44 MAE, Beyrouth, Cabinet Politique, 463, ʿAriḍa to Minister of Foreign Affairs, no. 7, copy of letter, Bkirki, 1 March 1935.
45 See Longrigg, pp. 206, 219.
46 Atiyah, "Attitude", p. 141.
47 See ʿAdil al-Ṣulḥ, pp. 10–110.
48 MAE, Beyrouth, Cabinet Politique, 463, ʿAriḍa to MAE, no. 7 Bkirki, 1 March 1935.
49 *Le Jour*, 11 September 1935, quoted in Rabbath, *La formation historique*, p. 406.

50 *L'Orient*, 19 January 1936, quoted in Rabbath, *La formation historique*, p. 406.
51 Steger to Secretary of State, no. 992, Beirut, 23 November 1935, in Browne, vol. 1, p. 185.
52 Ibid., p. 186. Petro Ṭrād was temporarily appointed President of the Chamber as successor to his co-religionist al-Dabbās. Al-Khuri describes Khālid Shihāb as the candidate of the Constitutional Bloc while he claims that Ṭrād lost the election because of certain "deficiencies" in his personality; al-Khuri, vol. 1, pp. 193–194.
53 Steger to Secretary of State, no. 1020, Beirut, 6 January 1936, Browne, vol. 1, p. 188.
54 al-Khuri, vol. 1, p. 195.
55 See 'Awaḍ, pp. 207–218; among others, 'Awaḍ mentions Khalīl Ma'tūq, a Lebanese merchant who imported Persian *tombac* from Iran before the monopoly that put the tobacco and tombac under the French companies' control. Ma'tūq had good relations in Iran with Siridar As'ad, one of the most influential merchants, and with Iran's minister of finance, who were both arrested and then executed having been accused of attempting a coup d'état. Before their arrest the two Iranians deposited their fortunes with Ma'tūq, who subsequently fled to Lebanon with this wealth. According to 'Awaḍ, Ma'tūq also contrived to buy the letters de Martel had written to his mistress, Madame de Kurkuv.
56 al-Riyāshī, *Rū'asā'*, pp. 134–135. In order to show the extent of cooperation between the Maronite patriarch and the Syrian nationalists, al-Riyāshī relates an incident in which a group of demonstrators had left a mosque in Damascus shouting "*Lā ilāha illā Allah wal-baṭriyark 'Ariḍa ḥabīb Allah*"; see al-Riyāshī, *Qabla wa-Ba'ad*, p. 136.
57 Ibid.
58 MAE, Série E, Levant 1930–1940, Carton 413–2, vol. 501, pp. 15–17, letter of de Martel to MAE, Beirut, 28 February 1936.
59 al-Khuri, vol. 1, pp. 199–200.
60 See Rabbath, *La formation historique*, pp. 407–408.
61 See al-Khuri, vol. 1, p.199.
62 Steger to the Secretary of State, Beirut, 13 March 1936, in Browne, vol. 1, pp. 191–192.
63 See Shu'ayb, *Tārīkh Lubnān*, pp. 117–118.
64 The foremost participants were: Sunnis: (Beirut) Salīm 'Ali Salām, 'Umar Bayhum, Muḥammad Jamīl Bayhum, Ṣāliḥ 'Uthmān Bayhum, Aḥmad al-Dā'ūq, Zakariyā al-Nuṣūlī, Ma'mūn Ayās, Dr. Māliḥ Sinnū, Nājī Fākhūrī, 'Abd al-Qādir Ṭabbāra, Ḥasan al-Qādī, 'Izzat Qraytim, Kāẓim al-Ṣulḥ. (Tripoli) 'Abd al-Ḥamīd Karāmī, 'Abd al-Laṭīf al-Biṣār. ('Akkār) Shawqī al-Dandashī. (Sidon) Dr. Riyāḍ al-Shihābī and 'Alī al-Bizri. Shi'is: (Jabal 'Amil) 'Adil 'Usayrān, Aḥmad 'Arif al-Zayn, Aḥmad Riḍā, Sulaymān al-Ḍāhir. Druzes: (Mount Lebanon) 'Ali Nāṣir al-Dīn. Christians: Ṣalāḥ Labakī (born in Brazil in 1906), Yūsuf Yazbak and Fawzī Brudwil. See Atiyah, "Attitude", p. 143, and "Discussion and Protocol of the Coastal Conference of 1936," in Ḥallāq, *Mu'tamar al-Sāḥil*, pp. 43–64; see also Ḥallāq, *Mudhakarāt Salīm 'Ali Salām*, p. 82.
65 See "Protocol of the Coastal Conference," in Ḥallāq, *Mu'tamar al-Sāḥil*, pp. 43–48.
66 Ibid., pp. 49–50.
67 Ibid., p. 56.
68 See ibid., pp. 63–64.
69 Kāẓim al-Ṣulḥ, "Mashkilat al-Ittiṣāl wal-Infiṣāl," in ibid., pp. 77–80.
70 Ibid., pp. 80–82.
71 Ibid., pp. 82–87.
72 Ibid., p. 89.
73 Having studied statements made by 'Ariḍa between 1936 and 1945, Pierre Rondot speaks of "*fluctuations politiques.*" For instance, in 1939 the patriarch protested "*contre les déclarations qu'on lui prête sur 'le Liban arabe par son sang, par sa langue, par son coeur'*"; see Rondot, pp. 110–112.
74 The text of the "Green Book" was sent by Meyrier to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on 22 May 1936, and can be found in MAE, Beyrouth, no. 596, Cabinet Politique, 1926–1841, no. 9, *Livre vert du Patriarch Maronite, le Liban et la France. Documents publiés par le*

Patriarch Maronite (n.d.). In a long introduction to the Arab translation of the book, Mas'ūd Ḍāhir portrayed 'Ariḍa as a Lebanese nationalist who had struggled not only against the French Mandatory but also against the Muslims who had called for the return of the "annexed districts" to Syria and the Maronites who wanted a "*Petit Liban*"; see Antoine 'Ariḍa, *Lubnān wa Fransa* (translated by Fāris Ghaṣūb and edited by Mas'ūd Ḍāhir) (Beirut 1987), pp. 18–29.

75 MAE, Beyrouth, no. 596, Cabinet Politique, 1926–1941, no. 10, Extracts from the Lebanese press concerning 'Ariḍa's "Green Book," 8 May 1936.

76 MAE, Beyrouth, no. 463 Cabinet Politique, no. 38. "*Mémoire présenté par le Patriarche Maronite au Ministre des Affaires Etrangres*" (n.d.) (probably March 1935).

77 Ibid.

78 MAE, Beyrouth, no. 596, Cabinet Politique 1926–1941, no. 7, *Note présenté par le Patriarche Maronite à de Martel en memorandum* (n.d.).

79 Ibid.

80 For example, see MAE, Beyrouth, 596, no. 12, Meyrier to 'Ariḍa, 2 September 1936, and no. 13 'Ariḍa to Meyrier, 16 August 1936. Not surprisingly, in many of the "dossiers" of Beyrouth 596 covering the correspondence of the patriarch 'Ariḍa comes through as a main defender of "Maronite rights."

81 FO 371, 20066, E 4804/195/89, Furlong to Mr. Eden, Beirut, 20 July 1936.

82 American Consul General, "Review of the Press for the State of the Levant under French Mandatory," 19 to 28 June 1936, in Browne, vol. 1, p. 202.

83 al-Khuri, vol. 1, p. 201; FO 371, 20066, E 4804/195/89, Furlong to Eden, Beirut 20 July 1936.

84 Ibid., and MAE, Levant 1930–1940, Syrie-Liban, vol. 501, p. 49; see also Murād, *al-Ḥaraka al-Waḥdawiyya*, p. 261.

85 See Murād, *al-Ḥaraka al-Waḥdawiyya*, pp. 261–262.

86 FO 371, 20066, E 4804/195/89, no. 69. Furlong to Eden, Beirut, 20 July 1936.

87 For further information, see Shu'ayb, *Tārīkh Lubnān*, pp. 124–125.

88 FO 371, 20066, E 6753/195/89, no. 98, Furlong to Eden, Beirut 23 October 1936. The representatives of the six principal communities are: Bshara al-Khuri and Émile Eddé (Maronites), 'Abdalla Bayhum, Khālid Shihāb and Muḥammad al-'Abbūd (Sunis), Najīb 'Usayrān (Shi'i), Ḥikmat Junblāt (Druze), Petro Ṭrād (Greek Orthodox), Gabriel Khabbāz (Greek Catholic) and Wahram Lelakyan (Minorities).

89 al-Khuri, vol. 1, pp. 203–204. Al-Khuri accepted the article that allowed for the military presence of France in Lebanon during the negotiations in October and November 1936; thirty years later he justifies his acceptance by claiming that the "parliamentary majority" which supported Eddé made the ratification of the treaty at the beginning of 1937 inevitable.

90 See the text of "Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between France and the Lebanon" in Browne, vol. 1, pp. 204–206.

91 Text of the "Military Convention," in ibid., pp. 207–209.

92 MAE, Levant, 1930–1940, Syrie-Liban, vol. 502, pp. 20–21, Salīm Salām to M.E., Beirut, 23 October 1936; see also Murād, *al-Ḥaraka al-Waḥdawiyya*, pp. 267–268 and Atiyah, pp. 149–150.

93 MAE, Beyrouth, Cabinet Politique, 460, no. 17, French translation of Ṣulḥ's speech at the National Muslim Conference published in Beirut, 25 October 1936; for other declarations of the same period, see Atiyah, p. 150; also Murād, *al-Ḥaraka al-Waḥdawiyya*, p. 269.

94 On these arguments, see el-Khazen, pp. 35–36.

95 Kāẓim al-Ṣulḥ, "Mashkilat al-ittiṣāl wal-infiṣāl," in Ḥallāq, *Mu'tamar al-Sāḥil*, p. 86.

96 Quoted in Rondot, p. 49.

97 On the statement and position of Ra'īf Abu al-Lam', see Shu'ayb, *Tārīkh Lubnān*, pp. 127–128.

98 On the reaction of the general populace to the negotiations and the conclusion of the

Franco-Lebanese treaty, see Murād, *al-Ḥaraka al-Waḥdawiyya*, pp. 272–274; Shuʿayb, *Tārīkh Lubnān*, pp. 129–137; Atiyah, "Attitude" pp. 151–152.
99 MAE, Serie E. Levant 1930–1940, Syrie-Liban, vol. 502, pp. 83–84.
100 FO 371, 20066, E 7315/195/89, no. 103, Furlong to FO, Beirut, 17 November 1936.
101 The circular was signed by fifteen Christian and Muslim leaders, among them Bshara al-Khuri, George Thābit, Henri Farʿūn, Salīm Salām, Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ, ʿUmar al-Dāʿūq, and Muḥammad ʿUmar Bayhum. Text of the circular in Ḥallāq, *Mudhakarāt Salīm ʿAlī Salām*, p. 313.
102 Theodore Marriner, US Consul to the Secretary of State, Beirut, 19 November 1936, in Browne, vol. 7, p. 230.

Chapter six

1 See above, Chapter 4, nn. 7 and 8.
2 For the text of Annexes 6 and 6(bis), see Browne, vol. 1, pp. 213–215; summary and comments on Treaty and Annexes in FO 371, 20066, E 7315/195/98, Furlong to FO, Beirut, 17 November 1936.
3 Ibid.
4 See below, n. 23.
5 Rondot, p. 50.
6 See Rabbath, *La formation historique*, pp.91–126; see also Rondot, pp. 67–70.
7 Ibid.
8 This was to happen in 1955, 1962 and 1967, respectively; emphasis added.
9 For further details, see Rabbath, *La formation historique*, pp. 91–126, and Rondot, pp. 67–70.
10 Rondot, p. 117.
11 See Atiyah, "Attitude", pp. 145–146.
12 MAE, Beyrouyth, 460, Cabinet Politique, no. 18, *delegué du haut commissaire de la republique Libanaise* to de Martel, Beirut, 24 October 1931.
13 Ibid.
14 MAE, Beyrouyth, 460, Cabinet Politique, no. 12, information (n.d.) (probably 6 November 1936).
15 MAE, Beyrouyth, 460, Cabinet Politique, no. 22, French translation of Nuṣūlī's article published in *Beirut*, 19 October 1936.
16 MAE, Beyrouyth, 460, Cabinet Politique, nos. 15 and 16, Salām to de Martel, Beirut, 28 October 1936.
17 Ibid.
18 MAE, Beyrouth., 460, Cabinet Politique, no. 9, Salām to de Martel, Beirut, 28 November 1936.
19 Ibid.
20 MAE, Beyrouth, 460, Caninet Politique, no. 13, de Martel to MA, Beirut, (n.d.) (30 October to 2 November 1936).
21 MAE, Beyrouth, 460, Cabinet Politique, no. 14, ʿAzīz al-Hāshim to ʿArīḍa, Beirut, 29 October 1936.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 MAE, Beyrouth, 460, Cabinet Politique, no. 17, French translation of al-Ṣulḥ's speech published in *Beirut*, 25 October 1936. Murād quotes part of the speech as it was published in *al-Nahār*, 26 October 1936; see Murād, *al-Ḥaraka al-Waḥdawiyya*, p. 269.
25 *L'Orient*, 9 February 1937, qouted in Murād, *al-Ḥaraka al-Waḥdawiyya*, p. 279, and Rondot, p. 52.

26 MAE, Beyrouth, 460 Cabinet Politique, no. 5, Salām to de Martel, "*Memoire presenté par le Conseil Musulman National*," Beirut, 8 February 1937.
27 Ibid.
28 MAE, Beyrouth, 460, Cabinet Politique, no. 4, Salām to de Martel, "*Requête presentée par le Conseil Musulman National*," Beirut, 23 April 1937.
29 MAE, Beyrouth, 460, Cabinet Politique, "*Note pour Mr Kieffer*" (probably written by de Martel), no. 2, Beirut, 12 June 1937.
30 On the elections of 1937, see Rabbath, *La formation politique*, pp. 418–419; ʻAwaḍ, pp. 231–234; al-Riyāshī, *Rūaʾsāʾ*, pp. 138–142; Shuʾayib, *Tārikh Lubnān*, pp. 144–145
31 MAE, Beyrouth, 456 (In. no. 5), Cabinet Politique, 1926–1941, no. 59, Pechkoff, adminstrative adviser of Southern Lebanon to the delegate of the High Commissioner, no. 160, Sidon, 19 May 1934. In his *50 Sana Maʿa al-Nās* (Fifty Years with the People) (Beirut 1975), pp.27–34, Yūsuf Sālim describes how his fifty-year political career began with his appointment in the Water Company of Beirut; he remains silent, though, on the role he played in Tyre's politics.
32 MAE, Beyrouth, 456 (In. no. 5), Cabinet Politique, 1926–1941, no. 59, Pechkoff, adminstrative adviser of Southern Lebanon to the delegate of the High Commissioner, no. 160, Sidon, 19 May 1934.
33 Ibid.
34 Although the Shiʿi historian, ʻAlī ʻAbd al-Munʿim Shuʿayb, singles out—somewhat forcedly to my mind—Shiʿi demands for unity with Syria and for more equality, he also describes the process in the first years of the Mandate of Shiʿi integration; see his *Maṭālib Jabal ʻAmil, al-Waḥda, al-Musāwa fī Lubnān al-Kabīr, 1900–1936* (The Demands of Mt. ʻAmil, Unity and Equality in Greater Lebanon, 1900–1936), (Beirut 1987), pp 72–104.
35 See *al-ʿIrfān*, vol.6, nos. 5 & 6, March 1921, p 293; ibid., no.8, June 1921, p. 405, quoted in Shuʿayb, *Maṭālib Jabal ʻAmil*, p. 93.
36 On the Shiʿi areas before and during the Syrian Revolt, see Shuʿayb, *Maṭālib Jabal ʻAmil*, pp. 91–98.
37 Quoted in Rondot, p. 66, the decree continued to be qouted by the Shiʿi "representatives" in their petitions to further the independence of their community vis-à-vis the Sunnis. An example is found in a long memo of Rashīd Bayḍūn to the High Commissioner in 1939, see MAE, Beyrouth, 456, Cabinet Politique, no. 9, delegate of the High Commissioner in the French Republique to Gabriel Puaux (High Commissioner 1939–1940), Beirut 22 March 1939, which includes no. 353, A Memo of the Deputy Rashīd Bayḍūn, Beirut, 6 January 1939.
38 Shuʿayb, *Maṭālib Jabal ʻAmil*, p. 98, the quotations from Rondot, p. 66.
39 MAE, Beyrouth, 456, Cabinet Politique, 1926–1941, no. 6, the French administrative consultant in South Lebanon to the French consultant in the Lebanese Government, 15 March 1940.
40 MAE, Beyrouth 456, Cabinet Politique, no. 51, Report on two Shiʿi meetings at Sidon and Kafr Rummān, 23 and 24 February 1933, unsigned *compte rendu*, Beirut, 1 March 1933.
41 *Al-Shuʿūbiyya* is a term used to denote non-Arab poets, writers and politicians (most of them Persians) who protested against Arab political and cultural dominance, notably during the ʻAbbasid Caliphate (750–1258).
42 See Shuʿayb, *Maṭālib Jabal ʻAmil*, pp. 100–104.
43 MAE, Beyouth, 456, Cabinet Politique, 1926–1941, no. 42, Report of the High Commission's department entitled *Les chiites, note*, Beirut (n.d.) (1933). The Shiʿi participants at the Jerusalem conference were Aḥmad Riḍā, Muḥammad al-Humānī and Sulaymān Ḍāhir; see Shuʿayb, *Maṭālib Jabal ʻAmil*, pp.107–108.
44 MAE, Beyrouth, 456, Cabinet Politique, 1926–1941, no. 51, Report on two Shiʿi meetings at Sidon and Kafr Rummān on 23 and 24 February 1933, unsigned *compte rendu*, Beirut, 1 March 1933.
45 In adddition to al-Amīn, Sharaf al-Dīn and Riḍā, the participants were ʻAbdalla and Muḥammad al-Ḥur, ʻAbd al-Ḥusayn and Ḥusayn Nūr al-Dīn, Mūsā and Muḥammad

‘Izzeddin, ‘Abd al-Karīm Ṣādiq, Muḥammad Amīn Shams al-Dīn, Ḥasan al-Ḥusaynī al-Mūsawī, Jawād Kawtharāanī, Muḥammad ‘Alī Qabalān, Sulaymāan Ḍāhir, Amīn al-Ḥusaynī and ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Zayn.

46 Among the nineteen *‘ulama* who participated at the Sidon meeting were Ḥusayn and ‘Abd al-Karīm Mughaniyya.

47 MAE, Beyrouth, 456 Cabinet Politique, 1926–1941, no.50, *Revendications de la Communauté Chiite*, sent by Riḍā Tāmir and signed by dozens of Shi‘i *‘ulama*. Shu‘ayb, *Maṭālib Jabal ‘Amil*, pp. 116–118, suspects that Riḍā Tāmir’s petition could not be the original one, quoting *al-Qabas* of 10 March 1933, which claimed that the resolutions of Sidon’s meeting concentrated only on the demands of the Shi‘is and did not refer to the territorial integrity of Lebanon. Archival documents show that two different petitions were sent to the French authorities, one by Tāmir and the other, which did not refer to the territorial issue but was signed by only 12 *‘ulama*, by ‘Usayrān and al-Faḍl.

48 See Shu‘ayb, *Maṭālib Jabal ‘Amil*, pp. 118. Text of the second petition in MAE, Beyrouth, 456 Cabinet Politique, 1926–1941, no. 51, Report on two Shi‘i meetings at Sidon and Kafr Rummān on 23 and 24, February, *compte rendu*, Beirut, 1 March 1933.

49 MAE, Beyrouth, 456 Cabinet Politique, 1926–1941, no. 51, Report on two Shi‘i meetings at Sidon and Kafr Rummān on 23 and 24, February, *compte rendu*, Beirut, 1 March 1933.

50 MAE, Beyrouth, 456, Cabinet Politique, no. 40, French translation of the petition of the Kafr Rummān meeting on 24 February 1933, Beirut 3 March 1933; see also the Arabic text in Shu‘ayb, *Maṭālib Jabal ‘Amil*, pp. 115–116.

51 MAE, Beyrouth, 456, Cabinet Politique, no.40.

52 *Al-Qabas*, 26 March 1933 and Lisān al-Ḥāl, 28 March 1933, quoted in Shu‘ayb, *Maṭālib Jabal ‘Amil*, pp. 119–120.

53 Ibid., pp. 120–121.

54 Personal information on Ḥasan al-Amīn in MAE, Beyrouth, 456, *Cabinet Politique*, no. 37, *Haut Commissairat, Note du commandant Pechkoff, chargé de mission au Liban Sud*, 29 December 1933.

55 Ibid.

56 See, e,g., the petitions and counter-petitions in MAE, Beyrouth, 456, Cabinet Politique, nos. 45 (23 November 1933), 44 (14 november 1933), 43 (14 December 1933) and 41 (14 December 1933). Pro-French elites did appear sufficiently concerned about the “propaganda” of the nationalists to send letters to the High Commissioner stressing the loyality of the Shi‘is to France and Greater Lebanon. In one of these letters, signed by Tawfiq al-Balāghī, the *imām* of Tyre, Ismā‘īl al-Khalīl, ‘Alī Mughanniyya, Fū’ād ‘Usayrān, and about twenty other chiefs, they claimed to “represent the whole community” and expressed their “attachment to our Lebanon under the French Mandate.” Arabic text of the letter, ibid.; no. 41, 14 December 1933.

57 MAE, Beyrouth. 456, Cabinet Politique, no.46, Arabic text of an “open letter from Niẓār Aḥmad ‘Arif al-Zayn to de Martel” (n.d.). Before sending on the letter, the French inspector of mail in the High Commmissioner’s Office commented that Nizār was the 25–year old son of *al-‘Irfān*’s editor, who apparently had himself penned the letter: MAE, Beyrouth, 456, Cabinet Politique, no. 45, 9 November 1933.

58 MAE, Beyrouth, 456, Cabinet Politique, no. 47, Petition of Muḥammad al-Bāqir to the High Commissioner, 5 November 1933.

59 MAE, Beyrouth, 456, Cabinet Politique, no. 40, *Extrait de presse*, Beirut, 21 December 1933.

60 Ibid.

61 MAE, Beyrouth, 456, Cabinet Politique, no. 39, Unsigned petition translated into French concerning public posts, Beirut, 20 December 1933.

62 MAE, Beyrouth 456, Caninet Politique, no. 36, petition translated into French and signed by more than fifty Shi‘i *‘ulama* and “representatives” of Shi‘i families, 1 March 1934; no. 35, Arabic text of petition signed by seven *‘ulama*, 13 April 1934.

63 MAE, Beyrouth, 456, Cabinet Politique, no. 33, Arabic text and French translation of a petition signed by 17 deputies and addressed to the High Commissioner, Beirut, 1 November 1935.
64 MAE, Beyrouth, 456, Cabinet Politique no. 54, names and number of office-holders of the Ḥaydar family, 21 February 1934, the same list of the names and numbers in no. 56, (n.d.).
65 MAE, Beyrouth, 456, Cabinet Politique, no. 21, Petition of Shi'i youth to the High Commissioner, No. 13876, 11 August 1937.
66 MAE, Beyrouth, 456, Cabinet Politique, no. 55, unsigned report (probably of the delegate of the High Commissioner to the Lebanese republic, 28 April 1934).
67 MAE, Beyrouth, 456, Cabinet Politique, no. 57, delegate of the High Commissioner to the Lebanese republic, no. 4391/D, Beirut 24 December 1935.
68 See Shu'ayb, *Maṭālib Jabal 'Amil*, pp. 136–137.
69 For more details on these activities and the names of people involved, see ibid., pp. 140–150
70 MAE, Beyrouth, 456, Cabinet Politique, 1926–1941, no. 30, High Commission's information, Beirut, 16 July 1936.
71 MAE, Beyrouth, 460, Cabinet Politique, 1926–194, no, 26, Arabic text of petition addressed to the High Commissioner by eight *'ulama*, among them Ḥusayn Mughanniyya, Amīn Shams al-Dīn, Muḥammad Amīn Shams al-Dīn, Amīn 'Alī al- Ḥusaynī, Ḥusayn Sharaf al-Dīn, 'Abd al- Ḥusayn Sharaf al-Dīn and others.
72 MAE, Beyrouth, 460, Cabinet Politique, no. 31, Meyrier to MAE, no. 824, Beirut, 21 August 1936.
73 Ibid.
74 MAE, Beyrouth, 460, Cabinet Politique, no. 29, High Commission's information, Beirut, no exact date (October 1936), including a translated extract from al-As'ad's manifesto.
75 MAE, Beyrouth, 460, Cabinet politique 1926–1941, no. 8, Report of the High Commissioner to MAE on the Chamber's session, Beirut, 26 November 1936
76 MAE, Beyrouth, 456, Cabinet Politique, 1926–1941, no.27, Ḥasan Ṣādiq to the High Commissioner, 8 December 1936.
77 MAE, Beyrouth, 456, Cabinet Politique, no. 23 the delegate of the High Commissioner to the Cabinet Politique, 22 April 1937. 'Usayrān's complaints in nos. 25 & 26, the High Commissioner's notes of 4 May 1937; quotations is from "note," no. 24, 20 May 1937.
78 MAE, Beyrouth, 456, Cabinet Politique, no. 28, Muḥammad al-Bāqir to the High Commissioner, 30 April 1937.
79 MAE, Beyrouth, 456, Cabinet Politique, no. 22, Muḥammad al-Bāqir to the High Commissioner (no exact date), May 1937.
80 'Awaḍ, pp. 229–231.
81 MAE, Beyrouth, 456, Cabinet Politique, 1926–1941, no. 21, Petition addressed to the High Commissioner by "the Shi'i Youth," no. 13876, 11 August 1937.
82 MAE, Beyrouth, 546, Cabinet Politique, no. 20, High Commissioner to Cabinet Politique, Beirut (n.d.).
83 MAE, Beyrouth, 546, Cabinet Politique, no. 19, Rashīd Bayḍūn to the High Commissioner, Beirut, 2 December 1937.
84 MAE, Beyrouth, 456, Cabinet Politique, no. 18, High Commissioner to MAE, no. 1154, Beirut 7 December 1937.
85 MAE, Beyrouth, 456, Cabinet Politique, No. 17, Sûreté Générale's information, no. 6769, Beirut, 15 December 1937.
86 MAE, Beyrouth, 456, Cabinet Politique, no. 11, High Commissioner to MAE, Beirut, 22 December 1937.
87 MAE, Beyrouth, 456, Cabinet Politique, no. 9, Petition signed by thirty six merchants to the High Commissioner, Beirut, 15 December 1937, and transmitted to MAE, Beirut, 15 January 1938.
88 MAE, Beyrouth, 456, Cabinet Politique, no. 14, Beirut, 16 December 1937, no. 13, Hermel, 17 December 1937; quotation from no. 12, Hermel, 18 December 1937.

89 MAE, Beyrouth, 456, Cabinet Politique, no. 15, Sûreté Générale's information no. 6797, Beirut, 16 December 1937.
90 MAE, Beyrouth, 456, Cabinet Politique, no. 12, French adviser of south Lebanon to the French delegate to the High Commissioner, Sidon, 24 December 1937.
91 Ibid.
92 On the economic stuation, see Murād, *al-Ḥaraka al-Waḥdawiyya*, p. 285.
93 MAE, Beyrouth, 460, Cabinet Politique, 1926–1941, no. 74, Report of delegate of the High Commissioner to the Lebanese republic on the nominations in the Biqā' during the first government of al-Aḥdab, no. 64/C.A.B., Zaḥla, 17 March 1937; nos. 75 and 76, Reports of the same on the new appointments in the administrations of Beirut, Sidon and Tripoli, 1, 3 and 4 March 1937.
94 See Rabbath, *La formation historique*, p. 422.
95 In 1937 when the Chamber's presidency was twice in the hands of Sunni *zu'ama*, the Maronite Patriarch indicated that this should not become a precedent; see Rondot, p. 88.
96 MAE, Beyrouth, 456, Cabinet Politique, 1926–1941, no. 8, Petition of Rashīd Bayḍūn to the High Commissioner, Beirut, 6 January 1939.
97 Ibid.
98 MAE, Beyrouth, 456, Cabinet Politique, no. 8, Sûreté Générale's information, no. 5419, 4 July 1939.
99 For more details and quotations, see Rondot, pp. 98–99.
100 Yūsuf al-Sawdā, "Bayna al-Waṭaniyya wal-Ṭā'ifiyya" (Between Nationalism and Confessionalism), *al-Ḥikma*, (Beirut, vol.5, no.9, July 1956), p. 4, quoted in Atiyah, "Attitude" pp.160–161.
101 MAE, Beyrouth, 785, Cabinet Politique, no. 4, Report of the National Democratic Conference held on 27 November 1938.
102 MAE, Beyrouth, 456, Cabinet Politique, 1926–1941, no. 10, administrative adviser in south Lebanon to the High Commissioner, No. 136, 3 April 1939.
103 MAE, Beyrouth, 456, Cabinet Politique, No. 73, Maximos Ṣāygh to Émile Eddé, 6 April 1937.
104 MAE, Beyrouth, 456, Cabinet Politique, no. 72, Maximos Ṣāygh to Emile Eddé, 27 May 1937.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 Several complaints by the Greek Orthodox "representatives" were accompanied by tables which illustrated the "unjust" repartition of the adminstrative posts among the communities. For example, the complaints of Elie Ṣāliby, the Greek Orthodox archbishop to the High Commissioner, included a table of the distribution of the officials in "*les divers directions publiques*," 20 June 1934; no. 82; Salīm Ḥadād to de Martel, 12 September 1934; no. 85, The Sûreté Générale reported that Saliby intervened to promote his friend, Jubrān Tuwaynī to the post of the state secretary, information no. 3362, 6 December 1935; other complaints of the Greek Orthodox "representatives" are found in ibid, nos. 87 to 93.
108 See the proposal of al-Khuri before the Chamber, Shu'ayb, *Tārīkh Lubnān*, p. 147.
109 For more details, see Longrigg, p. 294; Rabbath, *La formation historique*, pp. 423–424.
110 Ely E. Palmer, American consul to secretary of state, Beirut 29 September 1939, in Browne, vol. 2, pp. 254–255.

Chapter seven

1 Ely E. Palmer, American consul to the secretary of state, Beirut, 29 September 1939, in quoting the High Commission's press office; in Browne, vol. 2, p.257.

2 MAE, Beyrouth, 463, Cabinet Politique, no. 4, Maronite patriarchate to Puaux, Dimane (Lebanon), 22 September 1939.
3 MAE, Beyrouth, 463, no. 1, Puaux to MAE (n.d., end of September 1939), including the four petitions. The first was signed by professionals from several communities, such as Nāṣir ʻUsayrān, Shafīq and Farīd Talḥūq, Jamīl al-Shaʻār, Nāṣīf Barrāj, George Iskandar, Wadīʻ and Edmond Zakkūr; the second by Sunni *ʻulama*, the third and fourth by Sunni merchants.
4 On French and British diplomatic and military activities and their impact on Syria and Lebanon from June 1940 to April 1941, see Longrigg, pp. 293–305; al-Khuri, vol. 1, pp. 238–239; Rabbath, *La formation historique*, pp. 424–425.
5 See Longrigg, pp.305–309.
6 FO 371, E 2839/104/89, no. 33, Havard to FO, Beirut, 12 April 1941.
7 MAE, Beyrouth, 463, Cabinet Politique, Dossier Situation Politique 1940–1941, Sûreté Générale, informations, nos. 41 & 42, 3 April 1941, and nos. 39 & 40, 4 April 1941.
8 MAE, Beyrouth, 463, High Commission, Extract of a letter of Sûrete Générale, "Information," 4 April 1941; the original Arabic slogan would have been "*la badna la misio wala mister badna abuna Hitler*."
9 MAE, Beyrouth, 463, no. 37, Sûreté Générale's information, Beirut, 5 April 1941.
10 MAE, Beyrouth, 463, no. 42, Arbic text of a Leaflet of Muslim-Christian Youth, the Committee of Students, Beirut, 11 April 1941
11 MAE, Beyrouth, 463, nos. 35 and 36, 19 April 1941.
12 MAE, Beyrouth, 463, no. 34, Letter of Christian from al-Shūf (n.d., mid April 1941).
13 MAE, Beyrouth, 1266, no. 2, Schoffler to Puaux, 1 August 1940.
14 MAE, Beyrouth, 1266, no. 2, Pierre Bart, *Note sur la situation dans le chouf*, 31 July 1940.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 For a survey of the Druze elites' political activities, factionalism and the representation within the Lebanese institutions, see Bʻaynī, *Durūz*, pp. 243–268. Although Jamīl Talḥuq, Salīm Talḥuq and Nasīb al-Dāūd were able to make it into the Chambers of 1925–1929, 1929–1932 and 1937–1939, respectively, thanks to their close relations with the leaders of the two Druze factions, Junblāṭ and Arslān continued to monopolize Druze affairs. For example, under the leadership of sit Naẓīra, Ḥikmat and Rashīd Junblāṭ monopolized the representation of the Junblāṭi faction in the Lebanese institutions, while Sāmī, Fūʼād, Rafīq and Tawfīq and then, since 1931, the latter's son, Majīd Arslān monopolized the representation of the rival faction; ibid., pp. 255–256.
20 MAE, Beyrouth, 1266, no. 3, information of Services speciaux du Levant, Marjʻiyūn, 23 August 1940.
21 MAE, Beyrouth, 459, no. 4, information of French administrative consultant in Mt. Lebanon, 29 August 1940, including a leaflet (in French translation) "*L'histoire fera paraître le devoué à cette nation, Les arabes 'populaires' devoués, en action, ont seuls le droit de parler et d'éclairer les intelligences en ce qui concerne leur pays dans cette lutte historique*" (n.d.).
22 Ibid.
23 MAE, Beyrouth, 459, no. 5, information of the French adviser in Mt. Lebanon, 29 August 1940, including a French translation of the songs; allegedly the pro-German songs had bothered ʻAdil Arslān. Following the "incident" at Kafr Nabrakh, the Sûreté Générale (ibid, no. 6, information, no. 3831, 4 September 1940) accused Muṣṭafā Abu Ghānim, the *mukhtār* of the village, and his relative Fūʼād Abu Ghānim of having been involved in the pro-German songs, which was confirmed by the high commander of Troupes du Levant, (ibid, no. 7, no. 4515, 10 September 1940). But, finally the French adviser (ibid., no. 9, 28 September 1940) wrote to the High Commissioner that neither of the two Abu Ghānims had taken part in the demonstration and they were members of the PPS.

24 MAE, Beyrouth, 459, nos. 12 & 13, the French adviser to the delegate to the Lebanese republic, 24 and 31October 1940; it seems that Abu Ghānim was dismissed and replaced by Muḥammad ʿAlī Naṣr from the rival Abu Ghānim family, though, again, the French had no evidence that the former had been involved
25 MAE, Beyrouth, 459, no. 14, information of the French adviser in Mt. Lebanon, No. 2121, 5 November 1940.
26 MAE, Beyrouth, 459, no. 16, informations of Services speciaux du Levant, 3 & 4 January 1941; although providing first of all intelligence on the activities of Ḥamāda family in Ḥawran, these reports also indicated that, as in the food crisis of 1914–1918, Druzes from Lebanon had begun contacting their co-religionists in Ḥawran in order to guarantee their wheat supply.
27 MAE, Beyrouth, 463, Cabinet Politique, no. 31, information of the Lebanese *gendarmerie*, no. 245, 11 April 1941.
28 FO 371, E 2839/104/89, no. 33, Havard to FO, Beirut, 12 April 1941.
29 MAE, Beyrouth, 463, Cabinet Politique, dossier on the Druzes, no. 27, High Commission, 12 April 1941, French translation of an 11 April 1941 leaflet.
30 MAE, Beyrouth, 463, no. 33, Druze leaflet (translation) in Sûreté Générale, information, 15 April 1941.
31 MAE, Beyrouth, 463, no. 30, Arabic text of a petition signed by thirty five Druze notables, among them Majīd Arslān, Rshīd Ḥamāda, Yūsuf al-Najjār, Maḥmūd Ḥasan Talḥūq, Fū'ād Amīn ʿAbd al-Malik, Muḥammad Muṣṭafā al-ʿArīdī, Salmān Jābir, Ibrāhīm Shqayr, Manṣūr ʿAbd al-Ṣamad, Hasīb Salmān and Salīm Salmān, 17 April 1941; no. 28, petition signed by Hānī Bāz Raḍwān, Dāūd ʿAql, ʿAlī Muḥsin Jurdī, Hānī Masʿūd Raiys and others, 17 April 1941; no. 27, Ḥusayn Ḥamāda, Sheikh ʿAql of the Druzes to Dentz, 18 April 1941; no. 25., two petitions, the one was signed by ʿArif Shqayr, from Ḥammāna village, 21 April 1941, the second by ʿArif and Amīn al-Maṣrī, Amīn Qāsim al-ʿAwar and many others.
32 MAE, Beyrouth, 463, no. 24, Cabinet Politique, 21 April 1941.
33 MAE, Beyrouth, 463, no. 21, Sûreté Générale, information, 21 April 1941.
34 MAE, Beyrouth, 463, no. 20, Delegate of the High Commissioner to the Lebanese republic to the High Commissioner (n.d., probably 22 April 1941).
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 MAE, Beyrouth, 463, no. 22, information of Troupes du Levant, 21 April 1941.
38 MAE, Beyrouth, 463, no. 19, information of the Lebanese *gendarmerie*, and no. 18, information of Troupes du Levant, 21April 1941.
39 MAE, Beyrouth, 463, no. 16, Delegate of the High Commissioner to the Lebanese republic to the High Commissioner, 25 April 1941.
40 MAE, Beyrouth, 463, no. 13, information of Troupes du Levant, 22 April 1941.
41 MAE, Beyrouth, 463, no. 15, French adviser of Mt Lebanon to the High Commissioner, no. 60, 25 April 1941 and No. 14, information of Troupes du Levant, Bḥamdūn and Ḥammāna's zone, 26 April 1941.
42 MAE, Beyrouth, 463, no. 17, Sûreté Générale, information on local politics, 24 April 1941.
43 MAE, Beyrouth, 463, no. 26, Arabic text of a leaflet distributed in al-Shūf, 18 April 1941.
44 MAE, Beyrouth, 463, no. 10, translated text of complaint by Druzes from Qubayʿ addressed to the High Commissioner, 29 April 1941, and no. 9, Direction of Political Affairs to the High Commissioner, 7 May 1941.
45 MAE, Beyrouth, 463, no. 8, translated text of leaflet signed by Fahīm al-Khuri, ʿAlī Nāṣir al-Dīn, Qusṭanṭīn Yannī and Muḥammad ʿAlī Bayḍūn, 30 April 1941.
46 MAE, Beyrouth, 463, no. 7, Report of Troupes du Levant, Bḥamdūn and Ḥammāna's zone, 7 May 1941.
47 MAE, Beyrouth, 463, no. 4, information provided by the chief of the military hospital of Suq al-Gharb, 5 May 1941; no. 6, information of Troupes du Levant, Commander of Bayt al-Dīn's zone, 7 May 1941. In his information on the Druze armament, the commander

wrote "*des renseignements, plus ou moins tendancieux, peut être (Je ne puis le vérifier) font connaître, que les druzes s'arment. Les chretiens se lamentent et demandent qu'on les autorise à s'armer eux-même pour se défendre.*"

48 Ibid., no. 3, information, no. 478, 28 May 1941.

49 On British attempts to contact the Druzes at the end of May and the beginning of June see B'aynī, *Durūz*, pp. 313–314.

50 MAE, Beyrouth, 463, Cabinet Politique, no. 2, information, no. 922, 5 May 1941.

51 On the Druze legion, see Kais M. Firro, *A History of the Druzes* (Leiden 1992), pp. 312–313.

52 On the occupation of Syria and Lebanon by the British and Free France forces, see Longrigg, pp. 310–315.

53 Large part of the French text in Rabbath, *La formation historique*, p. 433; see also Longrigg, p. 310, and parts of the Arabic text in Murād, *al-Ḥaraka al-Waḥdawiyya*, p.287.

54 al-Khuri, vol. 1, p. 241.

55 See General G. Catroux, *Dans la Bataille de Méditerranée; Egypte, Levant, Afrique du Nord, 1940–4* (Paris 1949), p. 230,

56 For further details on the agreements between the Free French and the British and on promises of independence, see Rabbath, *La formation historique*, pp. 432–441.

57 US Consul Engert, telegram to secretary of state, 10 November 1941, in Browne, vol. 2, pp. 262–263.

58 Spears Private Papers, Box 2, file 4, Spears' Memorandum, 14 April 1954, pp. 2, 6–10.

59 US Consul Engert, telegram to secretary of state, no. 443, 9 November 1941, in Browne, vol. 2, p. 260.

60 Ibid.

61 US Consul Engert, telegram to secretary of state, no. 449, 13 November 1941 in Browne, vol. 2, pp. 264–5.

62 FO 371, 27367, E 6937/6937/89, War Office to FO, no. 17176, 25 October 1941.

63 FO 371, 27367, E 6949/6937/89, telegram from Lampson to FO, no. 3351, Cairo, 25 October 1941, including the text of telegram of Lampson to Spears, no. 314, 25 October 1941.

64 FO 371, 27367, E 7134/6937/89, Lampson's telegram to FO, no. 97, 2 November 1941.

65 On the pro-Arab position of Spears and the influence this had on the British policy, see Iris Fruchter, "Edward Spears: His Activities in Lebanon, 1941–1944" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Haifa, 1995), pp. 37–40.

66 FO 371, 27367, E 7201/6937/89, FO to Cairo, 3 November 1941.

67 FO 371, 27367, E 7262/6937/89, text of proclamation's draft, Lampson to FO, 5 November 1941; the full text of the proclamation as it was issued by Catroux on 26 November, in Rabbath, *La formation historique*, pp. 443–44.

68 FO 371, 27367, E 7263/6937/89, FO to Lampson, 7 November 1941.

69 Ibid., telegram from Cairo to Spears, no. 363, 5 November 1941.

70 This polemic and the arguments of the two opposite sides in FO 371, E/7330/6937/89, telegram, no. 372, Cairo to Beirut, 7 November 1941; E 7335/6937/89, Cairo to War Office, 9 November 1941; E 7336/6937/89, Major Watson (Spears Mission) to Caclia, 9 November 1941, including French text, "*Extrait de documents diplomatiques relatifs à la délimitation du Liban*," 8 November 1941; FO telegram to Cairo, no. 3899, 10 November 1941; E 7346/ 6937/89, Lampson's Telegram to FO, no. 3515, 9 November 1941, and others.

71 FO 371, 27368, E 7391/6937/89, Lampson to FO, no. 3569, 11 November 1941; E 7415/ 6937/89, Lampson to FO, 12 November 1941.

72 FO 371, 27368, E 7415/6937/89, FO to Mr. Dejean, 14 November 1941.

73 FO 371, 27368, E 7630/6937/89, Cairo to War Office, no. 27939, 19 November 1941; FO 371, 27369, E 7719/6937/89, Cairo to War Office, 22 November 1941; E7737/6937/ 89, Cairo to War Office, 23 November 1941

74 FO 371, E 7810/6937/89, Spears to Cairo, no. 487, 26 November 1941.
75 Ibid.
76 FO 371, E 7910/6937/89, Lampson to FO, no. 3760, 29 November 1941.
77 US Consul Engert, telegram to secretary of state, no. 468, 27 November 1941.
78 FO 371, 27369, E 6002/6937/89, Lampson to FO, no. 3807, 3 December 1941.
79 FO 371, 31465, E 877/28/89, Hopkinson to Eastern Department, no. S8/41, 13 December 1941, including a letter of a group [25] of Lebanese notables to the British prime minister.
80 The full text of "Resolutions adopted by Various Lebanese Delegations at Bkirki, 25 December 1941," in Browne, vol. 2, p.280.
81 al-Khuri, vol. 1, p.242.
82 FO 371, 31465, E 28/28/89, Lampson to FO, 1 January 1942.
83 US Consul Engert to secretary of state, Beirut 30 January 1942, in Browne, vol. 2, p. 278.
84 Same to same, no. 269, Beirut 30 January 1942, in Browne, vol. 2, p. 274; FO 371, 31465, E 592/206/89, Hopkinson to Estern Department, 13 January 1942.
85 MAE, Beyrouth, 456, Cabinet Politique, 1926–1941, no. 5, French administrative adviser in the Biqā' to the French delegate to the Lebanese republic, no. 158/C.A.B, Zaḥla, 4 March 1940; no, 6, French administrative adviser in south Lebanon to the French adviser of the secretary of the Lebanese republic, Sidon, 15 March 1940.
86 Ibid, Beyrouth 785, recommendation of Antoine 'Arīḍa, 18 October 1941.
87 Ibid., Arabic text of petition adressed to Catroux and signed by seventeen *'ulama* representing the families of Ibrāhīm, Faḥs, Ni'me, Kawtharānī, Salmān, Ṣafiy al-Dīn, Mughanniyya, 'Usaylī, Nūr al-Dīn, Shams al-Dīn, Ḥusaynī, Basma, Shūr and Ṣāygh, [end of] October 1941.
88 Ibid., Petitions adressed to Catroux no.6, 25 November 1941; no. 7, 23 November 1941; no. 8, 14 November 1941; no. 9, 10 November 1941; no. 11, 31 October 1941.
89 Aḥmad al-Dā'ūq had finished his "consultations" that were to lead to the formation of this Cabinet on 28 November.
90 Ibid., no. 5, Ismā'il 'Izzeddīn on behalf of the Shi'i youth to Catroux, 1 December 1941.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid., no. 13, Ḥabīib Pasha al-Sa'd to Catroux, 21 October 1941.
93 For example, ibid., no. 15, Patriarch of the Greek Orthodox Church to Catroux, 18 October; no. 12, Kāmil Ḥamiyya, a Druze ex-government official, to Catroux (n.d).
94 FO 371, 27369, E 8316/6937/89, Minister of State (Cairo) to FO, no. S8/138/41, 4 December 1941, including Spears' report, 2 December 1941, with his personal comments on each of the members of the Cabinet, viz., Aḥmad al-Dā'ūq (Sunni from Beirut), Philipe Najīb Bulus (Greek Orthodox from Tripoli), Aḥmad al-Ḥusaynī (Shi'i from Biqā'), Ḥamīd Franjiyya (Maronite from Ihdin, North Mt. Lebanon), Amīn al-Sa'd (Maronite from Mt. Lebanon), Wāṣif 'Izzeddīn (Sunni from Tripoli), Ḥikmat Junblāṭ (Druze, a nephew of Sit Naẓīra), Rāmiz Sarkīs (Protestant from Beirut, owner of the newspaper *Lisān al-Ḥāl*), Alfred Skāf (Greek Catholic from Zaḥla), and Aḥmad al-As'ad (Shi'i from Jabal 'Amil).
95 FO 371, 31471, E 1354/207/89, Cairo to FO, no. 142, 27 February 1942. In September 1941 Spears wrote "We [the British and the Free French] were confronted at once with the great difficulty of supplying the native population with food. They were on the verge of starvation. Shipping was our greatest difficulty but nevertheless we had to import 80,000 tons of wheat and flour within the first year of our occupation." The way of the supply and the treatment of the producers, brokers and merchants of corn and wheat became a controversial issue between the French and the British authorities in the Levant until their agreement, on 23 May 1942, to establish the "Office des Céréales Panifiables" which monopolized the supply and the distribution of wheat. According to Spears, Franco-British coordination "with the full co-operation of the native governments" achieved a satisfactory result "in spite of greatest difficulties"; from Spears Private Papers, Box, 2, File 4, Sepears Memorandum, 14 April 1954, pp. 11. On the wheat crisis, see also ibid., Box 4, File 1, Spears Memorandum, 21 June 1943, p. 1; Edward Spears, *Fulfillment of a Mission: The*

Spears Mission to Syria and Lebanon, 1941–1944 (London, 1977), pp. 177–190.
96 FO 371, 31471, E, 1369/207/89, Spears to Minister of State in Cairo, no. 680, Beirut 26 February 1942.
97 Ibid.
98 MAE, Beyrouth, 785, Cabinet Politique, no. 23, Sûreté Générale, information, no. 363, 27 March 1942.
99 Ibid., no. 21, Sûreté Générale, information, 30 March 1942.
100 Ibid, no. 22, Sûreté Générale, information, 31 March 1942, and no. 24, "Note", 31 March 1942.
101 Ibid, no. 20, Délégation générale of Free France, information, 2 April 1942
102 Spears Private Papers, Box 2, File 6, "Note on conversation with General de Gaulle," 11 March 1942.
103 US Consul Engert, telegram to secretary of state, 15 April 1942, in Browne, vol.2, p. 298.
104 US Consul Engert, telegram to secretary of state, 21 April 1942, in Browne, vol. 2, pp. 305–306.
105 Despatch of Paul Alling, from the division of Near East Affairs in department of state, 22 April 1942, in Browne, vol. 2, p. 307.
106 US Consul Engert, telegram to secretary of state, 29 April 1942, in Browne, vol. 2, p. 315.
107 Ibid.; see also Matthews, telegram to secretary of state, London, 23 April 1942 in Browne, vol. 2, pp. 314–315.
108 Spears estimates that the controversy between Patriarch ʿArīḍa and Naqqāsh stemmed from the "age-long rivalries between Maronites and Jesuits, President Naccashe being a disciple of the latter," Spears to Engert, 28 April 1942, in Browne, vol. 2, pp. 324.
109 In March 1942, Eddé, Ḥabīb Abu Shahla and Gabriel Khabbāz tried to set up a political party that aimed to maintain the complete separation between Lebanon and Syria; see Shuʿayb, *Tārīkh lubnān*, p. 174.
110 See the full text of the Memorandum of the Muslim bloc to the president of the Lebanese republic, 20 July 1942, annex no. 3, in ibid, pp. 266–274.
111 FO 371, 31473, no. 14, Spears to FO, 16 May 1942.
112 FO 371, 31473, E 3920/207/89, Cairo to FO, no. 940, 30 June 1942.
113 FO 371, 3143, E3977/207/89, Spears to FO, no. 276, 1 July 1942.
114 FO 371, 31474, E 42147/207/89, Spears to FO, no. 323, 15 July 1942.
115 FO 371, 31474, E 4277/207/89, Spears to FO, no. 329, 16 July 1942; E 4285/207/89, Spears to FO, no. 333, 18 July 1942; E 4378/ 207/89, Spears to FO, no. 348, 22 July 1942.
116 MAE, Beyrouth, 1266, no. 9, Sûreté Générale, information, 11 July 1942.
117 Ibid, no. 11, Sûrete Générale, information, 11 July 1942.
118 FO 371, 31474, E 4441/207/89, Spears to FO, no. 357, 25 July 1942; see also E 4447/ 207/89, Spears to FO, nos. 358 and 359, 26 July 1942. On 27 July, Spears reported that Naqqāsh had "sent the ex-Minister of Justice to see me late this evening with the list of the proposed new Cabinet … 'if we had no objection'. I replied that I was sorry, but that I could make no comment … Our position was reserved … the list is at first sight unsatisfactory and includes only one man of proved competence"; E 4465/207/89, Spears to FO, no. 365, 27 July 1942.
119 FO 371, 31474, E 4477/207/89, Spears to Cairo, no. 367, 28 July 1942.
120 MAE, Beyrouth, 1266, no. 12 Sûrete Générale, information, 26 July 1942.
121 FO 371, 31474, E 4477/ 207/89, Spears to Cairo, no. 368, 28 July 1942.
122 MAE, Beyrouth, 1266, no. 8, Sûrete Générale, information 20 July 1942.
123 Ibid., no. 7, Sûreté Générale, information, 27 July 1942.
124 Ibid., no. 5, Sûreté Générale, information, 31 July 1942.
125 Ibid., no. 2, Sûreté Générale, information, 19 January 1943.
126 Ibid., no. 4, Bulletin d'information special, no. 1202 (source: Sûreté Générale), 8 August 1942.

127 FO 371, 31474, E 4641/207/89, Spears to FO, no. 384, 5 August 1942.
128 FO 371, 31474, E 4866/207/89, Spears to FO, no. 414, 18 August 1942; on De Gaulle's visit to Lebanon and his position vis-à-vis the independence of Syria and Lebanon, see the US Consulate's reports in Browne, vol. 2, pp. 352–360.
129 FO 371, 31474, E 4800/207/89, Spears to FO, no. 415, 19 August 1942.
130 See al-Khuri, vol. 1, pp. 248–250.
131 See Rabbath, *La formation historique*, pp. 451–452; Shu'ayb, *Tārīkh Lubnān*, pp. 181–183.
132 FO 371, 35175, E 1273/27/89, Spears to FO, no. 5, 10 February 1943.

Conclusions

1 FO 371, 35176, E 1602/27/89, Spears to FO, no. 198, Beirut, 19 March 1943.
2 Radio broadcasts played an important role in the propaganda war of both the Allies and the Germans; see al-Riyāshī, *Qabala wa-Ba'd*, pp. 236–239.
3 FO 371, 35176, E 2234/27/89, Spears to FO, no. 20, Beirut, 1 April 1943.
4 On the constitution and the 1943 amendments, see Juḥā, *al-Dustūr al-Lubnānī*, pp. 45–46, 50, 56–57.
5 FO 371, 35177, E 2642/27/89, Spears to FO, no. 284, Beirut, 5 May 1943.
6 FO 371, 35177, E 2798/27/89, Spears to FO, no. 291, Beirut, 12 May 1943.
7 FO 371, 35177, E 3102/27/89, Spears to FO, no. 309, Beirut, 26 May 1943.
8 al-Riyāshī, *Rū'asā'*, p. 94
9 FO 371, 35177, E 3651/27/89, M. Lascelles to FO, no. 363, Beirut, 24 June 1943;
10 See Shu'ayb, *Tārīkh Lubnān*, p. 185.
11 FO 371, 35177, E 3651/27/89, M. Lascelles to FO, no. 363, Beirut, 24 June 1943.
12 See Atiyah, "Attitude", pp. 168–169, Shu'ayb, *Tārīkh Lubnān*, pp. 185–189. According to Muḥammad Bayhum, *al-Naza'āt al-Siyāsiyya*, pp. 59–60, the congress was held on 21 June; see also Murād, *al-Ḥaraka al-Waḥdawiyya*, p. 296. While Atiyah's sources seem to indicate that the congress was exclusively Sunni, Murād relies on Bayhum who claims that participants came from all the Muslim sects.
13 FO 371, 35177. E 3651/27/89, M. Lascelles to FO, no. 363, Beirut, 24 June 1943.
14 FO 371, 35177, E 3692/27/89, M. Lascelles to FO, no. 369, Beirut, 24 June 1943.
15 FO 371, 35178, E 3702/27/89, M. Lascelles to FO, no. 370, Beirut, 26 June 1943.
16 FO 371, 35178, E 3737/27/89, M. Lascelles to FO, no. 373, Beirut, 28 June 1943.
17 FO 371, 35178, E 3779/27/89, M. Lascelles to FO, no. 383, Beirut, 30 June 1943.
18 FO 371, 35178, E 3957/27/89, M. Lascelles to FO, no. 396, Beirut, 7 July 1943.
19 FO 371, 35178, E 3785/27/89, M. Lascelles to FO, no. 379, Beirut, 29 June 1943.
20 FO 371, 35178, E 4029/27/89. M. Lascelles to FO, no. 410, Beirut, 11 July 1943.
21 FO 371, 35179, E 4166/27/89, M. Lascelles to FO, no. 411, Beirut, 17 July 1943.
22 Ibid ; see also Wadsworth to the secretary of state, nos. 229 and 234, Beirut, 16 and 21 July 1943, in Browne, vol. 2, pp.391–395.
23 Ibid., p. 395; FO 371, 35179, E 4263/27/89, M. Lascelles to FO, no. 420, Beirut, 21 July 1943.
24 Wadsworth to secretary of state, no. 243, Beirut, 2 august 1943, in Browne, vol. 2, pp. 402–403; FO 371, 35179, E 4611/27/89, Spears to FO, no. 442, Beirut, 4 August 1943.
25 Ibid.
26 Wadsorth to secretary of state, no. 243, Beirut, 2 August 1943, in Browne, vol. 2, p. 403
27 FO 371, 35180, E 4779/27/89, Spears to FO, no. 452, Beirut, 6 August 1943.
28 See the patriarch's justification in Shu'ayb, *Tārīkh Lubnān*, p. 192.
29 FO 371, 35180, E 4779/27/89, Spears to FO, no. 452, Beirut, 12 August 1943.
30 MAE, Beyrouth 1270, Cabinet Politique, Sûreté Générale, information, no. 8, Beirut 19 August 1943.
31 MAE, Beyrouth 1270, Cabinet Politique, Sûreté Générale, information, no. 22, Beirut, 25

June 1943; no. 15, Beirut 21 August 1943.

32 FO 371, 35180, E 4779/27/89, spears to FO, no. 452, Beirut, 12 August 1943. In April Rashīd Muqaddam had been captured by British forces on suspicion of drugs smuggling to Egypt and across the Turkish border. Despite the pressure by Spears on the French to deal with Muqaddam as a criminal, he was released and he then presented his candidacy in the elections. To try to put further pressure on the French, British security mission personnel had gone to the house of Rashīd Muqaddam to arrest him, his son, Nāfidh and his uncle ʻUmar, and to suspend the *muḥafiẓ* (the local governor) and chief of police.

33 FO 371, 35180, E 4900/27/89, Spears to FO, no.459, Beirut, 18 August 1943.

34 Spears Papers, Box 3, file 4, Memorandum on the Lebanese Elections (probably November 1943)

35 Spears Papers, Box 2, file 4, Memorandum, 14 April 1954, p. 13.

36 FO 371, 35180, E 4974/27/89, Spears to FO, no. 467, Beirut, 23 August, 1943; E 5070/27/89, Spears to FO, no. 270, 26 August 1943, E 5092/27/89, Spears to FO, no. 478, Beirut, 26 August, 1943; E 5107/27/89, Spears to FO, no. 485, Beirut, 27 August 1943; E 5119/27/89, Lascelles to FO, no. 479, Beirut 26 August 1943; E 5120/27/89, Spears to FO, no. 482, Beirut 26 August 1943; E 5126/27/89, Spears to FO, no. 484, Beirut 27 August 1943.

37 MAE, Beyrouth 1270, Cabinet Politique, Sûreté Générale, information, no. 3, Beirut 28 August 1943; no. 4, 28 August 1943.

38 FO 371, 35180, E 5130/27/89, Spears to FO, no. 488, Beirut, 28 August 1943.

39 MAE, Beyrouth, 1270, Cabinet Politique, Sûreté Générale, information, no. 9, Beirut, 22 February 1943.

40 MAE, Beyrouth 1266, Cabinet Politique, "*Note pour un projet d'action dans les quartiers musulmans*," no. 1, Beirut (n.d); this "Note" and other reports on *qabadayāt* are significant, too, for the information they contain on the nature of patron-client relationships.

41 See Rabbath, La formation historique, pp. 518–524. For a summary of the Lebanese historiography on the National Pact, see Shʻuayb, *Tārīkh Lubnān*, pp. 227–231; Farid el-Khazen, *The Communal Pact of National Identities*, p.18.

42 al-Khuri, vol. 1, pp.263–265

43 FO 371, 35182, E 5596/27/89, Spears to FO, no. 525, Beirut, 17 September 1843.

44 MAE, Beyrouth, 1270, Cabinet Politique, administrative adviser to ambassador of France (*délégué général*), no. 37, Beirut, 28 August 1943.

45 MAE, Beyrouth, 1270, Cabinet Politique, French *délégué* to the Lebanese republic to *délégué général*, no. Beirut, 26 May 1943; no. 27, Beirut, 17 April 1943; see also the informations of the Sûreté Générale, in information no. 25, Beirut, 7 May 1943, and no. 24, Beirut, 13 May 1943.

46 MAE, Beyrouth, 1270, Cabinet Politique, French *délégué* to the Lebanese republic to *délégué général*, no. 22, Beirut, 25 June 1943.

47 FO 371, 35180, E 4900/27/89, Spears to FO, no. 459, Beirut, 18 August 1943

48 See al-Ṣulḥ's Ministerial Declaration of Policy, 7 October 1943, in Y′suf Quzmā Khuri, vol. 1, pp. 92–102.

49 FO 371, 35182, E 5743/27/89, Spears to FO, no. 539, Beirut, 24 September 1943.

50 For the Lebanese official version on the history of Lebanon's flag, see A. Yammīn Muḥsin, *Lubnān al-Ṣūra*, (Beirut 1994), pp. 46–52.

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